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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is an attempt to relate an epis-
temological theory, imagism, to the philosophies of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume, Imagism is a theory of thought which 
may be discussed from the point of view of two separate but 
related contentions. The first, which may be called the 
polemical side of the doctrine, maintains that the primary 
and basic symbols, used in thought are images, mainly but 
not exclusively visual images. Other symbols used, including 
words, according to this side of the doct.rine, must be cash-
able in terms of images. The second contention, which may 
be called the constructive version of imagism, tries to show 
that image-thinking forms a not inconsiderable part of thought 
and that such image-thinking has been neglected in most 
accounts of thought, In general the effort in this investi-
gation will be to determine the degree to which either one 
or both sides of this doctrine appears in Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume, either explicitly as a doctrine of imagination or 
implicitly by their mode of argumentation. In general 
imagism appears in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume primarily in 
the defense of empiricism which all three thinkers undertake 
in one way or another. 
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To accomplish the task of showing the close relation 
of imagism to empiricism in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume a num-
ber of subsidiary themes are introduced. The two principal 
subsidiary themes are a treatment of nominalism designed to 
permit discussion of universals and abstract general ideas 
on the semantical plane rather than on the ontological and a 
treatment of the psychology of the image process. A number 
of relevant psychological observations have been made since 
the time of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume which in some cases 
permit more adequate assessment of their arguments than has 
been customary in philosophical accounts of their work. 
In general there has been almost a conspiracy of 
silence in the literature on the subject of imagism. Except 
for the names mentioned in this introduction--whose work will 
be commented upon in the course of the separate chapters--
almost everyone in the twentieth century has tended either to 
deny flatly the role of images in thinking or to pass the 
whole matter of the role of images in thinking by without 
comment. Three names, however, may be singled out as having 
written from time to time from a point of view closely 
affiliated with that of this investigation. These three 
philosophers are Price, Russell, and Blanshard. Price.coined 
the term 'imagism• in the sense in which the term is used in 
this investigation, and his development or the theory is 
taken as the point of departure. Russell has advanced 
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arguments in several writings which may be taken to represent 
an up-to-date defense of certain theses maintained by Berkeley 
and Hume. These writings of Russell's are thus of consider-
able value in formulating the problems of this investigation. 
Lastly, Blanshard has criticized incisively the imagism of 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Blanshard 1s critique will not be 
dealt with directly until the final chapter. In the develop-
ment of the subsidiary theme of nominalism, various writings 
of Quine have been employed, Among psychologists the writings 
of Boring and Titchener have proved of greatest value. 
In Chapter One the doctrine of imagism is given an 
exposition, and in a preliminary way it is shown that the doc-
trine is applicable to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In the 
second chapter the psychology of the image process is dis-
cussed. In the third chapter the imagistic tendencies in 
Locke are shown in his defense of empiricism. To accomplish 
this task, certain other doctrines are discussed--sensational-
ism, subjectivism, and compositionalism. In the fourth and 
fifth chapters, imagism is related to empiricism in Berkeley 
and Hume respectively. In these chapters other subsidiary 
themes relevant to Berkeley and Hume are introduced. Finally, 
in the sixth chapter conclusions are drawn. 
The method of this dissertation is on the whole a-
historical, i.e. the order and relation of topics is dictated 
by their logical significance to the development of the main 
themes rather than by a chronological or historical order. 
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Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are treated in the separate chapters 
in historical order, but again within the chapters the arrange-
ment of the material discussedis dictated by considerations 
concerning imagism rather than in terms of a possible develop-
ment of the views of the men. The method is fundamentally one 
of critical examination of the relevant texts of each of the 
men, using in each case whatever logical and psychological 
results are germane. 
The sources for this investigation may be divided into 
two classes. The primary sources are the writings of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume. The secondary sources may be subdivided 
into two categories, although to some degree these categories 
overlap. In the first place, an important secondary source is 
the books written primarily about Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
Secondly, logical, psychological, and epistemological writings 
frequently have a bearing on imagism in Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume. Conclusions established in such writings were not 
primarily written up with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume directly 
in mind, but nonetheless use may be made of such results in 
this investigation. Illustrations of results that may be 
usefully applied are recent logical researches into the 
nature of nominalism, and results in experimental psychology 
designed primarily to test results other than the conclusions 
of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, e.g. the discussion of image-
less thought. 
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There are two reasons why this .investigation is of 
value. It has not been sufficiently recognized that the 
role of image-thinking in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume was of 
profound moment to their philosophies. Secondly, certain 
probable inferences can be drawn concerning the dead-end 
that is reached in epistemological speculation along the 
line taken at certain points by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN EXPOSITION OF IMAGISM 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In Sec-
tion One two views are discussed which purport to analyze 
the basic empirical fact that change occurs. These two 
views are here called the Philosophy of Universals and the 
Philosophy of Resemblances. They are given a contemporary 
formulation which will prove useful as a point of reference 
in later chapters discussing Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. In 
Section Two the polemical version of imagism, that images are 
the primary symbols in thinking and that all other symbols 
are secondary, is discussed and reasons are suggested for 
maintaining that this doctrine is ultimately unsatisfactory. 
In Section Three the constructive version of imagism is dis-
cussed, viz. the doctrine that images play an important and 
frequently neglected role in thinking. In Section Four some 
texts are cited and commented upon briefly which would appear 
to demonstrate thatimagism is a useful theory in understand-
ing the views of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
1. Universals and Resemblances 
There occur in the world many instances of repeti-
tion or reoccurrence. Particulars, taking particulars to 
-1-
include both things and complexes of things, resemble each 
other in many or few respects and to a greater or less 
degree. This repetition is perhaps the most obvious and 
pervasive feature of our experience of the world, It makes 
conceptual cognition possible, for without it nothing would 
be recognizable, but would only be experienced. There are 
two theories of both historical and contemporary interest 
2 
that have been offered to explain this repetition. These 
theories have recently been called The Philosophy of Resem-
1 blances and The Philosophy of Universals, The Philosophy of 
Resemblances is by far the more important for the purposes of 
this investigation because in one or more of its variant 
forms it was held by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume and forms part 
and parcel of their imagism. The Philosophy of Universals 
can be more briefly dealt with since this discussion will 
have occasion to discuss it only insofar as the classical 
British empiricists2 rejected it. It will be well, however, 
1H. H. Price, Thinkin~ and Experience (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1953), Cap, 1 and passim, In discussing 
these theories the names of the theories will be capitalized 
to indicate that it is Price's version that is under discus-
sion. 
In Chapter 1 Price discusses these two theories from 
the ontological standpoint and in later chapters they make 
appearances discussed from the epistemological standpoint. 
There will be occasion to make frequent references to 
Price's standpoint throughout this dissertation since he, 
among contemporary writers, has dealt most fully with imagism, 
the principal problem with which this dissertation is concerned, 
2In this dissertation the term 'classical British 
empiricism' will be reserved for Locke, Berkeley, and Hume and 
to have a fairly simple and clear-cut version of the theory 
at hand for purposes of comparison, criticism, and discus-
sion. 
The Philosophy of Universals, or the Aristotelian 
1 doctrine of universalia in rebus, as expounded by Price, 
3 
begins by classifying the recurrent features of the world 
into qualities and relations. A quality, according to Price, 
is a "recurrent feature of the world which presents itself in 
individual objects or events taken singly." Examples of 
qualities are such occurrences as redness, bulginess and 
squeakiness. Relations, on the other hand, present themselves 
"in complexes of objects or events such as this beside that, 
this preceding that, orB between A and c."2 Price is not 
attempting an exhaustive analysis of the irreducible features 
of experience. There may be other features such as causality 
which are irreducible, but for the purposes he has in mind 
such a possibility need not be explored. 
Qualities and relations as they occur in experience 
taken together may be called universals or characteristics. 
this only for variation in terminology. The term 'classical' 
here could easily be extended to Bentham, James Mill, John 
Stuart Mill, and even to Bain and Spencer, but, since these 
men are not objects of study, the term will not be so used. 
1Price particularly avoids discussion of the platonic 
ante-rem version, feeling it is difficult enough to convince 
anyone today that the milder Aristotelian version has any use-
fulness. 
2Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 8. 
These universals or characteristics are in some sense cons-
trued as entities or things which are instantiated by 
particulars. One and the same particular may instantiate 
several universals, say whiteness or roundness, and the same 
universal, again whiteness or roundness, may instantiate 
several particulars. As an ontological doctrine it offers a 
simple analysis of change. A thing which changes, say an 
apple going from green to red, at one time instantiates one 
universal and later another universal. 
One objection to this doctrine has always been that 
4 
it is misleading. A universal may be easily construed as a 
sort of entity above and beyond the objects, events and situa-
tions in which it occurs. Price tries to remove the sting 
from this objection by the following considerations. In the 
first place, it is common in discussing the doctrine to make 
such statements as: 
(1) Universals are in things. 
The immediate question that is asked, however, is what is the 
meaning of the 'in' in (1)? It is clearly different from the 
following case. 
1 (2) The key is in the lock. 
1The kind of objection Price is here countering is 
found in Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind (New York: Barnes and 
Noble, 1949), pp. 37ff., though Ryle is not mentioned by 
Price by name in this connection. Ryle discusses the meaning 
of the phrase 'a tune running in my head', and contrasts it 
with the kind of noise a doctor might hear with a stethoscope. 
One of Ryle 1s major contentions is that philosophers have cor-
rupted ordinary language with alien metaphors. This central 
5 
It may be preferable to use an expression such as the follow-
ing. 
(3) The particular has the universal. 
Even this, however, may mislead the literal-minded. 
Another suggestion of Price's is to adopt the termi~ 
nology of characteristics rather than that of universals. A 
characteristic, in the ordinary manner of speaking, is a 
characteristic of something. According to Price, the termi-
nology of characteristics has as its logical analogue not a 
single letter, such as '¢' or 'R', which could be mistaken 
for an entity, but '¢x' or 1xRy 1 , a propositional function 
which is overtly incomplete. Using the terminology of charac-
teristics, one cannot mistake the expression 'characteristic 
of' as an expression which is supposed to be complete any 
more than one can think of •¢x' as complete where 'x' stands 
for an unspecified object. 
There is a well-known difficulty in the Philosophy of 
Universals more serious than the fact that the 'in' in (1) 
may be misleading. This difficulty Price calls that of 
"inexact resemblances." Discussion of this difficulty will 
serve two purposes: in the first place, it will prepare the 
way for discussion of The Philosophy of Resemblances; and 
secondly, by suggesting the answer given to this objection, 
contention of Ryle's will be treated below. Price contends, 
and it would seem he has made his case, that in many--perhaps 
not all--cases, no one is misled by this sort of thing unless 
he wants to be misled. 
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it will help to indicate that, for Price at least, there is 
nothing conclusive on the ontological side to be said against 
either The Philosophy of Universals or The Philosophy of 
Resemblances. 
Following Price, one may distinguish between exact 
resemblance in one or more respects, and total or complete 
resemblance. Resemblance has two dimensions of variation, 
intensity and extent. If one were to take a blank piece of 
white paper and cut it into two roughly equal pieces, the 
likeness between the two resultant pieces would presumably 
have a maximum degree of intensity. In such cases it would 
be natural to say that the two pieces are indistinguishable 
in color. Within a single expanse, e.g. the sky, further-
more, one may find a monotony or uniformity throughout. 
Total or complete resemblance, resemblance in extent, however, 
is an ideal limit never encountered in experience. If two 
things, ~impossible, were alike, in all respects inClud-
ing dates and boundaries, then there would no longer be two 
1 objects, but one. The concern here is with the first of 
these senses of resemblance, intensity of resemblance, or 
resemblance in one or more respects. It is not necessary to 
discuss whether or not objects may properly be said exactly 
to resemble one another; the following argument requires 
1It is not necessary to discuss further at this point 
Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles as it 
does not make a further appearance in Price's book. 
only close resemblance. If two objects do resemble one 
another, according to the logic of The Philosophy of Univer-
sals, with its universals instantiated by particulars, this 
resemblance should always be exact. The Philosophy of Uni-
versals seems to allow no place for inexact resemblances. 
Resemblances among things given in experience, however, are 
just of this inexact sort; things form a continuum in the 
degree to which they may be said, for example, to be white. 
In Price's words, in The Philosophy of Universals, "resem-
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blance is treated as if it were degreeless, either present in 
its maximum degree or else not present at all.J Resemblance. 
in The Philosophy of Universals is treated as derivative. 
According to the Philosophy of Resemblances, which will be 
treated shortly, the situation is reversed. It is resemblance 
which is treated as primary and characterization which is 
derivative. 
Price's answer to this objection has as its first 
step use of the distinction between determinable and deter-
minate characteristics.2 In describing the Philosophy of 
Universals the terminology of universal and particulars is 
frequent. A universal functions adjectivally in that it 
characterizes a particular. One function of a particular is 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 17. 
2The distinction was introduced by William E. Johnson, 
Logic (3 parts; London: Cambridge University Press, n.d.), 
part 1. 
to be characterized by a universal. It is in discussing ad-
jectives and adjectival uses of language that Johnson intro-
duces the distinction between a determinable and a determin-
ate. He writes as follows: 
Adjectives are fundamentally distinguishable into 
determinables and determinates, the relation between 
which is primarily a matter of degree, a determinable 
being the extreme of indeterminateness under which 
adjectives of different degrees of determinateness 
are subsumed. 1 
8 
As an illustration one may consider the relation of blue to 
colored. The characteristic of being colored is a determin-
able; the characteristic of being a particular shade of blue, 
the absolutely specific shade that may characterize a flower, 
for example, is a determinate. Under a particular determin-
able, colored, there may be sub-determinables, various shades 
of blue. Using such a terminology one would then go on to 
say that to be a particular (noun) is quite different from 
being a determinate (an adjective). It is determinates 
1Johnson, Ltgif, part 1, xxxv. Johnson's work is a 
detailed developmen o logic from the Aristotelian point of 
view. The sentences immediately following the quoted 
passages are: 
"The relation of a determinate to its determinable resem-
bles that of an individual to a class, but differs in 
some important respects. For instance, taking any given 
determinate, there is only one determinable to which it 
can belong. Moreover any one determinable is a literal 
summum genus not subsumable under any higher genus; and 
the absolute determinate is a literal infima species 
under which no other determinate is subsumable. 
Johnson, Logic, part 1, xxxv. Johnson, however, will not be 
followed In fils distinction between determinable and deter-
minate and the class calculus. This distinction is of no 
particular value for this investigation, and would appear to 
require a somewhat extended justification if used. 
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(adjectives) which recur and not particulars (nouns). The 
essential point of this distinction for the purposes to 
which it will be put in this investigation could be restated 
in terms of the class calculus. Using this terminology, 
there are classes corresponding to determinables, sub-classes 
corresponding to sub-determinables, and unit classes correa-
l pending to determinates. In general, however, Johnson's 
terminology will be employed, but the proviso is required 
that his terminology is redefined to bring it into line with 
the calculus or classes.2 
Applying this distinction to the difficulty of inexact 
resemblances, one can say that when two objects resemble one 
another the same determinable characterizes them although not 
the same determinate. The difficulty over inexact resemblances 
is thus answered by drawing the distinction between determin-
ate and determinable. Various degrees of inexactness can be 
derived from the notion of various determinates subsumed under 
one determinable. 
Turning now to the Philosophy of Resemblances, the 
primary point of the theory is that the notion of resemblance 
itself is taken as basic. When instances of repetition of 
lThe unit-class has only one member, viz itself. The 
unit class may be so defined that the word •o~is not em-
ployed in the definition. The matter, however, need not be 
pursued here. Cf. Church, "Unit-class" Dictionary of Philo-
sophy, ed. Dagobert Runes (N.Y.: Philosophical Library1 p. 326. 
2The notion or the determinable-determinate hierarchy 
is dealt with here somewhat more fully than in Price because it 
underlies a great deal of modern epistemology and use will be 
made of it in later chapters of this investigation. 
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qualities and relations occur, one may take the resemblance 
itself as basic and define expressions such as 'This object 
has the quality red' in terms of this resemblance. 'This has 
the quality red' means that it resembles other red objects. 
There are two notorious objections to The Philosophy 
of Resemblances. The first difficulty arises from the phrase 
'resemblances in respect of.' The starting point of discus-
sion is the fact that objects resemble one another. When 
asked to specify the resemblance in question, say red, the 
natural reply to make is 'They resemble one another in respect 
to redness,' and it would appear that the universal is again 
reinstated. The argument is generalized by Price in this way: 
Whenever we say that A, B and C resemble each other in a 
certain respect, we shall be asked 'in what respect?' 
And how can we answer, except by saying-rrn respect of 
being instances of the universal ¢, or 'in respect of 
being characterized by the characteristic¢'? ••• When 
asked to specify in what way they resemble each other ••• 
we shall still have to answer by mentioning such a uni-
versal or characteristic. 1 
Resemblance is always resemblance in some respect. Specifi-
cation of what the respect is, the argument runs, implies a 
universal. In an earlier writing Price found this objection 
convincing. Concerning it he wrote: 
Try as one may to get around it, it seems to me that 
resemblance is always resemblance in a certain respect 
(or in several respects at once). The attempt to avoid 
this by substituting what I called resemblance in a 
certain direction, namely resemblance •towards' cer-
tain standard objects, seems to be to fail. For if the 
particular object A has resemblance 'towards' the 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 20. 
particular object B, the fact remains that they do not just resemble each other. There is a respect in which 
they resemble. There is no such relation as pure and 
simple resemblance, which is resemblance in no respect 
at all. 1 
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Later, however, in the work which is here being com-
mented upon, Price finds this objection less convincing. His 
answer consists still in substituting resemblance towards for 
resemblance in respect of. The resemblance is towards a class 
of standard objects, or exemplars. Both parties to the dis-
pute, the upholder of the Philosophy of Universals and the up-
holder of the Philosophy of Resemblances, accept the notion of 
a class of objects. The dispute concerns the structure of the 
class. In the Philosophy of Universals, on the one hand, all 
the members of the class have the same status; in the Philo-
sophy of Resemblances, on the other hand, every class has an 
"inner ring of key menibers"2 which are exemplars or standard 
objects. The resemblance between these standard objects need 
not be close; all that is required is that "every other member 
of the class should resemble the class-examplars as closely 
as they resemble one another."3 The Philosophy of Resemblances 
is a denial that there are universals in rebus "but it asserts 
that there are resemblances inter res. ,.4 
1H. H. Price, "Thinking and Representation," Proceed-
ings of the British Academy, XXXII, (1946), p. 33. 
2Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 20. 
3Ibid. , p. 21. 
4 lli.!!. , p • 23 • 
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The second objection to the Philosophy of Resemblances 
is the standard objection, and one which Price at one time 
thought was conclusive. He puts the difficulty and his re-
action to it (in 1946) in the following passage. 
Resemblance itself is a universal. It is something of 
which there are many instances. It is, of course, a 
universal of relation. Its instances are not objects 
~ se, complexes. But it is a universal all the same. 
so-the most that would have been achieved would be to 
reduce all other universals to this one relational uni-
versal. This is a very notorious difficulty, and 
perhaps by much repetition has become a bore. Yet I do 
not think it has ever been answered. 1 
Russell has offered an argument having the same outcome, using 
the term 'similarity' rather than the term •resemblance• as 
basic. Russell writes 
If A and B are perceived to be similar, and C and D are 
also perceived to be similar, that means that AB is a 
whole of a certain kind and CD is a whole of the same 
kind; i.e., since we do not want to define the kind by 
a universal, AB and CD are similar wholes. I do not 
see how we are to avoid an endless regress of the vicious 
kind if we attempt to explain similarity in this way •••• 
I conclude, therefore, though with hesitation, that there 
are universals and not merely general words. 2 
Resemblance and similarity, according to the foregoing argu-
ments, are themselves universals. The upholder of the 
Philosophy of Resemblances has unwittingly granted one uni-
versal; thus there is no reason for him to cavil at the intro-
duction of others. 
lPrice, Proc. Brit. Acad., XXXII, (1946), p. 32. 
2Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philo-
~ (2d ed.; London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1920), 
p. 436. Russell has always defended universals. The view ex-
pressed above is his minimum defense. Morton G. White, Toward 
Reunion in Philosolhy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956) 
treats Russell's v ews on universals and its influence in the 
twentieth century. 
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The outcome of this discussion is of some moment to 
the general problems to be discussed in this dissertation. 
Early variants of the Philosophy of Resemblances are among 
the strongest cards played by the classical British empiri-
cists and are crucial to imagism. If the Philosophy of 
Resemblances is mistaken badly from the outset, the attitude 
one takes on various arguments adduced on questions of imag-
ism will thereby be prejudiced at the outset. If, on the 
other hand, an up-to-date version of the theory is able to 
meet this celebrated difficulty, one would be more inclined 
to view favorably the classical British empiricists' approach 
to the epistemological problems to be discussed hereafter. 
In his later writings, Price feels he has dodged the 
difficulty. Price attacks, first, the notion that "resemblance 
itself is a universal" as question-begging. All would agree, 
it is assumed, that •resemblance' is a general word, 1 but the 
1In traditional logic the distinction was drawn be-
tween general words (more often called general names) and 
singular words. General words could significantly be applied 
to a set of' objects each of' which possessed the characteristics 
which determined the applicability of the name, e.g. 'men•. 
A singular word (or name) referred to one object only, e.g. 
1 this man.' General words may be considered from the inten-
sional point of' view (connotatively) as signifying character-
istics which may or may not belong to an existent, but which 
if' they do so belong, may belong to more than one object. They 
may also be considered extensionally and it is the extension 
of' general words that will be of' most interest in this disser-
tation. The distinction between general words and singular 
words is d~scussed by L. Susan Stebbing, A Modern Introduction 
to Lo~ic (6th ed.; London: Methuen and Co., 1948), pp. 53-54. 
This ootnote is a precise of her discussion. 
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conclusion drawn by the Philosophy of Universals, namely 
"that because we use general words, there must be general 
1 
somethings (universals}," is assumed without being proved. 
The principle which the Philosophy of Universals seems re-
quired to prove is that every general word stands for a 
universal. It follows that if this principle is proved the 
word 'resemblance' will be an illustration of it, but no 
proof of this contention is forthcoming. Secondly, granting 
that resemblance is a general word, the Philosophy of 
Resemblance can draw a distinction between resemblances of 
different orders, a distinction which the Philosophy of Univer-
sals is likewise compelled to draw. Two cats and two sounds, 
A and Band C and D respectively are examples~ first order 
resemblances. The A-B situation and C-D situation, moreover, 
have "a likeness between likeness situation"2 which Price calls 
a second-order resemblance. Resemblance can be used in both 
of these senses. It may next be noted that the Philosophy of 
Universals is in the same boa~ requiring either a distinction 
of first order universals and second order universals or else 
a universal for universality. The argument under discussion 
overlooks that there may be resemblances of different orders in 
its contention that resemblance is a universal. In the third 
place, resemblance is treated in this argument as one relation 
among others whereas it is "too fundamental to be called a 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 24. 
2!E.!.£., p. 25. 
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relation at all, in the ordinary sense of the word 1relation. 11 
A relation, as the term is ordinarily used, is itself analyz-
able into a resemblance. The relation named 'being-inside-of' 
is founded upon "the resemblance between the Jonah-whale coml-
plex, the room-house complex, the match-matchbox complex, etc."2 
In the last place, the Philosophy of Universals, despite 
itself, does not give the same status to resemblance in the 
argument under consideration as it does to other relations. 
Price puts this argument as follows: 
If resemblance in the Philosophy of Universals is to be 
called a relation at all, it is a relation of a very 
special sort, quite different from anything to which 
the word 'relation' is ordinarily applied. We should 
have to say that it is a formal or metaphysical rela-
tion (as opposed to a natural or empirical one) just as 
the relation of instantiation is, if that can be called 
a relation at all. 3 
Price is contending here, and the argument is obscure, that 
resemblance, like the relation of instantiation in the 
Philosophy of Universals, is so basic as not properly to re-
quire the term 'relation' to be applied to it at a11.4 The 
term is not one perhaps that can be verbally defined, given 
this manner of speaking, but can be only ostensively defined. 
1 Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 26. 
2Ibid. 
4This matter will be more fully discussed in a later 
chapter. Reasons will be given, at that point, for the con-
clusion that Price's arguments are not altogether convincing. 
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The upshot for Price of this discussion of the 
Philosophy of Universals and the Philosophy of Resemblances 
is that the honors are about even. Considered as ontological 
doctrines, they are systematically different terminologies 
for the same facts. The terminology of the Philosophy of 
Universals is handier, but may lead one to think of a univer-
sal as an entity, or an existent. The terminology of the 
Philosophy of Resemblances is more clumsy and harder to 
formulate, but keeps closer to the actual facts. 
In such cases of systematically different terminolo-
gies the course of wisdom is to be familiar with both termin-
ologies. It should be pointed out that it is not a termin-
ology that is misleading; it is only users of terminologies 
that are misled. The terminology that is most free from the 
danger of misleading users is the terminology of symbolic 
logic because centuries of associations do not surround the 
terms. Even in symbolic logic the terminology needs exposi-
tion genetically in a non-formal mode of exposition. 
2. The Polemical Version of Imagism 
The terms 1 image 1 and •imagination• require some pre-
liminary explication before dealing with the polemical side of 
the image theory of thought. The term 1 image 1 designates "a 
sensory quality reinstated by the mind in the absence of sen-
sory stimulation."1 The term 1 imagination 1 has two senses. 
lLedger Wood, "Image," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. 
Runes, p. 141. This provisory definition is paralleled by 
similar definitions in Andre Lalande, Vocabulaire technique 
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In the first place, it is used as a technical term by psycho-
logists and epistemologists to refer to the process or reviv-
ing sensory images derived from earlier perceptions. In this 
usage, imagination is the process of 'imaging' or 'imagery.• 
(The term 'imagery' must be used with some care, since it 
does not carry on its face as it were the connotation of pro-
cess as does the word 'imaging•). Two other terms are met 
with in connection with this usage of the term 'imagination.• 
In the first place, the term •memory image' is used by many 
British epistemologists in the literature of the twentieth 
century. Seeondly, in classical British empiricism the term 
1 idea 1 (in one use) is more or less synonymous with the term 
'image' in a manner that will be specified in detail in a 
subsequent treatment here. 
The second sense of the term 'imagination' is often 
called the •creative imagination' or the 'productive imagina-
tion, 1 i.e., "the combination of ••• elementary images into 
1 
new unities." The productive imagination may be subdivided 
into fancy, i.e. relatively uncontrolled and spontaneous 
creative imagination, and the constructive imagination exempli-
fied in science, philosophy, and invention. 
1932), 
~~~~~~r;-;~~~~~~~~~~~~~· ed. Co., 
1Ledger Wood, "Imagination," Dictionary of Philosophy, 
ed. Runes, p. 141. 
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In the older association psychology, represented by 
the classical British empiricists, images played an important 
part in memory and recognition because these mental processes 
were construed as dependent upon the comparison of a presen-
tation, i.e. anything present to a knowing mind, with a 
memory image. This notion of the role of images in mental 
life falls within the first meaning of 1 image 1 and 1imagina-
tion• discussed above. Therefore, unless otherwise specified 
the term 1 image 1 will be used in this first sense. In the 
rare cases where it is necessary to discuss the second sense 
of imagination the term •productive imagination• will be used. 
The image theory of thought has as its starting point 
the notion that in thinking images are the primary symbols and 
1 
all other symbols are secondary and derivative. Words parti-
cularly are secondary symbols in this theory. Words, according 
1rt is to be noted that Price uses the term 'symbol' 
in a very wide, although not necessarily ambiguou~way. The 
tag-line that roughly gives the meaning of the term for Price 
is that a symbol is "whatever we think with." Price, Thinking 
and Exlerience, p. 237. An earlier description of the term 
'symbo ' is as follows: 
"The term covers not only words and complexes of words, 
e.g. sentences, descriptive phrases. It also covers 
what could be called pictorial symbols, whether public 
or private; for example, pictures, diagrams, mental 
images. In addition( it covers gestures, both imitative 
gesture ( 1dumb-show 1 J and deictic gestures, e.g. point-
ing at someone with one's finger ••• ; and quite elaborate 
pieces of non-verbal behaviour ••• ceremonial or ritual 
actions would be counted as symbols." 
Ibid., pp. 145-146. There are extensive discussions by Price 
o1's1gn-cognition, "the type of cognition in which something 
not immediately experienced is brought before the mind by 
means of a sign." !E.!£., p. 88. The term 1 sign 1 for Price 
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to the imagist theory, have meaning only indirectly as sub-
stitutes for images. Such a substitutionary function as 
words perform is necessary because words can be much more 
easily manipulated than images can. Normally words are used 
by us uncashed, i.e., "without being aware at the moment of 
1 
what we mean." This is the function of words. 
There are two sorts of words which are not simply de-
pendent upon images--logical and syntactical words and emotive 
and evocative words. This, however, is not as real a limita-
tion upon this theory as it might at first seem. Words which 
are basic symbols, i.e. words for which ostensive definitions 
presumably means an object that stands for something else. 
The distinction he draws between sign and symbol can be illus-
trated by the following quotations. 
"It is often said that we must distinguish two senses 
of the word 'meaning': meaning in the sign sense (e. 
g. black clouds mean rain) and meaning in the sl{bol 
sense (e.g. the word •rain' means rain) •••• It s of 
course pretty clear that not all signs are symbols. 
The black clouds can hardly be said to symbolize the 
rain of which they are a sign." 
Ibid., p. 144. 
-"we have now to consider the relation between symbols 
and signs. On this point we find almost inextricable 
confusion. Sometimes the words 'sign' and 'symbol' are 
used as if they were synonymous •••• Whatever objections 
there may be to the wide use of the word 'symbol' dis-
cussed above, this wide use of the word 'sign' is still 
more objectionable. Black clouds mean rain, and the 
word 'rain' means rain. It'is plain as anything can be 
that there is some difference between the two situations." 
Ibid., p. 160. From this one might conclude, and this sugges-
tiOn is no doubt on thin ice, that for Price 'symbols' are a 
special kind of sign, namely man-made. Fortunately, it is not 
necessary to take special account of Price's theory of sign-
cognition. 
1Price, Proc. Brit. Acad., XXXII, (1946), p. 5. 
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are finally required, are according to this theory substi-
tutes for images, Berkeley's attack on matter was based on 
such an imagist theory. The destructive side of his attack 
on the materialistic and dualistic philosophers was that 
these "minute philosophers" used words without their being 
cashable. 
Before further exposition of the image theory, one 
topic in need of further clarification is the notion of 
verbal-images. Among the various types of images most people 
seem to possess, there are verbal images. Such verbal images 
may be visual (by far the most common) or auditory or kin-
1 
aesthetic. Seeing in the mind's eye, the letters C, followed 
by A, followed by T, illustrate a verbal image. The image 
theory of thought, however, is not concerned with verbal 
images. In what follows reference to images will be reference 
to non-verbal images only, As Price puts the matter: "the 
term 1 image 1 must be taken to mean non-verbal images only; as 
when I think of dogs not by means of the word 1dog 1 (not even 
the imagy word 1dog 1 ) but by means of a dog-like image of 
some kind,"2 Another way of putting the matter is to dis-
tinguish between the type-word 1dog 1 and the token-word 1 dog~ 
whether overtly spoken, written in various ways, or as a ver-
bal image. Verbal images are only one of the token used to 
1This phrase will be discussed at a later point. It 
can be shown that it is not too misleading a way of speaking, 
2Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 244. 
1 
exemplify the type. 
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A further difficulty in exposition of the image theory 
of thought arises from controversy over the schema for the 
analysis of mental phenomena used by the image theory. The 
image theory of thought is committed to a three-term analysis 
of thought which schematizes mental phenomena into act, content, 
and object.2 Price puts the theory as it relates to images in 
the following way: 
[There is] (l) an act of immediate awareness or intuitive 
apprehension (2) an entity called an 'image' which is what 
we are supposed to be immediately aware of (3) a material 
object or physical event or part of one, which this entity 
resembles and represents. 3 
Speaking of an imagist, i.e. one who holds the image theory of 
thought, Price says "his analysis of the imagining process is 
the three-term one. rr4 
lThe distinction between type and token will occasion-
ally be useful as reference will have to be made to the signs, 
images, and words (tokens) all of which may refer to the same 
object. The matter may be put as follows. The word 'word' 
has two senses. The various individual marks, more or less 
resembling one another, all of which refer to the same thing 
are called 'tokens.' Contrasted with this is the type of which 
all such tokens are instances. The word 'word' then is subject 
to type-token ambiguity, an ambiguity which is cleared up by 
clarifying whether it is the type word or the token word that 
is being used or mentioned. The distinction between type and 
token is commonly extended to include all symbols, not only to 
words. Cf. also Max Black, "Type-Token Ambiguity," Dictionary 
of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 324. 
2This analysis, stemming from Brentano and Meinen~, is 
ably presented by Bertrand Russell, The Anal~sis of Mind {Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin, 1921), pp. 13-2 and criticized 
throughout the remainder of the book. Fuller details of this 
analysis will be given here, where necessary, in later chapters. 
3price, Thinking and Experience, p. 247. 
4~., p. 252. 
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Recently views have been put forward sharply critical 
of this analysis as misleading and confused. Following Price, 
philosophers who are critical of these views, so far as they 
relate to the image theory of thought, will be called anti-
image philosophers. A typical representative of this view-
point puts the criticism in the following way: 
I want to show that the concept of picturing, visualiz-
ing, or 'seeing' is a proper and useful concept, but 
that its use does not entail the existence of pictures 
which we contemplate or the existence of a gallery in 
which such pictures are ephemerally suspended. Roughly, 
imaging occurs, but images are not seen. 1 
Ryle, it is clear from this quotation, is denying the second 
term of the three-term analysis, namely that it is proper to 
call an image an entity of which one is immediately aware. 
The following statement of Ryle's position is also interest-
ing for at least two reasons which may be discussed after the 
quotation has been given: 
There is not real life outside, shadowily mimicked by 
some bloodless likeness inside; there are just things 
and events, people witnessing some of these things and 
events, and people fancying themselves witnessing 
things and events that they are not witnessing. 2 
1The views critical of the three-term analysis can be 
found in Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 245-279, in regard to 
images. (Price does not mention Ryle or anyone else by name 
in this connection). These views owe their remoter origin to 
Wittgenstein, but as Price's replies to these criticisms can 
be applied seriatim to Ryle it is not necessary to inquire 
further into their genealogy. 
2Ryle, Concept of Mind, pp. 248-249. 
23 
In the first place, this quotation illustrates neatly 
the slogan of the book from which it is taken, the dogma of 
the ghost in the machine. The general thesis this book 
wishes to establish is that philosophers have been misled by 
alien metaphors into hypostasizing entities that do not exist, 
and then becoming involved in trying to answer spurious ques-
tions arising from this hypostasization. In one sense, the 
book is in the high empirical tradition running from Hume to 
Russell in which certain analyses are deflated and replaced 
by less pretentious analyses. With such a general program, 
this dissertation is not concerned. The usefulness, however, 
of the particular analysis that the book proposes to substi-
tute for the traditional analyses in regard to images are 
important. It is only to such features of this book that the 
remarks to follow are addressed. Secondly, as has been pointed 
1 out, the thesis of the above quotation is difficult to main-
tain, because it seems clear, upon phenomenological examina-
tion,2 that one may imagine, for example, the oft-cited 
golden mountain, without imagining that one is witnessing it. 
1stuart Hampshire, "Review of Ryle 1s Concept of Mind," 
Mind, LIX, (1950), p. 255. 
2 The term 'phenomenological' as used in this disser-
tation will mean merely descriptive analyses of subjective 
processes. In the usage of the term in this dissertation 
there is no commitment intended to the type of analysis asso-
ciated with Husserl. On the usage suggested here, the dis-
tinction between phenomenological investigation and psycholo-
gical investigation comes in that the latter discipline 
investigates causal laws, whereas the former is purely 
descriptive. 
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The principal features of the point at issue between 
Ryle and Price may be brought out in the following way. 
Verbs such as 'see' are radically ambiguous. In one sense, 
which for the moment may be called see1 , 'see' appears in 
such sentences asl 
(4) I see a dog in front of the fireplace. 
As Broad puts the matter, there is in such a case both an 
ontological object and an epistemological object. In the 
second sense of the verb 'see', see2 , there is an epistemolo-
gical object but no ontological object corresponding to it, 
i.e., "the situation involves a certain claim which the phy-
sical world refuses to meet."2 'See2 • may be illustrated by 
(5) I see the face of my long-dead aunt before my eyes. 
For Ryle the bone of contention arises in cases like (5). 
The 'see' in (5), even if enclosed in sin~le quotes to indi-
cate the peculiar sort of vision involved, is misleading. 
The verb •see' should be reserved for cases of literally see-
ing, seeing with one's eyes open, seeing under conditions in 
1The device of the superscript is used rather than the 
single quote which is often used to mark the distinction now 
under discussion. The device of single quotes will be used in 
this dissertation solely to distinguish use from mention as pre-
viously stated. A further device hitherto used but not dis-
cussed may be commented upon at this point. Double quotes will 
not be used to mark a sentence constructed for purposes of 
illustration and comment as is often the case. A sentence used 
for illustration and comment will be indented and numbered and 
double quotes used only for punctuation. 
2C'.D~.B~oad, The Mind and its Place in Nature (New York: 
Humanities Preijs, 1951), p. 142. All that is essential in 
Broad's distinction between an epistemological and an ontologi-
cal object is carried in the quoted passage. 
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which other people would also see what the subject of (5) 
claims to see. For Price, on the other hand, expressions 
such as (5) "are not just silly confusions but are dictated 
by the phenomenology of the imaging process itself."1 If 
they are misleading, the alternatives are worse. 
From these general considerations one may next turn 
to the specific details of Price's reply to criticisms such 
as Ryle presents. Price grants that imagists "have not 
always distinguished clearly enough between occurrent images 
2 
and image-dispositions (or image-producing dispositions)." 
This distinction may be brought out in the following way.3 
Consider the statement 
(6) I have an image of Napoleon. 
The man who asserts (6) may be asserting one of two things. 
In the first place, his assertion may be taken to mean that 
he has a Napoleon-image at the present moment, i.e. an occur-
rent image. On the other hand, his assertion in (6) may be 
taken to mean that he has a permanent capacity to have a 
Napoleon-image which could be brought into use at any time by 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 252. 
2 Ibid., p. 245. 
3This discussion is based upon Charlie D. Broad, 
Examination of MeTa art's Philoso h (3 vols.; London: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1933 , I, p. • The distinction is 
usually associated with Broad, e.g. Everett J. Nelson, "The 
Category of Substance," Philosopht for the Future, ed. Roy 
Wood Sellars, Virgil McGill, Marv n Farber (New York: Macmil-
lan Co., 1949), pp. 106-124, where it is discussed. 
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a suitable stimulus, i.e. a disp~nal-image. The image-
theory of thought, according to Price when stated in a 
guarded way, does not require the assumption that we have a 
permanent image which we carry around with us forever. All 
that one is required to suppose is 
that something persists in the mind of psycho-physical 
organism ••• and all we really know is that because it 
is there he has the permanent capacity to produce an 1 
occurrent image ••• whenever he is suitably stimulated. 
It is, of course, well-known that an explanation of this 
capacity to produce an occurrent image is very difficult. The 
2 trace theory of memory is one attempt to explain just this. 
One must, however, take the phenomenological facts as one 
finds them. People do seem able to produce upon occasion 
mental phenomena of the kind illustrated in {6). The anti-
image philosopher, however, denies that there is such a par-
ticular as (6) describes. There is only the imaging but there 
are no images. The entity word image is proscribed. 
Price offers two general observations to the forego-
ing. In the first place, the anti-image philosophers talk 
about words as if they were entities. "A token-word is far 
less 1 like an entity• than an occurrent image is."3 Yet, 
argues Price, "why do these philosophers choose to be misled 
1 Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 245-246. 
2Beatrice Edgell, Theories of Memory {Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1924), passim discusses these problems. Discussion 
of these theories is not relevant. 
3Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 248. 
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when images are spoken of as entities when words are spoken 
of in the same entity like way?"1 The answer given is simply 
that such philosophers happen to be more interested in talk-
ing than imaging. This leads to Price's second general ob-
servation. In any phenomenological inquiry it is difficult 
to avoid using an entity terminology. If one chooses to talk 
on any subject in detail, it is difficult to avoid such a 
terminology. It is not difficult to avoid an entity termin-
ology if one proscribes a certain vocabulary, and this is the 
strategy of the anti-image philosopher, according to Price. 
In general Price contends that the imagist and the anti-
image philosopher are in the same boat in regard to an entity 
terminology. In going into detail about a particular subject, 
both find it natural to use such a terminology. 
Furthermore, Price suggests that there are special 
features of the process of imaging which make it natural to 
use an entity terminology, i.e. a noun substantive 'image' to 
describe the psychological processes. In imaging there is 
confrontation, not material or physical but something of 
which "it is natural to say that we are aware of an entity, 
to use the entity-word 'image' for what we are aware of."2 
The poverty of everyday language allows no better way of 
talking about such matters than to use some such language. 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 248. 
2 ~., p. 249. 
28 
The anti-image contention that there are no images 
but only imaging is supported by a further argument Price con-
siders. Ryle puts the question to be considered in the follow-
ing way: 
I attempt ••• to show that to try to answer the question, 
1Where do the things and happenings exist which people 
imagine existing?' is to try to answer a spurious ques-
tion. They do not exist anywhere, though they are 
imagined as existing, say, in this room. 1 
According to Price, some images do have a place, i.e. they 
have certain characteristics which are best described as 
spatial. The space of such projected visual images is the 
2 private space of the percipient's visual field. Certain 
individuals at least,--and constantly in discussing such 
matters it must be recognized that there are individual differ-
ences--have the capacity to project a visual image. The visual 
image is out in front of the individual, say an image of a dog 
before the fireplace, but in Price's phrase no part of the sur-
face upon which it is projected is thus rendered "visually 
impenetrable."3 
1Ryle, Concept of Mind, p. 245. 
2 George F. Stout, A Manual of Psycholo~* (3rd ed.; 
London: Univ. Tutorial Press, 1924), pp. 528-5 , has given 
a careful account of this process. Price has also dealt with 
it in his earlier book Perception (2d ed.; London: Methuen & 
Go., 1950), especially in chap. viii. It will be appropriate 
to deal with it more fully in the second chapter of this 
dissertation. 
3Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 251. 
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The position adopted in this dissertation towards the 
controversy just discussed is a tame one. It would not appear 
that any of the arguments offered by the anti-image philosopher 
are definitive against a discussion of images using the tradi-
tional terminology. Indeed this thesis need not even be 
defended. One need only say that there are special features 
of the process of imaging which make this terminology useful, 
and one may remain noncommittal toward other investigations of 
philosophical psychology from a Wittgensteinian standpoint. 
Features of imaging which make this terminology useful will 
be brought out subsequently. 
The image theory of thought holds that in thought the 
primary or basic symbols used are images, and that other sym-
bols used are secondary or derivative. The first question, 
then, to be answered is, Why is this primacy given to images 
1 
rather than to the other symbols used in thinking? In 
answer the following points are made by the imagist. One of 
the primary characteristics of thinking, according to Price, 
is that it is "cognition in absence, 11 i.e., "we are in cogni-
tive touch with what we do not at the moment see or feel." 2 
Such thinking, usually called free thinking in contrast with 
1 The broad usage of the term 'symbol' is to be 
remembered. (See footnote~) The term covers not only 
images, but words, gestures (dumbshow), and diagrams as well. 
2 Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 254-255. Price 
is not, of course, the only one to stress this point. See 
for example Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought (2 vols.; 
New York: Macmillan Co., 1940), I, p. 257ff. "The attainment 
of the free idea marks our escape from the mind of the animal." 
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1 the tied thinking of sensation, according to the imagist, 
requires some particular to stand as an instance of the con-
cept brought to mind in free thought. Of the possible non-
instantiative particulars--images, words, gestures, diagrams--
images have a great advantage over others, for "they come 
nearer than words do to beinglnstances of the concepts 
brought to mind by means of them."2 Images are cashable, i.e. 
one is aware immediately of what one means if they are used. 
This is not always the case with other symbols. Images may 
be called quasi-instantiative particulars whereas words and 
other symbols are non-instantiative.3 Words, on this theory, 
are not basic (even words whose definition is given osten-
sively) but are substitutes for images. 
The plausibility of this theory depends upon the tacit 
assumption that there is paradox in thinking of something 
which is not, in some manner, being presented to the senses. 
1The distinction between tied thinking and free think-
ing with ideas is succinctly discussed by George F. Stout, 
"Psychology," Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 14th:ed.), XVIII, p. 681. 
Stout's article Is the best contemporary conspectus of intro-
spective psychology. Many of the discussions in this disser-
tation will be indebted to this article. The general validity 
of the introspective program, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, will be commented upon in the second chapter. 
2price, Thinking and Experience, p. 254. 
3The terms 1non-instantiative particulars' and •quasi-
instantiative particulars' used by Price are coined for the 
occasion by him as far as the present writer can determine. 
They do not seem altogether satisfactory, but the attempt to 
rephrase or supplant them would seem to lead to more confusion. 
Their general meaning seems clear enough. 
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When using images "thinking of the absent approximates as 
closely as its nature permits inspecting the present. 111 The 
motivation underlying this assumption Price finds valid. 
Thought to be called thought at all must be cum fundamento 
2 This any tenable philosophy of thought must achieve. 
For Price, the statement of the assumption in the 
image theory of thought does not seem to be true. Verbal 
thinking is bound to reality by means of ostensive defini-
tions. The image theory of thought fails to trust memory suf-
ficiently. It is memory which can reinstate the quasi-instan-
tiative particulars, both images and other particulars--words, 
diagrams, gestures. There is an associative linkage between 
memory and the capacity to utter a sound, use a word, or 
create an image. The imagist contention that words are only 
substitutes for imagesrests, according to Price, upon too 
narrow a conception of memory. Herein lies the extremism of 
the image theory of thought. 
Two points may now be made. In the first place, Price 
has not committed himself to the image theory on its polemi-
cal side, viz. that words are only substitutes for images. 
Secondly, there is a constructive side of the image theory of 
thought to which attention needs to be given. 
1charlie D. Broad, "Critical Notice of Price's Think-
ing and Experience," ~' LXIII, ( 1954), p. 399. 
2Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 26-261. 
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3. The Constructive Version of Imagism 
Even though the image theory of thought ultimately 
may require rejection on its polemical side, i.e. as a 
criticism of verbal thinking, it contains a useful account of 
a not inconsiderable part of thinking which does depend upon 
the use of images as symbols. This is important to consider 
in its own right because the subject of image-thinking has 
not received its due in contemporary philosophy. It is quite 
possible that the classical British empiricists may offer 
constructive suggestions concerning image-thinking if their 
views on this score are elicited. This at any rate is one 
assumption upon which the present dissertation rests. The 
answer as to whether such an enterprise as this is feasible 
will lie in the results which such an attempt succeeds in 
bringing to light. 
There is a cluster of epistemological problems con-
nected with image-thinking on its constructive side concerned 
with images as general symbols. The explication of these 
problems will be aided by an excursus into the meaning of 
three terms--'vagueness,' 'ambiguity,' 'generality'--that are 
1 frequently confounded in such discussions. Vagueness is a 
1 Price's discussion does not treat these crucial 
terms, sufficiently (Price, Thinkinf and Exterience, pp. 265-
297). It will be useful to attempt o give hem greater pre-
cision both for the exposition of Price's views in the above 
pages, and for other problems with which this dissertation 
will later be concerned. 
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term applied to symbols, concepts, or images. 1 The vagueness 
of a symbol is said to consist "in the existence of object(s) 
concerning which it is intrinsically impossible to say either 
that the symbol in question does, or does not apply."2 
Vagueness is perhaps most easily illustrated by color 
names. A certain shade of reddish-orange in the spectrum is 
easily imaginable as a border-line case for the application of 
the terms 'red' or 'orange.' In such a case one may say that 
the terms 'red' or 'orange' are vague in the English language. 
The following quotation from Stout is relevant. "The changes 
of color in the spectrum are throughou~ so continuous that it 
is not possible to find the exact point at which changes of 
direction begin."3 Phrasing the situation as in the above 
quotation suggests that "the fault is in the language or 
imperfect perception: there is an 'exact point' where the 
transition occurs, but we are unable to find it."4 This, 
however, is misleading. All words, symbols, and images which 
1ordinarily discussions of vagueness are concerned with 
words or propositions, (ef. Max Black, Lanfuage and Philosothy (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1949], p. 30 but no importan 
difference arises in also speaking of an image's vagueness. 
It will be simpler in the exposition to follow to speak of the 
vagueness of words and symbols and apply the results mutatis 
mutandis to images. 
2The following discussion is indebted to Blac~s well-
known article "Vagueness" reprinted in Language and Philosophy. 
Quotations will be from this latter volume. 
3stout, Manual of Psycholo~t' p. 160in 1898-1899 edi-
tion. This quotation is cited lnack, Language and Philoso-
phy' p. 33. 
4Black, Language and Philosophy, p. 33. 
34 
refer to perceptible objects are vague in some degree. It 
is in this very vagueness that their usefulness lies. The 
matter may be put in regard to words in the following way. 
It would be reasonably easy in the case of any class-name 
to find "doubtful objects" or "border-line"1 cases in which 
it would be difficult to say whether or not the class-name 
applied. The crux of the matter is not the question of 
whether such is the case with all objects perceived by the 
senses, but rather whether such vagueness is to be taken as 
a defect in language. 
A further term met with in discussions of vagueness 
is the term 'fringe.• 2 This term as applied to symbols may 
be defined as "the set of all objects about which a decision 
as to the symbol's application is intrinsically impossible."3 
The assumption, however, of such a set of objects as mentioned 
in the foregoing quotation can be shown to be inconsistent 
with negation in its ordinary formulation in the propositional 
calculus. According to the usual notation, 'Lx' will be 
taken to mean that 'L' applies to 'x'. Let 'L' be a vague 
symbol. Consider Black's example.4 
1Black's phrases. 
2E.g. Russell uses the term in a classic paper on 
vagueness of the same title. Bertrand Russell, "On V:tgueness " 
The Australian Journal of Philosofhy and Psychology, I, (1923~, 
pp. 84-92. The term 1fringe 1 In his usage Is, of course, 
quite different from the term 'psychical fringe' as applied 
to the margins of consciousness as distinguished from the 
focus of consciousness. 
3Black, Language and Philosophy, p. 28. 
4(7) minus its numerical indicator was formulated by 
Black for destructive purposes. Ibid., p. 36. 
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(7) There is at least one term to which neither L 
nor its contradictory applies. 
A statement purporting to locate the 'fringe' or the 'range 
of doubtful application' of a vague symbol will result in 
some such statement as (7). Translating (7) into logical 
notation there results: 
(8) 1 (Ex) ( -- Lx & -- ( -- Lx)) 
which by the usual rule of double negation becomes 
(9) (Ex) ( -- Lx & Lx), 
an explicit contradiction. It would appear that all efforts 
to locate a well-defined set of objects to which application 
of a vague symbol is doubtful will result in the type of flat 
contradiction displayed in (8) and (9). Recourse to a new 
definition of negation, i.e. rules according to which the 
sign will be used that will avoid the contradiction, seems 
too drastic. The term will, therefore, be dropped.2 
General words are appropriate to more than one object 
in the field of reference (See footnote 1, page 13). The 
important point to notice here about generality or general 
words is that generality has to do with the extension of a 
symbol, word, or image. It does not, like vagueness, have 
1In (8) the ampersand is used as a sign of conjunction 
for reasons of typographical convenience rather than the more 
common dot. 
2If it became necessary to discuss the notions covered 
by the abandoned term 'fringe' Black has provided a method of 
symbolizing "the statistical analysis of the frequency of 
deviations from strict uniformity by •users' of a vague symbol." 
Black, Language and Philosophy, pp. 39-53. 
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to do with a range of doubtful application. Generality may 
be illustrated in the following: 
(10) All men are mortal. 
The second word in (10) is a general word, appropriate to 
more than one existent. 
Ambiguity, the last of the three terms now under e~pli­
cation, occurs when a word "stands for a different referend on 
1 different occasions." Whereas vagueness is a matter of 
degree, the range of doubtful application varying from occa-
sion to occasion, ambiguity is a matter of context. In one 
context a word may be ambiguous, and in another context it 
may be unambiguous. Ambiguity requires the same word (or 
complex of words) to be capable of being used in more than 
one sense in the same context. It is possible for a word to 
be both ambiguous and vague, e.g. Conservative, democrat, 
artist, etc. One further distinction may be noted. Tradi-
tional logic frequently used the terms 'equivocal' or 'ambi-
guous' to refer to a word used in different senses. Such a 
usage may, however, be confusing. The confusion may be illus-
trated by consideration of the following pair. 
(11) Jones has a fair complexion. 
(12) It was a fair bargain. 
The fourth word in (11) and the fourth word in (12) do not 
illustrate ambiguity. In (11) and (12) the fourth words are 
1stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 21. 
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different words; they are not the same word used ambiguously. 
The problems connected with images and their func-
tions as general symbols may be classified, following Price, 
into two categories: problems arising from too little resem-
blance between the image and an actual instance, and problems 
arising from too much resemblance. The first of these prob-
lema for the sake of reference will be called the difficulty 
of too little resemblance. The question to be considered may 
be put in the following way. How close does the resemblance 
between an image and the actual instance of which it is an 
image have to be in order for one to think with it? It is a 
matter of phenomenological observation that images vary greatly 
in their vividness, detail, and fixity. There might occur 
images so faint and poor that one could not think with them 
at all. Where is the line drawn? In replying to such a line 
of criticism Price points out that words suffer from the same 
possibility of extreme vagueness as do images. Price's 
example illustrates the point well. 
(13) An oecumenical council is now meeting in Valparaiso.1 
As Price points out, some would know what it would be like 
for (13) to be true, some wouldn't know, and some would be 
betwixt and between. Vagueness is a characteristic in some 
degree of all thinking; it cannot then be fairly objected that 
1 Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 267. 
the imagist has a problem on this score peculiar to his 
special theory. There are images that are bad, and there 
are images that are good. The problem of drawing the line 
between such images is no more difficult for the imagist 
than one who holds the more common theory in contemporary 
thought that thinking is done with words, i.e. verbal images. 
Having disposed of the difficulty of Too Little 
Resemblance, Price turns to the second difficulty, the 
difficulty of too much resemblance. This difficulty takes 
two forma which may be examined in turn. In the first place, 
Price points out that any image may resemble too many things, 
.and consequently any image is ambiguous. An image of a croco-
dile, to use Price's example, may not only resemble a 
crocodile:. but a lizard, a reptile, and even organismic life 
in general. To generalize this portion of the argument, an 
image of a crocodile may indeed be "a quasi-instance of any 
concept which comes above Crocodile in the determinable-deter-
1 
minate hierarchy." If this is the case, an image might seem 
to have a systematic ambiguity within the determinable-
determinate hierarchy to which it refers. In reply to such 
a possible criticism, Price appeals to the notion of mental 
set. i.e. "a temporary condition of an organism, facilitating 
2 
a certain more or leas specific type of activity or response." 
lprice, Thinking and Experience, p. 268. 
2Jamea Drever, A Dictionar~ of Paycholo~y (Penguin 
Books, 1952), p. 263. The phraaedirected rea iness to 
respond' would also define 'set' sufficiently for the purposes 
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The meaning of an image, at any one time, according to this 
reply, would depend upon the particular problem with which 
the individual wasconcerned at the time. Given a set in one 
direction, the image would have one meaning and given another 
set its meaning might be quite another. This view makes the 
relations between words and images a two-way street. Images 
may bring words into one's mind, and words may bring images 
into one's mind. The relation is reciprocal. Such a conces-
sion, however, is of no great moment unless one is prepared 
to try to defend the polemical account of image-thinking dis-
cussed earlier in which images were supposed to be primary 
and words and other symbols secondary. This stronger thesis 
is not at the moment under examination and it is doubtful if 
the classical British empiricists in their better moments 
were defending anything of this kind. The minimum thesis, 
viz. that image-thinking is of considerable importance in 
much of thought and that thought cannot be understood without 
taking it into account, is certainly untouched by the recog-
nition that words and images reciprocally affect one another. 
of exposition at this point. Psychologists use the term 
'set' in discussing 'mental set' and 'neural set.' It is 
with 'mental set' only that this dissertation will be con-
cerned. The term 'set' thus will always mean 'mental set' 
in this dissertation. As Price points out, (Price, Think-
in~ and Experience, p. 268) this is essentially Berkeley's 
so ution, with of course a different terminology. A fuller 
elucidation of the notion is thus more appropriately placed 
in a later chapter on Berkeley. 
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The difficulty of too many resemblances, however, 
need not be stated only in such termsatobe applicable to 
the determinable-determinate hierarchy. A second type of 
ambiguity, more damaging to the argument for image-thinking 
because not systematic, seems possible. As Price puts it, 
"It would seem that any image symbol or indeed any replica 
whether physical or mental, is bound to be ambiguous ••.• it 
1 
cannot help having too many resemblances." The image of a 
dog may resemble an image of a sausage about as closely as 
it resembles an image of a dachshund. In actual fact, how-
ever, Price contends that such an alleged ambiguity fails to 
occur, either with physical replicas or with mental images. 
One is usually not mistaken in identifying what a physical 
replica is, however bad, -- say a clay dog made by a child, 
nor are we often mistaken in what images are images of. 
Price is here pointing to an important fact that contemporary 
experimental psychology has tended to confirm. Human thought 
and communication are able to limp along under what would a 
priori appear to be insuperable barriers to communication.2 
The objections if taken seriously prove too much. If they 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 270. 
2one example among many that might be cited is the 
kind of experimental evidence available from studies in the 
perception of speech. The human organism has an "extrava-
gant provision of discriminative clues" says a recent summar-
izer of the psychological literature on the subject. George 
S. Miller~ Language and Communication (New York: McGraw-Hill 
co., 1951,, p. 7o. 
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were accepted one might well ask how we could think at all. 
The fact is thinking does occur. Furthermore, a specific 
argument is advanced by Price which tends to remove the 
force of the objection. In thinking about something by 
means of images ("in an imagy manner") 1 one is not restricted 
to a single image. The image may well change with the 
characteristic behavior or placement of the thing of which 
it is an image. A single image usually suffices "if we have 
the capacity to produce other suitable images at need ."2 The 
notion of the single image is thus reinforced by the notion 
of strings of images, alterable and changeable, as needs 
change. Such a fluent state of affairs seems closer to the 
actual facts of the image-process than the single image. 
Here, undoubtedly, as will be observed throughout the dis-
cussion of imagery in this dissertation, there are individual 
differences in the powers of imagery and the extent to which 
images are used in thinking. Such psychological differences 
among individuals, more prominent he~e perhaps than elsewhere 
in psychic life, tend to make theorizing difficult, Differ-
ences of opinion on theoretical points may unwittingly arise 
out of individual differences in the imaging process. The 
additional images just discussed need not be "present in 
1 Price, Thinking and Experience, pp. 272. 
2 Ibid., pp. 272-273. 
1 fact" but may only be "present in power." An image that 
otherwise might be ambiguous is often saved from ambiguity 
if other images are present in power. i.e. in capacity, 
although not present in fact. This notion, coupled with 
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that of 'set', a directed readiness to respond, seem suffi-
cient to meet the objection of Too Many Resemblances. 
Although the difficulty of Too Many Resemblances 
seems soluble by the expedients discussed briefly in the 
foregoing, there is a difficulty that is classical in con-
nection with image-thinking. It may be called the difficulty 
of Too Much Resemblance. This is the difficulty. It is the 
2 
one usually taken to be insuperable by any image-theory. An 
image by representing one instance too closely might appear 
to be prevented from fulfilling its main function -- to be 
an image of a concept in general. As Price puts it, "from 
this point of view it would almost seem that a 'bad' image--
schematic, sketchy, lacking in detail--is better than a 
'good 1 one. "3 If an image is too like some one thing it 
1navid Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Selby-
Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), I, Pt. 1, sec. 7, p. 
20. This distinction between images present "in power" and 
"in fact" will be dealt with fully in the chapter on Hume. 
2 This, for example, is one way of giving a summary 
statement of Blanshard's criticisms of 1magism. Blanahard's 
views will be considered in the final chapter. See Blanshard, 
Nature of Thought, I, pp. 257-281, especially pp. 264-269. 
3Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 275. 
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may be more like any of a class of things. Images, it would 
seem, cannot fulfill their alleged function in thinking un-
less they somehow can function as general symbols. This is, 
of course, Berkeley's problem. After dealing what he felt 
was the "killing blow"1 against Locke in his brilliant pole-
mic against abstract ideas, Berkeley faced the constructive 
task of showing how an image could function as a general 
symbol. It is best, however, at this point simply to state 
the objection and leave fuller examination of the problem 
until later chapters. 
4. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as Imagists 
After this survey of Imagism, it is appropriate next 
to cite some leading passages in the classical British empiri-
cists which would appear to support the contention that imag-
ism is a useful theory in attempting to understand their 
views. Commentary and discussion of such passages will be 
kept to a minimum; most of the passages cited will receive 
detailed examination in the chapters devoted to each of the 
1 George Berkeley, Philoso~hical Commentaries, ed. A. 
A. Luce (London: Thomas Nelson, 1~4), p. 78. For an account 
of the "killing blow" see George Berkeley, "The Principles of 
Human Knowledge," The Works of George Berkeley, ed. Luce and 
Jessop (6 vola.; London: Thomas Nelson, 1948), II, sees. 13-
17, pp. 32-36, although there the phrase is not used. In 
general, citations from the Philosorhical Commentaries are 
best made to Luce's editio d!Klomat ca (1944) for the reason 
that many remarks in Philosop ical Commentaries are marked by 
a plus sign, indicating, according to Luce, that Berkeley was 
not going to adopt them. Full discussion of such matters is 
only to be found in the edition of 1944. See the introduction 
xxv-xxvi of Philosophical Commentaries (1944). 
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classical British empiricists. The force of some of these 
passages will be clearer if consideration is given to the 
terms 'idea' and 'image' as used by Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume. 'Idea' in classical British empiricism considered in 
its widest sense refers to a state of consciousness involving 
sense-perception and imagination. 1 Closer specification 
requires a separate account of the usage of the terms 'idea' 
and 'image' in each of the classical British empiricists. 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in the opening sections of each of 
their major works define 'idea' in such a way that it is very 
2 
close to what they intend by the term 'image.' Passages will 
be cited in support of this contention. The initial view of 
'idea' and ~mage' will be referred to as their official view 
1James Gibson, Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its 
Historical Relations (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1917), 
p. 14. Closer specification of the usage at the outset would 
fail to be broad enough to cover what was intended by all 
three of the classical British empiricists. There is another 
usage of the term 'idea' in the 17th and 18th century in which 
writers under the revived study of Plato used 'ideas' to refer 
to 'universal notions' which revealed the spiritual nature of 
the soul. This usage, however, would be only applicable to 
the late Berkeley and not at all to Locke or Hume. Therefore, 
it need not be considered in this dissertation. 
2 The point is well made in the following quotation. 
"Notons par ailleurs que laplace attribuee a l'image dans la 
pensee, par Locke et par Hume, est si grande qu'ils n'eprovent 
pas le besoin de differencier l'image par un terme speciale. 
Chez l'un et chez l'autre, elle s'appelle 'idea', et elle 
~ardara ce nom chez les psychologues anglais." I. Myerson, 
Les Images," Nouveau Traite de Psycholo~ie, comp. Georges 
Dumas (8 vols.; Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932 , II, p. 547. It is 
to be noted that it is only Locke and Hume who are thus men-
tioned. Berkeley's usage is not as subject to this assimila-
tion of 'idea' and 'image.' 
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for purposes of discussion and comment because the closer 
analysis of the classical British empiricists in the chapters 
devoted to them will reveal fairly considerable departures 
from this usage. For purposes of classification and discus-
sion it is desirable to depart from the historical order and 
treat Locke and Hume in that order, reserving consideration 
of Berkeley's usage of the terms until last. 
Locke's official usage of the term 'idea' is that the 
term signifies "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species 
or whatever is which the mind can be employed about in think-
ing."1 This usage is notoriously broad. It may be contended 
that on the view just quoted the sun and moon are ideas, i.e. 
they are capable of being thought about. One need not, how-
ever, adopt such a radical suggestion as this to find Locke's 
usage too broad. The more common criticism is that Locke in 
the passage just quoted lumps together in his usage of the 
term 'idea' the content apprehended, the more usual signifi-
cation of the term 'idea' in such contexts, and the apprehen-
sion of the content, i.e. the perceiving.2 For the purposes 
1John Locke, Essaf Concerning Human Understandin~, ed. 
Alexander c. Fraser (2 vo s., 4 bks.; Oxford: Clarendonress, 
1894). Roman numerals in references will always refer to 
book number, not volume number. 
2E.g. Gibson, Locke's Theort, p. 19. Aaron, ever anxi-
ous to defend Locke against his crl ics, writes, however, that 
it is doubtful if "a single unambiguous instance of the expli-
cit identification of 'idea' with perceiving can be found." 
Richard I. Aaron, ~ohn Locke (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1955), pp. 88-89. Aaron's account is careful and useful, 
although one feels here and elseKhere that Locke is saved by 
Aaron's use of the term 'explicit' where so often the very 
point is that Locke is not explicit where he should have been. 
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at hand here, however, it is necessary only to show that in 
one signification of several, Locke intends by the term 'idea' 
the term 'image.• This comes out clearly in the following 
famous passage: 
Let us suppose then the mind to be, as we say, white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How 
comes it to be furnished? ••• Whence has it all the 
materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in 
one word, from ex~erience •••• First, our Senses, con-
versant about par lcular sensible objects, do convey 
into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, 
according to those various ways wherein those objects do 
affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of 
yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet. 1 
In the chapter from which this quotation is cited and the one 
immediately following are laid down the principles of British 
empiricism. It is not, however, to extract these principles 
that this passage has been quoted. The last line of the 
quoted passage leaves no doubt that here Locke intends by the 
term 'idea' the term 'image.' For Locke, then, 'idea' is the 
more comprehensive term and 'images' are included under the 
term 1idea.• 2 
Hume's official usage or the terms 'idea' and 'image' 
is given in the following passage: 
1 Locke, Essay~ I, chap. 1, (Italics in original.) 
sees. 2-3, pp. 122-123. 
2other passages might easily be cited in which 'image' 
and 'idea' tend to be equated for Locke. This is particularly 
the case where Locke is discussing memory and imagination. cr • 
.OonaldJ<l'. O'Connor, John Locke (London: Penguin Books, 1952), 
p. 35 for this point. 
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All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves 
into two distinct kinds, which I shall call impressions 
and ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the 
degree or force and liveliness with which they strike 
upon the mind, and make their way into our thought and 
consciousness. Those perceptions which enter with most 
force and violence, we may name impressions; and under 
this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and 
emotions, as they make their first appearance in the 
soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in think-
ing and reasoning. 1 
There are well-known difficulties in this seemingly clear-cut 
distinction. between impressions and ideas, but they need not 
be treated at this point. For the purpose at hand, the 
important point to note is that Hume makes a distinction which 
he feels should have been preserved by Locke,2 viz. that the 
term 'idea' should not include all perceptions. Locke's 
'ideas' then are halved by Hume into 'impressions' and 'ideas.' 
Hume's 'ideas' have as their contemporary analogues the terms 
'idea' and 'image'; his term 'impression' has as its contem-
porary analogue the terms 'sensation' and 'perception.' Hume 
himself did not particularly like the term 'perception' but 
found no other suitable name "either in English or any other 
language. "3 Hume 's 'impressions ' and 1 ideas 1 are the 
1 Hume, Treatise, Bk. I, Pt. 1, sec. 1, p. 1. 
2cf. footnote on the following page in which Hume com-
ments that he restores "the word idea to its original sense 
from which Mr. Locke had perverted it." Ibid., p. 2. 
3Ibid., pp. 2-3. Edwin G. Boring, A History of 
Experimen~Psychology (2d ed.; New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts Inc., l950), p. 188 discusses the relation of Hume's 
terminology or contemporary psychology. 
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respective experiences themselves; they are not defined 
physiologically or by means of reference to external objects. 
Berkeley's official usage of the term 'idea' is that 
an idea 1 is a sensory object •. The important distinction to 
be noted here is between Berkeley's 'ideas of sense' and 
'ideas of imagination.' The following passage will bring out 
the distinction. 
It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the ob-jects of knowledge, that they are either ideas actually 
imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived 
by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, 
or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, 
either compounding, dividing or barely representing those 
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. 2 
There is an ambiguity, doubtless deliberate, in this passage. 
The phrase 'such as' may mean either •such ideas' or 'such 
objects.' The interpretation to be followed here is that the 
reference is to the latter rather than the former.3 On this 
1Luce comments that "Berkeley always means by 'idea' 
a sensory object." Editor's footnote in Berkeley, "Princi-
ples, 11 Works, II, Pt. 1, sec. 1, p. 41. 
2Ibid. 
3cf. footnote by the editor cited above and, further, 
A. A. Luce Berkeley's Immaterialism (London: Thomas Nelson 
Ltd., 1945~, pp. 39=46. Recent Berkeley scholarship by Luce 
and Jessop has made views put forth prior to their work sus-
pect unless care is exercised to see that such views do not 
conflict with their results. This is particularly true of 
interpretations of Berkeley that depend upon use of Philoso-
phical Commentaries. For one problem in particular, of some 
concern in this dissertation, viz. Berkeley's polemic against 
abstract ideas, this is of somelmoment, since Berkeley's 
polemic is seen in the making in Philosophical Commentaries. 
At this point, the interpretation of Luce, as opposed to 
Fraser, will be accepted and the reasons for this acceptance 
will be presented in the chapter devoted to Berkeley as the 
occasion requires. 
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interpretation, the 'objects of knowledge' fall into three 
classes: (1) ideas of sense; (2) "such as are perceived by 
attending to the passions and operations of the mind" and 
(3) "ideas formed by help of memory and imagination." It is 
the third class that requires explication at this point. 
These 'ideas of imagination' are examined in sections twenty-
eight to thirty-three of the Principles. The following 
passage coupled with the passage just cited give Berkeley's 
official view of the relation of 'ideas' and 'images.' 
The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of 
Nature are called real things: and those excited in 
the imagination being less regular, vivid and constand, 
are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, 
which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, 
be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless 
ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived 
by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. 1 
Discussion of the terms 'idea' and 'image' in the 
classical British empiricists may now be drawn together by 
the following remarks. The term 'idea' is crucial for all 
three but it has1not been shown that it is crucial for the 
same reasons. Nothing has been done thus far to explicate 
the term. For the moment it is best to treat it as a techni-
cal term, i.e. a term not involving the usual associations 
that contemporary thought gives to it. The usage of the term 
'idea' can be dealt with separately in each thinker as the 
occasion arises. What has been shown, however, is that the 
terms 'idea' and 'image' coincide in one important usage for 
1Berkeley, "Principles, 11 Works, II, Pt. 1, sec. 33, 
p. 54. (Italics in original.) 
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each of the classical British empiricists. To mark this 
usage the term 'idea-image' will be used. From this usage 
it is not to be inferred that the signification of the term 
is necessarily the same for all the classical British empiri-
cists. For this reason, the term will never be used without 
specifying which of the classical British empiricists is 
under discussion unless the context renders the application 
1 
of the term unambiguous. 
Locke, of the three classical British empiricists, is 
the least obviously an imagist. His official position, no 
doubt, is best called conceptualism, i.e. "concepts refer to 
abstract ••• envisaged by the mind but having no metaphysical 
2 
status." Imagism, although present, is latent and not 
explicit in his system. There is a twofold justification, 
however, for treating his imagism. In the first place, his 
1 The term 'idea-image' is borrowed from G. A. 
Johnston, Develo ment of Berkele 's Philoso h (London: Mac-
millan and o., 2 , p. and pass m in reference to 
Berkeley. The term is also used by Luce, Berke1ey's Immater-
ialism and John Oulton Wisdom, Unconscious Ori in of Berkele 's 
Philosophi (London: Hogarth Press, 95 • The extension o 
the term n this dissertation to Locke and Hume is a natural 
one; the same problem or reference that makes it useful in 
discussing Berkeley by parity of case makes it useful in dis-
cussing Locke and Hume. 
2Ledger Wood, "Conceptualism," Dictionary of Philoso-
£hX, ed. Runes, p. 61. There are other senses of conceptual-
IBm, some of which are cited in the article just quoted. For 
the initial expository purposes at hand here, the definition 
given will suffice. It is not to be inferred that imagism and 
conceptualism are necessarily incompatible; it is maintained 
here that Locke is more often conceptualist than imagist. 
influence on Berkeley, and to a lesser extent on Hume, was 
immense. For one problem with which this dissertation is 
concerned, it is essential to consider Locke, and this for 
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the following reason. Berkeley and Hume try to refute 
Locke's doctrine of the abstract general idea. The question 
arises immediately as to what exactly Locke held and whether 
the refutation is a refutation of a straw man. Now the 
problem of abstract general ideas is inextricably bound up 
with imagism. It can be shown, and this is perhaps the more 
important point, that an argument crucial to Locke's empiricism 
and British empiricism in general is closely tied up with the 
problems of imagism. It is only this second contention that 
will be examined at this point. 
Consider the following passage: 
When the understanding is once stored with these simple 
ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite 
them, even to an almost infinite variet~ and so can make 
at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the 
power of the most exalted wit or enlarged understanding 
••• to invent or frame one new simple idea •••• I would 
have anyone try to fancy any taste which had never 
affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had 
never smelt; and when he can do this, I will also con-
clude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf 
man distinct notions of sounds. 1 
This passage is fundamental as evidence for empiricism. Simple 
ideas are essential to British empiricism; they are being dis-
cussed in this passage. Without simple ideas it would be easy 
to overthrow British empiricism. The refutation would consist 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 2, sec. 2, pp. 145-146. 
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in citing a complex idea, e.g. a golden mountain, and point-
ing out that such an idea is not derived from experience. 
The answer of British empiricism to such a contention is to 
mark a distinction between simple ideas and complex ideas. 
The golden mountain of the foregoing example is a complex 
idea composed of simple ideas. The critical position for 
British empiricism to defend is that all simple ideas are 
derived from experience; the classical British empiricists 
were very well aware of this. There are notorious problems 
and endless discussions in the literature concerning the issues 
raised by this contention. With some of these issues this 
dissertation will perforce be concerned later. For the pre-
sent, however, it is to be noted that the 'simple idea' in 
the foregoing passage is an idea-image. Locke denies in this 
passage that anyone could "frame the idea of a scent he had 
never smelt." Locke, in other words, is denying that 'idea-
images' can occur prior to experience. Whether all simple 
ideas are idea-images may be left for fuller discussion. 
The reason for discussing Locke as an imagist is now 
clearer. A fundamental contention of British empiricism is 
at stake and the issue is first raised in Locke. This funda-
mental issue is closely connected with images and thus 
requires treatment in this investigation. Two passages from 
the Essay may be cited which are concerned with image-think-
ing, although full analysis of them is best left to a later 
point. In the first of these passages, simple ideas are 
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again under discussion and the major purpose of the passage 
is to show that the understanding (in Locke's sense) is 
passive in receiving such simple ideas. 
These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the under-
standing can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they 
are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones it-
self, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the 
images or ideas which the objects set before it do there-
in produce. 1 
Here again is illustrated the identification of the 'idea' and 
the 'image.' Furthermore, and this is of considerable moment 
for future discussion, Locke does not say in this passage that 
when the simple ideas are "offered to the mind" they are 
offered in their simplicity. Here is the bone of contention. 
The charge of psychological atomism leveled commonly at 
British empiricism is here at stake. According to some of its 
critics, British empiricism to make its case seems to require 
simple ideas, given as simple ("offered to the mind"). It is 
furthermore contended that this is psychologically false to 
experience. The question of psychological simples is one 
with which this dissertation will have to be concerned, for 
prima facie the psychological simple is close to the image. 
In the passage below Locke is concerned directly with image-
thinking. He writes: 
And that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and 
verbal propositions separately is, that most men, if not 
all, in their thinking and reasoning within themselves, 
make use of words instead of ideas; at least when the sub-ject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas. 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. l, sec. 25, pp. 142-143. 
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Which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncer-
tainty of our ideas of that kind, and may ••• serve for 
a mark to show us what are those things we have clear 
and perfect established ideas of, and what not. For if 
we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in 
thinking and reasoning we shall find ••• that when we 
make any propositions within our thoughts about white or 
black, sweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can 
and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves, 
without reflecting on the names. But when we would con-
sider ••• propositions about more complex ideas ••• we 
usually put the name for the idea: because the ideas 
these names stand for, being for the part imperfect, con-
fused, and undetermined, we reflect on the names them-
selves, because they are more clear, certain, and 
distinct, and readier to occur to our thoughts than the 
pure ideas. 1 
The distinction between image-thinking and verbal thinking is 
clearly drawn in t~is passage. Secondly, image-thinking is 
asserted here when dealing with what Locke calls "mental 
propositions." In the third place, Locke contends in this 
passage that such image-thinking occurs only with a certain 
class of cases, best left unspecified for the moment, as 
images are "imperfect, confused, and undetermined." It is in 
the light of such a passage that it was suggested above that 
it is better at the outset not to contend that Locke is an 
imagist as the term has been used in this dissertation. Never-
theless, for the reasons given above his views require the 
chapter which will be devoted to them. 
Clear-cut examples of imagism are to be found more 
easily in Berkeley than in Locke. One such example, the 
passage containing the main arguments against Locke's abstract 
1Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 5, sec. 4, p. 245. 
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general ideas, will suffice. 
Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstract-
ing their ideas, they best can tell: for myself, I find 
indeed I have it not. I find indeed I have a faculty of 
imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those 
particular things I have perceived, and of variously 
compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with 
two heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the body 
of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, 
each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of 
the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it 
must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the 
idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a 
white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, 
a tall, or a low or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any 
effort of thought conceive the abstract ideaooove des-
cribed. And it is equally impossible for me to form the 
abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving, 
and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor 
rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other 
abstract general ideas whatsoever. 1 
In this passage Berkeley uses the term 'imagine' three times. 
In this section the argument really turns on whether in fact 
imaging is thought, i.e. that thought proceeds by means of 
images. He remarks in the above quoted passage that he "can-
not by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above 
described." What he cannot imagine, he cannot conceive. The 
fundamental assumption in this argument, whether obvious to 
Berkeley or not, is that the meaning of a thought is carried 
by an image. Without an image, there is no thought. An 
abstract general idea has no such image; it is therefore, 
ipso facto, meaningless. Grant this assumption to Berkeley 
and his argument in the above passage is irrefutable. 
p. 29. 
1Berkeley, "Principles," Works, II, intro., sec. 10, 
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As with Berkeley, one clear-cut instance of imagism 
inHume is sufficient. Hume's discussion of abstract ideas 
offers a suitable example. Over the issue of abstract general 
ideas Hume sides with Berkeley against Locke. Hume calls 
Berkeley's contribution to the subject "one of the greatest 
and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years 
in the republic of letters."1 Hume, in the lines just pre-
ceding the passage to be quoted, offers arguments which he 
2 hopes will put the matter "beyond all doubt and controversy." 
To accomplish this aim, Hume tries to establish two proposi-
tions. It is the first of these propositions that may be 
appropriately quoted. Says Hume: "the mind cannot form any 
notion of quantity or quality without forming a precise 
notion of degrees of each."3 The first of three arguments by 
which Hume hopes to establish this proposition says in part: 
We have observed that whatever objects are different are 
distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distin-
guishable are separable by the thought and imagination ••• 
But it is evident at first sight, that the precise length 
of a line is not different nor distinguishable from the 
line itself; not the precise degree of any quality from 
quantity. These ideas, therefore, admit no more of 
separation than they do of distinction and difference.4 
1 Hume, Treatise, I, sec. 7, p. 17. 




'Objects' in the first line of the above quotation refers to 
objects of the mind, i.e. what today would be called •sense 
data.• Now for Hume 'ideas' are 'images.• The passage has 
its puzzling aspects, but these may be glossed over. What is 
clear, however, is that Hume's clever instance of the line and 
the length of line are admirably suited to his purpose, viz. 
of citing a case in which thought presumably cannot proceed 
without 'images.' 
CHAPTER II 
IMAGERY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY AND 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THINKING 
Introduction 
The organization of this chapter is dictated by the 
logical significance of the topics treated to the imagism of 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume rather than by historical considera-
tions. In Section One a distinction will be drawn between 
analytical and experimental psychology as sources of evidence 
for psychology of imagery. The general methodology of experi-
mental psychology will be discussed. In Section Two the main 
lines of the doctrine of associationism will be presented and 
it will be shown that, although the coordinates have changed 
the doctrine has a fundamental unity and is of permanent 
historical importance. Next, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume will 
be considered as precursors of associationism. This discus-
sion will be useful for two reasons--first as a means of 
showing the relation of classical British empiricism to the 
controversy in later times over imageless thought, an 
immediate consideration for this chapter; secondly, such a 
discussion will form a background for later chapters dis-
cussing the empiricism and theories of perception of the 
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classical British empiricists, subjects relevant to their 
imagism. Finally, the imageless thought controversy will 
be discussed. This controversy is relevant because the 
protagonists of imageless thought were criticizing associa-
tionism. 
In Section Three the position of Titchener on the 
imageless thought controversy will be discussed. Titchener•s 
context theory of meaning will then be presented and the 
affiliation with Berkeley's theory will be considered. In 
Section Four the psychology of the image process will be 
discussed. Images will be classified and the doctrine of 
imaginal types rejected. The possibility of visualization as 
a source for the epistemologies of the classical British 
empiricists will be introduced, but full discussion of this 
matter will be left for later chapters. Finally the role of 
imagery in generalization will be discussed and certain 
suggestions will be put forward as to the role of imagery 
in mental life as a whole. 
1. Analytical and Experimental Psychology 
In this chapter several lines of psychological 
thought relevant to this investigation are considered. Cer-
tain historical and methodological considerations concerning 
psychology may first be commented upon. "Psychology has a 
long past but only a short history."1 Put more prosaically, 
1 Boring, Hist. of Experimental Psych., p. ix. 
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this quotation indicates that psychology as a science dates 
1 from about 1860, less than 100 years ago, whereas its "long 
past" goes back to Aristotle and earlier. This historical 
fact has caused a certain division in attitude among psycho-
logists themselves. To mark this division in attitude the 
terms 'analytical psychology' and 'experimental psychology' 
will be used. 2 A preliminary discussion of this difference 
in attitude may be attempted at this point, leaving the 
studies to be cited from the two traditions to mark more fully 
the differences. 
Analytical psychologists have remained closer to one 
of the parents of contemporary psychology, viz. philosophy.3 
Such psychologists are more acutely aware of the epistemologi-
.... 
cal theories which were the original raison d'etre of psycho-
4 logical study. Further there are differences in the subject 
1This is the date of publication of Fechner's Elemente, 
a work made famous because of its psychophysical investigations. 
This was not, however, Fechner's intention. Boring, Hist. of 
Experimental Ps~ch., pp. 275-296. The date 1860 is given by 
Boring in the a ove book and by R. s. Woodworth, Experimental 
Psycholo~y (lst ed.; New York: Holt and Co., 1938) as the con-
venient ate to mark the founding of experimental psychology. 
2George Humphrey, Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1951), 
passim uses this terminology. FOr what are here called 
'Analytic psychologists' Boring uses the term 'philosopher-
psychologists. 1 
3The other parent of contemporary psychology is 
physiology. 
4stout is a good example of an analytic psychologist. 
One of his best-known psychological books is Analytic Psychology. 
(G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology [2 vols.; London: Swan 
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matter and method of analytical psychology as compared with 
experimental psychology. Analytical psychology has as its 
subject matter presentations, i.e. the world is perceived 
through the medium of presentations, which are either images 
or sensations. Mental life is, speaking roughly, the manipu-
lation of such presentations. Not only is this presentational 
psychology still current {particularly in Great Britain), but 
it was also the psychological framework within which the 
British empiricists, Titchener, and the Wftrzburg school of 
1 imageless thought operated. The change in the climate of 
opinion in American psychology that makes this analysis seem 
somewhat obscure is primarily a change in the subject matter 
of psychology. In recent years the subject matter of psycho-
logy is no longer consciousness butconduct, i.e. psychology 
Sonnenschein, 1896]). The term •analytic' in reference to 
psychology has no obvious relation to the term used as a 
description for the philosophical movement stemming from 
Russell, Moore,. and Wittgenstein nor for its usage in psy-
choanalysis as a method of therapy. The general psychologi-
cal sense of the term •analysis' is the determination of the 
constituents of a total complex experience or mental process 
into its elements. In this sense, the classical British 
empiricists were clearly analytical. It is to be remembered, 
however, that their work was not genetic in the sense that they 
considered the development of the individual's mind in time. 
Such truly genetic accounts in psychology had to wait until 
the volutionary developments of the 19th century. Ttls is a 
major point of difference between the analytical psychology 
of the 19th and 20th centuries and the psychology of the 
classical British empiricists. G. s. Brett, A History of Psy-
chology ( 3 vols • ; London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1912-
1921), II, p. 259 mentions this. 
1The three term analysis into act, content, and object 
discussed in Chapter I is such an example of a presentational 
psychology. This particular analysis, however, usually called 
•act psychology' has a theory of meaning which would not be 
generally accepted by many who nonetheless hold to a presenta-
tional psychology. 
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has become objective. The studies of imagery to be cited in 
this chapter and later chapters were most usually performed 
some thirty or forty years ago. Such studies are often 
mentalistic, i.e. the method of obtaining the data was intro-
spective, whereas today psychology is objective; it is con-
cerned with behavior rather than mental states. 1 
From the point of view of methodology, the fundamental 
method of presentational psychology is introspective. Such a 
method is characteristic of any psychology whose subject 
matter is consciousness and its states. Nearly all of the 
psychological studies of imagery and related experiments to 
be cited in this chapter and elsewhere in this investigation 
were obtained from introspective data. As introspection, how-
2 
ever, has been vigorously challenged in modern times, it 
1This is illustrated in the fact that the edition of 
Woodworth's Exterimental Psychology, cited frequently in this 
chapter, is da ed 1938. The later edition has pruned away 
much of the material on imagery and other mentalistic inves-
tigations. The definitive contemporary handbook of experi-
mental psychology, ed. s. s. Steven~ Handbook of Experimental 
Psychology (New York: Wiley, 1951), only uses the term 1imag-
ery1 once in its subject index and contains no references to 
studies of imagery. 
2watson, although not the first critic of introspec-
tion, may be taken as the most vociferous. He wrote: "The 
time seems to have come when psychology must discard all 
reference to consciousness; when it no longer need delude 
into thinkillfi that it is making mental states the object of 
observation. Quoted in R. S. Woodworth, Contemporary 
Schools of Psychology (lst ed.; New York: Ronald Press, 1931), 
p. 70. 
would seem desirable to comment upon this method, suggest its 
epistemological ramifications, and finally to take a general 
position on ita validity. 
Two types of introspection may be distinguished, 
inspection and retrospection. Inspection is the study of 
conscious states at the time of their occurrence; items of 
consciousness like images, sense-data, and emotional and 
1 
affective data may be said to be inspected. Retrospection 
is the recovery of past mental states by an act of mind, i.e. 
memory may be sa~d to be retrospective. The problem of 
introspection may be stated in terms of inspection; the prob-
lem is applicable mutatis mutandis to retrospection. The 
problem of introspection is the following: 
(1) In introspection, e.g. perception, must the 
mind also perceive the perception to know that 
perception has been had? 
To reply affirmatively to (1) would appear to establish an 
infinite regress and there are good and well-known reasons to 
objecting to such a regress. To reply negatively to (1), in 
other words, to deny such a regress, creates another problem 
which may be stated as follows: 
1 The term 'presentational immediacy' is sometimes used 
to characterize items of consciousness which are cognitively 
directly present, i.e. as the term 'inspection' is here used. 
This latter terminology is not adopted because it is leas 
natural and, furthermore, is a term used by Whitehead and 
probably does not mean the same thing for him as it does for 
others who use the term. See Ledger Wood, "Presentational 
Immediacy," Dictionary of Philoaoahy, ed. Runes, p. 249 and 
Ledger Wood, "Introspection," Ibi ., p. 149. 
64 
(2) Why, if the mind perceives its own perceptions, 
is true knowledge of one's own mind so diffi-
cult to come by? 
It may be agreed by all parties in the dispute that such know-
ledge is difficult to come by; the problem is why this is the 
1 
case. As stated in epistemological contexts the problem is: 
(3) How can subject be object to itself? 
James, Russell, and the nee-realists fought this battle some 
twenty-five years ago in the issue of the possibility of the 
mind's awareness of an awareness. 
Psychologists, who operate within a framework of 
ideas developed since psychology became objective and experi-
mental may be called 'experimental psychologists.' A science 
becomes a science not by its subject matter but by its method. 
Psychology is no exception to this rule. Experimentation in 
psychology has the usual scientific desiderata: control of 
the conditions in which the event being studies occurs; the 
timing of the occurrence of the event to be studied to allow 
the experimenter to be prepared; the possibility of repeti-
tion of the experiment; and the possibility of systematically 
varying the conditions. It would seem superfluous to mention 
this, were it not for the fact that the imageless thought 
controversy, one concern of this chapter, was in part brought 
about by questions concerning the legitimacy of the intro-
spective data obtained. 
1 Boring, Hist. of Exterimental Psychology, pp. 163-
164, p. 175 comments upon th s problem. The discussion here 
is indebted to him. 
The distinction suggested in the foregoing is not to 
be taken as one of praise or blame for either of these two 
attitudes in psychology; the methods are complementary. The 
method of methodological behaviorism overplayed the hand in 
1 
ruling out all reference to the data of consciousness, and 
it is the methodological behaviorism of the early years of 
the century that denied all validity to introspection. It may 
2 be that in the future operationism will contrive in some 
fashion to objectify the data of imagery and other such mental-
istic phenomena; in the absence, however, of such results, the 
sensible course seems to accept introspective data as being 
the only data available for certain problems. It is a matter 
of historical fact that some of the fiercest debates over 
1As a matter of fact, even the behaviorism of Watson 
smuggled in conscious data in the use of so-called 'verbal 
reports.' See Woodworth, Contemporary Schools, p. 82ff. for 
discussion of this point. 
2operationism in psychology is commonly associated 
with a behavioristic point of view. Operationism, however, is 
much more sophisticated concerning the problems and conse-
quences of its tenets than was the behaviorism of Watson in 
the early years of the century. In psychology it amounts to 
the contention that the definition of such concepts as mind, 
sensation, and perception, to be meaningful as positivism under-
stands meaningfulness, must be in terms of differential behav-
iors, verbal reports and discriminations. See Boring's discus-
sion in Hist. of Experimental Ps~ch. in a chapter entitled 
"Behavioristicst," pp. 62o-664.r. also the classic paper by 
S. S. Stevens, 'Psychology and the Science of Science," Read-
ings in the Philoso~h~ of Science, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New 
York: Scribner's, 1 5 ), pp. 158-184. This paper contains an 
annotated bibliography of all important publications to 1939, 
by which time the movement had all its important characteris-
tics to date. Cf. also Carroll C. Pratt, The Logic of Modern 
Psychology (New York: Macmillan Co., 1939), passim. The 
attitude taken in this investigation toward operationism will 
be spelled out somewhat more fully at a later point in this 
chapter. 
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introspection as a method in psychology stemmed directly from 
the controversy over imageless thought and the lack of agree-
ment on the data by well-trained observers. It is with some 
of these questions that this chapter is in part concerned; 
fortunately it will not be necessary to settle these issues. 
It is enough to be aware that final answers, acceptable to all 
observers, are not easy to obtain in questions involving 
imagery and related concepts. 
2. Associationism and Imageless Thought 
The doctrine of associationism is "the name of a 
principle of explanation put forward by an important group of 
1 
thinkers to account generally for the facts of mental life." 
The foregoing definition, framed by an analytical psychologist, 
can be extended to cover the conditions under which events 
arise, either in experience or in behavior. Association, in 
the psychological sense, is the "phenomenon of connection or 
2 
union between any two i terns of consciousness." There are 
two quite distinctoonnections to be considered under associa-
tion: first, the so-called natural (or original) connections 
la. c. Robertson, "Association," Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica (9th ed.; New York: Funk-.Wagnalls, 1890) , II, p. 730. 
ThiS account is excellent for its discussion of the epistemo-
logical aspects of the theory of association as opposed to the 
purely psychological. 
2Ledger Wood, "Association," Dictionary of Philosophy, 
ed. Runes, p. 25. The distinction of natural and acquired con-
nection mentioned below is modified from wood's statement. 
between sensations which together form a perception; and 
secondly, the acquired connection whereby a sensation or 
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idea-image tends to reinstate a previous idea. Although any 
one thinker may not subscribe to all aspects of the doctrine, 
it may conveniently be discussed under three aspects: sensa-
tionalism, mechanism, and atomism.1 Sensationalism is the 
doctrine that all knowledge is ultimately derived from sense 
experience. The mechanism and atomism of the theory of 
associationism are brought out in the following quotations: 
The association theory, where it stands by its own 
principles, represents all mental events, simple or 
complex, as collocations of generically unchanged 
elements resulting from the elementary stimulation of 
the organism. 2 
An analytic psychologist of the end of the 19th century dis-
cussed the theory in the following way: 
Carried to its full extent, this conception might fairly 
be called that of psychical atomism; for on the whole in 
its two fundamental features it presents a strong resem-
blance to the physical doctrine of atoms: in the first 
place the elements are simple and retain throughout their 
original character; and in the second place the combina-
tion which occurs among them is represented as being of 
the general nature called mechanical. 3 
1George Humphrey, Thinking (New York: Wiley, 1951), 
chap. 1 passim discusses the doctrine from this point of view. 
Traditional discussions of associationism are concerned with 
the so-called laws of association. There is, however, little 
unanimity in the accounts of what the laws of association are. 
Thus it is inadvisable to try to discuss the doctrine from 
this point of view. Two of the most famous statements of the 
laws in slightly varying accounts are those of Aristotle and 
Hume. Aristotle's account will be mentioned in a footnote to 
follow, and Hume's account more fully treated in this chapter. 
2Ibid., p. 7. 
3R. Adamson, Development of Modern PhilosophB (2 vols.; 
London: Wm. Blackwood and Sons Inc., 1903), II, p. 1 7. 
The later history of associationism may be briefly 
summarized by reference to the history of psychology itself 
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in modern times. The tendency of psychology has been to 
change the focus of interest from the study of mental states, 
i.e. consciousness, to the study of objective behavior and 
conduct. Associationism has paralleled this general develop-
ment within psychology. 
stem from the Pavlovian 
Modern versions of associationism 
1 
conditioned reflex. Behavioristic 
systems, which may be viewed here as elaborations of a 
Pavlovian system, attempt to explain all mental phenomena in 
terms of interaction of the organism and its environment via 
the mechanism of associationism. Associationism, thus, is of 
whole cloth. The coordinates have changed, but the older 
associationism and contemporary associationism can be seen as 
1 Put in its simplest terms conditioning is the study 
of the process whereby a response comes to be elicited by a 
stimulus (object of situation) other than that to which it is 
the normal or natural (i.e. unacquired) response. The term 
'conditioning' was originally applied to reflexes, i.e. fixed 
and ineradicable forms of response such as sneezing, salivat-
ing, coughing, but later was extended to include otherforms 
of response than mere reflexive modes of behavior. The term 
'conditioned reflex' is commonly met with, although the term 
'conditioned response' would be more accurate. There is one 
major difference, however, between Pavlovian theory and the 
associationism that will occasionally be discussed through-
out this investigation. According to Pavlovian theory, a 
repeated conditioned reflex gradually disappears, even when 
reinforced, whereas inHume's associationism, the version of 
consequence for this investigation, this is not the case. 
For several other differences of less importance see 
Humphrey, Thinking, p. 28. 
the same doctrine by the proper translation of terms from 
one framework to another.1 
The classical British empiricists neither founded 
this theory, nor did they fully formulate it.2 If it seems 
desirable to tag them in connection with the theory they may 
be called its precursors. They are, however, important in 
its history because the most famous analytically derived 
criticisms of associationism are often directed at them. 
Furthermore, discussion of their views on the role of images 
in mental life may be initially considered most profitably 
after some discussion of their associationism. 
Locke's contribution to associationism may be con-
sidered from the point of view of a chapter, "On Association 
1 A good brief account of conditioning is found in 
Woodworth, Exterimental Psych., pp. 92-123. The rise of be-
havioristicss chronicled with full notes in Boring, Hist. 
of Experimental Psych., pp. 620-663. The suggestions in the 
last paragraph are indebted to Humphery, Thinking, chap. 1 
passim. 
2Aristotle may be called the founder because of his 
list of the laws of association (similarity, contiguity, and 
contrast) as the method of reviving memories. Aristotle, 
"De Memoria," Aristotle's Psycholo~;v", tr. and ed. w. A. 
Hammond (London: George Allen andnwin Ltd., 1902), pp. 205-
207. Hobbes may be called a second founder because of his 
discussion of trains of thought in Leviathan, chaps. 1 and 2, 
and Human Nature, chaps. 2 and 3. H. C. warren, History of 
the Association Psychology (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 
1921), pp. 23-26 neatly summarizes Hobbes' contribution to the 
subject. Associationism in its full formulation is usually 
dated from David Hartley's Observations on Man, 1749. On this 
last matter, cf. Boring, Hist. EXperimental Psych., pp. 193-
194 and Warren, Hist. of Assoc. Psych., p •. l5. Hartley is a 
contemporary of Hume, a point not without interest. 
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of Ideas," added to the fourth edition of the Essay in 1700.1 
The crucial passage in this chapter runs as follows: 
Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and 
connexion one with another: it is the office and excel-
lency of our reason to trace these, and hold them toget-
her in that union and correspondence which is founded in 
their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another 
connexion of ideas wholly owing to change or custom. 
Ideas that in themselves are not all of kin, come to be 
so united in some men's minds, that it is very hard to 
separate them; they always keep company, and the one no 
sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its 
associates appear with it; and if they are more than two 
which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, 
show themselves together. 2 
The first and second sentences of the above quotation illus-
trate the dual meaning of the term •association,' referring 
to natural and acquired associations respectively. In writers 
after Locke, the term 'association' has tended to be restricted 
to acquired associations.3 As has been pointed out, Locke's 
usage of the term 'idea' is very wide. The usage of the 
term 'idea' in later writers has tended to have been fixed 
by Hume's usage, which although retaining the term, narrowed 
the field of application to include only representative data, 
4 i.e. images (and thoughts). For this reason, the doctrine 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 33, pp. 527-535. 
the facts and interpretations of classical British 
and its relation to associationism in this chapter 
from Warren, Hist. Assoc. Psych., passim. This is 






2 Ibid., sec. 5, p. 529. (Italics in original.) 
3wood, "Association," Diet. of Phil., ed. Runes, p. 
25 makes the point. 
4 Warren, Hist. Assoc. Psych., p. 5. 
of associationism was somewhat weakened as later writers 
l 
tended to neglect sensation altogether in their accounts. 
Furthermore, as sections of the chapter other than those 
quoted show, Locke conceived the problem of association in 
ethical and pedagogical terms. His real purpose is to show 
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how human error arises through wrong judgments and to offer 
practical advice as to how such error may be avoided. There 
are in this chapter keen practical insights and odd bits of 
lore that give the chapter a unique interest even after one 
hundred and fifty years.2 The chapter on "The Association 
of Ideas" may be taken as Locke's principal contribution to 
associationism. Here his contribution is in fixing the term, 
and, in the passage cited, discussing the mode of association 
of ideas, for ideas associated by "natural correspondence" 
and by "chance or custom" could be easily resolved into 
association by similarity and contrast respectively, although 
Locke himself does not take the step.3 
1warren, Hist. Assoc. Psych., p. 5. 
2Brett, Hist. of Psych., II, p. 264 comments that ~. 
the physician, displays himself in this chapter. If this be 
the case, it is of some interest, since Locke seldom shows this 
side of himself. Locke in general avoids physiology (for ex-
ample, in dealing with sensation the physiology is passed over) 
and this would seem a natural s~ect for a physician to deal 
with. (In reference to his treatment of sensation this, of 
course, maybe explained as a well-founded feeling of ignorance 
about the matter.) 
3warren, Hist. Assoc. Psych., p. 38 comments upon this. 
Warren also exhaustively covers other passages:in the Essay 
which bear upon associationism. As these passages are mostly 
in the way of suggestion and contain nothing that is not more 
clearly dealt with inHume, they will not be discussed here. 
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Berkeley's principal contributions to psychology are 
his "new principle," i.e. his denial of matter as such and 
affirmation of ideas as the immediate reality; his theory of 
visual space-perception; and his theory of meaning. These 
are closely interrelated and are all dependent on or connected 
with his imagism. These matters will be dealt with fully in 
the chapter devoted to Berkeley. His contribution to asso-
ciationism is only in the nature of adumbration; it has no 
particular elements of originality, nor is there anything 
found in it that is not stated better inHume. Several illus-
trative passages may be quoted, however, showing his relation 
1 to associationist doctrines. Berkeley's contribution to 
the doctrine of associationism may be viewed as a contribu-
tion to the modes of association, i.e. to the natural and 
acquired connections which join sensations and perceptions. 
Berkeley's term for the associative process is suggestion. In 
the New Theory of Vision he writes: 
Distance is suggested to the mind by the mediation of 
some other idea, which is itself perceived in the act 
of seeing •••• That one idea may suggest another to the 
mind, it will suffice that they have been observed to 
go together, without any demonstration of the necessity 
of their coexistence. 2 
The modes of association of successive ideas for Berkeley are 
1 Warren, Hist. Assoc. Psych., pp. 40-42 collects 
together a large number of such passages. The passages here 
quoted are taken from his collection as most typical of 
Berkeley's associationism. 
2 Berkeley, Works, I, sec. 16, p. 174 and sec. 25, p. 176. 
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similarity, causality, and coexistence or continuity. These 
three modes are brought out in the following passage from 
the Theory of Vision Vindicated: 
In certain cases a sign may suggest its correlate as an 
image, in others as an effect, in others a cause. But 
where there is no such relation of similarity, causality, 
nor any necessary connection whatsoever, two things by 
their mere coexistence, or two ideas merely by being 
perceived together, may suggest or signify one the 
other. 1 
Hume•s principal contribution to associationism lies 
in his attempt to produce a complete classification of the 
modes of association. In this he claims originality. He 
writes: 
Though it be too obvious to escape observation that 
different ideas are connected together, I do not find 
that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or 
class all the principles of association--a subject, how-
ever that seems worthy of curiosity. 2 
Hume continues: "To me there appear to be only three princi-
ples of connexion among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguitl 
in Time or Place, and Cause or Effect. ,,3 
Concerning the nature of the connection between sue-
cessive ideas Hume writes: 
1 
Berkeley, Works, I, sec. 39, p. 264. 
2 David Hume, An En uir Human Understand-
ing (Chicago: Open Cour , , sec. , p. 22. Italics n 
original.) Warren suggests that probably Hume was not aware 
of Aristotle's earlier attempt at classification. Warren, 
Hist. Assoc. Psych., p. 43. 
3Ibid. 
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It is evident that there is a principle of connection 
between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, 
and that in their appearance to the memory or imagina-
tion they introduce each other with a certain degree 
of method and regularity. l 
It is in the Treatise that Hume specifies more fully, although 
not without his doctrine having been variously interpreted, 
the nature of this connection. The important passages may be 
quoted, interspersed with transitional connections. "Were 
ideas entirelymose and unconnected, chance alone would join 
them," but as "the same simple ideas ••• fall regularly into 
complex ones" it is necessary to assume "some bond of union 
among them, some associating quality, by which one idea 
naturally introduces another."2 Continuing the description 
Hume writes: 
This uniting principle among ideas is not to be consid-
ered as an inseparable connexion ••• nor yet are we to 
conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two 
ideas; ••• But we are only to regard it as a gentle 
force, which commonly ·prevails. 3 
Later in this section this 'gentle force' is described as "a 
kind of Attraction, which in the mental world will be found to 
have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to show 
itself in as many and as various forms."4 Thus, for Hume, 
1David Hume, An Enruirf Concerning Human Understand-(Chicago: Open Court,912 , sec. 3 p. 21. 
2Hume, Treatise, I, sec. 4, p. 10. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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association is a dynamic and causal mode of connection. The 
causal connection, however, Hume later reduces to a purely 
mental relation. Says Hume: "Reason can never shew us the 
connection of one object with another, tho'·.aided by experi-
ence, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all 
past instances."1 The principles of the mode of association 
between successive ideas thus virtually reduces from three to 
two: resemblance and customary contiguity in experience. 
Hume's doctrine of association, viewed purely as a psychologi-
cal doctrine, anticipates not the "mental chemistry" of John 
Stuart Mill, but mental mechanics. A further anticipation of 
later psychological doctrine comes about in connection with 
Hume's doctrine of association as a "gentle force." The later 
notion was, as Boring puts it, "that associations are tenden-
cies in that they do not always occur and must therefore be 
dealt with statistically,"2 and this is clearly anticipated 
by Hume in the above passage. 
The psychological theory of the thought process held 
before the researches into imageless thought may be summar-
ized as follows. In general, the psychology of thought has 
been concerned about two problems: the matter (subject-
matter) and the mechanism (motor) of thought. The matter of 
thought, according to the associationist school, was 
1 Hume, Treatise, I, sec. 6, p. 92. 
2 Boring, Hist. Exper. Psycho., p. 191. 
76 
presentations, which, in the main if not completely, were 
thought of as images. The mechanism of thought was associa-
tion. Trains of thought occurred as a result of associations. 
The results of the w£rzburg school1 led to a revision in 
theory concerning both the matter and mechanism of thought. 
Before turning to the Wllrzburg schoo~ however, it 
will be useful to .discuss several well-known analytically 
derived criticisms of associationism.2 Some of these are 
important in epistemology and particularly concern empiri-
cism. The criticisms may be presented under the three main 
tenets of associationism described earlier: sensationalism, 
mechanism, and atomism. Against the sensationalism of asso-
ciationism the following points were made. In the first 
place, it was argued that the higher mental processes are not 
comprised of sense-data or images reoccurring in unchanged 
form. An image reinstated is changed. James put the point 
thus: 
1The classification of theories of the psychology of 
the thought process into 'matter' and 'mechanism' is adopted 
from Humphrey, Thinki~, passim. These are the guiding 
threads that he usesroughout to lead through the maze of 
controversy and results. It is customary to ail the propon-
ents of imageless thought 'the Wllrzburg school.' In a way 
this is inaccurate because neither Woodworth in America nor 
Binet in Franceworked in Germany, and both were of importance 
in the movement. The name, however, has stuck and it will be 
used here. 
2 Humphrey, Thinking, pp. 8-13 is the source for this 
pre-experimental critique of associationism. 
A permanently existing 'idea' or 'Vorstellung' which 
makes its appearance before the footlights of consci-
ousness at periodic intervals is as mythological an 
entity as the Jack of Spades. 1 
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Secondly, against the sensationalism of the theory, it was 
urged that sense-data or images are particular whereas 
thought is general. Bradley in 1883 gives this criticism 
classic form in his phrase "Association marries only univer-
sals."2 Associationism thus fails to explain the generality 
of thought since thought proper is not of particulars and 
according to the logic of associationism, that is all that is 
given in experience. 
Against the mechanical aspect of the theory of asso-
ciationism, it was urged that thinking is goal-directed and 
purposive whereas the clash of associations cannot explain 
this. "Thinking is motivated."3 In contemporary accounts of 
the psychology of thought phrases such as 'set' and 'deter-
mining tendency,' a legacy from the Wllrzburg school, are 
1William James, Principles of Psycholo!y (2 vola.; 
New York: Henry Holt, 1890), I, p. 236 quotedn Humphrey, 
Thinking, p. g, This is one of the most famous sentences in 
James' Principles. The criticism originated in Bradley, in 
an article in 1883, which was later to become part of the 
Principles of Logic of 1912. Bradley's critique is equally 
famous and was taken by many as definitive. But associationism 
is a perennial way of looking at the facts of mental life. 
Its strength is in part shown by its ability to withstand such 
criticism artd reappear as part of a later psychological fashion. 
It should be noted that the present investigation is not com-
mitted to a belief (or lack of belief) in the cogency of 
associationism. 
2F. H. Bradley quoted in Humphrey, Thinking, p. 12. 
3Adamson, Develop. Modern Phil., II, p. 171. 
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used to account for the directed aspects of thinking. Such 
concepts are used to avoid explanation in terms of the 
fortuitous occurrence of mechanical, blind elements. 
Finally, against the atomic aspect of associationism, 
it was urged that mental life is continuous and free flowing. 
The classic description here is from James: 
Consciousness ••• does not appear to itself chopped up 
in bits •••• It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' 
or a •stream' are the metaphors by which it is most 
naturally described. 1 
It should also be pointed out that the criticisms cited in 
discussing the sensationalism and mechanism of associationism 
are equally applicable to the atomic aspects of the theory. 
Further, the present summary is a far from exhaustive survey 
of the criticisms that have been leveled at associationism, 
although they do represent a fair cross-section of those 
that are analytically derived. 
2 The controversy over imageless thought began in 1901. 
1 James, Prin. of Psych., I, p. 239. 
2 This is the publication date of a paper by A. Mayer 
and J. Orth, "zur qualitativen Untersuchung der Association-
en," Zeitschrift PsKchologie, 1901, vol. 26, pp. 1-13. The 
printed record of t e wUrzburg school is listed in Boring, 
Hist. Exper. Ps*ch., pp. 434-435. The movement is discussed 
briefly on pp. ~1-410 of that book. The standard reference 
to the Wfirzburg school is Humphrey, Thinking, chaps. 2, 3, 4, 
where results are comprehensively and exhaustively surveyed. 
Humphrey knows this controversy better than anyone since 
Titchener (and Titchener was involved in the controversy) and 
it is unlikely that anyone will wish to go over this dreary 
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The reigning psychology prior to Kulpe and the W~rzburg school 
has been called "the psychology of content."1 This content 
psychology may be characterized as follows: It was intro-
spective; the subject-matter of psychology was consciousness. 
It was sensationalistic; sensations showed the nature of what 
consciousness was. It was atomistic and the atoms of this 
2 psychology were sensations, images, and feelings. Finally, 
it was associationistic; associationism described the princi-
ples of mental compounding by which the complex mental pro-
cesses were built up. It is within this systematic psychol-
ogy that the imageless thought controversy arose. 
literature with the meticulous care of Humphrey for some time 
to come. In the preparation of this section, secondary sources 
(particularly Boring and Humphrey) have been relied upon en-
tirely. (Even if anyone desired to do so, the publications 
emanating from the Wurzberg school are now becoming very hard 
to obtain. The relevant publications are also almost entirely 
in German.) 
1For discussion of this term, see Boring, Hist. Exter. 
Psycho., pp. 430-431. Boring contrasts this psychology wi h 
the act psychology of Brentano. In general, act psychology 
distinguished between the content of any experience and the 
act of experiencing. Act psychology is easy to characterize, 
but very complicated to discuss in detail. It would not be 
relevant to discuss it here. What is here called 'content 
psychology' is experimental, physiological psychology. It is 
sometimes called 'structuralism,' but this is confusing since 
Gestalt psychology also uses this term and the two brands of 
psychology are utterly opposed. 
2This is usually called 'elementarism' or 'elementism' 
(e.g. by Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., p. 385), but the term 
•atomsm' is accurate also as long as it is borne in mind that 
the 'atoms' of this systematic psychology are mental. This 
characterization follows Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., pp. 384-
386 with some modifications of terminology. (The principal 
modification is the one just discussed,) 
80 
The contributions of the W8rzburg school to the 
psychology of thought may be considered under two aspects 
in turn: first, the subject matter of thought, and second-
ly, the mechanism of thought. Such a classification will 
make it possible to deal with the controversy only so far as 
it is relevant to the functioning of imagery in mental life, 
the main aspect of the controversy relevant to this investi-
gation. 
The paper published in 1901, with which researches 
into the subject-matter of thought may be dated, was intended 
to bring into the laboratory a subject that traditionally had 
been discussed by logicians, viz. the classification of asso-
ciations. The traditional classification of associations 
was based upon the so-called laws of thought.1 The psycho-
logical processes of thought were supposed to mirror faith-
fully this logical classification. It was this assumption 
that was under investigation in the first paper. 
The method of experimentation, a deceptively simple 
2 
one, was that of free association to a verbal stimulus. 
l The laws of thousht of traditional logic were: (l) 
identity, that 'A is A'; (2} contradiction, that 'A is Band 
A is not B cannot both be true'; (3) and excluded middle, 
that 'A is BorA is not B'. These laws were supposed to be 
in some sense fundamental presuppositions of reasoning. 
(See Alonzo Church, "Logic, traditional," Diet. of Phil., ed. 
Runes, pp. 181-182.) 
2 This is sometimes called the •train of thought experi-
ment.' A train of thought is a sequence of associated ideas 
and images. This type of continuous free association is to be 
distinguished from the variety in which the subject responds 
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10' was asked to respond to the stimulus word by a report on 
everything in his consciousness from the time the stimulus 
was presented. Reaction time was measured by a stop-watch. 
The function of the •o• 1 was simply to describe, not to 
explain or interpret. The technique sometimes included 
questions by the 'E' on imagery, silent speech and other such 
content but most usually it was a free report. A ten-second 
observation might take as much as ten minutes to describe to 
the experimenter. Four E's were used, including Mayer and 
Orth, and 1224 associations were evoked. The classification 
suggested has been of no importance and may be neglected. 
After excluding sensations, images, and feelings, the 
O's, however, felt constrained to report on another kind of 
data which could not be classified as belonging to these 
three categories. Such data they called Bewusstseinslagen--
states of consciousness.2 This conscious content was 
by a single word or phrase by the first word or phrase that 
comes to mind. This latter variety, as exemplified in Jung's 
word association test, for example, is sometimes called 
'diagnostic free association~' 
1rt is customary in writing up the method and data of 
psychological experiments to use the words '0' and 'E' to 
refer to the subject and the experimenter (s) respectively. 
This practice will be adopted here in what follows. 
2 Following E. B. Titchener, Lectures on the Experi-
mental Psycholo or the Thou ht Processes (New York: Mac-
m an o., , p. , s common o translate 
'Bewusstseinslagen' by •attitude of consciousness.' The term 
'state of' consciousness' is preferred by Humphrey on the 
ground that it is neutral, and this was in part what the O's 
seemed to be driving at in their descriptions. Thus Humphrey's 
term will be adopted here. The problem of terminology is often 
handled in this investigation by using 'Bs~ for Bewusstseins-
lagen, on the ground that the term is practically untranslat-
able. 
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characterized negatively as imageless thought. 
A further experiment of considerable interest about 
the same time was one designed to discover the psychological 
l 
conditions of the judgment. There had been many arguments 
in the past over the psychological conditions of the judg-
2 
ment. The experimenter, Marbe, devised a series of simple 
experiments--lifting weights, simple mathematical problems, 
fixating tones as high or low, etc.-- and the O's were again 
1There is a terminological muddle here which is worth 
trying to straighten out. When Marbe published, 1901, the 
distinction between the 'judgment' and the 'proposition' was 
not clearly drawn. This distinction dates from the publica-
tion of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen in 1913 (Humphrey, 
Thinking, p. 77). This distinction, as it came to be quite 
widely accepted, construed the judgment as "the simplest com-
plete act of thought or piece of thinking." (H.W.B. Joseph, 
An Introduction to Logic, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1916], p. 17.) The proposition, on the other hand, was the 
expression of the judgment in words. Logicians who have 
drawn this distinction have been at pains to consider judg.,.· 
menta as primarily psychological, and propositions as inde-
pendent of psychological considerations. (There are accepted 
usages of the term 'proposition,' however, in which this 
would not be the case. See Alonzo Church, "Proposition," 
Diet. of Phil., ed. Runes, p. 256 for two definitions of 
'proposition' which involve "a content of meaning" which pre-
sumably is partly psychological.) When Marbe investigated 
the psychological conditions of the judgment, he felt he was 
bringing a battle of logicians into the laboratory for test; 
the consensus from the contemporary point of view would 
probably be that his researches, although interesting psycho-
logically, are irrelevant to the logical issues. Because of 
the ambiguous definition of 'proposition' many today have 
dropped the term 'proposition' and use instead sentence 
(declarative} to cover what was meant by proposition. See, 
for example, Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Lo~ic (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1954) for a discussion of the sentential 
calculus' rather than 'propositional calculus.• 
2Humphrey points out that in Wundt's togi~ there are 
seven different definitions of the nature of he udgment on 
one page, none of which Wundt himself accepted. Humphrey, 
Thinking, p. 34. 
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instructed to describe the thought processes involved in 
making the judgments. Said Marbe concerning the results of 
this experiment: "There are no concomitant events of which 
it could be said that such events give to judgment its 
l 
character." Humphrey describes the state of mind of these 
observers in the following passage: 
This first peep which a properly controlled introspec-
tion afforded into the working of the thought process 
gave early workers something of a shock. No psycholo-
gical criterion of Judgment, which is the very back-
bone of thought, and apparently an utterly familiar 
experience to everybody. Judgments, recognized as such, 
with nothing in consciousness to indicate why they are judgments! Apparently Marbe can hardly believe his 
ears, and has to repeat the astonishing fact to him-
self to give himself confidence. 2 
Again and again careful observers discovered these ·~· 
These states were always relatively indescribable, but nega-
tively could not be described under the categories of sensa-
tion, image, and feeling. However variously these facts 
described, the existence of 'Bsl' cannot be doubted.3 
p 
1Quoted in Humphrey, Thinking, p. 35. 
2Ibid. 
3rt does not seem necessary to give quotations from 
the extensive protocols that were obtained. Mace in a re-
view of Humphrey's book has collected some of the phrases 
that were used to describe these 'Bal.' It will be useful 
to quote some of them here. They were: "peculiar facts of 
consciousness" essentially "different from the generally 
recognized classes of conscious content" and not "resolvable 
into them by analysis." The 'Bsl' were "unformulated and 
intuitive" and "impalpable." See C. A. Mace, "Critical 
Notice of Humphrey 1 s Thinking," Mind, LXII, ( 1952) , p. 254. 
Protocols are found also in Humphrey, Thinkin~, pp. 30-65 
passim and in Woodworth, Exper. Psych., pp. 7 6-787. 
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This may be stated as the chief outcome of the Wijrzburg 
1 
school's researches into the matter or material of thought. 
Turning next to the mechanism of thought, the prin-
cipal contribution of the wijrzburg school was to show that 
thought does not operate solely by means of associations. 
The task2 influences the course of thought. The subject, 
however, requires fuller exposition as reference has already 
been made to 'set' and this and related terms will be used 
in discussing Berkeley. Exposition may well begin with dis-
cussion of the introspective method of fractionation. watt, 
who introduced the method, found, as others had, that an 
'0' would use hundreds of words and spend many minutes des-
cribing a few seconds of consciousness. In putting this 
experience into words memory faded. Watt, therefore, div-
ided consciousness into four periods: (1) the preparatory 
period; (2) the moment of the appearance of the stimulus 
1In a fully rounded historical account of the contro-
versy it would be necessary to discuss Wundt's critique of 
the Wijrzburg school,--that it did not fulfill the necessary 
conditions for experimentation. For him, the experimenta-
tion at wijrzburg was a Scheinexferiment, a pretended experi-
ment. History, however, has no supported Wundt. Titchener 
criticized the entire movement and his critique has more 
relevance to the problems of this investigation. Wundt may 
therefore be ignored. Wundtls polemic is discussed by 
Humphrey and dismissed-Thinking, pp. 106-119. 
2 The German word used was Auffabe, usually rendered 
in English as 'task.' The Aufgabe se sup in the individual 
an Einstellung, or 'set' and t e individual, in acceptingthe 
Auffabe, becomes eingestellt. There is a much looser usage 
of ufgabe, however, in which it has come to mean any "poten-
tiality of consciousness." Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., p. 
404 is the source of this exegesis. 
word or situation; (3) the period of search for the 
reaction word; and finally (4) the occurrence of the 
reaction word. By confining attention to one period and 
then another, a more complete picture was obtained of the 
contents of consciousness. It was assumed, and it was a 
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natural assumption, that the critical period of the process 
of thought would be the third period, the period of search 
for the reaction word. Experimental investigation, however, 
demonstrated that this period was one of inadequate consci-
ous content. Watt discovered that thought could go on at 
the presentation of the stimulus automatically, and with 
very little content. Boring comments upon this as follows: 
This was really a remarkable result. So far as consci-
ousness goes, one does one's thinking before one knows 
what he is to think about; that is to say, with the 
proper preparation the thoughts run off automatically, 
when reaeased with very little content. 1 
The upshot of the W~rzburg school's investigation 
into the material and mechanism of thought may now be sum-
marized and related to the problems of this investigation. 
The associationist psychology had been raked with criticism. 
Not only had it been shown that images were not always nee-
essary for thought, but it had been shown that some thought, 
and this in important realms of thought, i.e., the judgment, 
presumably could even proceed without images at all. 
Furthermore, the accepted explanation for the mechanism of 
~Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., p. 404. 
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thought, association, was shown to be inadequate. To explain 
thought, the motivational aspect of thinking had to be con-
sidered. Thoughts do not just follow one another by the 
clash of associations; they are directed. Some fifty years 
after this discussion one is tempted to say that the mountain 
has called forth a mouse in view or the enormous introspec-
tive labors involved in these conclusions. This may be, but 
it is not to the point to discuss such a consideration in 
this investigation. There are, however, consequences from 
this research that are relevant to the epistemological 
theory, imagism, that is under investigation here. 
There is a massive amount of evidence that thought 
can proceed without the necessity of the image as a vehicle 
1 
to carry the meaning. Imagism, as discussed in the first 
chapter of this dissertation, was said to involve two theses: 
(1) a polemical thesis that images are primary symbols for 
thought and that all other symbols are secondary; (2) a cons-
tructive and tamer thesis that images are an important and 
frequently neglected part of an adequate account of thought. 
It would appear that the W~rzburg school has shown that in 
important cases the first thesis is factually false; 
1The phrase 'image as a vehicle to carry the meaning' 
will need fuller explication at later stages of this investi-
gation. This phrase, and others more or less synonymous with 
it, are frequently met in discussions of this tope. As this 
thesis is being more or less denied at this point, it would 
appear possible to leave it incompletely explicated for the 
time being. 
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frequently, not only are images not primary and other 
symbols secondary, but there are no images at all. The fur-
ther question of the applicability of this result to the 
present investigation may be posed as follows: Did the 
classical British empiricists hold, when their position is 
1 put in its strongest form, the polemical side of imagism? 
This question, however, may be answered later. Concerning 
the second thesis of imagism, the constructive thesis, whose 
results have been shown to proceed from the researches of the 
wUrzburg school into imageless thought, has less conclusive 
results and this partly because the constructive thesis of 
imagism has been left without close specification. The 
wUrzburg school, in dealing with the matter of thought, does 
not assert that images never accompany thought; its thesis is 
the negative one--that some thought proceeds without images. 
The assertion, therefore, that images are important in think-
ing and are often neglected in accounts of thinking, the 
constructive side of imagism, has no tendency to be refuted 
1It would appear that there are only two great fig-
ures in the history of philosophy who might be said to have 
held the polemical theory of i~gism: Aristotle and Hume. 
Aristotle wrote, "Thought is impossible without an image." 
Aristotle, "De Mem.", Aristotle 1 s PsBch., ed. Hammond, p. 
197. The sense-rn which Hume might ave been said to hold 
to the polemical side of imagism will be discussed in a later 
chapter. If there are other important figures who held the 
doctrine, they were presumably not known to Titchener when he 
wrote Exper. Psych. of the Tholfht Processes, nor to I. Myer-
son, "Lea Images," Nouveau Tra te, ed. Dumas, pp. 541-606, the 
two writers who have most carefully reviewed the history of 
thought for the relation of thought and image. 
by the existence of irnageless thought. The most that might 
be suggested is that a constructive account of the role of 
images in mental life must recognize the fact that some 
thinking occurs without images. 
3. Titchener and the Context Theory of Meaning 
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Edward Bradford Titchener was the greatest exponent 
of a pure1 introspective psychology. He knew the literature 
of the imageless thought controversy as no writer in English 
has ever known it. There are two closely related reasons 
for considering his views in this dissertation. In the first 
place, after a careful summary of the irnageless thought con-
troversy, Titchener maintained that the proponents of the Bsl 
had failed to prove one of their crucial contentions, viz. 
that thought could proceed without images. Titchener main-
tained to the last ditch, subject to modifications to be con-
sidered, that thinking could always be explained in sensory 
and imaginal terms without recourse to Bsl. This is an 
important contention for the purposes of this investigation, 
and it is offered by a man whose views are not to be rejected 
lightly in view of the erudition and mass of evidence brought 
to bear in support of his position. Secondly, in defending 
1The term 'pure' as a description of Titchener's 
system may almost be taken as a defining characteristic, in 
a sense to be explained below. It should be pointed out, 
however, that 'pure• is not a term Titchener himself used in 
this connection; his term for the matter at issue was •exis-
tential.' The term 'pure' is used by Boring, Hist. Exper. 
Psych., p. 417 to describe Titchener. 
his contention, Titchener advanced a context theory of mean-
1 
ing very similar to a theory of Berkeley's. To put 
Berkeley, therefore, in his strongest position, it will be 
helpful to be able to refer to this Titchenerian theory of 
meaning. Guided by these considerations rather than by an 
effort to expound Titchener's systematic position for its 
own sake, this section will first consider his general posi-
tion insofar as it is relevant for the limited purpose at 
hand here, and then consider his critique of imageless thought 
and the related context theory of meaning. 
In its main lines, Titchener's systematic psychology 
is relatively simple; it is in its full details that the 
system seems overwhelming. A rapid survey of his views on 
the subject matter of psychology, the method of psychology, 
and his view of the so-called stimulus error and the problem 
of psychology are relevant. The subject matter of psychology 
is the mind. Mind is defined as "the sum total of human 
experience considered as dependent upon an experiencing per-
2 
son." Mind is to be distinguished from consciousness. 
1Boring is the source of the idea that there is a 
parallel between Berkeley's theory of meaning and Titchener's. 
This will be discussed with full references below. 
2 E. B. Titchener, A Textbook of Pstcholo~y (New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1924), p. lb. A Textbook o Psyc~logy is the 
nearest thing to a complete exposition of his system that 
Titchener ever wrote. Most of the material relevant to the 
purposes at hand here in dealing with Titchener's systematic 
psychology are to be found in the first chapter of this work. 
The exposition in this dissertation has been aided in what to 
include and exclude by Heidbreder's excellent account of 
Titchener. E. Heidbreder, Seven Ps~cholo~ies (New York: 
Appleton-Century Crofts, 1933),pp. 13-15 • 
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"Mind is the sum-total of the processes occurring in the life-
time of the individual" and "consciousness is the sum total of 
the mental processes occurring now at any given time. til. Consci-
ousness, thus, for Titchener is but a part of the mind stream. 
The mind so studied is tne generalized, normal, human, adult 
mind and the purpose of study is not therapeutic or practical. 
It is knowledge for its own sake. Soon after the heyday of 
Titchenerian psychology, American psychology began to study 
individual differences, abnormal psychology, applied psycho-
logy, and child psychology. For Titchener none of these is a 
province of psychology properly so-called, and this in part 
explains why Titchener so soon after his death seemed outside 
the mainstream of American psychology, with its early and 
insistent practical bent. 
The method of psychology for Titchener is introspec-
tion. Titchener's attitude toward introspection may be 
approached by consideration of his view of the relation between 
psychology and physics. Both psychology and physics are con-
cerned with experience, but the two disciplines regard experi-
ence in different ways. Physics takes the point of view of 
experience "regarded as altogether independent of any 
particular person" and psychology takes the point of view of 
1 Titchener, Textbook, p. 19. 
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experience "regarded as altogether dependent upon the parti-
cular person."1 The data of psychology, thus, are dependent 
upon the point of view. There may be several points of view: 
psychological, physical, and biological. To confuse the 
point of view, i.e. to lapse from the psychological view to 
the physical point of view, is to commit the stimulus error. 
In a psychological experiment involving sensation, this error 
is committed by describing the nature of the stimulus rather 
than attending to and describing the experience. Concerning 
the stimulus error Titchener wrote in the Textbook: 
We liVe so habitually in a world of objects, and we 
think so habitually in terms of common·sense, that it is 
difficult for us to take up the psychological standpoint 
towards intensity of sensation, and to look at conscious-
ness as it is, apart from any objective reference. This 
book, we say, is heavier than that •••• Strictly inter-
preted, such statements may mean either one of two things. 
They may be taken physically to mean that the books weigh 
differently in the balance ••• or they may be taken 
psychologically, to mean that the books feel heavy and 
light ••• As a rule, however, we are talking neither 
physicsror psychology, but a confused mixture of the two • 
••• We transfer to sensation the properties that really 
belong to stimulus. 2 
1 Titchener, Textbook, p. 6. This distinction is not 
original with Titchener. It is the view of Mach and Avenarius, 
and with slight modifications, is the view of Titchener's 
teacher, Wundt. On the distinction, see Boring, Hist. Exper. 
Psych., p. 417. 
2Titchener, Textbook, p. 202. This dichotomy, one of 
several by which Titchener hoped to keep psychology 'pure 1 , as 
the quoted passage shows, referred primarily to experiments on 
sensation. The problem so generalized may be called, follow-
ing Woodworth, Contemp. Schools of Psych., p. 40, an error of 
objective reference. Concerning the meaning and value of the 
notion of the stimulus error there is a considerable litera-
ture. It is discussed with full references in Boring, Hist. 
Exper. Psych., pp. 417-418, p. 436. It is not relevant~pur­
sue the details of interpretation further here. 
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Avoiding this error is not easy and requires highly 
trained introspectionists.1 Titchener was far too sophisti-
cated not to know all the arguments that are advanced against 
introspection, but these failed to move him; it remained for 
him the fundamental psychological method.2 However difficult 
it may be to avoid the stimulus error, for Titchener it 
always can be avoided and the trained introspectionist must 
try to do so. Psychology, then, to be pure must not involve 
itself with considerations that belong to physics, epistemol-
ogy, or biology. Introspection, accordingly, is not mere 
inspection of the contents of consciousness. It is a task 
requiring sophistication and awareness of what to look for, a 
knowledge of what is not psychological data as well as what 
is, and finally, awareness of the difficulties of report. 
Science, according to Titchener, asks three questions 
about its subject matter, the questions of what, how and why. 
He writes: 
What precisely stripped of all complications and reduced 
to its lowest terms, is this subject-matter? How, then, 
does it come to appear as it does; how are its elements 
combined and arranged? And, finally, why does it appea3 
now in just this particular combination or arrangement. 
1Titchener somewhere speaks of "hard introspective 
labours." The phrase is often quoted but the present writer 
has never come upon it in Titchener's writings. It is quoted 
without citation in Heidbreder, Seven Psychs., p. 129. 
2The full account of introspection is in E.B. Titchener, 
Experimental Psycholofy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1901-1905), 
xlx-xxxl£1. The crlt cs of introspection seem amateurish in 
their attacks when compared with the thoroughgoing treatment 
of the pros and cons of introspection discussed here. 
3Titchener, Textbook, p. 36. 
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The answers to these three questions form the problem of 
psychology, as they form the problem of any science. The 
question "What?" is answered by analysis into elements; the 
question "How?" is answered by synthesis, showing how the 
elements are combined and arranged; and the question "Why?" 
is a causal question. The first two questions are descrip-
tive and the third question is a search for explanation. 
Titchener's answer to the third of these questions may be 
considered first. Explanation of mental phenomena for 
Titchener is made by reference to the nervous system. He 
writes: 
The nervous system does not cause, but it does explain 
mind. It explains mind as the map of a country explains 
the fragmentary glimpses of hills and rivers and towns 
that we catch on our journey through it. In a word, 
reference to the nervous system introduces into psychology just that unity and coherence which a strictly descrip-
tive psychology cannot achieve. 1 
It is not, however, to be inferred that the nervous system 
for Titchener is fundamental to consciousness. Psychology 
goes beyond its subject matter, consciousness, to a realm 
beyond itself only because the world of physics, i.e. the 
nervous system in this case, has continuity that consciousness 
lacks. 
The elements of consciousness, the "What?" of the 
science of psychology, ar.e three: sensations, images, and 
affections (feelings}. Concerning these three classes of 
data Titchener writes: 
1Titchener, Textbook, p. 39. 
Sensations are ••• the characteristic elements of per-
ceptions, of the sights and sounds and similar experi-
ences due to our present surroundings. Images are ••• 
the characteristic elements of ideas, of the mental 
pictures that memory furnishes of past and imagination 
of future experience ••.. Lastly, affections are the 
characteristic elements·.·Of emotions, of love and hate, joy and sorrow. 1 
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Titchener admits the possibility that there may be other ele-
mentary processes than sensation, image, and affection, and 
further recognizes difficulties in distinguishing sensations 
and images. This latter problem will come up for discussion 
in treating Hume. As Titchener does not have anything of 
unusual interest to say on this score, his discussion may be 
passed over. Titchener's doctrine of attributes, however, 
deserves passing mention. The elementary processes--sensa-
tion, image, and affection--are simple; they cannot be reduced 
by further analysis. Elements, however, have attributes, i.e. 
characteristics or aspects with the vanishing of which the 
elementary process would vanish. Sensations and images have 
at least four attributes: quality, intensity, duration, and 
2 
clearness. Quality is the characteristic that distinguishes 
1Titchener, Textbook, p. 48. 
2The doctrine of the attributes of sensation has under-
gone some modification since the time of Titchener, but much 
of the change is merely terminological. The minimum number of 
attributes of sensation usually recognized today are three: 
quality, intensity, and duration. This is opposed to Titchener's 
four. Further, for duration, the term 1protensity 1 is often 
used, following Ward, to avoid the alleged definiteness of the 
term 'duration' because such a definiteness is presumably a 
characteristic not initially present in experience. The base 
line for contemporary discussions of attributes is E. G. 
Boring, Ph sical Dimensions of Consciousness (New York: The 
Century Co., 3 , pp. - 5, an s re erences. 
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one sensation from another, e.g. blue, sweet, and cold. 
Intensity is the quantitative aspect of sensation; it places 
the experience of a given quality on a scale running from 
the highest to the lowest degree of its kind. Duration is 
the attribute that gives a process its course in time, "its 
1 rise, pois.e, and fall as a process in consciousness." 
The elements are not static; they. are in process. 
Despite the complexity of the processes, everything in con-
sciousness is reducible to the three elements; their combina-
tions into different degrees of intimacy or blends constitute 
the conscious experiences of perception, imagination, emotion, 
and thought. 
The bulk of the Textbook is concerned with sensation, 
and attention receives the next amount in terms of total space. 
Concerning the image there is not much said by Titchener; his 
2 
account is in a short section. The principal interest of 
the section for the purpose at hand hare is Titchener's 
treatment of the problem of distinguishing image from sensa-
tion.3 After pointing out that confusion is probably not as 
1Titchener, Textbook, p. 53. Titchener's general dis-
cussion of attributes is found in Titchener, Textbook, pp. 52-
55. 
2The image is treated in section 61. Ibid., pp. 197-
200. 
3The general problem of distinguishing sensation 
(Hume•s 'impression') and images (Hume's idea') is relevant 
to imagism as an epistemological theory, principally because 
the confusion of sensation and image could overthrow Hume's 
verion of empiricism. Hume's criterion officially for dis-
tinguishing them is "force and vivacity," but there are 
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common as might be supposed, and further that in large meas-
ure conscious context aids the individual, Titchener writes: 
"but the writer is not sure that the image does not, as a 
rule, evince a sort of textural difference from sensation; 
1 that it is not more filmy, more transparent, more vaporous." 
For Titchener's system, as he immediately states, this allows 
the possibility that sensations and images are not funda-
mentally simple but sub-classes of a larger order of mental 
elements that would include them both. This point, however, 
is not of major interest for this investigation. The point 
to be noted is that a textural difference is suggested as the 
basis for recognition of the image as an elementary process 
distinguishable from sensation. 
After this rapid summary of some of the main lines of 
Titchener 1s systematic psychology, consideration may next be 
given to Titchener's views on imageless thought, and the con-
2 text theory of meaning consequent upon these views. 
Titchener did not reject the work of the Wllrzburg school out 
difficulties here. In the first place, Hume does not always 
use this criterion, and, secondly, it is doubtful if this is 
the real criterion that people do use to so distinguish them. 
There are relevant psychological observations and experiments 
that have been made since the time of Hume. It will be use-
ful to comment on some of these as the occasion arises. 
Here Titchener is a case in point. 
1 Ibid., p. 199. 
2Titchener 1s views on thought are contained in his 
Ex Ps ch. of Thou ht Processes, passim. It is to the 
re s wor that attention will next 
be 
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of hand. Constructively he felt that they had made three 
contributions. In the first place they had set the problem 
by investigating in the laboratory the conditions of think-
ing, particularly in the case of the judgment. Secondly, 
they had proposed a partial solution of the problem with the 
doctrine of the Aufgabe, a solution which, with minor modi-
fications, Titchener was willing to accept. Lastly, they 
had presented a great number of untrimmed introspective pro-
1 tocols which Titchener felt would be of great value. 
Were Titchener to have accepted the Bsl of the 
Wfirzburg school at face value, however, he would have had to 
modify his doctrine of elements, as the Bsl of the Wfirzburgers 
are, by definition, neither sensations, images, nor affections. 
As a matter of fact, however, Titchener found no need to 
modify his doctrine of elements. The hypothesis he proposes 
is that the Bsl can be analyzed into sensory and imaginal 
terms. The following passage discussing attitudes and aware-
nesses is relevant in this connection. 
Consider ••• the attitudes and awarenesses of which I 
have said so much. If we can trace an attitude back, 
within the same mind, to an imaginal source; if it 
thus appears not as an original endowment but as a resi-
duum, not as primule but as vestige, then I should 
protest against its ranking as a mental element. 2 
1Titchener 1s appreciation of the wfirzburg school is 
found in Exper. Psych. of Thought Processes, pp. 157-166. 
2Ibid., p. 171. It should be remembered that the 
term •attitude' refersto •conscious attitudes', i.e. 
Titchener•s translation of Bewusstseinslagen. Thus, the hypo-
thesis Titchener suggests is that the Bsl can be traced back 
to sensory and imaginal sources. 
This hypothesis was tested in the Cornell laboratories and 
the results were in flat contradiction to the Wfirzburg 
results; those working in Titchener's briar patch found no 
need to postulate anything beyond sensation, image, and 
feeling. 1 The point, however, needs fuller development. 
Consider the mental processes of an Englishman or 
American upon forming a visual image of the letter 'C', 
followed by 'A', followed by 'T'. Contrast these mental pro-
ceases with someone unfamiliar with English. Obviously the 
mental processes would differ, but in what sense? Many 
answers have been given and such matters are still under dis-
cussion. One answer, the answer given by the Wfirzburgers, 
was that the Englishman or American, familiar with the lang-
uage, i.e. being able to attach meanings to this combination 
of letters, would have a Bewusstheit, an awareness of 
that the foreigner unfamiliar with the language would 
meaning, 
2 lack. 
1The experiments from the Cornell laboratory which 
contradicted the Wfirzburg results are summarized in Humphrey, 
Thinking, pp. 120-130. 
2The problem of meaning is central in psychology as 
it is in many other disciplines. Complete treatment of the 
problem lies far beyond the scope of this investigation. 
There are two theories of meaning, however, that of necessity 
must be commented upon in this chapter. The first of these, 
Titchener 1s context theory of meaning, is also Berkeley's. 
The source for this notion is Boring and the references are 
as follows: E. G. Boring, Sensation and Perceftion in the 
Histor of Ex erimental Ps cholo (New York:ppleton-Cen-
ury, , p. c ener s context theory of meaning); 
Ibid., p. 7f (annotated bibliography of Titchener's writings 
ana-reference to the experimental literature to which this 
theory gave rise); Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., pp. 184-186 
This supposition Titchener denies. Rather than an 
awareness of meaning, a Bsl, Titchener finds another image. 
Titchener•s central passage on the psychology of meaning 
runs as follows: 
I hold that from the psychological or existential point 
of view, meaning--so far as it finds representation in 
consciousness at all--is always context. An idea means 
another idea, is psychologically the meaning of that 
other idea, if it is that idea's context. And I under-
stand by context simply the mental process or complex 
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of mental processes which accrues to the original idea 
through the situation in which the organism finds itself, 
--primitively, the natural situation; later, either the 
natural or mental. 1 
Meaning, according to this theory, consists in the associated 
imaginal context of any experience. The theory may be illus-
trated by the following example: the meaning of a boy's per-
2 
ception of a lawn-mower is a well-mowed lawn. This aspect of 
Titchener's context theory of meaning may be put in the form 
of a thesis and stated as follows: 
(Berkeley's anticipation of Titchener); Ibid., pp. 410-420 
(Titchener's general position). The Nievance of Titchener to 
the subject of imagism is shown by the fact that Blanshard, 
Nature of Thou~ht. I, pp. 271-281 devotes a half-chapter to 
Titchener, fol o~ his discussion of the·classical British 
empiricists. The second theory of meaning to be commented 
upon in this chapter is a theory which is perhaps the more 
nearly standard theory of meaning than Titchener•s. It has 
done service in psychology, in linguistics, and elsewhere. 
This theory may be called the •reference theory' and will be 
dealt with below. 
1 
Titchener, Exper. Psych. of the Thought Processes, 
p. 178. 
2 The example is from Mary w. Calkins, "The ambiguous 
conce-pt: meaning," American Journal of Psychology, XXXIX, 
(1927), pp. 7-22. 
(1) The meaning of an image or a perception is the 
associated imaginal context of that perception 
or image. 
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The theory thus far deals with conscious meaning. This pro-
position in Titchener's theory may be related to his general 
systematic position by the recognition that for Titchener 
psychology deals with conscious processes, i.e. he holds 
what has here been called a presentational psychology. 
Titchener himself would have called it an existential psy-
1 
chology. The important point to be noted is that on this 
theory it takes "two mental processes to make meaning." In 
cases where a sensation or image is added to, in Titchener's 
2 
word "accrues," an original perception, sensation, or image 
there is meaning. A meaning according to this theory is a 
conscious relation and Titchener specifies the nature of that 
relation. As will be shown in detail later, Titchener 
explicitly formulates in his context theory of meaning a 
theory which is implicit in Berkeley. 
There are two further contentions to Titchener's 
theory. Says Titchener: 
1 E. G. Boring, "Titchener on Meaning," Psychological 
Review, XLV, (1938), p. 93 and elsewhere refers to this 
term ~existential' as Titchener's description of his system. 
The reason the term is not used here is that in a pivotal 
sense of this term, as used in Heidegger, Sartre and others, 
it has no immediate connection with Titchener. 
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Meaning is originally kinaethesis; the organism faces 
the situation by some bodily attitude, and the charac-
teristic sensations which the attitude involves give 
meaning to the process that stands at the conscious 1 focus, are psychologically the meaning of that process. 
This contention may be put as follows: 
(2) Meaning is originally kinesthesis. 
This point seems to have had little effect on psychology as 
2 
such, and for the purposes of this investigation need not 
further be considered. 
Lastly, in systematic exposition of the context theory 
of meaning, a third contention of Titchener's may be examined. 
Titchener writes: 
I doubt if meaning need necessarily be conscious at all--
if it may not be •carried' in purely physiological terms. 
In rapid reading, the skimming of pages in quick succes-
sion; in the rendering of a musical composition in a 
particular conception; in shifting from one language to 
another as you turn to your right or left hand neighbor 
at a dinner table: in these and similar cases I doubt if 
meaning necessarily has any conscious representation. 3 
As Boring points out, Titchener here goes beyond the 
tradition psychology and this for the following reason. 
Common sense and traditional psychology would assert that 
meanings were conscious. Meaning is knowledge and knowledge 
is conscious; however, as Titchener realized, the organism 
lTitchener, Exper. Psych. of Thought Processes, p. 179. 
2 Boring, Psych. Review does not comment upon this 
notion. Concerning the notion Calkins writes, "there seems 
to be no need of foisting the term meaning on such bodily 
attitudes." Calkins, Am. Journ. Psych., p. 12. 
3Titchener, Exper. Psych. of Thought Processes, p. 180. 
102 
or observer may be said to 'know' a great many things of 
which, in the nature of 
conscious, viz. habitual 
the case, it cannot be said to be 
1 perceptions. In habitual percep-
tiona conscious context drops off or is pared away and with 
such habituation conscious meaning gradually comes to be 
unconsciously carried. 2 
Titchener's agreement with and differences from the 
Wtirzburgers may now be more precisely stated. For Titchener 
there are two ·stages to perception, that is in having mean-
ings as opposed merely to having sensation. In the first 
stage imagery is required and it is here that Titchener is 
at odds with the Wtirzburgers; for the Wfirzburgers there are 
important cases such as those involving judgments in which 
meaning occurs with new perceptions without the occurrence of 
imagery. Secondly, for Titchener there is a stage when per-
ceptions are old, in which they have become habituated, and 
in such stages imagery is not required. Here Titchener 
agrees with the Wtirzburgers. 
lBoring, Psych. Review, p. 93. The terms 'sensation' 
and 'perception' need bo be more carefully defined at this 
point than has been necessary hitherto. The external world 
is mediated to the organism by way of the sense organs. The 
messages, to use the usual metaphor to describe this process, 
are called 'sensations.' Such messages merge in the higher 
centers of the brain where they are organized in such a 
fashion as to interact and associate mutually. The result of 
this latter process is called perception. Cf. S. S. Stevens, 
"Sensation and Psychological Measurement," Foundations of 
Psycholo~y, ed. E. G. Boring, H. s. Langfeld, and H. P. Weld 
(New Yor :Wiley, 1948), pp. 250-251. 
2 Titchener's phrase "carried in purely physiological 
terms" in the above cited passage may be translated into con-
temporary terminology as •unconscious.' 
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All meanings require for Titchener some such supple-
mental imagery except in the cases already specified in which 
the perceptions are old. This includes that which is non-
sensible such as ideas of relation or the feeling of 'but.' 
Writes Titchener in a famous passage: 
What do we have when we have a "feeling or relation." 
••• It was my pleasure and duty, a little while ago, 
to sit on the platform behind a somewhat emphatic lec-
turer, who made great use of the monosyllable 'but.• 
My 'feeling of but• has contained, ever since, a flash-
ing picture of a bald crown, with a fringe of hair below, 
and a massive black shoulder, the whole passing swiftly 
down the visual field from north-west to southeast. 1 
If this last passage sounds somewhat grotesque, it is to be 
remembered that Titchener does not argue that the context 
theory of meaning is the only meaning of 'meaning.' Titchener 
asserts only that 'the feeling of but• described in such 
imaginal terms is a description of process to which psycho-
logy should confine itself. Psychology properly so-called 
should not become involved in logical meanings. So far as 
psychology confines itself to its proper subject-matter such 
imaginal material will occur as constant content of conscious-
ness. This is, no doubt, hard doctrine and easy to criticize. 
It has been contended thus far that Titchener's con-
textual theory of perception (meaning) is an explicit formu-
lation of what Berkeley held implicitly. The point requires 
evidence at this point with fuller explication of Berkeley 
left to a later chapter. An illustrative example may be 
1Titchener, Exper. Psych. of Thought Processes, p. 185. 
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quoted from the New Theory of Vision. Writes Berkeley: 
No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language 
pronounced in our ears, but the ideas corresponding 
thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very 
same instant the sound and the meaning enter the 
understanding: so closely are they united that it is 
not in our power to keep out the one, except we exclude 
the other also. We even act in all respects as if we 
heard the very thoughts themselves. 1 
The term 'idea' in the above passage refers to an idea-image. 
When compared with Titchener•s "an idea means another idea ••• 
if it is that idea's context" the parallel is obvious. In 
each case the meaning of an idea is found in the supplemental 
imagery associated with it. 
There is a standard objection to this doctrine which 
may be put in a number of ways or which at least may be said 
to have several corollaries. It may be granted for the sake 
of avoiding the imageless thought controversy for the moment, 
that most perceptions do have associated supplementary ima-
gery. Titchener's theory, however, asserts that such 
supplementary imagery is the meaning, at least insofar as 
psychology must concern itself with meaning. It is contended, 
however, that one cannot maintain that all supplementary 
imagery is meaningful and further that on the basis of 
Titchenerian theory one cannot tell which imagery is meaning-
ful and which not. It may be stated in the form of a thesis 
as follows: 
1 Berkeley, Works, I, sec. 51, p. 190. 
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(3) What is the difference as an effect in conscious-
ness of an image that carries meaning and one that 
does not? 
It is to be noted that Titchener's defense of unconscious 
meaning applies only to habituated perceptions and not new 
perceptions and thus some effect in consciousness should be 
noted. If there is an effect, according to Titchenerian 
theory, it should be an effect of a sensory nature and avail-
1 
able for introspective analysis. 
4 • Meaning and 1magery 
This section has as its primary task the description of 
the psychological process of imagery. Before undertaking 
such a description, however, for reasons which will come out 
more clearly in what follows, it is desirable to discuss the 
1 That this is the standard objection, i.e. that there 
is wide agreement on the objection from men who otherwise dis-
agree markedly, may be seen by the fact that the objection is 
found to be cogent by such men as Hoernle, writing from an 
idealistic standpoint, and Ogden and Richards, who hold a 
behavioristic theory of meaning. Writes Hoernle: 
"That a significant psychic whole contains as a sub-
ordinate factor these sensational elements and that 
such a whole apparently cannot be present without ••• 
such elements ••• in no wise entitles us to treat them 
as the only solid substantial factor of meaning." 
Hoernle is quoted in Calkins, Amer. Jour. Ps{ch., p. 13. 
Ogden and Richards write: "Images to a grea extent appear to 
be mental luxuries •••• There is no good reason to think that 
the mind could not work equally well without them." C. K. 
Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meani~ of Meani5e (8th ed.; 
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., ~53), pp.-61. Scattered 
throughout The Meanil! of Meanin~ are several re~ences to 
images which, if col ected, woul form an arsenal for the 
anti-image philosopher. It is not relevant to consider all 
their objections, for such a task would require extensive 
analysis of this difficult book. 
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problem of possession of meaning, or as it will be termed 
here, the problem of significance.1 Significance is one of 
the pivotal senses of the ambiguous term •meaning.• Such a 
discussion will have two results: it will render possible 
for the purposes of this investigation more precise criticism 
of the context theory of perception (meaning) than has hither~ 
been attempted; and it will serve as a prolegomena to the 
primary task of the section, description of the process of 
imagery. 
Consider the following example, which will be called 
a state-description: 2 
(4) John has a clear and detailed image of a rosebush. 
There are three quite different things, i.e. nameables, refer-
red to in state description (4): 
(a) an individual 
(b) a presentation3 
1The term 'significance• follows Willard Van Orman 
Quine, From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1953), p. 11 and passim. 
2The term •state-description• is Carnap•s term for 
the exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic state-
ments of language. cr. Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity 
(Chicago: Uiversity of Chicago Press, 1947), passim and Quine, 
Logical Point of View, p. 23f. Thus Carnap 1s sense is not 
followed here, but only his convenient terminology. The term 
•state-description• as used here is simply a terminology for 
such expressions as 'description of a state of affairs,• where 
neutrality and priority to epistemological analysis is intended. 
3The term •presentation• will be used here in a wide 
sense to include images, percepts, ideas, and sensations. 
Ordinarily, following James Ward, Psycholo~ical Principles 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19 3), passim, the 
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(c) a concrete object 
For the purposes of the present analysis of significance, 
i.e. possession of meaning, (a) may be ignored, but it should, 
of course, be remembered that this involves an abstraction 
from the whole process to which state description (4) refers. 
1 Taken together (b) and (c) will be called the context of per-
ception of (4). It is to the psychical process, (b), the pre-
sentation, that attention will first be given. The image in 
such a presentation has significance, i.e., an ultimate and 
irreducible fact about the given presentation is possession 
of meaning--representation to the cognitive function. This 
presentation, (b),may be called referend of the context of 
term includes percepts and ideas, but the extension here is a 
natural one. Discussion of the term in Ward's sense may be 
found in G. F. Stout and C. A. Mace, "Psychology," Enc. Brit. 
(14th ed.), vel. 18, 678-679. The reason for the extension 
of the term in this investigation will come out in what fol-
lows, but much of the discussion in the article of Stout and 
Ward just referred to is applicable to the present discussion. 
For the term 'presentation' the terms •awareness' and 'aware-
ness situations' might have been substituted. The distinguish-
ing characteristics of presentations (awarenesses), in the 
sense in which they are to be understood in what follows, are 
sensitivity and affectivity, i.e. emotional tone lying on the 
pleasantness-unpleasantness continuum. There are various 
other terms, some of which will be discussed in what follows, 
such as 'idea,' 'image,' 'percept,' 'judgment', and 'concept' 
involving differences of complexity. Such other terms may be 
defined by the generic term 'presentation.' 
1 The term •context' has hitherto been used in Titchen-
er1s sense of a psychical fringe accompanying a presentation, 
i.e. as a mental entity. The term as used in this discussion 
is the name for a relation between a mental entity and another 
mental entity or a physical entity. To render unambiguous the 
two senses of •context,• this latter use, as a name of a rela-
tion, will be called a 'context of perception.• 
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(4), i.e. it is a vehicle or instrument of designation or 
reference in the context of (4). There is no necessity to 
hypostatize meaning as an entity above and beyond the given 
1 presentation. The concrete object, (c), referred to in 
state description (4), is identifiable by the layman as a 
creeping shrub with prickly stems, pinnate leaves, and showy 
five or six petaled flowers in the wild state. This concrete 
object may be called the referent of the context of (4). 
The question may next be asked: 
(5) What does the context of (4) mean? 
Analysis of (5) involves breaking it up into two separate 
questions. 
(6) What is the proper analysis of the referend of the 
context of ( 4)? 
1In traditional discussions of such matters by analy-
tic psychologists (up to and including Stout and Titchener), 
the term 'idea' was used where here the term 'significance' 
is used. Stout, Manual of Ps{ch., p. 529, for example, writes: 
"An idea can no more exis without an image than per-
ception can exist without sensation. But the image is 
no more identical with the idea than sensation is 
identical with perception. The image is only one con-
stituent of the idea; the other and more important 
constituent is the meaning which the image conveys." 
It is this usage of 'idea' that is being avoided here. In 
the first place, the term 'idea' has had considerable histori-
cal diversity of usage. (Cf. w. Long, "Idea," Diet. Phil., 
ed. Runes, p. 136 for nine different usages of the term by 
classical philosophers). Secondly, the term 'idea• has a 
technical sense in classical British empiricists which may be 
specified at a later point. Toward the end of explicating 
this matter, the term 'idea-image' has already been used and 
'idea' will be reserved for each of the classical British 
empiricists. In the third place, the usage by analytic psy-
chologists has been an entity terminology; such a terminology 
construes meaningfulness as the 'having of meaning' by an 





What is the proper analysis of the referent of the 
context of (4)? 
With (7) we need not be further concerned. 1 The study of (6) 
is the study of conscious experience, and to analysis of 
this conscious experience attention may next be given. 
The objection to the Titchenerian context theory of 
2 perception (meaning) may first be discussed in this light, 
using the terminology just developed. Consider the following 
statement: 
(8) The referend in a context of perception may be des-
cribed without remainder by the reference to the 
supplemental imagery in a presentation. 
An upholder of the Titchenerian theory would presumably accept 
(8), whereas the critic of this theory would reject it. The 
positive position of the critic, using this recently developed 
terminology, would run as follows: 
(9) The referend in a context of perception has signi-
ficance, i.e. an ultimate and irreducible aspect 
1According to Quine's terminology, (7) is properly 
not a part of the theory of meaning at all; it is a part of 
the theory of reference and in this case would involve the 
key term 'naming.' Quine, Logical Point of View, p. l30f. 
As may be noted, Quine is not followed in his usage of the 
expression 'theory of reference.• 
2 In Titchener's sense of 'meaning,' viz. that the 
meaning of a presentation (for Titchener an TOea) is to be 
found in the supplemental imagery associated with the pre-
sentation. 
or moment in a given presentation is representa-
tion to the cognitive function. 1 
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His denial of (8) would presumably be based on the grounds 
suggested above, viz. that in terms of Titchenerian theory 
there is no way of telling which supplemental imagery is 
significant and which not. This is a minimum statement; his 
is not required to defend the position that supplemental 
imagery as such lacks significance; some supplemental imagery 
is clearly significant and only by detailed analysis in par-
ticular can decision be reached. 
1The statement in (5) is couched in mentalistic terms, 
in the framework of a presentational psychology. As has been 
pointed out earlier in this chapter, this is unavoidable be-
cause of the fact that most experimental studies of imagery 
are written up in mentalistic terminology. It remains true, 
however, that by known methods an operational definition can 
translate a psychological description expressed in terms of 
consciousness into a description in behavioral and physiologi-
cal terms. From this, however, it is not to be inferred that 
this is necessarily a gain; one may not choose a behavioral 
terminology for various reasons, one of them being the 
reason suggested above. Everyone is free to choose his own 
terms. One could go further and say that if such translation 
were not possible, then the terms would lack fruitfulness for 
scientific purposes. For a recent effort to deal with consci-
ousness in behavioral and physiological terms see Boring, 
Physical Dimensions, passim. Cf. also Boring, Psych. Review, 
p. 94 to which this footnote is indebted. A typical state-
ment of operationism, which finds its clue to meaning in 
adequate behavior, is the following: "Response is the con-
text that gives the stimulus its meaning for the responding 
organism." Boring, Sensation and Perception, p. 18. Carnap's 
principle of tolerance, formulated for syntactical studies, 
may be extended to cover the coordinates used to express 
psychological data. Writes Carnap: "It is not our business 
to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions." 
Rudolf Carnap, Logical S~ntax of La~uage (New York: Humani-
ties Press, 1951), pp. 5 ff. Likew~e, deadlock between the 
older analytic psychology and the present experimental psy-
chology can be avoided by recognizing a principle of toler-
ance for coordinates to explain behavior. 
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Turning now to the description of the image process, 
the nature of presentations in general may first be consid-
ered. A presentation has two moments or aspects which may 
be called imaginal and significant respectively. Ordinarily 
in a presentation these two moments fused. There are border 
conditions describable, however, in which either one of 
these moments is either lacking or attenuated to a high de-
gree. In cases where imagery is lacking the situation may 
be described as a case of pure thought-experience.1 Such 
lThe term 'thought-experience' is not particularly 
satisfactory. It is used by w. Stern, General Psycholo~y, 
tr. N. D. Spoerl (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938), p. 27 • 
The term 'thought' is even less satisfactory because of its 
misleading associations. To avoid confusion several possible 
senses of the term 'thought' not intended may be specified 
in the remainder of this footnote. Psychologists use the 
term 'thought' (more often the term 'thinking' because of 
its connotation of process) to mean a train of ideas initi-
ated by a problem. (cr. Drever, Diet. Psych., p. 293.) The 
term in this sense is a technical term departing to a large 
degree from ordinary usage and is also too narrow to be use-
ful in this investigation. Secondly, traditional logicians 
have used the term 'thought' in discussing the so-called laws 
of thought. It is doubtful if there are but three laws of 
thought, as traditional usage held. Further, this usage sug-
gests a uniformity in thinking which is psychologically false 
to the facts. (Cf. Stebbing, Modern Intro. to Logic, p. 469.) 
(Frega's usage of the term in an article recently translated 
into English is exempt from the foregoing criticism. For him 
the term is used to refer to something "for which the ques-
tion of truth arises. 11 G. Frege, "The Thought: A Logical 
Inquiry, 11 tr. A • M. and Marcelle Quinton, Mind, LXV, [ 1956 ], 
pp. 289-311. This is not, however, to be taKen as a defini-
tion, and further, although the terms are similar, it is not 
identifiable with the term 'Judgment' on Frega's usage. In-
sofar as logicians need the term, Frege has discussed it 
quite precisely, although his usage is at considerable vari-
ance from that adopted here.) Lastly, the term 'thought' was 
used by Buhler, wfirzburger, as more or less equivalent to Bsl, 
i.e. the term referred to impalpable contents of consciousness. 
This usage is less unsatisfactory than the others discussed, 
but treats of thought as an element in a way which is mislead-
ing. 
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impalpable and non-imaginal thought-experiencesare approxi-
mated most frequently by individuals working in the abstract 
sciences and mathematics. With such individuals, of course, 
pure thought-experiences are rare; they occur only at certain 
points in their mental processes and are not the normal form 
of their thought. Purely imaginal experiences, aimless imag-
1 
ery, is exemplified in its purest form in phenomena like day-
dreaming or the flight of ideas of the insane. An image in 
such cases is "simply present in its immanent depictive 
nature."2 Most presentations lie somewhere between these 
extremes. The presentations of mental life may thus be 
ordered on a scale which has at one end concrete sensory imag-
ery and at the other thought-experiences. 
This notion of a scale from concrete sensory imagery 
to abstract conceptual thinking gives a principle of classifi-
cation which will serve to order the discussion of the psy-
chology of imagery. The classification which will be used 
may put in the form of a series as follows: 3 
1According to the Freudians there are no cases of aim-
less mental processes; every mental process has some signifr= 
cance in the psychic life of the individual. This view, how-
ever, does not conflict with the statement in the body of the 
text which is the occasion of this footnote. For the Freud-
ians, although no mental processes lack significance, the 
significance of many are unconscious. In the discussions of 
this investigation there will be little occasion to refer to 
unconscious mental processes, but the assumption may be granted 
that there are unconscious processes. Whether or not there are 
such processes does not in fact seem to affect the arguments of 
this investigation one way or another. 
2 Stern, Gen. Psych., p. 275. 
3This classification is modified from Stern, Gen. 
Psych., p. 281. 
113 
Class I 








Generalized images (schematic images) (generic images) 
Class VI 
Thought-experiences 
1 Such a scale of "the intellectual content of inner experience" 
is made from the psychological point of view, which "consists 
of simply indicating certain accentuations in a smooth and con-
tinuous series."2 As contrasted with this psychological point 
of view, traditionally epistemology has tended to emphasize 
"the difference between the extremes of 'sensuousness' and 
•reason'" and thus has required "special connective principles 
to account for their factual relations."3 For the purposes of 
this investigation, interest will center around the middle 
ranges of the series, i.e. concrete images and generalized 
images. It is with these classes that imagism must be pri-
marily concerned; the other classifications are defined and 
discussed only insofar as to delimit the field of discussion. 
1stern, Gen. Psych., p. 280. 
2 Ibid., p. 281. (Italics in original). 
3Ibid. 
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Class I, immediate sensory experience, has three 
modalities: vital sensitivity, object perception, and intro-
ceptive perception. Vital sensitivity may be considered 
biological, in a narrow sense of the term. Concerning this 
modality Stern writes: "Human life holds in common with 
vegetable and animal life those functions which bring the 
individual naturally and unquestionably into conformity with 
1 his environment." This modality Stern calls the "biosphere." 
Concerning the second modality, object perception, there is 
little to say that is useful in discussing imagery. Speaking 
2 generally, it includes the "world of objects." Psychology 
is directly concerned with this modality but not at the sub-
jective level in which imagery functions. Finally, under 
this first classification is the phenomenon of intro c eption, 
the incorporation into the personality of the motives, stan-
dards, values of the social group of which he is a member.3 
After-images, the second class in this series, may be 
defined as a phenomenon resultant from the continuance of 
1 Stern, Gen. Psych., p. 72. 
2Ibid., pp. 73-77 is Stern's account of personality 
as the "ui'ii'tii"s multitlex," a conception which lies at the 
heart of his systema ic position and one which stems from his 
view of perception. It would, howev•r, be a digression to 
comment upon it at this point. 
3 Ibid. , p • 73 • 
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excitement in the sense organs after stimulation has ceased. 
1 It would be more correct to call them after-sensations. 
Such after-images are most pronounced in the visual sphere 
and are both positive and negative, i.e. that are--using the 
visual modality as the source of the example--of the same 
quality or hue or the apposite or complementary hue as the 
original stimulus. They are of no relevance for imagism. 
2 Eidetic images, the third class in the above series, 
are a phenomenon in which recollected or imagined objects 
appear to the subject in complex and full detail. These 
images can be localized and projected upon a screen set up 
before the subject. In one well-known study of eidetic 
imagery,3 pictures were shown to thirty English school child-
ren for thirty five seconds. One of the pictures contained 
the unfamiliar German word Gartenwirthschaft over a shop as 
1 Drever, Diet. Psych., p. 11 uses the term •after-
sensations• for what are here called •after-images,• but 
this terminology is not followed here. 
2 The standard work in English is by E. R. Jaensch, 
Eidetic Imagery (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1930). This book 
contains the character typology, not discussed here, built 
up on the basis of the studies of Eidetikers by the Jaensch 
brothers. This work has been severely criticized. A care-
ful review of the whole question of eidetic imagery has 
been made by Gordon Allport, 11Eidetic Imagery, 11 British 
Journal of Psychology, XV, Pt. 2, (1924}, pp. 99-126. 
3Allport, Brit. Journ. Ps ch. The picture used is 
reproduced in Boring, La~ld, an~ Weld, Foundations of 
Psych., p. 187 as well as in numerous other textbooks of 
psychology. The comments in Boring, Langfeld, and Weld, 
pp. 187-188 form part of the basis of this discussion. 
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as well as a number of other details. Three of the children, 
Eidetikers, could spell the word correctly immediately for-
ward or backward. This is an example of recollected eidetic 
imagery; other examples may be cited of imagined objects. 
1 Such eidetic imagery is more frequent in children than adults. 
Actually an eidetic image is between an image and a percep-
tion. Eidetic images are not hallucinatory, i.e. individuals 
do not experience them without relevant and adequate sensory 
stimulation. The phenomenon of eidetic imagery, intrinsically 
interesting in itself presumably because of its somewhat 
bizarre character, is, however, of no importance for the doc-
trine of imagism. The reason is simple enough; at most, 
eidetic images are possessed by but a small percentage of 
individuals, mostly children, and imagism, both on its pole-
mical and constructive sides, deals with thinking in the 
normal human adult mind. 
Concrete imagery, the fourth class of images in the 
series above, may be broadly classed into two groups, memory 
images2 and fantasy images. It is with memory images that 
1Adults may report them under special cases of fatigue. 
In such cases, images of material over which an individual has 
worked long and hard such as the symbols of mathematical logic 
or microscopic slides may appear to float before the eyes just 
before sleep. Boring, Langfeld, and Weld, FoUndations of 
Psych., p. 188. This is also a matter of the writer's personal 
experience. 
2Memory images are sometimes called 'mnemic images.• 
The term 1mneme' was employed by A. Semon, Mneme (2nd ed.; 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1921) to designate a basic memory in 
the individual and the race which acted as a conservatory 
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this investigation is primarily concerned, although, in gen-
eral, all remarks made are applicable to fantasy images. The 
first important division of memory images results from the 
sensory modality from which the image is obtained. Images 
ordinarily are recalled from 1 three sensory modalities; vision, 
hearing, and kinesthesis, or the feeling of bodily movements.2 
tendency. This term and terms such as •mnemic' derived from 
it have not been widely adopted. Russell, Anal~sis of Mind, 
hassim discusses Semon's theories and uses hiserminology, 
owever. The term will not be used in this investigation. 
1 The classification of concrete imagery into visual, 
auditory, and kinesthetic imagery is not exhaustive. There 
are gustatory and olfactory images. Myerson, Nouveau Traite, 
ed. Dumas, I, p. 600 discusses these. Historically, however, 
visual imagery has been discussed most frequently. The 
reason for this seems to be that the eye has always been felt 
to be the queen of the senses. Further, there is a phenomenon 
called synesthesia, much discussed by artists, in which sensa-
tions from one sensory modality carry with them sensory im-
pressions and images from another sensory modality. The 
commonest form of this phenomenon is colored hearing, but 
there seems no physiological reason why it could not occur in 
other modalities as well. The classes of concrete imagery 
discussed in this footnote, however, are not relevant to 
imagism. 
2A full phenomenological description of the concrete 
imagery of the various sensory modalities does not seem called 
for. Although visual imagery is perhaps not typical, the 
following preliminary account of visual imagery by Myerson 
illustrates the content of the imaginal process. 
"Presque tous les sujets, semble-t-il, ont des images 
visuelles, un tres grand nombre de sujets ont des images 
visuelles pures. Toutes les proprietes de la sensation 
et de la perce~tion visuelle peuvent etre evoquees dans 
l'image: lumiere, couleur, contour, forme, relief, 
localisation spatiale. Il semble bien qu 1on puisse evo-
quer de pures formes ou de pures lumieres ou couleurs. 
Il semble de meme qu'on puisse avoir des localisations 
spatiales avec un minimum de representation des objets 
figures." 
Myerson, Nouveau Traite, ed. Dumas, II, p. 598. Most discus-
sion of imagery will be of visual images in this investigation 
118 
It is necessary also to distinguish concrete imagery 
of the visual, auditory, and kinesthetic sort from verbal 
recollection. Consider the perception of a concrete macros-
copic object such as a door. The door may be recalled, i.e. 
a memory image obtained, in the following six ways at least: 
(1) The look of the door. 
(2) The sound of the door closing. 
(3) The feel of the limbs as the door is pushed shut. 
(4) The look of the word 1 door • 1 
(5) The sound of the word 'door. 1 
(6) The voice-feeling in uttering the word 'door. 1 
The first three recollections exemplify concrete imagery of a 
visual, auditory, and kinesthetic sort respectively. The last 
three recollections are a verbal imagery of a visual, audi-
tory, and kinesthetic sort respectively. Combinations of 
these various types of imagery are of course possible. Prob-
ably the most common type of imagery is auditory-kinesthetic-
1 
verbal imagery. Imagism as an epistemological doctrine, 
however, is not concerned with verbal imagery. verbal 
imagery is not the type of imagery intended in either the 
with only occasional references to other modalities. It will 
not be necessary to refer always to the fact that what may be 
said of visual images may most probably be said, mutatis 
mutandis, of imagery in the other modalities. 
1 
p. 194. 
Boring, Langfeld, and Weld, Foundations of Psych., 
1 polemical or the constructive sides of the doctrine. 
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Many of the early psychological studies of imagery 
were concerned with imaginal types. Such studies stressed 
a predominance of imagery corresponding to a particular sen-
sory modality. Three types were usually distinguished: a 
2 
visual type, an auditory type, and a kinesthetic type. There 
is a methodological difficulty, however, common to nearly all 
typologies;3 the vast majority of individuals belong to a 
mixed type rather than to the pure categories of the typology. 
Typological theory, however, if it is to have any usefulness 
for general psychology, requires that the normal individual 
be capable of being typed in a pure category. The methods 
for testing imaginal types and the pedagogical results 
4 
extracted from such studies are now considered obsolete. 
1There are studies on the inner perception of langu-
age, i.e. of verbal imagery, of epistemological consequence, 
but it may be stated rather flatly that such verbal imagery 
was not of concern to the classical British empiricists. 
Thus there is no need of burdening this investigation with 
attempting to assess what might have been their views if 
they had discussed such questions. 
2Many of these studies were at the anecdotal and bio-
graphical level. Typical of such studies was the suggestion 
that deaf Beethoven was able to compose the ninth symphony 
because of his rich auditory imagery. It might also be sug-
gested that James Joyce, who in his most productive literary 
years was nearly blind, filled Ulysses with auditory imagery 
as a result. 
3one could say all typologies were it not for Sheldon's 
studies on the relation between physique and temperament which 
may have succeeded in avoiding this methodological pitfall. A 
good resume of Sheldon's work is found in J. MeV. Hunt, Per-
sonalitt and the Behavior Disorders (2 vols.; New York: Ronald 
Press, 944). 
4stern, Gen. Psych., pp. 216-218. 
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There remains, however, one possibility of interest for this 
investigation stemming from the study of imaginal types. 
1 There are individuals who are visualizers; that is, visual 
imagery predominates in their recollections and descriptions. 
It is demonstrable that the classical British empiricists 
were visualizers and light is thrown on certain of their argu-
2 
menta by examining them from such a point of view. 
Generalized images, class V of the ordered series 
listed above, arose in philosophy in Berkeley and Hume in the 
form of the problem of abstract ideas. The essential point 
of Berkeley's argument, considered psychologically, is that 
general images (abstract ideas) are impossible.3 A visual 
image is particular and must be so. Berkeley wrote: 
I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by 
itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the 
body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must 
have some particular shape and colour. 4 
1Boring, Langfeld, and Weld, Foundations of Psych., 
p. 194. 
2The term 'visualizer' as used in this investigation 
means merely an individual in whom visual imagery predominates. 
Such individuals are exceptional but they exist. With the 
majority of people versatility is the rule rather than predom-
inace of imagery in one mode. Evidence for visualizations as 
a source of the psychology and epistemology of the classical 
British empiricists is found in A. Fraser, "Visualization as 
a chief source of the psychology of Hobbes, Locke~ Berkeley, 
and Hume," American Journal of Psychology, IV, ( ll;91), pp. 
230-247. This line of analysis is more appropriately dealt 
with in the chapters devoted to each of the classical British 
empiricists. 
3Full details of the epistemological significance of 
this argument will be presented in the chapter devoted to Ber-
keley. The purpose of the account at this point is to provide 
data for epistemological analysis in the later chapter. 
4Berkeley, "Principles of Human Knowledge," Works, 
II, sec. 10, p. 29. 
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Huxley, on the other hand, denies Berkeley's contention and 
offers an explanation of the formation of general images. 
He writes: 
Now when several complex impressions which are more or 
less different from each other--let us say that out of 
ten impressions in each, six are the same in all, and 
four are different from all the rest--are successively 
presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be 
the nature of the result. The repetition of the six 
similar impressions will strengthen the six correspond-
ing elements of the complex idea which will therefore 
acquire greater vividness while the four differing im-
pressions of each will not only acquire no greater 
strength than they had at first, but in accordance 
with the laws of association they will all tend to 
appear at once an~ will thus neutralize one another •••• 
The generic ideas which are formed from several similar 
but not identical, complex experiences are what are com-
monly called abstract or general ideas; and Berkeley 
endeavoured to prove that all general ideas are nothing 
but particular ideas annexed to a certain term which 
gives them a more extensive signification, and makes 
them recall, upon occasion, other individuals which are 
similar to them. 2 
1Galton introduced the term 'generic images' for what 
are here called 'generalized images.• Sir Francis Galton, 
Ingu~s into the Human Faculties (London: Macmillan Co., 
18 3) , appendix entitled "Generic Images • " The term is 
adopted by Huxley who also uses the term 'generic ideas' as 
in the above quoted passage. The term 'generalized images' 
indicates more clearly, however, the phenomenon under discus-
sion and thus seems preferable. 
2T. H. Huxley, Hume (New York: Appleton and Co., 1896), 
pp. 111-112. Huxley, in-a-passage omitted in this quotation, 
makes reference to Galton, who drew an analogy between compo-
site photography, the superposition of one photograph on 
another, and the generalized image. This analogy Huxley ac-
cepts. It is not to the point, however, for this investigation 
to continue this line of analysis, because all that need be 
shown for the present argument is that non-specific images 
exist. Composite photography does not seem to aid in demons-
trating this contention. 
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Philosophical opinion is thus divided on the existence of 
generalized images. The denial of generalized images has 
never been more clearly put than by Berkeley and the passage 
just cited from Huxley may be taken as typical of philoso-
phical opinion opposed to Berkeley. 
The issue of the generalized images is a case, not 
altogether common, in which experimental evidence seems to 
favor in a clear-cut fashion one philosophical opinion over 
another. Experimental evidence seems to tend to support the 
conclusion that there are generalized images. It is to dis-
cussion of such experimental results that attention will next 
be given. In order to locate the problem more precisely it 
is desirable first to distinguish the psychological process 
of abstraction from that of generalization. Abstraction may 
be defined as follows: 
The psychological process as the result of which behavi-
our or experience is determined, not by the total psycho-
logical situation immediately confronting an organism 
but by some particular feature or features with the ex-
clusion by the organism of other features. 1 
Generalization occurs when abstraction is from a number of 
variable situations confronting the organism and modification 
1Humphrey, Thinking, p. 265. Humphrey's review of 
the experimental evidence on abstraction and generalization 
is careful and thorough. This definition is broad enough, 
containing as it does reference to both behaviour and 
experience, to include studies from a mentalistic or a be-
havioral point of view. The term 'abstraction' has various 
other senses but ambiguity is avoided by the phrase 'psycho-
logical process' in this definition. Context, then, in 
general can be a fairly safe guide with the term 'abstrac-
tion.' 
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of experience or behavior is determined by common features of 
the group as such. Generalization may be defined, then, as 
"the process by which an organism comes to effect a constant 
modification towards an invariable feature ••• which occurs 
l 
under varying conditions." Generalization involves neglect 
of the irrelevant. In other words, generalization is impos-
sible without abstraction. The converse does not hold, how-
ever; the abstraction of a particular feature from a context 
does not of necessity concern other particulars. The studies 
relevant to this investigation are studies of the psychology 
of generalization and not studies of abstraction. 
Two questions may next be formulated, the discussions 
of which will order the experimental studies on the psychoiogy 
of generalization. 
(1) Is generalization essentially the formation of a 
special kind of image? 
(2) If generalization is not the formation of a special 2 image, what is the role of imagery in generalization? 
In the first place, there is no doubt that there are very 
vague images,3 but vagueness is not generality. As Stout 
l Humphrey, Thinki~, p. 265. There are epistemologi-
cal questions relating to he generality of thought as such 
which will not be dealt with in this investigation as refer-
ence to such studies would not seem to advance the argument. 
There is brief but pointed discussion of such broader issues 
in Adamson, Develop. Modern Phil., II, Chs. III and VI and 
Geor~e D. Hicks, Critical Realism, (London: Macmillan Co., 
1938), chap. 5. Both of these works are cited by Humphrey, 
Thinking, p. 265 in a useful footnote. 
2These two questions are formulated by Humphrey, 
Thinking, p. 278. 
3Ibid., p. 279. 
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says, if vagueness and generality could be identified, then 
"imperfection of the sense organs ought on this view to be 
1 
a great help towards conceptual thinking." Many observers, 
however, have asserted the existence of generalized images 
which represent in consciousness a whole class. Typical of 
several such reports is one by Koffka concerning which 
Humphrey describes as general images those which include 
statues of neither sex and coins of no determination.2 
The point has been made that vagueness is not gener-
ality. Further the point has been made that general images, 
and there is little doubt that such general images occur, do 
not have their generality conferred by their vagueness. What 
then is the relation between vagueness and generality? It 
has been suggested that generalized images, owing to repeti-
tion, have become mechanized, i.e. their particularity has 
been lost by repetition.3 The difference, then, between a 
generalized image and a particular image has nothing to do 
with the structural characteristics of the image, but rather 
lstout, Analytic Psychology, II, p. 179. 
2 Humphrey, Thinking, p. 279. 
3This is a somewhat speculative result less well-
documented than other assertions of this section. The con-
cept of mechanization does, however, seem to have some explan-
atory value. The remarks of this paragraph are a precis of 
Humphrey, Thinkief, pp. 280-281. The literature bearing on 
this subject is c ted in Humphrey. 
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has to do with what the images stand for. Generalized images 
have a referential function which particular images lack. 
Both generalized and particular images may be vague or clear, 
full, and detailed. Thus (1) above is answered in the nega-
tive. The essential character of generalization is not in 
theformation of a special kind of image. 
The role of imagery in the process of generalization 
may next be considered, that is, consideration of (2) of the 
preceding questions. Imagery may be thought of as a stage of 
organization which occurs early in the process of generaliza-
tion. Images may serve as a blueprint; they tend to anchor 
the problem and to provide leads. They may be used as a 
means of escape in the solution of a problem, what in Lewin-
ian psychology is referred to as "going out of the field." 
As the process of generalization continues, however, imagery 
tends to become more telescoped and fragmentary. The 
imaginal content tends to become pared away as concepts are 
1 formed. Indeed the foregoing remarks are applicable to the 
role of imagery in mental life as a whole and not only to the 
process of generalization. 
1studies of concept formation are not mentioned in 
this investigation because at this point such studies would 
require rather extensive analysis and it is doubtful if 
reference to such studies would aid the problems with which 
this investigation is concerned. The following definition, 
however, of conception may be quoted to clarify the occasional 
use of the term. Conception is "cognition of abstracta or 
universals as distinguished from cogntion of concreta or 
particulars • " Ledger Wood, "Conception," Diet • Phil., ed. 
Runes, p. 61. 
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Concerning the last class of the foregoing series, 
thought-experiences, little need be said except to point out 
that from the point of view of this investigation they should 
be looked at as a limiting case, seldom found in normal think-
ing but occasionally approximated at the acme of some indi-
vidual's thought processes. Finally, it needs to be reiter-
ated that there is wide variation from individual to 
individual and from process to process in the extent and 
manner in which imagery functions. In imagery as perhaps in 
no other psychological or epistemological problem, disagree-
ment over interpretation may stem from constitutional indi-
vidual differences. 
CHAPTER III 
LOCKE AND IMAGISM 
Introduction 
This chapter is divided into five sections. In sec-
tion one the term •empiricism' is defined for the purposes of 
this investigation. In section two Locke's doctrine of ideas 
is explored, both for the immediate purpose of discussing 
imagism in the third section and as a significant doctrine 
that Berkeley and Hume, with modifications, take over from 
Locke. Discussion in this section includes exposition and 
critical consideration of the distinction between simple and 
complex ideas, and between primary and secondary qualities. 
Further, in this section both sensationalism and composition-
alism are discussed, and the question of the relation of 
these latter doctrines to empiricism receives attention. In 
section three imagistic tendencies in Locke's defense of 
empiricism are considered. This discussion includes consid-
eration of Locke's view on space, time, substance, and infin-
ity. These crucial instances are discussed not because they 
form an exhaustive list of cases in which imagism in Locke 
comes to the fore, but rather as they are typical in showing 
Locke's latent imagism. In section four the term •nominalism' 
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is discussed and given a contemporary semantic formulation. 
This discussion enables the traditional doctrines of univer-
sals--realism, nominalism, and conceptualism--to be 
formulated in a comparatively non-polemical fashion. With 
the background thus developed, Locke's views on abstract 
general ideas are d~scussed and the degree to which imagism 
plays a part in at least one of his views is considered. In 
section five, various imagistic tendencies in Locke's account 
of the understanding, attention, consciousness, and memory 
are considered. The section concludes with a summary state-
ment of what is here called Locke's implicit imagism. 
1. Toward the Definition of Empiricism 
Traditionally Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have been 
treated as the founders of empiricism in modern thought; the 
justice of such an account is accepted in this investigation. 
Before commenting, however, upon the significance of empiri-
cism and its affiliated doctrines, as they will be understood 
in this investigation, a preliminary statement of the posi-
tion of these philosophers in the history of the European 
thought of the period may be made. Classical British empiri-
cism, externally considered in terms of the dates of publica-
tion of its important works, is part of a larger movement of 
thought known as the Enlightenment or AufklHrung. This latter 
movement of thought is dated roughly in the eighteenth cen-
tury; it may be said to begin with Locke's Essay, published 
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in 1690, i.e. ten years before the beginning of the eight-
ennth century, and sending with Kant's Critique of Pure 
Reason, published in 1871.1 Internally, in terms of its 
most characteristic doctrine, the movement is most broadly 
conceived as a stress on epistemology, i.e. taking "the point 
of view which assumes the validity of the psychological 
approach to all investigations of reality and then speculates 
on that basis concerning the nature of the world."2 It will 
not be necessary, however, in this investigation to give more 
than occasional consideration to tnis wider movement. That 
classical British empiricism has such a wider reference 
within the Enlightenment period, however, will be assumed. 
Further delimitation of the term 'empiricism' is 
required, since the term has been used with considerable lack 
of precision. There is a traditional interpretation of British 
1J. G. Hibben, The Philosoph! of the Enli!htenment 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,910), pp. 3- suggests 
these dates for the Enlightenment. This work is probably 
the clearest manual in English for the whole period. 
2s. Lamprecht, "Empiricism and Epistemology in David 
Hume," Studies in the History of Ideas, ed. Columbia Univer-
sity Department of Philosophy (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1925), II, 222. Lamprecht calls the doctrine just 
cited 'epistemology.• The more common name for this doctrine 
is 'subjectivism' and this term will be specified and employed 
in this investigation. This is Randall's usage. Cf. J. H. 
Randall, "David Hume: RaQ.ical Empiricist and Pragmatist," 
Freedom and Exkerience: Essa s Presented to Horace M. Kallen, 
ed. Sidney Hoo and M. R. onv z ew or : orne n var-
sity Press, 1947), p. 302. s. Lamprecht, Our Philosophical 
Traditions (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955), p. 312 
accepts Randall's suggested change in terminology. The two 
articles just cited are suggestive and useful for all the 
classical British empiricists, and not for Hume alone. 
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empiricism which may be commented upon briefly for the purpose 
of partially delimiting the term 'empiricism.' Tradition has 
it, and it would probably be agreed on by all hands that the 
interpretation is shallow, that empiricism is to be contrasted 
with rationalism. Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza in Europe 
are classical rationalists; Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in 
England are classical empiricists. The difference between 
rationalism and empiricism is thought to be a difference in 
philosophical method rather than a difference in content, i.e. 
both deal with the same problems but approach these problems 
in a different way. The contrast in method is described as a 
reliance primarily but not exclusively on reason by the 
rationalists and a reliance mainly on experience by the empiri-
cists. More particularly the difference in method is a 
difference both in starting point and mode of argument. For 
the rationalist the starting point is with self-evident 
principles such as the Cartesian cogito or Leibniz's principle 
of sufficient reason. With the empiricists, on the other 
hand, the starting point is with immediate experience, the 
data of consciousness. The mode of argument in continental 
rationalism is presumed to b~ generally deductive, exemplified 
in the Cartesian argument from causality to God. The mode of 
argument in the empiricists is inductive; it starts from 
psychological facts, from particulars. Lastly, this inter-
pretation holds that these two strains, rationalism and 
empiricism, are brought together, modified and synthesized 
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in Kant. 1 The theory has done yeoman service pedagogically 
in depicting the main lines of the history of modern philo-
sophy. 
However valuable such an account may be for this pur-
pose, the term so used is not useful for the purposes of this 
investigation. In the first place, both the continental 
rationalists and the classical British empiricists use 
reason and both appeal to experience, as indeed most philoso-
phers have. The distinction between rationalists and empiri-
cists becomes blurred as soon as it is pressed; rationalists 
become empiricists and vice versa. Secondly, this interpre-
tation generally neglects the role that science has played in 
the formation of the philosophies of both continental ration-
alists and the classical British empiricists. An example 
taken from Locke, one of the subjects of this study, will suf-
fice. In discussing primary and secondary qualities, an 
important distinction for epistemology, Locke takes the 
doctrine over whole from Galilee remotely and Robert Boyle 
2 immediately. Locke himself is in no doubt about the close 
1The most succinct statement summarizing this inter-
pretation of Kant is his own famous saying "Ideas without any 
perceptions by the senses are empty, but mere sensations with-
out ideas are blind." 
2The doctrine of primary and secondary qualities will 
be dealt with below. Evidence for the assertion that the 
source of the doctrine in Locke is to be found in Galilee and 
Boyle may be found, among other places, in Richard I. Aaron, 
John Locke (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1955), 
pp. lib-127. 
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connection between the science of his day and his philoso-
phy. In a justly famous passage he writes: 
The commonwealth of learning is not at this time with-
out master builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing 
the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the 
admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope 
to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces 
such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable 
Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is 
ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in 
clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the 
rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge;--which cer-
tainly had been very much more advanced in the world, 
if the endeavours of ingenious and industrious men had 
not been cumbered with the learned but friVolous use of 
uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms, introduced 
into the sciences. 1 
In cases where the reference to the wider bearings of the 
philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume seem called for in 
this account, it is more often useful to make such references 
to contemporaneous scientific developments rather than to 
other philosophers.2 In the third place, in a fairly detailed 
account of a particular problem such as the present invesgiga-
tion intends, reference to the later history of philosophy, 
in this case to Kantianism, is inappropriate. It wi.ll be suf-
ficient to point out the degree to which Berkeley and Hume 
1Locke, Essay, epistle, p. 14. 
2Berkeley and Hume wrote of course with Locke in mind 
and Hume wrote with Locke and Berkeley in mind, but the point 
is that they all wrote with contemporary science in mind and 
this is what is too frequently neglected. The relations of 
philosophers with one another have been exhaustively explored; 
their relations to science have been dealt with to a lesser 
degree; their relation to science is fully as important as 
their relation to previous philosophers. 
explored the consequences of the Lockean position; none 
write with Kant in mind.1 
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What then is empiricism for the philosophers who are 
the subject of this investigation? Put simply it is the doc-
trine that the "certainty and extent of human knowledge"2 is 
to be determined by examination of the "original" of that 
knowledge, i.e. the data from which that knowledge is derived. 
The data from which knowledge is derived are ideas; ideas 
are the materials of knowledge. The evidence for such know-
ledge for Locke is to be found in sensation and reflection. 
As Locke puts it: 
All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, 
and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and 
footing here: in all that great extent wherein the 
mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem 
to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those 
ideas which sense or reflection has offered for its 
contemplation. 3 
The following well-known passage illustrates the 
central points of Locke's empiricism of ideas. He writes: 
If any one asks me, what this solidity is, I send him 
to his senses to inform him: let him put a flint or a 
1 Woodbridge makes a remark that is applicable to all 
the classical British empiricists: "we are led to estimate 
Locke in terms of the consequences he provoked instead of in 
terms of the consequences he desired." F. J. E. Woodbridge, 
"Locke's Essay," Studies in History of Ideas, III, p. 244. 
2Locke, Essay, I, intro., p. 26. 
3Ibid., II, chap. 1, sec. 24, p. 142. (Italics not 
in originar:T 
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football between his hands and then endeavour to join 
them, and he will know. If he thinks this is not a 
sufficient explanation of solidity, what it is, and 
wherein it consists, I promise to tell him what it is, 
and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking 
is, or wherein it consists; or explains to me what ex-
tension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. 
The simple ideas we have are such as experience teaches 
them to us; but if, beyond that, we endeavour by words 
to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no 
better than if we went about to clear up the darkness 
of a blind man's mind by talking, and to discourse into 
him the ideas of light and colours. 1 
The central principles of British empiricism are laid 
down in the first two chapters of the second book of Locke's 
Essay. Berkeley and Hume departed from Locke in important 
respects, but not in respect to empiricism. There is, thus, 
good reason for the fact that it is difficult to think of 
Locke without immediately thinking of Berkeley and Hume. 
The empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and 
called in this investigation an 'empiricism of 
Hume will be 
2 ideas, • or 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap 4, sec. 6, pp. 156-157. 
2This formulation of the doctrine of empiricism is 
indebted to Professor w. T. Stace as a result of lecture and 
discussion. Stace, however, is not to be held responsible 
for the interpretation given here to his teaching; there may 
be much with which he would disagree. The interpretation 
here given to British empiricism flies flat in the face of a 
definition of empiricism offered by Russell. Says Russell: 
"Locke may be regarded as the founder of empiricism, which is 
the doctrine that all our knowledge (with the possible excep-
tion of logic and mathematics) is derived from experience." 
Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosohhy (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 609. Russell, t e most dis-
tinguished contemporary exponent of British empiricism, 
however, practices philosophy in a way which would make this 
distinction useful in understanding him. 
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simply •empiricism' when there is no possibility of confu-
sion. Subject to fuller specification of important tenets 
in what follows, it may be defined in a provisory manner as 
the doctrine that 
(1) All ideas are derived from experience. 
This doctrine is to be distinguished from another doctrine, 
also frequently called 'empiricism,' which in this investiga-
tion will be called 'empiricism of knowledge.' This doctrine 
may be stated as the doctrine that 
(2) All knowledge is a report on experience. 
Deferring for the time being fuller consideration of the 
significance to be attached to the term •experience' in (1) 
and (2), if the term is taken to mean sensory experience, 
either variety of empiricism leads to sensationalism. There 
is thus a third variant, sensationalism, which may be called 
a subvariety of empiricism, viz. the doctrine that 
(3) All knowledge is ultimately derived from 
sensations. 1 
This latter doctrine, (3), has been riddled with criticism, 
particularly by idealists like Green and Bradley.2 One 
1sensationalism, in modern philosophy, may be said to 
have Hobbes as its founder and Condillac as its most typical 
exponent. See Ledger Wood, "Sensationalism," Dictionary of 
Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 289. 
2Green in his introduction to Hume's Treatise. (David 
Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, ed. Thomas Hill Green and T.H. 
Grose [London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1878]). Green's pole-
mic as applicable to classical British empiricism will be con-
sidered below. Bradley's critique is summarized in the famous 
phrase "association marries only universals." This critique 
necessary task of this chapter will be to decide whether 
(1), which is here alleged to be the doctrine of the classi-
cal British empiricists, is reducible to (3). The task, 
however, is best postponed until some exposition of the 
Lockean doctrine of ideas has been given. 
The last important figure in the history of thought 
to hold an 
( 2) above, 
empiricism of knowledge, the doctrine described in 
1 
was John Stuart Mill. On this view knowledge is 
was against the sensationalistic aspect of association. It 
is thus a critique of association and sensationalism, the 
central burden of which is that sensory data are particulars 
and cannot be repeated, whereas thought requires universals. 
There is, no doubt, special metaphysical pleading in Bradley 
which would not gain assent from all who have considered the 
problems; as a critique of sensationalism, however, it is 
usually taken as decisive. That it is decisive, in any case, 
will be the position adopted in this investigation. Cf. 
Humphrey, Thinking, p. 12. 
1Mill contrasted his doctrine of empiricism with 
German transcendentalism and Scottish intuitionism. Concern-
ing empiricism, Mill wrote: 
"We see no ground for believing that anything can be the 
object of our knowledge except our experience, and what 
can be inferred from our experience by the analogies of 
experience itself; nor that there is any idea, feeling, 
or power in the human mind, which, in order to account 
for it, requires that its origin should be referred to 
any other source." 
John Stuart Mill, Dissertations and Discussions (4 vols.; 
London: 1855-75), I, p. 4o9 as quoted in James Seth, English 
Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy (London: J. M. Dent, 
1912) ' p. 262. 
His textbook he thought of as a practical treatise 
against the German a priori view of knowledge. He writes: 
"The System of Logic supplies what was much wanted, a 
text-book of tfie opposite doctrine (i.e. opposite to the 
German a priori view of knowledge), that which derives 
all knowledge from exterience, and all moral and intel-
lectua11. qualities pr ncipally from the direction given 
to associations •••• The notion that truths external to 
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a generalization or report on experience. There are well-
known difficulties in an empiricism of knowledge, the most 
obvious of which is the difficulty of offering a satisfac-
tory account of mathematics--a subject usually considered to 
be remote from experience.1 This doctrine has to do with 
truth--not with meaning; only those facts are known to be 
true which can be shown to be derived from observation, 
immediately or remotely. 
Empiricism of ideas, the doctrine here alleged to be 
central to the philosophies of the classical British empiri-
cists, may be illustrated by consideration of Hume's classic 
the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, 
independently of observation and experience is ••• the 
great intellectual support of false doctrines." 
John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (London: 1873), p. 225 quoted 
in Seth, Eiflish Philosop ers, p. 262. (Italicized phrase not 
in the orig nal.) 
H8ffding comments that this doctrine that all knowledge 
is derived from experience is central to Mill's two chief 
philosophical works, The System of Logic, and the Examination 
of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. Harald H8ffding, A 
Hlstor~ of Modern Philosoph~, tr. B. E. Meyer (2 vola.;; 
Doverubllcations, Inc., 1 55), II, p. 403. H8ffding's cri-
ticism, similar to that suggested here, is typical. 
1 This, of course, is the basis of a notorious criti-
cism of Mill. Mill held that the laws of arithmetic and geo-
metry are laws of nature known to us by experience. All in-
ference is induction from one particular event to another 
based upon the uniformity of nature. Arithmetic and geometry 
are laws of nature known to us by experience, on this view. 
The criticism consists in pointing out that it is inconceivable, 
in one ordinary sense of this term, to think of experience as 
either confirming or disconfirming arithmetic or any other 
branch of classical mathematics; experience is simply irrele-
vant in such cases. CX;£ Britton, John Stuart Mill (London: 
Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 130-140. 
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critique of substance.! Hume calls substance a 'falsity' 
(and occasionally a 'fiction') on the ground that for the 
idea of substance no antecedent impression can be found.~ An 
idea lacking such an antecedent impression is for Hume mean-
ingless.3 By parity of case many of the central arguments of 
Locke and Berkeley can be shown to be concerned with an 
empiricism of ideas and not an empiricism of knowledge. As 
will be shown in detail at later points, some distinction 
like that between 'impression' and 'idea' is critical to 
empiricism of ideas, although it was Hume who first put the 
matter precisely. This is not meant to suggest that the term 
'idea• means the same thing for each of the classical British 
empiricists; this is not the case. What each intends by the 
term will be brought out in the appropriate places. Two 
further points may be made concerning empiricism of ideas. 
In the first place, the doctrine is concerned with all ideas, 
true or false. Secondly, the doctrine has its affiliations 
lHume is chosen for the example because, as a result 
of his important distinction between impressions and ideas, 
the matter is easier to state in a preliminary account such 
as the present one. 
2 Hume 1s critique of substance, the burden of which is 
contained in one paragraph, is found inHume, Treatise, I, Pt. 
1, sec • 6, p • 15 • 
3A distinction is made in contemporary thought between 
meaninglesaRess and falsity. According to this doctrine, an 
assertion must possess mesing before the question of its truth 
or falsity arises, i.e. meaning is logically prior to truth or 
falsity. Hume, however, 2fers to assertions which today would 
be considered meaningless, provided that one accepts the cog-
ency of Hume's type of analysis as 'false' or as 'fictions.• 
His argument is made clearer, but not modified in essentials, 
by the terminological shift from Hume•s terms 'falsity' and 
'fiction' to the sfngle term 'meaningless.• 
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with considerations of meaning and not considerations of 
truth. Its most 'characteristic tenet is that ideas are de-
rived from experience, i.e. ideas are copies (using the term 
•copies' quite loosely at this point) which are obtained by 
abstraction and generalization from an experience which 
causes them. According to an empiricism of knowledge, in con-
trast, ideas are proved true or false by experience. No doubt 
both of these doctrines may be and have been held by one and 
the same thinker, but the characteristic and important doc-
trine of British empiricism for this investigation is an 
empiricism of ideas.1 
2. Empiricism and the Lockean Doctrine of Ideas 
The doctrine of ideas, beginning in classical British 
empiricism in Locke, is a well-worn path. A statement of the 
doctrine as well as certain comments about it relevant to this 
investigation is, however, necessary. Such a discussion may 
be begun by discussing Locke's usage of the term 'idea' 
followed by a discussion of the function and classification 
of ideas in Locke's theory of knowledge. 
1one might go further and say that empiricism of 
ideas is the aspect of British empiricism which is most alive 
today. As was pointed out above, empiricism of knowledge has 
been dead since Mill. An empiricism of ideas, however, enters 
very much into the contemporary scene as a result of contempo-
rary disagreements over meaning characteristic of philosophy 
since the rise of logical positivism. Reference to such 
contemporary developments will be made only so far as they 
serve to clarify Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
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As has already been pointed out, Locke uses the term 
'idea' in a very broad sense. It is defined as that term 
which "serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of 
the understanding when a man thinks" and among the things, 
i.e. nameables, which are included within the connotation of 
the term are "phantasm, notion, species or whatever it is 
which the mind can be employed about in thinking." 1 It is to 
be noted that thinking, on the view expressed in this quota-
tion, includes all cognitive activities. Ideas are such 
things as are "expressed by the words, whiteness, hardness, 
sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness 
and others."2 In this investigation the term 'presentation' 
will be used in much the same sense as Locke uses the term 
3 
'idea.• The Lockean idea may be characterized as the unit of 
1 Locke, Essay, intro., p. 32. 
2 Ibid., II, chap. 1, p. 121. 
3The term 'presentation' as it is used here was dis-
cussed in a preliminary way in the previous chapter. It may 
be further pointed out in explication that the term is us·ed 
here comprehensively to include both the objects of awareness-
situations, for example, for sense-qualities, images, meanings, 
sensations, etc.; and further to include the act of awareness 
itself, more particularly perception of material objects. On 
one interpretation of Locke's usage of the term 'idea' it is 
maintained that he uses the term to include both of these 
senses. Aaron puts this interpretation as follows: "It is 
frequently argued ••• that in his actual usage Locke ••• some-
times means by idea not so much an object of thinking but the 
thinking itself-;--uie perceiving of an object." Aaron goes on 
to deny this and says: "I doubt whether a single unambiguous 
instance of the explicit identification of idea with the per-
ceiving can be found." (Aaron, Locke, p. 1oo:- Aaron is 
followed by O'Connor, Locke, p. 35f In this interpretation.) 
As it is agreed upon by all hands that Locke's usage invites 
confusion, it does not seem necessary to attempt a decision 
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the mind, i.e., "if we can divide \'hat we know consciously at 
any given time into components, we find that we have ideas."1 
Another way of putting this is to say that ideas--in Locke's 
s.ense--are logical concepts, i.e. they operate in sentences 
as items of knowledge, as it were, which give sentences their 
content of meaning.2 
on this matter of interpretation here; it is, however, rele-
vant to fix upon a terminology that will permit unambiguous 
discussion of the Locke and other classical British empiri-
cists. The attitude of this investigation, thus, toward this 
matter of interpretation may be put as follows. If the inter-
pretation of Locke denied by Aaron were accepted as correct, 
viz. that Locke assimilates the act of perceiving and the 
QOJect (content) of awareness in his usage of the term 'idea,' 
then the usage of the term 'presentation' is this investiga-
tion would be synonymous with Locke's usage. If, on the other 
hand, Aaron's interpretation of Locke is accepted, viz. that 
Locke's term 'idea• is not to be identified with the-term 
'perception' (in its contemporary sense), then the usage of 
the term 'presentation' in this investigation would be viewed 
as an extension of Locke's terminology. 
1 Boring, Experimental Psych., p. 171. 
2This matter needs comment. The term •concep~ has 
two allied but significantly different current usages: a psy-
chological usage and a logical usage. In describing the 
psychological usage the term •concept' will be used; in des-
cribing the logical usage the term 'logical concept' will be 
used. 
Conception, as a psychological activity, is construed 
as cognitive process characterized by the thinking of qualities, 
relations, and aspects of objects at a level which permits 
comparison, generalization, and abstraction to take place. A 
concept is the product of this process. cr. James Dcever, 
"Conception," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 46. An 
epistemological counterpart of' this definition has already 
been quoted and may be repeated. Conception is the "cognition 
of abstrac·ta or universals as distinct from cognition of con-
creta or particulars." Ledger Wood, "Conception," Dictionary 
of Philosoph!, ed. Runes, p. 61. The important point of this 
psychologica definition, for the present discussion, is the 
stress on psychological activity. 
The term 'logical concept,• on the other hand, is 
synonymous with 'propositional function.' A propositional 
function is a "function ••• for which the range of the dependent 
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Stemming directly from Locke's notion of the idea, 
there develops a doctrine of considerable moment for the 
problem of this investigation, viz. Locke's representative 
theory of ideas. The first point to be noted about any 
representative theory of ideas, including Locke's, is that 
such a theory is epistemologically dualistic. Following 
Wood, epistemological dualism may be defined as follows: 
Epistemological dualism is the theory that in perception, 
memory, and other types of non-inferential cognition, 
there is a numerical duality of the content or datum 
immediately present to the knowing mind (sense-datum, 
memory-image, etc.) and the real object known (the thing 
variable is composed of propositions." Alonzo Church, "Pro-
positional function," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 
256. A proposition may be defined, on the broadest definition 
of three given by Church, as "a declarative sentence associated 
with its content of meaning." Church, "Proposition," Diction-
ary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 256. Lastly, a function, in 
the logical usage here being established, as opposed to the 
mathematical usage, is "a law of correspondence between an 
ordered set of n things (called ••• values of the dependent 
variables) and another thing (the value of the dependent vari-
able), of such a sort that, given any ordered set of n argu-
ments which belongs to a certain domain (the range of-the 
function),, the value of the function is uniquely determined." 
Church, 'Function," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 113. 
Locke's ideas function as logical concepts in the 
sense just described, although, of course, Locke does not 
define them in logical terms but rather in psychological terms. 
They also function as concepts, in the psychological usage 
described above, but specification of this is better left 
until consideration has been given to Locke's views on 
abstract ideas. 
Lastly, human knowledge for Locke is "a perception of 
the • • • agreement • • • or disagreement of any of our ideas." 
Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 1, sec. 2, p. 167. The proposition is 
the unit of knowledge, not the idea. The traditional term 
'judgment' might be used in describing knowledge, i.e. know-
ledge is about judgments except that Locke uses the term 
'knowledge' in such a restrictive sense, when he uses the term 
rigorously, that much that on the traditional view would be 
called a judgment would not pass muster on Locke's criterion. 
1 perceived or remembered). 
Locke maintains, although not always explicitly, that the 
human mind, when it thinks, has no other objects than its 
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own ideas. 2 According to Locke's version of this theory, a 
knowledge of cognoscenda requires an intermediary between the 
knowing mind and the cognoscenda. What is immediately given 
in every case is this intermediary object, the idea. When 
one looks at the table, the cognoscendum, one does not see a 
physical entity but an idea which represents this entity. 
The mind knows the world only through the medium and media-
tion of ideas.3 There is ample evidence that Locke was aware 
1Ledger Wood, "Dualism," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. 
Runes, p. 84. Following Lovejoy, the term 'cognoscendum' 
(plural--'cognoscenda') may be used for what Wood here calls 
the "real object known (the thing perceived or remembered)." 
Lovejoy defines the cognoscenda as "the things-to-be-known-if-
possible." A. 0. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism (n.p.: 
w. w. Norton and Co., 1930}, p. 12. 
2This theory has been held in early modern philosophy 
by many others besides the classical British empiricists, e. 
g. Descartes, Malebranche, and Hobbes subscribed to it in one 
form or another. cr. Ledger Wood, "Representative Ideas, 
theory of," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 271. Its 
best known exponent among contemporary epistemologists is 
probably Lovejoy. His statement of the theory is recent and 
meticulous. 
3The statement of Locke's representation theory of 
ideas in this investigation is indebted to Aaron's statement 
of the theory in Locke. Cf. Aaron, Locke, pp. 100-101. 
It is to be further noted that the statement of the 
doctrine here is as special reference to sense-perception, but 
such reference is not essential; the doctrine is equally 
applicable to memory; indeed, this is one of the strongest 
points of the theory. Cf. Ledger Wood, The Analysis of Know-
ledge (Princeton; Princeton Univ. Press,l941), pp. 17-18. To 
keep matters under investigation straight, the representative 
theory of ideas will be called subjectivism, following Randall's 
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of difficulties in this doctrine, but nonetheless he maintained 
. 1 
it throughout the Essay. After recognizing one of the major 
difficulties of this theory, Locke goes on to state his adher-
ence to the theory unequivocally. He writes: "It is evident 
the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the inter-
vention of the ideas it has of them. 112 
Subjectivism has, at least in the rather uncritical 
form in which it was held by Locke, two serious defects. In 
the first place, if the mind does not perceive real things, on 
the basis of the theory, what warrant is there for asserting 
their existence? Secondly, if only ideas are given, how do we 
know that they adequately represent the originals?3 
terminology. Cf. John Herman Randall, "David Hume: Radical 
Empiricist and Pragmatist," Freedom and Experience, ed. Hook 
and Konvitz, p. 298f. (There are, of course, other senses of 
the term 'subjectivism' but these need occasion no confusion.) 
The representative theory applied to sense-perception will be 
called the 'representative theory of sense-perception.' On 
Locke's version of the theory, this involves some difficulties 
which will be pointed out below in connection with the discus-
sion of primary and secondary qualities. 
1Aaron, Locke, pp. 101-107, discusses Locke's reasons 
for holding the theory despite his recognition of some of its 
difficulties. It is not, however, relevant to pursue the 
matter in this investigation. 
2Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 4, sec. 3, p. 228. 
3rt is not here being asserted (or denied) that these 
two criticisms are unanswerable. It is, however, an important 
point in the analysis of classical British empiricism in this 
investigation, so far as it has proceeded, to suggest that sub-jectivism had certain implications about which Locke was 
uneasy, but that nonetheless he retained the theory. Subjec-
tivism is important in British empiricism for the purposes of 
this investigation; it is closely affiliated with imagism. 
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Empiricism of ideas, the doctrine that all the 
materials, i.e. ideas the mind has are derived from experi-
ence, has not up to this point been fully developed. Con-
sideration should next be given to the doctrine of experience 
in the philosophy of Locke. What the term •experience' signi-
fies comes out clearly in the following famous passage: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white 
paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How 
comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast 
store which the busy and boun~ess fancy of man has 
painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence 
has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To 
this I answer, in one word, from Experience. In that all 
our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately 
derives itself. Our observation employed either, about 
external sensible objects, or about the internal operations 
of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is 
that which supplies our understandings with all the 
materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of 
knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can 
naturally have, do spring. 1 
Experience, thus, has two sides, sensation and reflection, 
which exhaust all that is signified by the term. 
In this famous passage, 2 Locke is discussing the 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 2, pp. 121-122. 
2A further point of interest concerning the above 
quoted passage may be made. It is frequently asserted that 
in British empiricism the mind is viewed as entirely passive, 
and it is this passage which is often cited at least in partial 
support of the contention. Concerning the justice of this 
interpretation, no comment need be made at this point. The 
reference to a "white paper," however, is a metaphor and should 
not be pressed too far. The metaphor is not even original with 
Locke, for it occurs in Aristotle; Locke, however, does make it 
central. Cf. Boring, Hist. of Experimental Psych., pp. 158ff. 
for a discussion of Aristotle's psychology whiCh is brief but 
pointed and which comments upon the metaphor of the white paper. 
Locke, in the passage quoted, says a "white paper void of all 
characters" and not a white paper void of all character. The 
difference is important. Locke is asserting here the existence 
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origin of ideas. The significance of this fact can best be 
brought out by discussion of Locke's compositionalism. Locke 
believes, as did all the philosophers of his perlod, that to 
discover the origin of an idea was to discover also its 
validity. Today our modes of thought are dominated by evolu-
tionary theories and it is difficult to realize that this was 
not the case in Locke's time.1 For Locke, and for the classi-
cal British empiricists who followed him, the place that 
evolution occupies in contemporary thought was occupied by the 
idea of composition. Concerning compositionalism Gibson writes: 
A complex whole being regarded as the mere sum of its 
constituent parts, these latter were not thought to 
undergo any modification as the result of their combina-
tion; similarly, the whole was supposed to be directly 
resolvable into its parts without remainder. 2 
The analysis of experience, thus, for Locke is an analysis of 
a complex whole into elements or simples. By retracing or 
reconstructing these simples an adequate account of experience 
of mind equipped and ready to function. It is not intended to 
burden this passage with more freight than it will carry, but 
it is well to recognize that the alleged passivity of the mind 
in British empiricism is often over-stressed. cr. Albert 
Hofstadter, Locke and Scepticism (New York: Albee Press, 1935), 
pp. 27-28 for this point and for a good discussion of Locke's 
view of the mini Actually this passage should be construed as 
further evidence to support Book I's polemic against innate 
ideas, i.e. ready-made items of knowledge presumably possessed 
by the mind prior to experience. It is not a complete account 
of Locke's view of the mind by any manner of means. 
1Evolution has dominated thought only since the nine-
teenth century; it plays almost no role in the thought of the 
classical British empiricists 
2Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 47. Gibson refers to vari-
ous permutations of this theory in Bacon, Descartes, and 
Leibniz, but this investigation need not be concerned with such 
thhkers. 
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is alleged to be rendered. It is to be noted that the simples 
in this account are simple ideas; the full significance of 
this doctrine and its relation to empiricism may be more 
appropriately dealt with after a brief account of sensation 
and reflection. 
Concerning sensation, the first source of our ideas, 
Locke writes: 
First, our Senses, conversantabout particular objects, 
do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of 
things, according to those various ways wherein those 
objects do affect them •••• This great source of most of 
the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and 1 derived from them to our understanding, I call sensation. 
There are no particular problems connected with Locke's account 
of sensation relevant to either his empiricist thesis or his 
doctrine of ideas that need to be discussed at this point. 2 
Locke is contending that sensible qualities are conveyed--the 
critical term--into the mind and there produce perceptions, or 
in his terminology, ideas. The second source of ideas is re-
flection, which for Locke "might properly enough be called 
internal sense."3 Locke's official account of reflection as 
a source of ideas is discussed in the following passage: 
1 Locke, Essay~ II, chap. 1, sec. 3, pp. 122-123. (Italics in original.) · 
2 
The doctrine of sensation in Locke is not without 
problems, however, A good account of the physiological cor-
relates of sensation implied by Locke's theory is to be found 
in Aaron, Locke, pp. 107-109. 
3Locke, Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 4, p. 123. 
Secondly, the other fountain from which experience 
furnisheth the mind with ideas is the perception of 
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the operations of our own mind within us, as it is 
employed about the ideas it has got;--which operations 
when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do fur-
nish the understanding with another set of ideas, which 
could not be had from things without. And such are 
perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, 
knowing, williniu and all the different actings of our 
own minds. ••• t as I call the other Sensation, so 
I call this Reflection, the ideas it affords being such 
only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own opera-
tions within itself. 1 
The term 'reflection' in the above passage is out of date, 
and Locke's meaning is made clearer if the term 'introspec-
tion' is substituted.2 
Locke classifies ideas as simple or complex and either 
type may be an idea of sensation or ~eflection. Concerning 
simple ideas Locke writes: 
Though the qualities that effect our senses are, in the 
things themselves, so united and blended, that there is 
no separation, no distance between them; yet it is 
plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the 
senses simple and unmixed •••• The coldness and hardness 
which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct 
ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily.3 
The criterion of the simplicity of an idea is that it is un-
compounded, that is "it contains nothing in it but one uniform 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 4,pp. 123-124. 
2The term 1 reflection 1 :In modern usage involves a pro-
cess of thinking things over, and this is clearly not Locke's 
usage. The proper term to use in describing Locke's doctrine 
of reflection is thus 'introspection'; the etymological deri-
vation of the term, as "looking within" or "looking backward," 
is suggestive. Cf. Aaron, Locke, p. 129. 
3Locke, Essay, II, chap. 2, sec. 1, p. 144. 
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appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not distinguish-
able into different ideas." 1 It would appear that the simple 
ideas of Locke, on the basis of the above quotation, are not 
2 
equivalent to the sense-datum of contemporary epistemologists; 
the red patch--the sense-datum--of contemporary epistemology 
contains both circularity and redness. It contains, in other 
words, two simple ideas rather than one.3 Simple ideas would 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 2, sec. 1, p. 145. 
2 This opinion seems in.conflict with Price's opinion, 
at least when he writes, "And I think all past theories have 
in fact started with sense-data •••• Locke and Berkeley called 
them ideas of sensation." H. H. Price, Perception ( 2d ed.; 
London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1950), p. 19. Price here identi-
fies sense-data with one class of simple ideas, viz. simple 
ideas of sensation. Price, however, does not offer as clear-
cut a definition of sense-data as does Broad, another well-
known expositor of the sense-datum terminology (called by 
Broad the Sensum Theory). Writes Broad concerning the Sensum 
Theory: 
"This theory allows that the objective constituents of 
perceptual situations [i.e. the transitory presentations] 
really do have all those positive characteristics which 
they seem on careful inspection to have •••• They are 
really extended; they really last for so long; they 
really have certain shapes, sizes, colors, etc." 
Broad, Mind and Its El.a::e in Nature, pp. 180-181. It is, of 
course, not necessary here to argue either for or against a 
sense-datum analysis, but only to clarify the way in which 
Locke's simple ideas are to be understood. 
3The last line of the definition quoted from Broad 
containing the phrase "they really have certain shapes, sizes, 
cOlors·; .etc." shows clearly that a single sensum may have the 
several characteristics of size, color, shape, etc. Each of 
these characteristics would be for Locke a simple idea. 
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be uncompounded, and (using a word made famous by G. E. Moore 
in another connection), unanalyzable.1 Locke invokes a test 
for the simple idea other than the criterion of uncompounded 
or uniform appearance given as the criterion in the above pas-
sage. Those ideas are simple in the reception of which "the 
understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will 
have these beginnings and, as it were, materials of knowledge, 
is not in its own power."2 It has, in fact, been doubted that 
simple ideas (or even ideas at all) exist in Locke's sense.3 
The further division of simple ideas by Locke into those pro-
ceeding from sensation, from the divers senses, from one 
sense, from reflection, and by all the ways of sensation and 
4 
reflection need not be considered further here. 
1 Unanalyzability, as it is used here, implies that the 
object of analysis, the simple idea, lacks parts; it is through-
out homogeneous. To say, however, that it is unanalyzable does 
not mean that it cannot be talked about. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 25, p. 142. Quoted 
in O'Connor, Locke. p. 47. O'Connor discussed the comparison 
of Locke's simple ideas with sense-data and concludes that 
Locke uses simple ideas in at least four different senses. He 
points out, however, that this is not fatal to Locke's position, 
but merely makes it hard to follow. 
3The whole Lockean doctrine of ideas has been vigor-
ously challenged by psychologists. cr. Boring, Hist of Exper. 
Pslch., p. 171. Titchener may be taken as a sample of this 
cr tlcism. His position is neatly summarized by Boring as 
follows: 
"Introspective psychology (Titchener ••• ) failed to find 
such ideas immediately obvious in experience, and sought 
to explain the common belief of men that they have just 
such ideas by calling them 'meanings' which do not exist 
in the mind, but are immediately implied by mind." 
4This division of simple ideas is that adopted by 
Locke in the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters res-
pectively of Book II of the Essay. 
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Attention may next be given to Locke's doctrine of 
complex ideas. Locke is not altogether clear about the clas-
sification of complex ideas and in effect offers a double 
classification. The first classification is set out in ~he 
first edition of the Essay. Complex ideas, that is, compounds 
of simple ideas, are divided exhaustively into modes, sub-
stances, and relations. Modes are complex ideas which 
"however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of 
subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences 
l 
on, or affections of substances." As examples of complex 
ideas of modes, Locke gives triangle, gratitude, and murder. 
Substance, as used by Locke in this connection, is defined 
relative to simple ideas as "such combinations of simple 
ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things 
subsisting by themselves."2 As has been pointed out, the 
distinction between modes and substances thus far is the 
common sense distinction between a thing and its properties.3 
Relation, the last of the complex ideas in this classifica-
tion "consists in the consideration and comparing one idea 
4 
with another." Relations are in this passage quite vaguely 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap.l2, sec. 3, p. 215. 
2~., sec. 6, p. 216. 
3cf. O'Connor, Locke, p. 52. 
4 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 7, p. 216. 
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defined, and further, Locke gives no examples of them. This 
classification of ideas may be thought of as based on the 
1 
types of objects to which the ideas refer. This distinction 
of simple and complex ideas is Locke's official distinction, 
introduced in the first edition, and not officially withdrawn.2 
In the fourth edition, however, Locke introduces what is in 
effect an entirely different classification, a classification 
based upon "the activities of our minds."3 It is in this 
addition in the fourth edition that Locke's criterion for dis-
tinguishing between the simple and the complex idea is in 
terms of the passivity of understanding in reception, rather 
than in terms of the first edition criterion of the uncom-
pounded appearance. Locke writes: 
But as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all 
its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, 
whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and 
foundations of the rest, the others are framed. The acts 
of the mind, wherein it exerts its ~ower over its simple 
ideas, are chiefly these three: (lJ combining several 
simple ideas into one compound one; and thus all complex 
ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas, 
whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by 
one another, so as to take a view of them at once, with-
out uniting them into one; by which it gets all its 
ideas of relations. (3) The third is separating them from 
1cf. O'Connor, Locke, p. 51. 
2This is made clear in Fraser's critical edition of 
Locke's Essay in which material added in later editions is 
indicated by brackets. The distinction is first drawn in 
the chapter from which quotation has just been made, viz. 
chap. 12 of Book II. 
3o•connor, Locke, p. 52. 
all other ideas that accompany them in their real 
existence: this is called abstraction: and thus 
all its general ideas are made. 1 
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As the above quotation shows, in this latter classification 
ideas of relation and general ideas are treated as distinct 
classes. It was noted on a previous page, in comment on 
Locke's metaphor of the white paper, that the passivity of 
mind in classical British empiricism was overstressed. The 
nature of this passivity may be profitably summarized at this 
point. Viewed retrospectively, ideas are passive for Locke, 
but in presently occurring experience, as this passage shows, 
although sensation is passive, reflection is active. 
The first edition classification of simple and complex 
ideas, with complex ideas exhaustively reducible to ideas of 
substances, modes, and relations, is compositionalism. In 
the course of writing, this theory tends tobreak down, 
although Locke never officially withdraws it. He does not 
rewrite the remainder of the Essay with his revised classifi-
cation in mind.2 The reason for the confusion is fairly 
obvious. Locke is never quite clear as to what he intends by 
the simple idea. On the one hand, the simple idea is thought 
of as the given; this is in the classification of simple and 
complex ideas based upon the fourth edition revision in 
which "the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 1, pp. 213-214. 
2Aaron, Locke, p. 113 makes this point. 
1 
simple ideas." On the other hand, by the term 'simple 
idea' Locke refers to the mental atom, the uncompounded, 
that which "contains within it nothing but one uniform 
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appearance or conception in the mind and is not distinguish-
able into different ideas."2 Locke, however, is not parti-
cularly bothered by this confusion, nor is it crucial for 
the argument of this investigation. This classification of 
complex ideas based upon an exhaustive division into sub-
stances, modes, and relations is compositionalism. Composi-
tionalism, in Aaron's words, is but a part of "the garb in 
which Locke tries to set out his empiricism."3 Empiricism is 
Locke's strong suit and empiricism is not compositionalism. 
One may carry the argument one step further, and suggest that 
the whole simple-complex distinction made by Locke needs to 
be considered in a somewhat different light from that in 
which Locke conceived it, if his position is to be put in 
its strongest form. Neither Locke nor classical British 
empiricism require an absolutely simple idea. All that is 
required is complex ideas and simpler ideas. Without this 
latter distinction, however, it would be easy to overthrow 
empiricism. A golden mountain is never given in experience, 
1 The full passage is quoted above. The phrase is 
from Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 1, p. 213. 
2 Ibid., chap. 2, sec. 1, p. 145. The terms 'the given' 
and 'the atom' for two of Locke's meanings in regard to simple 
ideas are Aaron's, Locke, pp. 113-114. 
3 Aaron, Locke, p. 115. 
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yet the individual may have an idea of one. How does he get 
the idea? According to Classical British empiricism in its 
strongest form, the mind receives its simpler ideas from 
sensation, and from these, complex ideas are built up. 
The doctrine that simpler ideas are given in experi-
ence is thus essential, but the doctrine of the absolutely 
simple idea is a compositionalist mode of analysis that is 
1 
unfortunate. 
There is another doctrine, sensationalism, that needs 
exploration in regard to its affiliation with British empiri-
cism. It is frequentlydharged that classical British empiri-
cism reduces to sensationalism when true to its principles.2 
1 The writer owes this interpretation, as he owes much 
else in the way of interpretation, to Professor W. T. Stace. 
Whitehead remarks, in discussing simplicity and com-
plexity, that "we may doubt whether 'simplicity' is ever more 
than a relative term, having regard to some definite procedure 
of analysis." Alfred North Whitehead~ Process and Reality 
(New York: The Humanities Press, l929J, p. 202. Thus for 
Whitehead, there would be no simple ideas of the sort Locke 
envisaged, i.e. ideas which are psychologically and logically 
simple. 
The classical British empiricists undoubtedly confused 
logical simplicity, psychological simplicity, and minimum 
sensibilia. Such confusion, however intrinsically interesting 
it might be to straighten out as an exercise in textual analy-
sis, is of no value for an investigation of imagism. The con-
fusion over simplicity, it may be argued, is in each case a 
confusion arising over an uncritical acceptance of composi-
tioaalism. Compositionalism, however, is not empiricism; it 
is the relation of imagism to empiricism that is here under 
investigation. 
2The following statements may be taken as typical of 
this interpretation. Writes T. H. Green, the author of the 
classic critique of empiricism by an idealist, "The sensational 
theory in Locke is still ••• unsophisticated." And later, while 
still referring to Locke, we writes: "As Plato long ago taught 
This charge must be examined with some care, for, if it is 
considered a valid interpretation of the classical British 
empiricists on the definition here given of empiricism, then 
the interpretation of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume would take a 
different turn from the one it takes when this interpretation 
is denied. The full details of the arguments that have led 
thoroughly competent scholars and philosophers like Green, 
Pringle-Pattison, and Whitehead to assert that empiricism is 
reducible to sensationalism would, however, lead far afield 
from the primary concern of this chapter.1 It can be shown, 
however, without exhaustive textual analysis of the writers 
mentioned--particularly Green, where the full dress presen-
tation of this interpretation is to be found--that there is 
no good reason at all for accepting this interpretation if 
••• a consistent sensationalism must be speechless. He [i.e. 
Locke] was not a man, however, to become speechless out of 
sheer consistency, He has a redundancy of terms and tropes 
for disguising from himself and from his reader the real 
import of his doctrine." Hume, Treatise, ed, Green and Grose, 
intro., p. 36. The real import of Locke's doctrine is, of 
course, sensationalism. 
Writes Pringle-Pattison, whose interpretation of Locke 
is at points quite critical of Green; "Empiricism, when it is 
pure and consistent reduces itself to Sensationalism." Locke, 
~, ed. A. s. Pringle-Pattison, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1924), intro., p, xviii. 
Says Whitehead, "The sensationalist principle is that 
the primary activity in the act of experience is the bare 
subjective entertainment of the datum, devoid of any subjec-
tive form of reception. This is the doctrine of mere sensa-
tion." Whitehead, Process, p. 239. He relates Locke to this 
doctrine in the following terms. "Locke accepted the sensa-
tionalist principle ••• " Ibid., p. 238. 
1 The procedure would, of course, involve analysis of 
the sense in which each of the writers mentioned understands 
the terms 'empiricism' and 'sensationalism.• 
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empiricism is taken to mean an empiricism of ideas. The 
thesis, thus, to be criticized is the following: 
(4) Empiriaism is ultimately reducible to sensationalism. 
The question will be discussed at this point only in connec-
tion with Locke, although it should be pointed out that, at 
least in the~case of Green, it is Hume who is the real target 
of this critique. Sensationalism may be taken to be the 
following thesis. 
(5) 1 All knowledge is ultimately derived from sensations. 
For Locke there are, of course, two sources of ideas: 
sensation and reflection. It is desirable first to establish 
that Locke maintains that there are simple ideas of reflec-
tion, for if there were not and all ideas of reflection were 
complex and thus derivative, the case could easily be made 
for the thesis of (4). Writes Locke: 
The mind ••• when it turns its view inward upon itself, 
and observes its own actions about these ideas it has, 
takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to 
be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it 
received from foreign things. 
The two great and principal actions of the mind, which 
are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent 
that every one that pleases may take notice of them in 
himself, are these two: Perception, or Thinking; and 
Volition or Willing, 2 
1 This is the definition given by Ledger Wood, "Sensa-
tionalism," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p, 289. 
2 Locke, Essa~, II, chap, 6, sec, 1, p. 159. The 
chapter from which t is quotation is taken is entitled "or 
simple ideas of Reflection." 
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The account in this chapter, aside from the matter under con-
sideration, is rather superficial and obvious. The main 
point throughout is that we get ideas of reflection from in-
trospection. There is a sense in which sensation is primary 
in the derivation of ideas for Locke, but the sense is not the 
required one for the thesis of (4). Locke's own summary of 
the section from which the last quotation was drawn is that 
simple ideas of reflection are "the operations of mind about 
its other ideas."1 Simple ideas of reflection, in other words, 
require comparison of one idea with another; the mind could 
not have anything to compare unless it had sensations. It is 
hard to conceive of any satisfactory theory of mind that would 
not maintain this; in any theory, sensation is the gateway to 
perception. The thesis of (5), sensationalism, however, re-
quires more than this to be assumed; it requires that ideas of 
sensation be shown to be primary and ideas of reflection shown 
to be derived. Locke's thesis may be put as follows: 
(6) The mind has no ideas until it is furnished and 
supplied. 
The thesis of (6), however, is not sensationalism and does 
not show that reflection is reducible to sensation. A homely 
illustration may clarify the matter. Sensation is like meat 
and reflection is like a meat-grinder. The meat-grinder 
cannot turn out meat until it is supplied. Sensationalism, 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 6, sec. 1, p. 159. 
l however, assimilates the meat and the meat-grinder. 
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Attention may next be given to Locke's famous doc-
trine of primary and secondary qualities, a distinction 
important for this investigation because the influence of 
imagism can be seen at work in the background of Locke's 
treatment. The doctrine of primary and secondary qualities 
is primarily concerned with the relation of ideas in the mind 
to material objects, not simply with ideas as such. Stated 
simply, the doctrine maintains that primary qualities are in 
2 the object and secondary qualities are in the mind. The view 
to be discussed was the conventional view in seventeenth 
lundoubtedly if one loo.ks at British empiricism 
through Kantian spectacles, it is easy to underplay the role 
of reflection in British empiricism. Kant placed, of course, 
great stress on reason as relating and synthesizing the data 
of sense. Undoubtedly, also, British empiricism tended to 
view the mind as passive. Leibniz suggested vhat prior to 
experience there.is nothing in the mind but the mind itself--
in other words, that the canvas has its own texture whatever 
painting is put upon it. If such criticisms are, however, 
granted as just--and this matter is not up for discussion--
this does not have the slightest tendency to prove the thesis 
of ( 4). 
2The divergence of Locke's usage of the term 'quality' 
and the contemporary usage should be noted at the outset. 
Color, sound, smell, and taste are qualities in the contempo-
rary usage, i.e. they are attributes of the subjective sensa-
tion. Primary qualities, however, are for Locke located in 
the stimulus-object and thus his usage of the term 'quality' 
in reference to the so-called primary qualities is the exact 
opposite of modern usage. On this point, see Boring, Hist. 
of Experimental Psych., p. 175. ----
The history of the distinction.of qualities is exten-
sively treated by Sir William Hamilton. Cf. Thomas Reid, 
Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir William Hamilton (2 vola.; 6th 
ed.; Edinburgh: MacLachlan & Stewart, 1863}, II, noteD, pp. 
825-875. 
1 
century science and was by no means original with Locke. 
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The importance of the doctrine for this investigationlies, 
however, in its relation to Locke's subjectivism and more 
particularly his representative doctrine of sense perception. 
The theory has, of course, been widely criticized. A modern 
1 It may be well to quote from men who were themselves 
scientists on the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, 
Their reasons for mainta~ng the doctrine .are primarily con-
nected with the procedures of science whereas this is not the 
case in certain important respects for Locke. Wrote Galilee: 
"Philosophy is written in that very great book the Uni-
verse, which is always open before our eyes. But we can-
not understand it unless we first learn to understand the 
language and characters in which it is written. It is 
written in mathematical language, and the characters are 
triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, with-
out which means it is impossible, humanly speaking, to 
understand a word of it." 
Quoted in C. D. Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosothy 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1952), p. 155. ~oncerning his 
quotation Broad writes: 
"Accordingly Galilee rejects all such sensible qualities 
as colour, taste, smell, sound etc. from the physical 
world and ascribes to it only extension, figure, position, 
motion, and mass which can be measured and treated mathe-
matically." 
Ibid. It is thus the possibility of mathematical treatment 
tnar defines primary qualities for Galilee. 
Boyle, however, is closer to Locke in time and also 
intellectually; in fact, it is possible that Locke may have 
influenced Boyle. Cf. Aaron, Locke, p. 122. Boyle's state-
ment on secondary qualities is worth quoting. Concerning 
matter, which he conceived as throughout homogeneous, Boyle 
wrote that it was "a substance extended, divisible, and impene-
trable." Quoted in Aaron, Locke, p. 121. There is no need to 
follow all the intricacies of "-.fiis views on primary and secon-
dary qualities, but the following interesting comment may be 
turned to directly. Boyle wrote: 
"I say not that there are no other accidents in bodies 
than colours, odours and the like, for I have already 
taught that there are simpler and more primitive affec-
tions of matter [i.e. the primary qualities] from which 
these secondary qualities, if I may so call them, do 
depend: and that the operations of bodies upon one another 
spring from the same we shall see by and by." 
Boyle quoted in Aaron, Locke, p. 122. As the last sentence 
shows, Boyle is aware of using the term •secondary qualities' 
in a somewhat novel sense. 
criticism of the doctrine is Whitehead's polemic against 
1 
what he calls"the bifurcation of nature. 
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There are in Locke's doctrine three kinds of quali-
ties or powers as applied to sense-perception.2 The primary 
qualities inhere in bodies and form an avenue of connection 
between mind and external world. The primary qualities are 
described by Locke as 
such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what 
estate soever it be; and such as, in all the alterna-
tions and changes it suffers, all the force can be used 
upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense con-
stantly finds in every particle of matter, though less 
than to make itself singly perceived by our senses; e.g. 
take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each 
part has still solidity, extensions, figure, mobility; 
divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; 
and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, 
they must retain still each of them those qualities .••• 
These I call ori~inal or primary qualities of body, which 
I think we may o serve to produce simple ideas in us, 
viz. solidity, figure, motion or rest, and number. 3 
1 Whitehead writes in a famous passage: 
"The bodies are perceived as with qualities which in 
reality do not belong to them, qualities which are in 
fact purely the off-spring of the mind. Thus nature 
gets credit for what should in truth be reserved for 
ourselves: the role for its scent: the nightingale for 
his song: and the sun for his radiance. The poets are 
entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics to 
themselves and turn them into odes of self-congratulation 
on the excellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull 
affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; merelr, the 
hurrying of material, endlessly, meaninglessly.' 
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: 
Pelican Mentor Books, 1948), p. 56. 
2The chapter containing the main discussion of the 
doctrine of primary and secondary qualities is Locke, Essay, 
II, chap. 8, pp. 166-182. 
3Ibid., PP. 169-170. 
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The ideas stimulated in the mind by primary qualities in the 
form in which they are perceived resemble the properties of 
the stimulus object. Secondary qualities are powers which 
objects possess to stimulate ideas in the mind which do not 
represent qualities in the object in the form in which they 
are perceived. ·According to Locke, they are: 
such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects 
themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in 
us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, 
texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, 
sounds, tastes, etc. 1 
Further, Locke adds a third category which objects possess, 
powers, i.e. capacities to affect other objects than the 
senses. Powers, by definition, have nothing to do with the 
production of ideas. As an example of power, Locke remarks 
the "power in fire to produce a new colour or consistency in 
2 
wax or clay." The doctrine, as thus far expounded, may be 
more clearly stated by a partial surrender of Locke's termin-
ology. Objects have properties which enable them to affect 
other objects. When such properties do not arouse ideas in the 
mind, they are called powers. When they arouse ideas they may 
be called qualities. In cases where the aroused ideas resemble 
the original properties of the stimulus object, such original 
properties are called primary qualities. When, however, the 
ideas aroused do not resemble the original properties of the 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, pp. 170. 
2 Ibid • , p. 171. 
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stimulus object, they are called secondary qualities. The 
primary qualities are usually given as solidity, extension, 
figure (shape), rest and motion, duration, number, and size. 
The last three are not given by Locke, but, in the passage 
already quoted, Locke makes it clear that he does not regard 
his list as exhaustive. The secondary qualities are color, 
scent, taste, smell, hardness and softness, hotness and cold-
ness. Nor is this list of secondary qualities regarded as 
exhaustive. 
Consideration needs next to be given to the arguments 
Locke advances in favor of his doctrine of primary and secon-
dary qualities. The argument falls into two parts: arguments 
designed to show the nature of primary qualities, and argu-
ments designed to show the nature of secondary qualities. 
The arguments may be treated in this order. It should first 
be noted that the mind's ideas of both primary qualities and 
secondary qualities should be thought of as simple ideas. 2 
With ideas of primary qualities this is a necessary condition 
1This manner of stating the Lockean doctrine is 
adapted from Boring, Hist. of Experimental Psych., p. 175. 
2The title of the chapter in which the doctrine is 
introduced and which is now being commented upon is "Some 
further considerations concerning our simple ideas of sensa-
tion." Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8. Moreover, in the passage 
already quoted in describing primary qualities, such primary 
qualities are said "to produce simple ideas i~ us." 
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if his doctrine is to prove what it sets out to prove because 
if ideas of primary qualities were not simple (that is, were 
complex), there would be involved a construction of thought 
which would suggest that such thoughts were not resemblances 
of the primary qualities of the objects. This is true at 
least so far as Locke argues that the ideas of primary quali-
ties are in any sense exact resemblances of qualities in the 
stimulus-object. It is, however, difficult to assess the 
argument for primary qualities; Locke's real interest is in 
secondary qualities and he tends to hasten over the argument 
for primary qualities, presumably on the ground that it would 
be familiar to everyone.1 
In the argument for primary qualities, that is, quali-
ties inhering in the stimulus object, Locke's contention 
hinges on the term 'inseparable.* Concerning these primary 
qualities he says they are "such as are utterly inseparable 
from the body in whatsoever state it may be."2 Lying back of 
this description there appears to be the notion that the idea 
of a piece of matter, a stimulus-object, without primary 
qualities is perfectly inconceivable, i.e. no idea of such an 
object could be formed or as Locke would put it, no such idea 
would be produced in the mind. Such a conception, in other 
1Gibson remarks concerning our ideas of primary quali-
ties "that our ideas of these qualities are identical in con-
tent with the determination of these qualities is simply taken 
for granted." Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 102. Cf. also Aaron, 
Locke, p. 118 where the same point is made. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 9, p. 169. 
words, is unimaginable. The rationale of his description of 
the primary qualities of objects does not rest, as it does 
with Galileo or Boyle, on the possibility of the mathematical 
treatment of the primary qualities of objects. Here the ques-
tion of imaginability or conceivability would be irrelevant. 
For Locke the argument hinges on the fact that the mind cannot 
conceive or imagine such a state of affairs. Locke's descrip-
tion of the primary qualities of matter, it will be here argued, 
really rests on imagism; images are a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the definition of the primary qualities of objects. 
Consider Locke's description of the ideas produced in 
the mind by primary qualities; he contends that "ideas of pri-
mary qualities are resemblances of them, and their patterns do 
really exist in the bodies themselves."1 Further, Locke writes 
that he is considering primary and secondary qualities in order 
that 
we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they 
are exactly the images and resemblances of something in-
herent in the subject: most of those of sensation being 
in the mind no more the likeness of something without us, 
than the names that stand for them are the likeness of 
our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite 
in us. 2 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 15, p. 173. Concern-
ing the ideas produced in the mind by the primary qualities of 
objects, Morris writes, "It seems fair to say that he (Locke) 
is thinking of an idea as a mental picture of the object, pro-
duced in our minds by looking at the object." C. R. Morris, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1931), pp. 
33~. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 18, p. 175. 
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Locke does not here contend that no ideas in the mind are 
like the objects perceived, but merely that most are not. In 
other words, primary-qualities produce in the mind idea-
images. The degree of resemblance is, however, a more diffi-
cult question to answer. The imagism expressed in such 
passages, as Locke is here interpreted, is, however, more 
latent than explicit. The imagism stands out more clearly 
when compared with the doctrine of primary qualities in physi-
cal scientists like Galilee, for whom the primary qualities 
are regarded as those characteristics of nature for which a 
mathematical treatment is possible. 
The important principle expressed by Locke in the 
foregoing quotation, that the "ideas of primary qualities are 
resemblances of them," however, can hardly be said to be 
proved by Locke.1 The two clearest statements that would 
appear to have a bearing on the proof of this principle may 
next be considered. Writes Locke, "A circle or a square are 
the same, whether 1n idea or existence."2 This contention, 
1 The matter is critical because Berkeley was later to 
criticize Locke on this point. How, argued Berkeley, do we 
know that our ideas of primary qualities resemble the objects 
themaives? Berkeley was to argue that the primary and secon-
dary qualities are in the same boat; what is said of primary 
qualities must be said of secondary qualities and vice 
versa. 
2 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 15, p. 173. 
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however, is hardly more than a reiteration of what Locke 
ought to be proving if he is to make his case, viz. that the 
object seen as circular or square is really so. Locke in 
this passage simply assumes the validity of his representa-
tive theory of sense-perception, that the ideas in the mind 
are true representations of the objects for which they stand. 
Secondly, as an argument tending to show that our ideas of 
primary qualities do actually resemble the primary qualities 
in the object, Locke offers considerations based upon the 
relativity of sense-perception. Locke offers the famous 
example of two hands, presumably separately treated, so that 
one is cold and the other warm. When plunged in the same 
basin of water, the water appears cold to one hand and warm 
to the other. The warmth and the cold are secondary qualities, 
according to the argument, and do not inhere in the water. 1 
Shape, Locke's figure, is a primary quality and as such pro-
duces only ideas in the mind that resemble the primary 
qualities in the object. He writes: "which yet figure never 
1 It is very difficult to decide exactly what argu-
ments from the relativity of sense-perception do show. It 
is not, however, necessary at this point to decide such 
matters. Broad argues that Locke's argument has no tendency 
to "disprove the reality of temperature." C. D. Broad, Per-
ception, Ph}sics, and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ:-
Press, 1914 , p. 10. He concludes that the argument 
"gives no reason for thinking that my two hands in 
Locke's experiment are not really hot and cold res-
pectively as I perceive them to be and that caeteris 
taribus they might not continue to be so, when I cease 
o perceive their temperatures." 
Broad, Perception, Physics, p. 11. 
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does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand 
which has produced the idea of a globe by another."1 Percep-
tion of shape, however, is just as much subject to changes in 
the conditions of perception as is temperature. Consider, 
for example, a cavity in the gum left by the extraction of a 
tooth. To the tongue the cavity feels large and to the finger 
it appears small. A primary quality, shape, in this instance, 
gives us different touch deliverances on different occasions. 
It would appear that Locke in the last passage cited is 
2 
simply factually wrong. 
Lastly, it should be noted that Locke does not 
specify the nature of the relationship of resemblance; it is 
taken as a primary and irreducible characteristic of experi-
ence. There is no appeal, at least in the argument thus far, 
to universals to explain the mind's knowledge of things. 
This lack of specification of the degree of resemblance 
between the primary qualities and the ideas in the mind gives 
rise to two possible interpretations of Locke, both of which 
can be supported by the text. On the one hand, the primary 
qualities are regarded as having quite specific characteristics 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 21, p. 177. 
2Arguments designed to show that primary qualities 
are just as liable to be perceived differently upon changes 
in the condition of perception are, of course, one of 
Berkeley's strong suits against Locke. 
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which may be here called determinates. He says, for example, 
that "the particular bulk, number, figure and motion of the 
parts of fire or snow are really in them--whether any one's 
1 
senses perceive them or no." On the other hand, when Locke 
says that the primary qualities "are utterly inseparable from 
the body in what state soever it be"2 his intention presumably 
is to refer to a determinable like colored, i.e. a class 
which has as its members determinates like specific shades 
of blue. The reason this interpretation seems required is 
that he refers to the fact that no matter to what degree a 
material object is deformed it will still retain its primary 
qualities; it will remain "as such in all the alternations 
and changes it suffers."3 In undergoing such deformation, 
however, an object might lose such determinate characteris-
tics as a specific shade of blue, but would retain determin-
able characteristics like bulk. As the nature of the primary 
qualities themselves are thus unspecified it becomes difficult 
to specify the degree of resemblance between the ideas in the 
mind and the primary qualities. 
Turning next to the second major division of Locke's 
discussion, the secondary qualities, the weight of the discus-




II, chap. 8, sec. 17, p. 174. 
2 Ibid., sec. 9, p. 169. 
(Italics 
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mind of the percipient and not in the object itself. Once 
again Locke's representative or causal theory of perception 
intrudes upon his discussion; the secondary qualities "in 
truth are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to 
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities." 1 
The argument for primary qualities, however, if it be con-
sidered cogent shows only that primary qualities are in the 
object; it has no tendency to show that secondary qualities 
are in the subject--nor does Locke assume that it does. The 
argument Locke chiefly relies upon to show that the secondary 
qualities have no resemblance at all to patterns existing in 
the object, is again an argument from the relativity of sense 
perception. Locke writes: 
And yet he that will consider the ~arne fire that, at one 
distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, 
at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different 
sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason 
he has to say--that his idea of warmth which was pro-
duced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire, and 
his idea of pain which the same fire produced in him the 
same way is not in the fire. 2 
Locke is here contending that nobody would say the pain is in 
the fire. There is no more reason, so the argument runs, to 
say that the warmth, a secondary quality, is in the fire. The 
argument as summarized by Gibson is based upon 
the supposed impossibility of distinguishing .•• our 
ideas of secondary qualities from ideas such as that 
1Locke, Essay, II chap. 8, sec. 10, p. 170. 
2 Ibid., sec. 16, p. 174. (Italics in original). 
of pain, the content of which, he thinks, must be 
admitted to be incapable of directly qualifying a 
material thing. 1 
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This argument, however, does not prove what it sets out to 
prove. There is no doubt that such an argument bears on the 
subjectivity of qualities, but it is by no means conclusive. 
The argument shows, presumably, that some of the ideas the 
mind has are not copies, exact or inexact, of qualities in 
the object itself. Locke, however, goes on to generalize 
this conclusion and assert that none of our ideas of secondary 
qualities copies the qualities. No matter how many instances 
of such cases Locke cites, all negative instances, the most 
that Locke could assert would be that some of our ideas of 
secondary qualities do not copy the qualities in the original. 
Locke also makes appeal to an argument based upon the supposed 
dependence of color upon the presence of light. He says: 
Let us consider the red and white colors in porphyry: 
hinder light but from striking on it, and its colours 
vanish; it no longer produces any such ideas in us. 
Upon the return of light, it produces those appearances 
on us again. Can any one think any real alternations 
are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of 2 light •••• when it is plain it has no colour in the dark. 
As it stands this argument is confusing. Locke is presumably 
referring to the psychological experience of color as opposed 
to the physical properties of the stimulus object, since he 
says that "the object no longer produces any ideas ••• in us." 
Locke then says "it is plain it has no colour in the dark;" 
1Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 102. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 8, sec. 19, p. 176. 
this is not an argument which tends to show anything, but 
rather a result of defining color as occurring only when 
someone observes it. 
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In summary it may be pointed out that Locke does not 
seem to have proved either his contention about primary quali-
ties, or his contention about secondary qualities. This does 
not, by itself, prove the doctrine wrong; it only shows that 
Locke has used some bad arguments. What is of more signifi-
cance, however, forthis investigation is that Locke displays 
clear imagistic tendencies in dealing with primary qualities. 
He tends to view our ideas mf primary qualities as images 
that copy the object. The relationship between the idea and 
the primary quality is one of resemblance; the argument con-
tains no appeal to universals. There is little specification 
of the nature of the resemblance, primarily because the doc-
trine of the primary qualities themselves remains unspecified. 
Consideration may next be given to another problem 
having an affinity with the discussion of Locke's doctrine 
of ideas, the possibility that Locke allows himself a line of 
escape from subjectivism. Subjectivism, the doctrine that 
the only objects of knowledge are ideas, is concerned not 
with the problem of how we know--this is empiricism--but with 
the subject-matter of knowledge. Speaking quite generally at 
this point, subjectivism is important in classical British 
empiricism because Locke asserts it, Berkeley denies it, 1 
1The sense in which Berkeley denies subjectivism will 
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and Hume accepts it but does not take it very seriously. It 
is thus interesting to consider the possibility that Locke 
tentatively breaks forth from the circle of ideas. The way 
this comes about is in his doctrine of sensitive knowledge 
and to this attention may next be given. 
The purpose of Locke's Essay, as described in the 
first chapter of Book I, is "to enquire into the original, 
certainty, and extent of human knowledge."1 The discussion, 
however, of the certainty and extent of human knowledge does 
not come until the fourth book. Further, the results of this 
book are usually taken to be rather insignificant, and even 
uninteresting and disappointing; the important book of Locke's 
Essay is Book II, the book dealing with Locke's empiricism. 
One of the main reasons for this mainly historical interest 
is the definition of knowledge given by Locke, a definition 
so restrictive as to exclude a great deal of what would 
ordinarily pass for knowledge. Further, even this definition 
is used in a wavering manner. Knowledge for Locke, according 
to his official definition, is "the perception of the connex-
ion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of 
our ideas." 2 Frequently, however, Locke would seem to mean 
be expounded in the chapter devoted to Berkeley. Berkeley's 
line of analysis may, however, be suggested at this point. 
Berkeley criticized the science of his day. His criticism may 
be summarized in the sentence "perception is the criterion of 
reality." This doctrine is incompatible with the doctrine 
that we do not perceive real things, but only ideas, or sub-jectivism. Berkeley was well aware of this and denied subjecti~. 
lLocke, Essaf, I, chap. l, int., p. 26. The purpose 
of the Essay, accord ng to this quotation, is very much like 
Kant's purpose, however different the upshot of Locke's 
philosophy is from that of the Critical philosophy. 
2Ibid., IV, chap. 1, sec. 2, p. 167. 
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by knowledge faith in probability. It is not, however, nec-
essary to enter into the details of this covert definition of 
knowledge.1 It is in the second chapter of Book IV, entitled 
"Of the degrees of knowledge," that the possibility of an 
escape from subjectivism seems to be suggested. 
Locke recognizes three degrees of knowledge: intui-
tive, demonstrative, and sensitive knowledge. Intuitive 
knowledge occurs where the agreement or disagreement of two 
ideas is perceived "immediately by themselves."2 Demonstra-
tive knowledge, a knowledge of a lower degree of certainty, 
would today be called deductive reasoning. Writes Locke, 
"This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, 
yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, 
nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge."3 It may 
be pointed out parenthetically that where knowledge is defined 
as absolute certainty the whole notion of degrees of knowledge 
seems inappropriate. Lastly, there is sensitive knowledge. 
This Locke discusses in the following manner: 
There is, indeed another perception of the mind employed 
about the particular existence of finite beings without 
us; which going beyond bare probability, and yet not 
reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of 
certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. 4 
lLocke discusses four kinds of knowledge, i.e. percep-
tions of agreements and disagreements of ideas,viz. identity 
or diversity, relation, co-existence, and real existence. ~ 
discussion, however, adds nothing to the point to be made here. 
2Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 2, sec. 1, p. 176. 
3~., sec. 3, p. 119. 
4 Ibid., sec. 14, p. 185. (Italics in the original). 
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In specifying the further details of this sensitive knowledge, 
Locke, in Aaron's words, "speaks in the most uncertain tones. 
It is a conviction, a feeling, which cannot be further 
1 explained." Locke in the following quotation compares sensi-
tive knowledge and intuitive knowledge and further gives an 
argument designed to show that sensitive knowledge exists. 
He writes: 
There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea 
we receive from an external object in our minds: this 
is intuitive knowledge •••• Whether we can thence cer-
tainly infer the existence of anything without us which 
corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men 
think there may be a question made •••• But yet here I 
think we are provided with an evidence that puts us 
past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not 
invincibly conscious to himself of a different percep-
tion, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on 
it by night. 2 
In the last two lines of this quotation Locke claims that 
there is a difference between a percept of the sun and a 
memory image of the sun, and obviously as psychological 
experiences the two are quite different. Locke, however, has 
not shown what the difference is, and it is this that seems 
called for. He commenced with subjectivism, that the mind 
knows only its own ideas, and feels constrained to go beyond 
it. The clearest passage, however, which would have any 
1 Aaron, Locke, p. 245. The suggestion that in sensi-
tive knowledge Locke goes beyond his subjectivism is derived 
from Aaron, although the interpretation put upon this matter 
differs somewhat from that to be found therein. 
2 Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 2, sec. 14, p. 186. 
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tendency to show Locke breaking out from subjectivism would 
l 
appear to be the one just quoted. On the premises of sub-
jectivism Locke has no right to sensitive knowledge. Fur-
ther, sensitive knowledge cannot be called the perception 
of the disagreement or agreement of ideas. 
The results of the discussion of sensitive knowledge 
may now be related to the problem of this investigation. On 
the premises of subjectivism, Locke has no right to sensitive 
knowledge; but, Locke is dubious about subjectivism. Second-
ly, sensitive knowledge cannot be called the perception of 
the agreement or the disagreement of our ideas, Locke's 
official definition of knowledge. Such inconsistencies are 
well-known in Locke and do not detract greatly from the 
Essay:'S value for the purpose envisaged here. Empiricism is 
Locke's strong suit. Empiricism needs to be disentangled 
from sensationalism, subjectivism, and compositionalism. 
When this task has been accomplished, and it has been the 
task of the first two sections of this chapter, empiricism 
can be studied in the light of some crucial instances. Such 
instances may then be examined on their merits as proofs 
designed to strengthen empiricism. The thesis to be examined 
1Later in section 14 than the passage cited, Locke 
concerns himself with Descartes' doubts about waking and 
dreaming. It cannot be said that Locke refutes these doubts. 
There is certainly a difference between "dreaming of being 
in the fire and being actually in it" (Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 
2, sec. 14, p. 188), but Locke does not show what this differ-
ence is. 
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here is that such crucial instances can be fruitfully studied 
in the light of imagistic tendencies in Locke. 
Before turning to this problem in the third section, 
however, the discussion of empiricism, sensationalism, sub-
jectivism, and compositionalism may be drawn together. 
Empiricism is the doctrine that ideas are the materials of 
knowledge, i.e. they are the data from which knowledge is 
derived. This empiricism of ideas may be stated, for purposes 
of reference, as the doctrine that all ideas are derived from 
experience. Empiricism thus understood is not an empiricism 
of knowledge, i.e. the doctrine that all knowledge is derived 
from experience. A doctrine which may be looked upon as a 
sub-variety of either form of empiricism is sensationalism, 
the doctrine that all knowledge is ultimately derived from 
sensations. Locke's empiricism of ideas, however, is not 
reducible to sensationalism. Such a contention may be made 
even if it be granted that the mind is viewed too passively 
in British empiricism. Empiricism does not require the 
restriction of empirical knowledge to a certain kind of 
experience, in this case sensory experience. Locke also 
holds a doctrine that is here called subjectivism, the doc-
trine that the mind knows only its own ideas. This latter 
doctrine is concerned with experience as the subject-matter 
of knowledge, whereas empiricism is concerned with experience 
as a method of knowing. Locke's empiricism is logically 
independent of his subjectivism. It was suggested that 
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Locke is dubious about subjectivism and makes tentative 
efforts to break forth from subjectivism with his doctrine 
of sensitive knowledge. The arguments advanced for sensi-
tive knowledge in this connection donot show what they intend 
to show, however, viz. that the mind can know objects 
directly. Lastly, Locke holds a doctrine here referred to 
as compositionalism, the doctrine that knowledge is built up 
from simple ideas. Complex ideas, not necessarily given in 
experience, are constructed from such simple ideas. Some 
such doctrine is necessary if empiricism is not to be over-
thrown, but all that is required is simpler and more complex 
ideas; the absolutely simple idea is clearly a psychological 
abstraction never given in experience and is not required by 
l the logic of Locke's position. 
3. Imagistic Tendencies in Locke's Defense of Empiricism 
The foregoing statement of Locke's empiricism will 
be assumed, for the time being, as substantially correct in 
essentials, although admittedly it is not a fully developed 
statement. Consideration needs to be given to the a fortiori 
argument Locke offers for this empiricism, in order to develop 
lThe ultimate source of an individual's ideas and 
interpretation is sometimes difficult to determine. The 
writer is aware of a great debt to Professor w. T. Stace for 
much in the way of interpretation in this investigation. 
Although he would not probably agree with much here, the 
stimulus of his teaching has influenced the writer. 
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the doctrine more fully. Locke, in the latter chapters of 
the second Book of the Essay, offers a series of crucial 
1 instances in defense of his empiricism. These latter 
chapters of Book II are concerned with the derivation of 
such ideas as space, time, infinity, and substance.2 These 
latter chapters of Book II work with the first-edition 
classification of simple and complex ideas; complex ideas 
are exhaustively considered under the sub-classes of modes, 
substances, and relations. With the alleged breakdown of 
this compositionalist classification,3 this investigation is 
1Fraser asks: 
"Do any of our complex ideas of modes, substances, in 
their different kinds, or of relations contain simple 
ideas that are not modifications, or combinations, or 
correlations of the primary data of external and internal 
sense?" 
Fraser, "Prolegomena" in Locke, Essay, lxv. A negative answer 
to this rhetorical question, accompanied by the evidence, would 
constitute a defense of Locke's empiricism. 
2The discussion of these topics is to be found in 
chapters 13-18 respectively of Book II of the Essay. Chapter 
16 deals with number, but this chapter will not be dealt with 
here since it contains no imagism that is not contained in 
sections about which comment will be made; its central notion, 
that of enlarging, is considered in dealing with space. Fur-
ther, chapter 19 of Book II deals with causality, a chapter 
which also contains imagism. Locke, however, adds nothing new 
to this discussion, and this whole matter is better discussed 
in connection with Hume. 
3For discussion of the breakdown of compositionalism 
in the later chapters of Book II, see Aaron, Locke, pp. 110-
114 and Gibson, Locke's Theory, pp. 63-119, passim. 
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not concerned. Further, this breakdown was not a matter of 
great concern for Locke as empiricism and not compositional-
ism was his primary concern. 1 
Locke's crucial instances for the defense of empiri-
cism to be here considered--space, time, infinity and 
substance--may be examined for imagistic tendencies. The 
hypothesis to be examined may be put as follows. Such ideas 
as space, for example, are not given in experience in any 
ordinary sense of given; yet Locke maintains that such ideas 
arise in experience; this is at the heart of his empiricism. 
Locke's method is to show the origin of such ideas in experi-
ence; such an account of the origin of ideas will also be for 
2 Locke a sufficient account of the validity of such ideas. 
1 As Aaron puts it: 
"Even in the first edition Locke does not allow himself 
to be bound too closely by his classification. He con-
veniently forgets it when discussing ideas of relation 
and general ideas. In the case of ideas of reflection 
his thoughts are never guided by the simple-complex 
division." Aaron, Locke, p. 113. 
2 This notion has here been referred to as one aspect 
of compositionalism. A clear statement of one of the central 
consequences of this doctrine is given by Morris, although he 
does not use the term. Morris writes: 
"[For Locke] the validity of a belief depends upon the 
way in which we arrive at it; the method of proof was 
assumed to be the same as the method of discovery. He 
seeks to discover how we normally come to apprehend such 
principles as we believe to be true, and he assumes that 
this discovery will in itself enable him to determine 
whether or not those principles are true." 
Morris, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, p. 25. 
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If he is to make out his case, he must show how such ideas 
do arise in experience. If Locke is to be classified as a 
latent imagist, in a sense that may best be specified at the 
end of the discussion, one would expect imagism to appear 
in his defense of empiricism in these later chapters of 
Book II to which reference has already been made. One may 
expect such imagism to appear, not necessarily explicitly, 
but as an underpinning of some of his crucial arguments. 
Further, it would not add materially to the argument of the 
present section to present a full-dress account of each of 
Locke's arguments on space, time, etc. in a survey with a pur-
pose like the present one; it will be sufficient to summarize 
briefly the main pointsofthe argument. The attempt will be 
made, rather, to comment upon the degree to which such argu-
ments seem to depend upon an assumption of the validity of 
imagism, or in which Locke seems to make an appeal to intro-
spective imaginal experiments to prove his case. 
As an introduction to this task, the Lockean doctrine 
of modes needs fuller explanation than has hitherto been 
attempted. Locke's views on the general nature of substances 
may more appropriately dealt with later in this section. Modes 
Locke defines in the following terms: 
Modes I call such complex ideas, which, however compounded, 
contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by them-
selves, but are considered as dependencies on or affections 
of substance. 1 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 4, p. 215. 
Locke gives as examples of modes such ideas as triangles, 
gratitude, and murder. Modes, for Locke, are thus names 
for ideas of qualities or properties taken in abstraction 
from substance.1 Further, modes are classified as simple 
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and mixed. Locke's official definition of simple modes is 
that they are "variations, or different combinations of the 
2 
same simple idea, without the mixture of any other." 
Simple modes are "contained within the bounds of one simple 
idea."3 The doctrine of simple modes is not without ambiguity,4 
1Fraser says of Locke's modes--"'simple' and 'mixed' 
are names for the ideas we have of qualities and collections 
of qualities, considered in abstraction from substances." 
Fraser, footnote 3 in Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 4, p. 215. 
Locke is aware that he may "use the word mode in somewhat of a 
different sense from its ordinary signification." Ibid. It 
is, of course, used by Locke rather differently from-Irs usage 
in either Augustine, medieval Aristotelianism, or Spinoza. Cf. 
Vernon J. Bourke, "Mode," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, 
p. 200. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 5, p. 215. 
3Ibid. 
4Gibson remarks that in Locke's treatment there is a 
"constant alternation between his professed view, that 
the simple idea is a unit from which ideas of simple 
modes are obtained by composition, and the tendency to 
treat the simple idea as a universal, of which the modes 
are so many different species or alternative determina-
tions." 
Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 73. It would appear that substan-
tially the same criticism is given by Aaron. On the one hand, 
the simple idea for Locke, according to Aaron, is the atom, 
"the outcome of a process of abstraction rather than a given 
of sensation." Aaron, Locke, p. 112. This would appear to 
correspond to Gibson's unit. On the other hand, the simple 
idea for Locke, according to Aaron, is the given, "the simple 
idea is that which the mind receives." Ibid., p. 111. This 
latter would seem to be close to Gibson•s-reference to the 
simple idea as a universal in the above passage. The differ-
ence between the two interpretations is that for Gibson the 
atomic view is Locke's official view, whereas for Aaron the 
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but there would appear to be nothing gained by an attempt to 
work out Locke's treatment in detail at this point. It needs 
to be stressed, however, that the simple mode is a complex 
idea and is not to be confused with a simple idea; the simple 
mode is a simple idea repeated over and over again. The 
mixed mode involves a difference in kind among the simple 
ideas of which it is composed; it is "compounded of simple 
1 ideas of! several kinds, put together to make one complex one." 
As an example of a mixed mode Locke instances beauty. The 
mixed mode is less important for the present analysis than 
the simple mode, since space, time, and infinity are all for 
Locke simple modes. After some general comments on the 
manner in which each of these simple modes are alleged to 
arise in experience, attention may be given to Locke's doc-
trine of space, time, etc. 
Locke's general method in the case of each of the 
simple modes to be here discussed, viz. space, time, and 
given is Locke's more usual or official view, 
There is no need to attempt to mediate these views 
here. Further, it is not necessarily the case that what 
Aaron and Gibson have in mind are quite the same. It is 
important to recognize, however, that Locke treats the 
simple idea in a wavering manner. Aaron's terminology seems 
somewhat easier to use and it will be followed here. 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 12, sec. 5, pp. 215-216. 
Bourke defines Locke's mixed modes as a type of ideation "in 
which various non-similar simple ideas are combined by the 
mind so as to produce a complex idea which does not rep,resent 
a substance: e.g. obligation, drunkenness." Bourke, 'Mode," 
Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 200. 
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infinity, is to show that they arise in experience from 
their corresponding simple ideas by a process of 'enlarging.' 
This process can be illustrated by an example given by Locke 
in reference to space. Writes Locke: 
When any such stated lengths or measures of space are 
made familiar to men's thoughts, they can, in their 
minds repeat them as often as they will, without mix-
ing or joining to them the idea of body, or anything 
else •••• and by adding these still to one another, 1 
enlarge their ideas of space as much as they please. 
Elsewhere Locke writes, "by repeating this idea number, in 
this case in our minds, and adding the repetitions together, 
2 
we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it." Enlarging 
then is a process of putting together several ideas of the 
same kind and describing the result as one idea. For Locke 
the mind becomes acquainted with moments of time and portions 
of space through sensation and reflection. Having had this 
original experience, the mind enlarges these experiences and 
is able mentally to add together such extensions and dura-
tions in imagination. In this way such concepts as infinite 
time and infinite space are imaginable, whether or not they 
exist. 
l Locke, Essay, II, chap. 13, sec. 4, p. 220. 
2 Ibid., chap. 16, sec. 2, p. 270. Concerning this 
process Gibson remarks that "it is with regard to our ideas 
of numbers that the conception of a combination of identical 
elements to form a complex idea seems to work most smoothly." 
Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 73. 
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'Space,' for Locke, is a term that is reserved, at 
least in his more rigorous moments, for the simple ideas 
that are the primary data, the givens, of experience. He 
writes: "Each different distance is a different modification 
of space; and each idea of any different distance, or space, 
is a simple mode of this idea." 1 The idea of a common space 
in which the whole universe is extended is called by Locke 
1expansion.• 2 The idea of space arises for Locke in sensa-
tion. He writes: "We get the idea of space both by our 
sight and touch."3 This sense to him self-evident, for he 
writes that it is 
so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove 
that men perceive by their sight a distance between 
bodies of different colours, or between the parts of 
the same body, as that they see colours themselves; nor 
is it less obvious that they can do so in the dark by 
feeling and touch. 4 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 13, sec. 4, p. 220. 
2
writes Locke, "But to avoid confusion in discourses 
concerning this matter, it were to be ••• wished that" the 
term expansion be applied "to space in general, with or with-
out solid matter possessing it." Ibid., sec. 27, p. 236. 
Occasionally Locke also calls •expansion' 'pure space.• This 
latter terminology appears in a quotation below. 
3Ibid., sec. 2, p. 219. For Locke, "getting an idea" 
is always-ro-be aware of an attribute or property for the 
first time. Cf. Fraser, footnote 2 in Locke, Essay, II, chap. 
13, sec. 2, p. 219. It is to be noted also that Berkeley main-
tains that space is not both seen and felt, but only felt. 
4 Ibid., sec. 2, p. 219. 
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Concerning expansion or pure space Locke writes: 
Of pure space then ••• there are several (amongst which 
I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have 
clear and distinct ideas; and that they c·an think on 
space, without anything in it that resists or is protruded 
by body. This is the idea of pure space •••• and on the 
other gide, they persuade themselves that they have, dis-
tinct from that of pure space, the idea of something that 
fills space ••• If there be others that have not these 
two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one 
of them, I know not how men, who have the same idea under 
different names, or different ideas under the same name, 
can in that case talk with one another; any more than a 
man who, not being blind or deaf, has distinct ideas of 
the colour of scarlet and the sound of a trumpet, could 
discourse concerning scarlet colour with the blind man I 
mentioned in another place, who fancied that the idea of 
scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet. 1 
The "clear and distinct ideas," reminiscent of Cartesianism, 
is in this context clearly a reference to an idea-image. Dis-
course is impossible, so runs this argument, with an individual 
who, because of a psychological privation--lack of vision or 
hearing--is unable to have images. So in the case of pure 
space; if an individual is not able to imagine the concept, 
then no discussion will serve to convince him. Locke, in 
other words, in proving his view of pure space or expansion 
appeals to experience and further the appeal to experience is 
an appeal to imagery. With an individual lacking such imagery, 
Locke feels the appeal to experience would be of no avail. 
Consider next an argument by Locke against an idea of the-
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 4, sec. 4, pp. 155-156. 
There is a polemic in this passage, continued in the thirteenth 
chapter, against the Cartesian identification of body with 
extension. Locke's final theory of space in the Essay is based 
upon Newton, with some modifications. For an account of the 
development of Locke's theory of space see Gibson, Locke's 
Theory, pp. 245-254. 
place-of-the-universe. Place for Locke is the relative 
position of anything, 1 with reference to "two or more points. "2 
The whole universe, however, cannot be so located. There is, 
accordingly, no idea of the whole universe. Writes Locke: 
We can have no idea of the place of the universe, 
though we can of all the parts of it; because beyond 
that we have not the idea of any fixed, distinct, 
particular beings, in reference to which we can imagine 
it to have any relation of distance •••• When one can 
find out, and frame in his mind, clearly and distinctly, 
the place of the universe, he will be able to tell us 
whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguish-
able inane of infinite space. 3 
No image of the place of the whole universe can be formed; 
4 the idea is confused. 
1Locke opposed the Aristotelian conception that place 
is the boundary of that which contains. (Cf. w. D. Ross, 
Aristotle [London: Methuen and Co., 1923], pp. 85-87, where 
the Aristotelian definition of place is translated as "the 
limit of the containing body.") He also rejected Newton's 
notion that "place is a determined part of space occupied by 
a body." Newton quoted in Aaron, Locke, p. 160. 
2 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 13, sec. 7, p. 222. Locke's 
argument is defective even for objects in a plane as three 
points at least are required to fixate a point in a plane. 
Says Locke: 
"When we find anything at the same distance now which it 
was yesterday, from any two or more points which have not 
since changed their distance one with another ••• we say 
it hath kept the same place." 
Ibid. Consider two points, A and B. 0 and 01 may be equidis-
tant from A and B, and yet not be in the same place. cr. 
Aaron, Locke, p. 160, footnote 3. 
3Locke, Jssa*, II, chap. 13, sec. 10, p. 224. (Italics 
not in original. T e word 'frame,' used in connection with 
such phrases as frame an idea, or frame in the mind (as in the 
above quote) are always an indication that Locke is thinking of 
an idea-image. 
4Locke frequently uses the words •confused' and 'ob-
scure' where today the word 'meaningless' would be much more 
common. For example, in the sentence immediately following 
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Locke's considerations on the general problems of 
time are among the least distinguished chapters of Book II 
1 
of the Essay; it is not, however, any the less important for 
the purpose of this investigation of imagism to consider them. 
That Locke considers his discussion of time, duration and 
eternity essential for his empiricist thesis can be seen from 
2 the following passage. He writes: 
However remote these may seem from our comprehension, 
yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt 
not but one of these sources of all our knowledge, viz. 
sensation and reflection, will be able to furnish u-s--
with these ideas, as clear and distinct as many others 
which are thought much less obscure. 3 
the passage quoted Locke writes: "the word place has some-
times a more confused sense ••• " Locke, Essay, II, chap. 13, 
sec. 7, p. 224. The word 'confused' used as verb means in 
one sense, to mix up, or to fail to be able to distinguish 
clearly. The noun 'obscure' means, in one sense, not distinct, 
faint, undefined; 'obscure' has as synonyms such words as 
shadowy, hazy, and misty. The antonyms for 'obscure' are such 
words as 'bright,' 'clear,' 'manifest.• Such terms are much 
more apt than the contemporary term •meaningless,' provided 
one was thinking of mental images as so often the classical 
British empiricists were. 
1 Problems of the reality of time, its absolute or 
relative character-problems considered by other thinkers of 
the day--are not considered by Locke. His views on time are 
contained principally in the fourteenth chapter of Book II. 
The fifteenth chapter compares space and time, but offers 
little material of interest from the point of view of imagism. 
2The discussion of these chapters in the Essay is here 
said to be concerned with Locke's views on time; but Locke 
would have referred to them as a discussion of duration, e.g. 
the fourteenth chapter is entitled "Idea of Duration and its 
Simple Modes." This distinction is, however, only terminolo-
gical. 
3Locke, Essay, II, chap. 14, sec. 1, p. 238. 
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Locke may here be interpreted as seeking for the idea-image 
which is the "original" of our ideas of time, of duration, 
and of eternity. The argument of chapter fourteen centers 
around two points: the distinction between duration and time, 
and the origin of the idea of duration in the consciousness 
of succession. 1 These two problems may be considered in 
order. Locke's definition of duration may be established. 
Writes Locke: 
There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea 
whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space, 
but from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts 
of succession. This we call duration; the simple modes 
whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have 
any distinct ideas, as hours, days, years, etc. time 
and eternity. 2 
Time is defined by duration. Writes Locke, "duration, as set 
out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or 
epochs, is that, I think which most properly we call time."3 
Secondly, turning to the source or origin of the idea of suc-
cession, Locke finds it in the train of ideas. He writes: 
To understand time and eternity aright, we ought with 
attention to consider what idea it is we have of dura-
tion and how we come by it. It is evident to any one 
wno-will but observe what passes in his own mind, that 
1Aaron 1s discussion of Locke's view of time is organ-
ized around consideration of these two problems and his prin-
ciple of organization will be followed here. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 14, sec. 2, p. 238. 
3Ibid., sec. 17, p. 246. The distinction between time 
and duratron-was not original with Locke; it is clearly set 
forth in Descartes. For some comment upon the relation between 
Locke and Descartes and references to Descartes see Aaron, 
Locke, p. 163. 
there is a train of ideas which constantly succeeds 
one another in his understanding, as long as he is 
awake. Reflection on these appearances of several 
ideas one after another in our minds, is that which 
furnishes us with the idea of succession: and the 
distance between any parts of that succession, or 
between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, 
is that we call duration. 1 
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The idea of duration for Locke would be inconceivable, i.e. 
2 
unimaginable, apart from the idea of succession. He writes: 
So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular 
succession of ideas in a waking man, is, ••• the measure 
and standard of all other successions. Whereof, if any 
one either exceeds the pace of our ideas, as where two 
sounds or pains, etc., take up in their succession the 
duration of but one idea; or else where any motion or 
succession is so slow, as that it keeps not pace with the 
ideas in our minds •••• there also the sense of a con-
stant continued succession is lost, and we perceive it 
not, but with certain gaps of rest between. 3 
In the following section Locke writes: 
And if a man had not the idea of motion otherwise, I 
think he would have none at all, which is enough to my 
present purpose; and sufficiently shows that the notice 
we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing there 
one after another, is that which gives us the idea of 
succession and duration, without which we should have no 
such ideas at all. It is not then motion, but the 
constant train of ideas in our minds whilst we are waking, 
that furnishes us with the idea of duration. 4 
Locke thus in the two passages just cited asserts the subjec-
tive origin of our ideas of duration and succession in 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 14, sec. 3, p. 239. 
2 The whole question of imaginability and conceivability 
will be discussed in later chapters. 
3 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 14, sec. 12, p. 244. 
4 Ibid., sec. 16, p. 245. (Italics in original). 
contrast to the view "then generally accepted that our 
temporal consciousness is essentially dependent upon the 
apprehension of movement in space."1 One may reasonably 
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speculate, although definitive proof from the text of the 
Essay is difficult to obtain, on Locke's reason for combat-
ting the traditional account of the perception of time as 
dependent upon the observation of a motion external to the 
observer. Duration, as Locke conceives it, is a simple mode, 
i.e. it consists in a simple idea repeated over and over 
again. Motion, however, apart from something moving is never 
given as a simple idea; the heat and light of the sun "united 
and blended"2 would be simple ideas. It may thus be conjec-
tured that Locke objects to the view current in his time, 
that the perception of time is dependent upon a motion 
external to the observer, because of an implicit imagism. 
The simple mode, a complex idea, is based upon a simple idea; 
external motion as such, apart from an object moving, is 
never, however, given to the mind as a simple idea. i.e. as 
an idea-image. Duration, construed as the notice the mind 
takes of its own train of ideas, i.e. idea-images, is able to 
1Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 80. It may fairly be 
asserted that Descartes and the Cartesians are the opponents 
Locke has in mind as upholding an objective theory of the 
temporal perception. Cf. Aaron, Locke, p. 163. Locke's sum-
mary of section 22 of chapter fourteen is entitled "time not 
the measure of motion." 
2 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 2, sec. 1, p. 144. 
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furnish the mind with the idea of duration. 1 The reason that 
it would appear impossible to establish this conclusively as 
Locke's reason for objecting to the then current view is that 
Locke hovers between two views in regard to simple ideas. On 
the one hand, the simple idea is the given, the sense of the 
term required for the foregoing interpretation. On the other 
hand, the simple idea is the atom. The passages in question, 
however, in the interpretation just suggested, refer neither 
to simple modes or simple ideas, and it is thus impossible to 
be sure which of at least two possible conceptions of simple 
ideas Locke has in mind. In general, however, it is true that 
Locke most usually means by the term 'simple idea' a given of 
sensation, 2 the sense of 'simple idea' required for the 
cogency of this interpretation. It should also perhaps be 
pointed out that the passage just discussed gives additional 
evidence that Locke is not to be interpreted as a sensation-
alist, if such additional evidence be needed. Duration, for 
Locke, is given to mind primarily by reflection on its own 
operations, and is not based primarily upon sensation. 
Locke's doctrine of infinity, according to Aaron, can 
be seen in its larger implications as a defense of empiricism 
1 
This summary of Locke's view should be read in the 
light of the last passage quoted. 
2 Aaron, Locke, p. 111. 
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against a possible rationalistic attack. As such, Locke's 
considerations on infinity in the seventeenth chapter of 
Book II of the Essay are not to be construed as an account 
of infinity in general, but rather as concerned to establish 
two points: first, that the mind does not have a positive 
idea of infinity; and secondly, that the concept of infinity 
that the mind does 




nothing in it not derived 
Such wider bearings of 
Locke's account do not need to be more than referred to here, 
for even if this account were not accepted as correct inter-
pretation, the latent imagism in this would still deserve 
comment in this investigation. 
Locke's chapter on infinity begins by pointing out 
that the only concept of infinity to be dealt with is the 
quantitative. He writes: 
Finite and infinite seem to me to be looked upon by the 
mind as modes of quantity, and to be attributed primarily 
in their first designation only to those things which 
have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by 
the addition or subtraction of any the least part. 2 
Locke points out that space, time, and number, all of which 
have been considered by him in the chapters immediately pre-
ceding, are of this sort.3 This quantitative view of infinity 
1 This interpretation of Locke's doctrine is found in 
Aaron, Locke, pp. 155-156 and pp. 166-170. This interpreta-
tion is based not only upon the Essay, but also upon consid-
eration of Locke's drafts. 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 1, p. 276. 
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is to be contrasted with another view of infinity with which 
Locke does not wish to concern himself. He writes: 
It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the 
Great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is 
incomprehensibly infinite: but yet, when we apply to 
that first and Supreme Being our idea of infinite, in 
our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in 
respect to his duration and ubiquity. 1 
Further, "more figuratively" we are assured of the Supreme 
2 
Being's "power, wisdom, and goodness." The idea of infinity 
for Locke, however, must be shown to have its content in more 
precise determinations than such an idea as we may have of 
the Supreme Being, i.e. his concern is to be with this quanti-
tative conception of infinity. Locke's method of argument is 
by now familiar; he will consider "how the mind comes by 
them,"3 i.e. these quantitative ideas of infinity. With the 
idea of finite, there is no difficulty: "the obvious portions 
of extension that effect our senses, carry with them into the 
mind the idea of finite; and ordinary periods of succession 
4 
••• are bounded lengths." Further, the process of enlarging, 
already encountered in considering Locke's view of space, 
suffices to explain the ideas we have of the infinity of 
space and of time.5 The idea so obtained for Locke, however, 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 1, p. 276. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., sec. 2, p. 277. 
4Ibid. 
5sections 4 and 5 are entitled respectively "Our idea 
of space boundless" and "And so of duration." The arguments 
add nothing to what has already been mentioned, except by way 
of repetition. 
is a negative one. In describing this negative idea of the 
infinity of space and of time Locke writes: 1 
What lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity 
lies in obscurity, and the indeterminate confusion 
of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do nor 
can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a 
finite and narrow capacity. 2 
The idea, in other words, of an infinite space can be con-
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ceived but cannot be imagined. The latent imagism of Locke 
comes out clearly when Locke's view of the formation of this 
idea is discussed. He writes: 
For, as our idea of infinity, being, as I think, an 
endlessly growing idea, but the idea of any quantity 
the mind has, being at that time terminated in that 
idea, (for be it as great as it will, it can be no 
greater than it is,) to join infinity to it, is to 
adjust a standing measure to a growing bulk. 3 
Whatever quantity one selects is imaginable, but coupling such 
an idea-image with infinity is to try "to adjust a standing 
measure to a growing bulk," i.e. no such idea-image can be 
formed. From this confusion between the suppositi~ idea 
the mind may think it has of infinity and its real impossi-
bility of formation, there follow the contradictions and antin-
omies into which reasoning may fall when considering space 
and duration. Locke puts this matter as follows: 
lLocke uses the expression 'infinity of space' to 
describe the idea obtained by enlarging, and the phrase 
'infinite space' to characterize this idea in its negative 
aspects. He thinks this not an "insignificant subtilty" 
(Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 7, p. 281), but in this 
Locke need not be followed. 
2Ibid., sec. 15, p. 288. (Italics in original.) 
3Ibid., sec. 7, p. 281. 
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Let a man frame in his mind an idea of any space or 
number, as great as he will, it is plain that the 
mind rests and terminates in that idea; which is con-
trary to the idea of infinity, which consists in a 
supposed endless progression. And therefore, I think 
it is that we are so easily confounded, when we come 
to argue and reason about infinite space or duration, 
etc. Because the parts of such an idea not being per-
ceived to be, as they are, inconsistent, the one or 
other always perplexes whatever consequency we draw 
from the other. 1 
Further, our ideas of infinity reveal themselves as defective 
when compared with the reality that lies beyond the circle of 
our thoughts. Locke writes of "the great and inextricable 
difficulties which perpetually involve all discourse concern-
ing infinity."2 Such difficulties are "the certain marks of 
a defect in our ideas of infinity, and the disproportion 
nature therefore has to the comprehension of our narrow 
faculties." 3 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 8, p. 282. 
2Ibid., sec. 21, p. 292. 
3Ibid. This lack of ability to know ultimate reality 
is not for-LOcke a matter of great concern. It must always 
be remembered that Locke's primary purpose is a moral one. 
This is set forth with unexcelled clarity by Locke in the 
introduction. He writes: 
"If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, 
I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to 
what things they are in any degree proportionate; and 
where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail 
with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling 
with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it 
is at the utmost extent of its tether •••• We should not 
then ••• raise questions, and perplex ourselves about 
things to which our understandings are not suited; and of 
which we can not frame in our minds any clear and distinct 
perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often 
happened) we have not any notions at all." 
The implication of this passage is imagistic. The reference 
to inability to "frame in our minds any clear and distinct 
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Locke's final paragraph in the chapter on infinity 
perhaps deserves comment. Locke does not pretend in this 
chapter to treat the ideas of infinity "in their full lati-
tude."1 It. suffices to show "how the mind receives them, 
such as they are, from sensation and reflection."2 In the 
following sentence, Locke claims that "some mathematicians 
perhaps, of advanced speculations, may have other ways to 
introduce into their mind ideas of infinity" but they "got 
the first ideas which they had of infinity from the method 
perceptions" followed by the phrase referring to ideas of 
which "we have not any notions at all" would seem to indicate 
this. This, however, is not a matter of great concern for 
Locke. Again and again the theme is repeated in the Essay that 
"our capacity is suited to our state and concerns." (Essay, 
II, intro., p. 29). Says Locke: 
"For though the comprehension of our understanding comes 
exceeding short of the vast extent of things, yet we 
shall have cause enough to magnify the bountiful Author 
of our Being." 
(Ibid.) Men have "light.enough to lead them to the knowledge 
oftheir Maker, and the sight of their own duties." (Ibid.) 
Often Locke reiterates that "the candle shines bright enough 
within us." 
Locke's doctrine may well be described as scepticism, 
provided that Locke's version is specified. It is scepticism 
of a rather different sort from much that is commonly asso-
ciated with the term. Locke's scepticism is scepticism about 
the possibility of human knowledge, even allowing for a less 
restrictive definition of knowledge than Locke's official 
definition. It is not, however, scepticism about the method 
of obtaining knowledge, or scepticism about values, or scep-
ticism which leads to inaction. Lastly, it is not scepticism 
which tends to vilify the human person, as did certain aspects 
of cynic teaching. Locke's brand of scepticism is quite dif-
ferent from Hume's (Hume's scepticism requires even more 
careful specification than Locke's). 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 22, p. 293. 
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of sensation and reflection."1 Locke studied Newton but was 
"incapable of u.nderstanding the Principia from his want of 
2 geometrical knowledge." Had Locke's knowledge of mathema-
tics been greater, his imagism would have probably been less, 
since he would not have been so chary of ideas that are not 
clearly imaginable. 
The discussion of substance in classical British 
empiricism is usually considered, and no doubt with perfect 
justice, to be one of the strategic and characteristic argu-
ments that sets the style of British empiricism. The discus-
sion of substance, for the purposes of this investigation, 
can be stated with comparative brevity, but such brevity is 
not an accurate gauge of the importance of the discussion in 
the philosophies here under examination. 
Locke inherited the idea of substance from Aristotle 
and the schoolmen. He criticized but did not repudiate the 
notion. Berkeley later mildly berated Locke because Locke 
"bantered the idea of substance," i.e. for Berkeley Locke no 
longer had reason to assert physical substance but did not 
repudiate the idea. Berkeley denied physical substance, but 
asserted mental substance. Hume repudiated the idea of 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 17, sec. 22, p. 293. 
2 Gibson, Locke's Theory, p. 251, footnote 2. Locke, 
however, as the story is repeated by Gibson, asked Huygens if 
the mathematics in the Principia were true, and having been 
assured of its certainty thereafter took it for granted. He 
thus became a master of "the physical truths there contained, 
and beC'ame a firm believer in the discoveries it contained." 
Ibid. 
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substance, both mental and physical. The classic argument 
against substance is Hume's. This much may be said in the 
way of introduction. 
Locke's views on substance may be conveniently con-
sidered under two topics: his views on "pure substance in 
general" 1 and his views on particular substances. 2 Locke's 
views on pure substance in general come out in the following 
passage: 
The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a 
great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the 
senses as they are found in exterior things, or by 
reflection on its own operations, takes notice also 
that a certain number of these simple ideas go con-
stantly together; which being presumed to belong to 
one thing, and words being suited to common apprehen-
sions, and made use for quick dispatch, are called, so 
united in one subject, by one name; ••• because ••• 
not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by 
themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some 
substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which3 they do result, which therefore we call substance. 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 23, sec. 2, p. 391. 
2The discussion of Locke's view on substance presented 
here is a somewhat str~ned version. Locke refers to sub-
stance a number of times throughout the Essay and elsewhere 
(particularly in connection with Stillingfleet, the Bishop of 
Worcester). For the purposes at hand here, however, most of 
these discussions come down to the same thing, and may be 
ignored. The order of discussion of topics relative to sub-
stance here is suggested by Locke's twenty-third chapter in 
Book II of the Essay. A list of references to Locke's treat-
ment of substance in the Essay may be appended at this point, 
although not all of these passages will be commented upon. 
Substance is treated in Book I, chap. 4, sec. 18; II, chap. 12, 
sec. 6; II, chap. 13, sees. 17-20; III, chap. 6, bassim; IV, 
chap. 3, sees. 6-16; IV, chap. 4, sees. 11-17. Tis list of 
references is from the Pringle-Pattison edition of the Essay, 
p. 154, footnote l. Book II, chap. 23 offers a convenient 
starting point for the discussion. 
3Locke, Essay, II, chap. 23, sec. l, pp. 390-391. 
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Substance, on the view expressed in this passage, is an 
inference from our simple ideas. Substance, of course, is 
the second class of Locke's complex ideas, according to 
Locke's official classification of simple and complex ideas. 
On Locke's own principles, however, he has no right to such 
an inference, unless he can show the simple ideas in sensation 
and reflection from which the idea of substance is derived. 
This, however, is exactly what Locke cannot show. Because we 
cannot show this "we accustom ourselves to suppose some sub-
stratum, wherein they do exist." The idea of substance is not 
presented as a clear idea-image but is "only a supposition of 
he knows not what su:e:eort of such qualities which are capable 
of producing simple ideas in us. ,1 That the idea of sub-
stance is never given in sensation and reflection comes out 
even more clearly in the following passage. Writes Locke: 
I confess there is another general idea which would be 
of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general 
talk as if they had it; and that is the idea of sub-
stance which we neither have nor can have by sensation 
and reflection. 2 
His view of substance in general is summarized in the follow-
ing passage, which also displays the relation of imagism to 
his doctrine of substance. Locke writes: 
And thus here ••• where we use words without having 
clear and distinct ideas ••• we talk like children ••• 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 23, sec. 2, p. 391. 
2 Ibid., I, chap. 3, sec. 19, p. 107. 
The idea, then, we have to which we give the ~eneral 
name substance, being nothing but the suppose , but 
unknown, support of those qualities which we find 
existing, which we imagine cannot subsist ••. without 
something to support them, we call that support 
substantia. 1 
For Locke there is no clear idea-image of subs~ance, yet 
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Locke somehow feels it is required as the support of quali-
ties, which are directly given in sense-experience. Locke 
clearly perceives that the notion of pure substance in 
general is inconsistent with his empiricism. It was left 
for Berkeley and Hume to draw the consequences of this fact; 
Locke was not revolutionary enough to do it. 
The difficulties, however, remain when consideration 
is given to particular substances by Locke. He writes: 
And obscure and relative idea of substance in general 
being thus made we come to have the ideas of particular 
sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of 
simple ideas as are, by experience ana-observations of 
man's senses, taken notice of to exist together •••• 
Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, 
water, etc. of which substances, whether any one has 
any other clear idea, further than of certain simple 
ideas co-existed together, I appeal to every one's own 
experience. 2 
Further instances of what have here been called 
latent imagistic tendencies in Locke's defense of empiricism 
could be multiplied, e.g. such tendencies are found in his 
discussion of self-identity, causality, and number. The 
multiplication of such instances, however, would not appre-
ciably advance the argument of this chapter. Enough instances 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 23, sec. 2, p. 392. 
2Ibid., sec. 3, pp. 392-393. 
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have been cited to attempt at this point to summarize the 
manner of argument and its upshot in regard to what is here 
called a latent imagism. The manner of argument is in 
general the same in each of the cases examined. Locke's 
empiricism requires that the "originals" of all general 
categories of human reasoning be found in sensation and re-
flection. Further, if such "originals" cannot be found, to 
maintain that we have ideas of such categories is inconsist-
ent with empiricism. The standard, however, by which the 
ideas are judged is a standard of sensuous imagination, i.e. 
Locke requires idea-images (or concrete images) as "originals" 
for all concepts. In certain cases, e.g. in his discussion 
of substance, Locke is unwilling to dismiss the concept of 
substance out of hand. So far as this is the case, Locke is 
inconsistent with his fundamental principles. It is in this 
sense that Locke's empiricism is best called an empiricism of 
ideas. The empiricism of ideas is not a test for truth, but 
a test for meaning, i.e. a test for the clarity of ideas. 
The standard of clarity is the concrete image. The matter 
may be stated inHume's terminology, although full explica-
tion of this terminology has not yet been offered. A funda-
mental assumption of the arguments of the classical British 
empiricists is that every idea must be shown to be derived 
from a prior impression. For Hume, if such a warrant is 
not shown, the assertion is made that we have no idea at all. 
Locke, however, does not explicitly draw such consequences. 
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He asserts the lesser thesis that, if an idea cannot be 
shown to have a prior impression, the idea is confused, 
obscure, negative. It is in this sense that Locke's imag-
ism is here called latent. This fundamental moment of 
classical British empiricism has not as yet been related to 
the polemical and constructive sides of the doctrine of 
imagism as they were discussed in the first chapter of this 
investigation. This task is best deferred for Locke until 
the last section of this chapter. The final chapter of 
this inwestigation will draw the matter together for all the 
classical British empiricists. 
4. Nominalism, Universals, and Locke's View of Abstract Ideas 
Nominalism, the denial that there are universals or 
other abstract entities, 1 is a term frequently applied to the 
classical British empiricists. An occasional use will be 
made of the term in this dissertation. It is desirable to 
avoid the long historical controversies and varying defini-
tions that have been connected with this term. To escape 
from this maze of words, another strategy seems to recommend 
itself. First, a rough account of the reasons the term was 
1 
The neatest historical formulation of nominalism is 
that of Hobbes, "there being nothing in the world universal 
but names." (The quotation is found in Richard I. Aaron, 
Theory of Universals [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952], p. 233.) 
Hobbes's f'ormulation is useful as a bench-mark for nominal-
ism. 
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applied to the British empiricists will be presented. 
Secondly, a contemporary linguistic formulation of nominal-
ism will be offered which may clarify some of the problems 
connected with this term. In the third place the manner in 
which these results can be used to measure the nominalistic 
tendencies in Locke will be discussed. The nominalistic 
tendencies in Berkeley and Hume may most appropriately be 
treated in the chapters devoted to them. 
The usual reason for the traditional account of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume as nominalists--Locke is perhaps more 
frequently called a conceptualist, but for the moment this 
distinction may be ignored1--was that all denied the 
Aristotelian doctrine of universalia in rebus.2 According 
to this traditional doctrine, thought was the inspection of 
universals, the epistemological counterpart of the ontologi-
cal doctrine of universals. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all 
denied this doctrine, but at the outset it is best not to 
assume that they necessarily did so for the same reasons. 
All three further denied that such abstract entities as 
universals were presented in immediate experience. Further-
more, they felt that only elements found in immediate 
experience ought to be considered as fundamental constituents 
lLocke, however, is called a nominalist by w. Windel-
band, A History of Philosophy, tr. James H. Tufts (2d ed.; 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1893), p. 451. 
2H. H. Price, Thinking and Ex4erience (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 195~, p. 23 . This doctrine will 
be treated briefly below. 
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of knowledge. From this contention arose the problem of 
abstract ideas for the classical British empiricists. They 
could not find abstract ideas in immediate experience, yet 
they all realized in varying degrees the necessity for some-
thing like them to account for thought. Thus they attempted 
to construct them from particulars. There are considerable 
differences in the views of Locke, Berkeley and Hume over the 
status of general ideas and the role that images play in the 
formation of such general ideas; it is the purpose of this 
dissertation to investigate these differences. If nominalism 
is understood merely as the blanket denial of the existence 
of objective universals, it follows that this sense of the 
term will not be helpful in clarifying the problems of this 
investigation. All the classical British empiricists denied 
the existence of objective universals, but their reasons for 
so doing were different, and it is these reasons that will 
be, in part, under investigation. 
Since the term cannot be ignored, however, an exposi-
1 tion more useful for the argument follows. The linguistic 
formulation of nominalism, a development stemming from the 
logical researches of the twentieth century, differs from 
traditional accounts in not conducting the discussion of 
1Willard Van Orman Quine, "Designation and Existence," 
Readin s in Philoso hical Anal sis, ed. Herbert Feigl and 
Wi rid Se ars New York: Apple on-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1949), pp. 44-51 and Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical 
Point of View (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, l953), 
passim are the sources for this exposition. 
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universals as a question of existence but rather as one of 
decision. The phrase "from existence to decision"1 is use-
ful if the phrase is guarded carefully: It seems to be 
possible to point to certain forms of discourse (in this 
case the form of discourse used by the traditional realists) 
as explicitly presupposing universals, and to point to 
another form of discourse (that used by the classical British 
empiricists) as not explicitly presupposing universals or 
other abstract entities. Conducting the discussion then on 
the semantical plane allows a standard of ontological commit-
ment to be so formulated that the issues, if not finally 
solved, are at least more precisely put than in the traditional 
discussions. The problem is, with this strategy, not one of 
describing the ontological state of affairs, the furniture 
of the world, but rather is one of describing ontological 
commitments of discourse. The standard of ontological commit-
ment : '' to be used is the following: "an entity is assumed 
by a theory if and only if it must be counted among the values 
of the variables in order that the statement affirmed in 
the theory be true, "2 The subsequent use of this criterion 
will serve to free this dissertation of much of the tradi-
tional polemics that have persisted for centuries. 
1The phrase is from Morton G. White, Towards Reunion 
in Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), 
chap. 1. 
2Quine, Logical.?oint of View, pp. 102-103. 
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A useful distinction for such an account of nominal-
ism is one between two kinds of existential statements: 
singular existence statements and general existence state-
ments. Singular existence statements are of the form: 
(7) There is such a thing as so-and-so.1 
The singular existence statement calls an alleged existent by 
name, e.g. 'Pegasus.• Every singular existence statement 
contains an expression which designates, which bears "the 
relation of name to the object whose name it is."2 Such a 
singular existence statement is true if, and only if, there 
is such a thing as the entity designated. As an illustration 
(8) There is such a thing as Boston 
will serve. On the other hand, there are general existence 
statements of the form 
(9) There are so-and-sos. 
A general existence statement says that at least one entity 
satisfies a given condition, whatever that condition may be. 
It can be illustrated by (10) 
(10) There are horses. 
The general existence statement appears in logical notation 
as an existential quantification, e.g. 
1Quine, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 44. 
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(11) (Ex) (xis a horse).1 
In English (ll) may be rendered as 
(12) There is something which is a horse. 
It does not necessarily imply existence in a peculiarly 
spatial or temporal sense. In a general existence statement 
an alleged existent is not named but "reference is made 
rather by a variable, 'x' the logistical analogue of a pro-
noun 'which, 1 'something which. 1 " 2 In the developments to 
be discussed shortly, it will be seen that the basic media 
of reference are not nouns, i.e. names, but pronouns. The 
bound variables of quantification •something,' •everything,' 
'nothing' become the basic media of reference, as names are 
eliminable in favor of description. Brief discussion of this 
notion is best left until later in the exposition. 
One stimulus for the acceptance of what Quine calls 
1For reasons of typographical convenience the existen-
tial quantifier will not be written in the more common form of 
the reversed E. The usage adop,ted here has sanction. See 
Alonzo Church, "Logic, Formal, ' Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. 
Runes , p. 173. 
The 1E 1 of existential quantification is tenseless, 
i.e. there is no particular time reference to present, past, 
or future. This timelessness of the existential quantifier 
does not mean that the values of 'x' are not things or events 
dated in time, but rather that existence can be ascribed to 
such things or entities without ascribing dates just as one 
may talk about them without reference to location or color. 
This has notable technical advantages in making the time 
reference within an existential quantification clear. On this 
last point, see Willard Van Orman Quine, "Mr. Strawson on 
Logical Theory," Mind, LXII, (October 1953), pp. 433-451. 
2Quine, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 45. 
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the "bloated ontologies" 1 of traditional platonic2 realism 
can be examined most easily by consideration of denial of a 
singular existence statement. Consider the denial of the 
following: 
(13) Pegasus exists. 
To deny (13) has seemed to some to require the assumption 
that the word 'Pegasus' has meaning, for if the word 1Pegasus 1 
is without meaning, the very denial of (13) seems to lack 
meaning, to itself fall into meaninglessness. Following 
this line of argument, some unactualized possibles (or 
impossibles) are postulated as entities for the term 'Pegasus' 
to name. Meaning and naming, however, are not to be confused 
and the quandary is resolved if this is made clear. A noun 
can be meaningful, i.e. have significance in that it can be 
used in statements (true or false) in the absence of a desig-
natum. If asked to produce a meaning for the name 'Pegasus,' 
where the term 'Pegasus' names nothing, one may present a 
translation. 
(14) The winged horse captured by Bellerophon. 
In Quine's words, "Many words form essential parts of intelli-
gible statements--truths andfalsehoods--without being names 
3 
of anything." This fact was recognized in traditional 
1Quine, Logical Point of View, p. 3. 
2The small 'p' indicates that Plato himself might not 
have held the doctrine. It is unnecessary to become involved 
in this ancient controversy hece. 
3Quine, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 46. 
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logic by means of the distinction between syncategorematic 
words and categormatic words. Syncategorematic words "are 
those that must be used with other words as parts of a com-
plex expressing a term (or proposition). They are incomplete 
in meaning without supplementation."1 Categorematic words 
require no such supplementation. It is a question of grammar 
and lexicography that tells us that 'Pegasus• is a noun, 
2 
synonymous, i.e. equivalent in meaning in all respects, to 
(11). It is settled by empirical investigation, however, 
that 'Pegasus• is not a name, does not designate in the 
semantic sense, i.e. it has no designatum. 
The foregoing analysis is not new. Russell, in his 
theory of singular descriptions, i.e. expressions of the form 
'the so-and-so' involving uniqueness of reference, shows how 
sentences, apparently containing names, can be used meaning-
fully without the supposition that there be the entities 
allegedly named.3 Russell introduced descriptions as 
1Ralph M. Eaton, General Logic (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 307. 
2 Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematic.al Lo 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Un vers ty Press, 95o , p. 
A hot controversy rages at present over a criterion for 
synonymy. For the rough purposes of exposition at this point, 
the quoted expression will serve as a criterion. A recent 
summary of the literature is R. Robinson, "Survey of the 
criterion of synonymy" (not titled in Journal), Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, XXI, (1956), pp. 79-82. 
3Perhaps Russell's clearest of several formulations 
of the theory of singular descriptions is to be found in 
Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1926), pp. 167-180. 
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incomplete symbols, i.e. "as symbols or expressions which 
have no meaning in isolation but which may occur as a 
constituent part in, and contribute to the meaning of, an 
expression which does have meaning."1 Russell's reason for 
introducing singular descriptions as incomplete symbols is 
that the alternative seems to be to treat descriptions as 
proper names. A singular description, however, as in the 
first five words of (15), 
(15) The present King of France is bald, 
cannot be a proper name because there is no person for the 
first five words to designate. (15) nonetheless may be 
construed to have meaning since someone may assert it who 
believes, falsely as it happens, that there is a person 
designated by the description if~5). Meaning and designa-
tion (or naming), thus, have to be distinguished. Only cer-
tain expressions can designate, viz. the names of designata; 
there are other words, many but not all of which are nouns, 
which do not designate but nonetheless figure in statements 
having meaning, i.e. they figure in statements which are 
true or false. 2 
1Alonzo Church, "Incomplete Symbol," Dictionary of 
Philosophy, ed. Runes, p. 142. 
2Russell's term for the term 'designate' is the term 
'denote.• The term 'designation' is used herein because it 
has been defined above. Russell's term 'denotation' would be 
more difficult to define precisely since Russell may have used 
it with somewhat conflicting intentions (see Max Black, 
Langua~e and Philosopht [Ittaca: Cornell University Press 1949], 
pp. 12 -134 f'or two ar fering possibilities of interpretation). 
There would seem to be no injustice done to Russell by this 
change in terminology. 
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What is new and important in the account herein pre-
sented is that .the use of bound variables ('everything, 1 
'something,' and 'nothing') provides the basic medium of 
reference to linguistic entities, whatever these extra-lin-
guistic entities may be construed to be. The point needs 
fuller discussion. It can be shown by known logical methods 
that all use of names, singular descriptions, class abstrac-
tions, and universals may be reduced to contexts of quanti-
fication. Contexts of quantification, i.e. expressions 
following a universal quantifier, (x) ( ••• x ••• ), and expres-
sions following an existential quantifier, (Ex) ( ••• x ••• ), 
are exhaustive in the sense that any other use of variables 
1 is reducible to this usage. The upshot of this fact is that 
all names and all references to abstract entities occur in 
contexts of quantification or are reducible to such an idiom. 
It must be emphasized again that this does not tell one any-
thing about reality; it simply enables one to find out what 
are the ontological commitments if one form of discourse 
rather than another is chosen. 
To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply to be 
reckoned as the value of a variable. In terms of the 
traditional categories of grammar, this amounts roughly 
1 It is not relevant to pursue the details of such 
reduction in this dissertation. It is discussed fully in 
Willard Van Orman Quine, Methods of Lo~ic (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1950), pp. 215-224 and g ven a thoroughgoing 
logistic treatment in Quine, Logical Point of View, pp. 80-
101. (The latter is Quine 1 s system of "New Foundations.") 
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to saying that to be is to be in the range of refer-
ence of a pronoun •••• The variables of quantification, 
1 something, 1 1 nothing, 1 1 everything 1 range over our 
whole ontology, whatever it may be. 1 
An example will illustrate the matter. Under the 
formulations of logic in most common use today there are two 
forms of inference in which names and variables are inter-
changed. The first of these is existential generalization 
in which a name is replaced by a variable, 1 x 1 , and an 
existential quantifier prefixed. This interchange may be 
illustrated by the following pair of statements. 
(16) Boston is a city 
which has as its existential generalization 
( 17) (Ex) (x is a city). 
The second form of inference is specification, in which a 
variable is replaced by a name and a universal quantifier is 
dropped. It may be illustrated by the following pair: 
(18) (x) (xis mortal), 
a universal quantification, which becomes by specification 
(19) Socrates is mortal. 
If existential generalization is valid with respect to a given 
term, then specification is also valid and vice versa with 
respect to that term. As an illustration of this consider 
' 
the following. Suppose that (16) is false. Its denial 
(20) - (Boston is a city)2 
1Quine, Logical Point of View, p. 13. 
2For reasons of typographical convenience a bar as a 
negation sign will be used rather than the more common tilde. 
is then true. By existential generalization on (20) one 
obtains 
(21) (Ex) - {x is a city) 
which is equivalent to 
(22) - (x) (x is a city) 
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by the usual equivalences of quantifiers. The falsity of 
(16) thus entails1 the falsity of {23). Therefore the truth 
of 
(23) (x) (x is a city) 
entails the truth of (16).2 Thus if existential generaliza-
tion is valid with respect to 'Boston' - as assumed in the 
inference of {21) from (20) - so is the specification justi-
fied by the entailment of (16) by (23). Similarly, if 
specification is valid with respect to 1Boston 1 , so is 
existential generalization. By specification from 
(24) (x) - (x is a city) 
there follows 
(20) - (Boston is a city). 
Hence, the latter's denial entails the former's, i.e. 
(25) - - (Boston is a city) 
entails 
1 The relation of entailment is a necessary implication. 
To say that one proposition entails another is to say that the 
first could not be true and the second false. It is to be con-
trasted with the assertion of material implication between two 
propositions, which asserts that the first is not in fact true 
and the second false. 
2This example follows Quine, Readings in Philosophical 
Analysis, p. 49. 
(26) -(x)-(xisacity). 
Cancelling double negatives and replacing '- (x) -' by its 
equivalent existential quantifier, there results 
(16) (Boston is a city) 
entailing 
(27) (Ex) (x is a city). 
215 
Consider next the term 'appendicitis' (Quine's example). 
With this term there is possible legitimate doubt as to how it 
is to be construed. If one construes the term as an entity 
designating something, then existential generalization is valid 
with respect to that term.. This is illustrated in the follow-
ing pair. 
(28) Appendicitis is dreaded. 
If the word 'appendicitis' is construed as designating an 
entity, and presumably the realist or believer in abstract 
entities would so construe it, then existential generalization 
is valid with respect to that ·terin. Such a believer in 
abstract entities would proceed from the singular existence 
statement that (28) is presumed to be, to its existential 
generalization, 
(29) (Ex) (x is dreaded). 
If one affirms a singular existence statement, as (28) under 
this interpretation is presumed to be, then one accepts (29) 
as valid, i.e. the passage from (28) to (29) is from truth to 
truth. 
The nominalist, on the other hand, boggles at the 
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passage from (28) to (29). For him the term 'appendicitis,' 
interpreted platonistically, does not designate; the word 
'appendicitis' designates no designatum. The nominalist can 
use the term 'appendicitis' but for him such talk is about no 
abstract entity, since it is translatable into talk about 
concrete entities by contextual definition. It is a manner 
of speaking, facon de parler, a convenient fiction. The 
difference between the two languages is seen in this light 
as a question of quantification over variables. The realist 
allows abstract entities such as universals as values for 
variables; the nominalist does not. 
Rather infrequently it will prove helpful to para-
phrase certain arguments in terms of the elementary quanti-
fication theory suggested above. It would be a mistake to 
rely too heavily on such a device for there are differences 
between 
1 . 2 og~c. 
language-in-use1 and the notions of contemporary 
There are three differences that are appropriate to 
discuss at this point. Language-in-use has many idioms, 
locutions, and constructions whereas these are reduced in 
1The phrase 'language-in-use' is Quine's. It is more 
awkward than the phrase 'ordinary language' but his latter 
phrase has been preempted by one wing of the analytic movement 
in England to describe philosophic activity of a sort not 
fairly comparable to the matter here under discussion. The 
term is here hyphenated to suggest it as a technical term. It 
is intended that the term 'language-in-use' be contrasted with 
formalized (and perhaps but not necessarily) interpreted logis-
tic systems. 
2Quine, "Mr. Strawson," Mind, LXII, (October 1953), 
438-440 discusses this question ana-the following discussion 
leans heavily on his remarks. 
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symbolic logic to a minimum. The power and simplicity of 
logic depends "on there being many occurrences of few ele-
1 
ments rather than few occurrences of many." There is danger 
that in making translations from language-in-use to logical 
notation that meanings will not be preserved. No dictionary 
has been provided to insure that such change in meaning does 
not occur and in view of the luxurience of language-in-use, 
it is doubtful if one will be provided. A second divergence 
between language as used and language as reflected in logical 
forms is that logical particles such as the truth-functional 
connectives ('or,' 'if-then,' 'not,' and 'and') and the bound 
variables of quantification ( •something,' 'nothing,' and •every-
thing') have employments in language-in-use that are differ-
ent from the laws formulated in symbolic logic. This may be 
illustrated by the systematic ambiguity in language-in-use 
between the exclusive and non-exclusive sense of the logical 
particle 'or.' In the third place, language-in-use permits 
what Quine calls truth-value gaps. Examples of truth-value 
gaps in language-in-use occur in the singular description and 
the conditional. Where the objects of singular descriptions 
do not exist, the truth of sentences containing such expres-
sions does not arise.2 A conditional as it appears in 
1Quine, "Mr. Strawson," Mind, LXII, (October 1953), 438. 
2cf. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Lo~ical Theory 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1952). This fact is rna e the basis of 
a well-known criticism of Russell's theory of singular descrip-
tions by P. F. Straws on, "On Referring," Mind, LIX ( 1950), 320-
344. This inadequacy inno way affects the usefulness of Rus-
sell's analysis for the purposes to which it was put earlier 
in this dissertation. 
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language-in-use is not thought of as true or false as a whole, 
as far as the notion is clear at all, but as "a conditional 
affirmation of the consequent." 1 Modern symbolic logic closes 
these truth-value gaps and accords no meaning to the notion of 
their having no truth-value. The only way in which these 
three dangers of translation can be avoided, and these are 
real dangers, is by care in analyzing the argument and sensi-
tivity to the various meanings that may be carried by 
language-in-use. The gains in power and perspicuity by 
translations into logical notation must justify their use in 
individual cases. 
Discussion may next return to the standard of ontolo-
gical commitment which has been discussed. This standard was 
not designed primarily to be applied to those in the history 
of philosophy who have traditionally been called nominalists; 
it was rather primarily designed to clarify certain contempor-
ary problems in the philosophy of mathematics. It would not 
be germane to the present inquiry to enter into an extended 
discussion of this matter, but some indication of the nature 
of the topic for which this standard was devised may be 
suggested. There are today three main schools of mathematical 
philosophy: logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. 2 The main 
1Quire, Methods of Logic, p. 32. 
2 A general survey of these schools of mathematical 
philosophy is provided in Chapter 1 of Max Black, Nature of 
Mathematics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, J933h'i'ii. 't-12. 
Later chapters discuss the mutual interrelations of these 
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thesis of logicism is that "pure mathematics is a branch of 
logic."1 The best known living representative of this school 
of mathematical philosophy is Bertrand Russell, although it is 
not safe to infer that Russell's present position is that of 
logicism in the philosophy of mathematics.2 The characteris-
tic thesis of formalism is that "pure mathematics is the 
science of the formal structure of symbols."3 The best known 
of this school is Hilbert. Finally, intuitionism maintains 
the thesis that "pure mathematics is founded on a basic intui-
tion of the possibility of constructing an infinite series of 
numbers .'.4 Brouwer is the best known representative of this 
last position. 
schools. ~Quine, using the same classification, treats these 
schools in From a Logical Point of View, pp, 13f, 18f, 125, 
127ff, The remarks made in this investigation are designed 
only to suggest the manner in which the criterion of ontologi-
cal commitment is to be used in this investigation; they are in 
no sense intended to survey even the rudiments of the contempor-
ary philosophy of mathematics. 
1Black, Nature of Mathematics, p. 7. 
2In the revision of the introduction to the second edi-
tion of Principles of Mathematics, Russell presumably departed 
to some degree from the realism of his early years. One fairly 
recent utterance of Russell's on this matter is to be found in 
a reply to a criticism of his later tendency to depart from 
realism made by Feibleman. Russell's remarks on the matter are 
found in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, ed. Paul Arthur 
Schilpp (New York: Tudor Pubiishlng Co., 1951), pp. 686-688. 
Here Russell remarks, "I will not describe myself as a realist 
or a nominalist; in regard to any suggested universal, I will 
examine its claims, and shall expect sometimes to admit them, 
sometimes to reject them." Logicism and realism are counter-
parts and Russell has gradually retreated from realism. The 
fact is that Russell has not worked in the philosophy of mathe-
matics extensively for some years. 
3Black, Nature of Mathematics, p. 8. 
4Ibid., p. 9. 
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These contemporary philosophies of mathematics have 
their counterparts in the traditional points of view regard-
ing universals. The three contemporary philosophies of 
mathematics--logicism, formalism, and intuitionism--may be 
said to correspond without specifying here the degreeof cor-
respondence, to realism, conceptualism, and nominalism, 
respectively.1 In a later part of this section these tradi-
tional doctrines will be defined as they are understood in 
this investigation. Quine's standard of ontological commit-
ment is intended primarily to be applied in connection with 
the current controversy in the philosophy of mathematics. 
The relation of Quine's standard of ontological commitment 
to the parallel to be found between current disputes over the 
philosophy of mathematics and the traditional disputes over 
universals is put in the following way by Quine: 
Because this standard of ontological presupposition 
[i.e. standard of ontological commitment] did not 
emerge clearly in the philosophical tradition, the 
modern philosophical mathematicians have not on the 
whole recognized that they were debating the same old 
problem of universals in a newly clarified form. But 
the fundamental cleavages among modern points of view 
on foundations of mathematics do come down pretty 
explicitly to disagreements as to the range of entities 
to which the bound variables should be permitted to 
refer. 2 
The standard of ontological commitment may, however, 
be profitably applied in this investigation. It would appear 
l Quine, Logical Point of View, p. 14. 
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that there are two ways in which this might be done. In the 
first place, crucial arguments of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
might be paraphrased in logical notation, using any of several 
possible logistic systems. This would require the establish-
ment of a minimum vocabulary, i.e. a vocabulary such that no 
term in the vocabulary could be defined in terms of any other, 
and such that by means of this vocabulary all the propositions 
that needed to be expressed within the system could be 
expressed. What would have to be expressed in a vocabulary 
designed for such a purpose would be quotations from the texts 
of the classical British empiricists that were taken as expres-
sing the crucial arguments. In other words, an interpreted 
1 logistic system would be employed. The interpretation would 
1An Uninterpreted system may be described by what it 
contains. First, it contains a set of axioms, assumed without 
proof in that system. Such axioms will usually "take the form 
of general and existential statements concerning the properties 
and relations of the entities; the relations are named but the 
entities are referred to by indefinite descriptions." (Black, 
Nature of Mathematics, p. 37). Axioms are the premises from 
which all theorems are derived. Thus theorems form the second 
major component of the system. (The term 'postulate' is often 
distinguished from the term •axiom' but there seems to be 
little agreement on the grounds of the distinction. For 
Euclid the ground of the distinction was that an axiom was 
thought to be self-evident, where as a postulate had to be 
assumed without proof in order to get certain theorems. Cf. 
Black, Nature of Mathematics, p. 153 and the references there.) 
There are three characteristics usually sought for in an axiom 
set, but these characteristics are all to some degree at least 
unobtainable within the system itself. First, fertility is 
sought for; many consequences thought to be useful by the 
investigator are able to be drawn. (From any axiom set an 
infinite number of consequences could be drawn by reiteration. 
This, however, would be of no advantage.) Secondly, indepen-
dence is sought for; no axiom in the set can be shown to be 
derivable from any of the others. {Again, there is no proof, 
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be a logical representation of the arguments of the classical 
British empiricists which supposedly would be synonymous with 
the text under analysis. Such an analysis seems feasible, 
but nothing of the sort will be attempted here. 
Secondly, and this is the task attempted here, the 
discussion may be informal. This involves at least two things. 
In the first place, the standard of ontological commitment 
will always be stated informally, 1 i.e. not given in a formal-
ized language, "a particular theory or system of logical 
analysis" 2 will not be employed. Further, the minimum voca-
bulary will not be specified but whatever parts of the 
language-in-use that seem appropriate will be employed. 
within the system itself, that all the axioms are independent, 
although it may be shown in a particular case that an axiom is 
not independent.) Finally consistency is sought for; no known 
contradictions can be derived from the set. An interpreted 
system is a set of axioms for which concrete representation 
or material content has been given, i.e. the axioms represent 
contingent facts. There are possible an indefinite number of 
interpretations for any given system. The discussion of the 
requirements for axioms is indebted to Morris Cohen and 
Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Lo ic and Scientific Method 
(New York: Harcour , Brace an o., , pp. 9- 5 passim. 
This whole matter could be described more elegantly, but not 
necessarily more clearly, by introducing the terminology of 
syntactical and semantical rules as described, for example, 
by Church, Intro. Math. Logic, I, pp. 1-68, passim. 
1 As, of course, has been the case thus far. 
2 Church, Intro. Math. Logic, I, p. 3. Church finds 
this the essential feature of a formalized language rather 
than "the more conspicuous but theoretically less important 
feature that it is found convenient to replace the spelled 
words of most (written) natural languages by single letters 
and special symbols." Ibid. 
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Informality, of course, should not be taken to mean either 
resultant lack of perspicuity or accuracy. It would appear 
that informality ~· formality could only be evaluated after 
comparing completed analyses and not before completion. 
With this second task prescribed, viz. to use the 
standard of ontological commitment in an informal manner to 
discuss the classical British empiricists, it is necessary 
next to establish a terminology adequate to discuss the 
general position of the classical British empiricists in 
connection with the traditional discussions over universals. 
Toward this end, the following terminology may be introduced. 
In the first place there is the term •term' itself. In 
common English usage a term is a word or expression and its 
1 
associated meaning. More specifically in the context of the 
present discussion it is a common noun, a substantive. A 
term has as its defining characteristic that it is true of 
many things, or one, or none, and false of the rest.2 A 
term is thus to be contrasted with a statement, the defining 
characteristic of which is that it is capable of being true 
or false. Terms may be classified into singular and general. 
ed, 
1cf. Alonzo Church, "Term," Dictionary of Philosophy, 
Runes, p. 315. 
2Quine, Methods of Logic, p. 65. The term 'thing' as 
used here may be interchanged with Quine's term 'object' with-
out confusion. There is no need to specify more exactly what 
objects are except to say that they are the kinds of entities 
to which the variables in contexts of quantification refer. 
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A singular term is one that in a particular context purports 
1 to name one and only one thing. There is no guarantee that 
the thing named by a term exists, either in a spatio-temporal 
sense or in any subsistent sense. General terms are terms 
that are not singular terms. Generality is not, of course, 
to be confused with ambiguity. There is further a "cross-
2 
classification" of terms into concrete and abstract terms. 
Quine puts the matter succinctly. A major portion of a para-
graph devoted to the distinction may be profitably quoted: 
Concrete terms are those which purport to refer to 
individuals, physical objects, events; abstract terms 
are those which purport to refer to abstract objects, 
e.g. to numbers, classes, attributes. Thus some singu-
lar terms, e.g. 'Socrates, 1 'Cerberus,' 'earth, 1 'the 
author of Waverley, are concrete, while other singular 
terms, e.g. 171 ••• 'piety• are abstract. Again some 
general terms, e.g. •man, 1 'house, 1 'red house, 1 are 
concrete (since each man or house is a concrete indi-
vidual), while others, e.g. 'prime number,' 'zoological 
species,' 'virtue• are abstract (since each number is 
itself an abstract object, if anfthing, and similarly 
for each species and each virtue). 3 
It should be noted that the division between concrete and 
abstract things is ~ distinction between the kinds of things 
referred to. It is a less crucial distinction from the point 
of view of logical structure than that between singular and 
general and this for the following reason. To say that a 
singular term purports to name one and only one thing is to 
1Quine, Methods of Logic p. 205. 'Thing' is here 
substituted for 'object.' 
2 ~·, p. 204. 
3Ibid. 
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say that "the singular term belongs in positions of the kind 
in which it would also be coherent 
'Y' etc. (or in ordinary language, 
to use variables, •x,' 
1 pronouns)." General 
terms, however, "do not occur in positions appropriate to 
variables." 2 Failure to observe this latter stipulation 
would result in the obliteration of the distinction between 
general terms and abstract singular terms. Inferences, how-
ever, from singular terms, presuppose the existence of the 
thing named or referred to. To obliterate the distinction 
would be to allow commitment to entities, through the medium 
of inferences from abstract general terms, which may or may 
not exist. The reason for preserving the distinction is thus 
Occam's reason: entities are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity. Nothing is lost in the way of advantages in 
technical manipulation by adherence to this distinction as 
formulations for references to abstract things are available.3 
No such difference in logical structure marks the distinction 
between concrete and abstract things. 
With this terminology established, the first use to 
which it may be put is to comment upon a matter which was 
deferred from the first chapter. It will be remembered that 
in the first chapter the Philosophy of Resemblance was dis-
cussed as a possible alternative to the Philosophy of 
1Quine, Methods of Logic, p. 205. 
2 Ibid • , p • 206. 
3Ibid., pp. 206-207 discusses this matter by reference 
to actual contexts of quantification, but nothing would appear 
to be gained here by so doing. 
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Universals. It was there suggested that this Philosophy of 
Resemblances would prove useful in discussing the classical 
British empiricists. It was also pointed out that there was 
a famous criticism of this Philosophy of Resemblances,~· 
that so far as this theory purports to dispense with univer-
sals it is not successful in so doing since resemblance 
itself is a universal--a universal of relation. According to 
this argument, since the Philosophy of Resemblances grants 
one universal, there is no need to cavil at others. Price 
offered some ingenious arguments to avoid this conclusion. 
This discussion may be related to the standard of ontological 
commitment that has been discussed in this in~estigation. It 
would appear to be the case that the Philosophy of Resemblances 
is committed to a platonistic language in which abstract 
objects stand as values of variables. This is so since by 
the usual definition of relations, relations are defined in 
terms of classes, and classes are abstract things. Resemblance 
is a relation. Price's principal argument relevant to these 
considerations is the denial of the conclusion that because 
general words are used that this implies that there are "gen-
1 
eral somethings in rerum natura." This latter fact, according 
to Price, is just what has to be proved; it is the assumption 
upon which the criticism that resemblance itself is a univer-
sal is based. Without entering into a discussion of what 
there is, it appears necessary to account for an irreducible 
1 Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 24. 
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and basic feature of experience, ~· that concrete objects 
resemble one another. The relevant linguistic issue is how 
resemblance, an abstract thing, is to be explained. The 
nominalist would treat terms like 'similar,' 'resemblance,' 
and other predicates of this sort as syncategorematic expres-
sions designating nothing; such terms can be used meaning-
fully but name nothing in the semantic sense of naming, i.e. 
they have no designatum. The nominalist task would then be 
to produce the relevant contextual definitions explaining 
quantification with respect to such abstract entities as 
resemblance and similarity. If such translations are forth-
coming he is entitled to talk as if there were such entities 
and not in so doing retreat from his nominalism. On the 
other hand, the realist, who speaks in a platonistic language, 
would appear to be required to show that "variables are 
needed primitively which take similarity or other universals 
as values."1 Fortunately, it is not necessary in this inves-
tigation to decide between such systematically different 
terminologies; it is only necessary here to recognize the 
separate tasks. 
Consideration may next be given to discussion of 
universals. There have been three traditional solutions to 
the problem of universals: realism, nominalism, and con-
ceptualism. These three doctrines.may be stated briefly in 
1
w111ard Van Orman Quine, "Review of Russell's Inquiry 
into Meaning and Truth, 11 Journal of Symbolic Logic, VI ( 1941), 
P. 3o. 
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their traditional forms and these comments related to remarks 
made concerning the issue of what is allowed to stand as the 
values of variables in each of the traditional views. The 
purpose of stating the standard of ontological commitment was 
to avoid polemics over the issues, not because such polemics 
are intrinsically uninteresting, but because ontology is not 
the primary task of this investigation. The problem of uni-
versals arises in this investigation because the classical 
British empiricists offer various solutions of the problems 
of universals; some of these solutions are closely tied up 
with imagism. It should be remembered that the standard of 
ontological commitment discussed earlier is a semantic 
formula; it serves only to test the conformity of a statement 
or a doctrine to some previous standard. Such a prior 
standard in each of the traditional solutions of universals 
is a view, implicit or explicit, about abstract entities. 
The first step in this task is a definition of the 
universal. For the purposes at hand at this point, a univer-
sal may be defined as a generic concept.1 This definition 
is meant to suggest that the generic concept is what thought 
conceives to be common to several instances of the same 
1rn terms of the discussion of the first chapter, 
there are two other definitions of universals available. Ac-
cording to what was there called the Philosophy of Universals, 
a universal could be defined as a recurrent characteristic of 
things. According to the Philosophy of Resemblances, a uni-
versal could be defined as a class of resembling particulars. 
At later points this definition by way of resemblances will 
prove the more useful definition for discussing the classical 
British empiricists. At this point, however, the definition 
of a universal as a generic concept seems to prejudge least 
the present discussion. 
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class. Generic concepts, on the view here intended, are 
characterized by conceptual objectivity, and are not appre-
hended in sense-perception. 
Realism, so far as it is a solution of the problem 
of universals, has usually been expounded in one of two 
forms, which may be called extreme realism and moderate 
realism. Both varieties of realism assert that, in some sense, 
universals have a being independent of mind; they are dis-
covered or uncovered but they are not mind-made. Extreme 
realism is associated with Plato and is usually called the 
~~theory. 1 This phrase ante ~ indicates that the 
universal is equal to or superior to anything that instantiates 
the universal. The second version of realism, moderate 
realism, asserts, as does the first version, the independence 
of universals from mind but asserts that universals exist only 
in things. This version of the doctrine of universals is 
associated historically with Aristotle and is usually called 
the in rebus theory. The difference between these two theories 
is in the locus of the universal; in the first theory the 
universal has an existence independent of the thing and in 
the second it does not. In terms of the earlier discussion 
in this section, realism may be considered as a doctrine which, 
in either of its forms, admits abstract entities as values 
for variables. 
is met 
1The plural of ante rem 
with frequently.---------- is ante ~· 
This latter term 
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Nominalism, the second classical solution to the 
1 problem of universals, traditionally is the assertion that 
universals are only names, flatus vocis. Universals, accord-
ing to nominalism, represent no objective real existents; 
universals are generalizations about existent things. On 
some versions of nominalism, universals are fictions of the 
mind, albeit useful fictions. The phrase traditionally used 
to describe this nominalistic doctrine was to say that univer-
sals were post ~· Viewing nominalism in the manner in 
which it was viewed earlier in this section, nominalism is 
1 There is some terminological confusion which the 
following remarks may serve in part to disentangle. 
Nominalism as the term has traditionally been used has 
two senses, a narrower sense and a wider sense. In the narrow-
er sense, nominalism was a doctrine about universals, viz. the 
doctrine universalia po~t rem. Further, conceptualism-was 
defined as a doctrine o uniVersalia plst rem. It has been 
argued that there were no nominalists n tne-Middle Ages, as 
thus defined. (cr. Aaron, Theory of Universals, p. 20, foot-
note 1 where DeWulf, one of the great historians of the 
philosoph~ of the Middle Ages, is reported as maintaining this 
position.) 
Traditionally, however, nominalism has also been given 
a wider sense as the view that "the ultimate constituents of 
existence are individual entities, and not universals." Hicks, 
Berkeley, p. 20. It is this latter definition that is compar-
able to the definition adopted in this investigation. Trans-
lating this quotation from Hicks into the terminology here 
adopted, one would say that the nominalist refuses to admit 
abstract entities as values of variables. The main advantage 
for the purposes of this investigation of not defining nomin-
alism in this traditional· wider sense is that it permits a 
more precise statement of conceptualism's several versions, 
some of which are nominalistic and some platonistic, by the 
terminology here adopted. The traditional terminology does 
not bring this matter out clearly. 
Further, there seems no reason to construe nominalism 
only as a problem about universals; it may most usefully be 
construed as a problem concerning the ultimate constituents of 
reality, one problem of which is the problem of universals. 
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the doctrine that refuses to admit abstract entities as 
1 
values of variables. The following pairs of statements may 
be taken as illustrating the respective teachings of nominal-
ism and realism in regard to universals. 
(30) some dogs are white. 
The existential generalization of (30) is 
(31) (Ex) (x is a dog & x is white) •2 
The nominalist and realist could agree on the passage from 
(30) to (31) because the value of the variable 'x' in (31) 
is a concrete entity, in this case a dog. Consider next the 
following. 
(32) Socrates has humanity. 
An existential generalization of (32) is 
(33) (Ex) (Socrates has x) •3 
1 In the remarks that follow, a language refusing to 
admit abstract entities as values of variables will be called 
a nominalistic language. A language that does allow abstract 
entities as values of variables will be called a platonistic 
language. It seems desirable to reserve the term 'realism' 
primarily as a description of an ontology and use 'platonietic 
language' when certain problems here discussed are given a 
semantic formulation. 
2 The ampersand in (31) is to be taken as the sign of 
conjunction. The ampersand is chosen for reasons of typo-
graphical convenience, although the dot is perhaps more common 
as the sign of conjunction. 
3The illustration, (32), is not particularly felicit-
ous from the stylistic point of view. It does, however, serve 
to bring out clearly the fact of existential generalization of 
an abstract entity. 
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The realist would allow the passage from (32) to (33) whereas 
the nominalist would not. Such reference to abstract entities 
by means of the medium of the bound variables of quantification 
would be inadmissible according to the nominalist. Hobbes, 
for example, is without question a nominalist. He writes, 
"there being nothing in the world universal but names, for the 
1 things named are every one of them individual and singular." 
Reference to things as "individual and singular" is, of course, 
to call them concrete in the terminology used in this investi-
gation. 
Conceptualism, the third of the traditional solutions 
to the problem of universals, presents greater difficulties in 
definition than either nominalism or realism. This is in part 
a result of the laxity with which the term has been defined 
historically; it is a term that has been used as a name for 
doctrines which actually do not have too much in common. The 
method of exposition best suited to this investigation would 
appear to be to present some versions of conceptualism which 
may be taken as more or less inclusive of what has been meant 
historically by the term. These versions of conceptualism may 
then be related to the terminology thus far adopted. At the 
outset it may be remarked that conceptualism, in whatever 
version it is held, is a compromise between extreme realism 
and nominalism. Conceptualism is a denial of extreme realism 
because it asserts that universals are in some sense mind-
1Hobbes quoted in Aaron, Theory of Universals, p. 20. 
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dependent. It is not nominalism because it refuses to con-
strue generic concepts as names. For the purpose of this 
investigation it may be considered as a doctrine having three 
versions. These may be stated as follows: 
(34) "The generic concept refers to a class of resembl-
ing particulars." 1 
(35) "The object of a concept is a universal essence 
pervading the particulars but having no reality 
apart from them." 2 
( 36) "Concepts refer to abstracta, that is to say, ideal 
objects envisaged by the mind but having no meta-
physical status." 3 
In terms of the notion previously presented, that the differ-
ence between a platonistic language and a nominalistic 
language is a difference as to the admissibility of abstract 
entities as values of variables, (34) and (36) differ. In 
(34) there is a clear reference to classes, and under the 
ordinary interpretations of what it means for a thing to be 
abstract, classes are 
involve a platonistic 
abstract. 
4 language. 
(34) would thus appear to 
This distinction between a 
1 Wood, "Conceptualism," Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. 




4 Reference may be made to the quotation from Quine 
on page 224 of this investigation in which classes are con-
strued as abstract. 
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realistic and nominalistic language, of course, hinges upon 
the definition of the concrete and abstract. Presumably one 
might hold that classes ought not to be considered as 
abstract things, on the ground that classes represent only 
a mental classificatory principle; on this view classes would 
be ideal but not real. A class, on this view, would be the 
name for a collection of particulars taken collectively in an 
act of apprehension. This possible view, however, will not 
be adopted in this investigation, even though it may well 
have been the position that one of the classical British 
empiricists would have taken if he had discussed such a ques-
tion. It will rather be asserted here that insofar as resem-
blance between particulars is taken as a basic and irreducible 
feature of experience, and further that the generic concept 
is taken as referring to such a class of resembling particu-
lars, discourse about such classes is committed to an ontology 
admitting classes and is properly called a platonistic 
language by the criterion of ontological commitment accepted 
in this investigation. 
The definition of conceptualism in (35) and (36}, 
however, may be construed as nominalistic. In (35) and (36) 
there is specific denial of ontological commitment to abstract 
things in the last clause of each definition. Such definitions 
may properly be called nominalistic. 
It can be shown that the classical British empiricists 
rejected extreme realism. It is axiomatic in British empiricism 
235 
that only particulars exist. To try to show this in Locke, 
however, is to be presented with an immediate difficulty. 
Locke, is a subjectivist, i.e. all the mind's knowledge is 
about its own ideas. This being the case, Locke would seem 
to have opposed idea and reality so completely that he must 
in consistency be sceptical concerning knowledge of anything 
beyond the circle of ideas, This is, of course, the case if 
1 Locke is consistent. Locke, nonetheless, faces his difficulty 
in its moat drastic form. He writes: 
The having of the idea of anything in our mind no more 
proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of 
a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions 
of a dream make thereby true history. 2 
So far, however, as Locke is ever explicit on what there is, 
he is a nominalist, as the term has here been defined. In a 
passage introducing one of his several discussions of univer-
sals (generic concepts) Locke writes: "all things that exist 
1 There are other alternatives for Locke. For one thing 
he might have accepted some form of metaphysical idealism, as 
Berkeley did, in which reality was construed as made of the 
same stuff ~a ideas. In knowing ideas, then, the mind would be 
in touch with reality. This, however, Locke never comes near 
to accepting. cr. Aaron's account of the assumption of a 
realism in Locke's account of sensation. Aaron, Locke, pp. 
107-109. (Berkeley may also be classed as a realist, but such 
a classification of Berkeley depends upon some matters of 
definition that have not yet been discussed.) 
2Locke, Esaa~ IV, chap. 11, sec. 1, pp. 325-326. 
Strictly speaking, t re is one idea that, for Locke, would not 
be subject to this opposition between idea ~nd reality, viz. 
the idea of God. Locke accepts a version of the ontological 
argument for the existence of God. This, however, need not be 
considered here. cr. Book IV, chap. 10, sec. 7. Even in this 
Locke decries use of this argument exclusively to prove the 
existence of God. This would seem to indicate that for Locke 
there was some uncertainty about the argument. cr. Gibson, 
Locke's Theory, p. 169 for discussion of this point. 
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,.1 being particulars. • • This passage is an authentic 
nominalism, fu1ly as extreme as Hobbes's nominalism. 
It will be remembered that the versions of concept-
ualism here under consideration may be classified as either 
nominalistic or platonistic. One set by its discourse is 
committed to a platonistic language, and the other set is 
nominalistic. There are two problems that need attention in 
this investigation. In the first place, it is desirable to 
define as clearly as possible Locke's views on generalization 
and abstract ideas. This is necessary because Berkeley, in a 
brilliant and fierce polemic in the "Introduction" to the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, attacks Locke's view. This 
latter document is a primary source of evidence concerning 
imagism in classical British empiricism. In general this 
polemic falls into two parts: one a negative thesis, which is 
a polemic against Locke; and secondly, a positive thesis con-
cerning imagism. The negative thesis, the attack on Locke, 
may well be an attack on doctrines that cannot be said to have 
been held by Locke. This matter cannot be justly assessed 
without a straightforward version of Locke's view at hand. 
Secondly, Locke's views on general ideas i.e. universals, is 
itself imagistic. This is interesting in its own right. With 
this as the framework within which this discussion is to be 
conducted, attention may next be given to Locke's views. 
1 Locke, Eaiay, I~ chap. 3, sec. 1, p. 14. 
phrase is repeate y used by Locke. 
This 
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1 It is customary to call Locke a conceptualist, and 
without doubt this is correct on some of the definitions of 
conceptualist here considered. Attention may be given next 
to texts illustrating conceptualism and imagism. 
Locke writes: 
Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the 
ideas existing in his own mind; which are truly, every 
one of them, particular existences: and our knowledge 
and reason about other things, is only as they corres-
pond with those our particular ideas. So that the per-
ception of the agreement and disagreement of particular 
ideas, is the whole and utmost of all knowledge. 
Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only 
in this, that the particular ideas about which it is 
are such as more than one particular can correspond with 
and be represented by. But the perception of the agree-
ment or disagreement of any two ideas and consequently 
our knowledge, is equally clear and certain, whether 
either, or both, or neither of those ideas be capable of 
representing more real beings than one, or no. 2 
The first sentence reaffirms Locke's subjectivism, and asserts 
in the second clause that the ideas existing in the mind are 
particular existences. Further, in the second sentence know-
ledge is defined; "the perception of the agreement and disagree-
ment of particular ideas, is the whole and utmost of our know-
ledge." Here the objectivity of universals is denied. Locke 
here and elsewhere never really argues against Plato and his 
1Locke is called a conceptualist by G. Dawes Hicks, 
Berkeley (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1932), p. 85. Aaron, 
Theory of Universals, entitles his second chapter "Locke's 
conceptualism, 11 pp. 18-41. Gibson does not C'all Locke a con-
ceptualist, but his remarks warrant the application of the 
term. Cf. Gibson, Locke's Theory, pp. 120-141. 
2 Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 17, sec. 8, p. 404. 
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world of transcendent forms; it is axiomatic in Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume that only particulars exist. This is true 
of ideas, as this passage clearly shows. It is also true of 
reality, but at least in Locke, the matter is more difficult 
to prove because of Locke's subjectivism. Universality, says 
the third sentence, is accidental and consists only in that 
"the particular ideas ••• are such as more than one particu-
lar [thing] can correspond with and be represented by." This, 
however, is not to be construed as nominalism. Locke does not, 
in this passage, identify the universal, i.e. the idea that 
has become the general representative, with a name which is 
ascribed to more than one particular. In the traditional 
terminologies, such an identification is to be looked for if .a 
passage is to be construed as authentically nominalistic, at 
least by the definitions here suggested. Hobbes's position 
may be taken as the standard here; for Hobbes there is nothing 
universal but ideas. The latter leads to a platonistic 
language, the former to a nominalistic language. In the last 
sentence of this passage, knowledge, defined by Locke in his 
official and highly restrictive fashion, is only of the per-
ception of ideas, whether any of these ideas "be capable of 
representing more real beings than one orro." Again Locke 
steers the conceptualist course, avoiding here reference to 
what there is, i.e. to ontology. 
Consider next the following passage in which conceptual-
ism and imagism are both asserted. Since the passage is 
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somewhat lengthy, numbers for purposes of reference will be 
assigned to the five sentences making up the quotation. 
Locke writes: 
(1) The use of words then being to stand as outward marks 
of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from 
particular things, if every particular idea that we take 
in should have a distinct name, names must be endless. 
(2) To prevent this, the mind takes the particular ideas 
received from particular objects to become general; which 
is done by considering them as they are in the mind such 
appearances--separate from all other existences, and the 
circumstances of real existence, as time, place, or any 
other concomitant ideas. (3) This is called Abstraction, 
whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general 
representatives of all of the same kind; and their names 
general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable 
to such abstract ideas. (4) Such precise, naked appear-
ances in the mind, without considering how, whence, or 
with what others they came there, the understanding lays 
up (with names commonly annexed to them) as the standards 
to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with 
these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. (5) 
Thus the same colour being observed today in chalk or 
snow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it con-
siders that appearance alone, makes it a representative 
of all of that kind; and having given it the name white-
ness, it by that sound signifies the same quality where-
soever to be imagined or met with; and thusuniversals, 
whether ideas or terms, are made. 1 
In (1) words are taken to be the signs of ideas. The ideas 
are obtained by abstraction from the particular things. In 
(1) it is also asserted that if every idea did not have a dis-
tinct name, there would be an infinite number of names required. 
The reason given for abstraction is thus economy; without 
names for the particular ideas there would be required an 
infinite number of ideas. This, however, is surely the wrong 
reason to give for the necessity of abstraction, for without 
generic concepts, however they are construed, thought would 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 11, sec. 9, pp. 206-207. 
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be impossible. 
In (2) it becomes clear that by idea in this account 
of abstraction Locke means by idea an idea-image. This is 
indicated by the use of the word •appearance,' frequently 
used by Locke for the term 'image.' Any doubts on this score 
are resolved by the reference in the fourth sentence to "pre-
cise, naked appearances." The latter portion of (2) gives an 
account of abstraction, but it is not necessary to discuss 
this passage; other passages will be considered which deal 
with the matter somewhat more clearly. One thing may, however, 
be noted; in this passage Locke does not identify the universal, 
i.e. the idea that has become the general representative, with 
the name which can be ascribed to more than one particular. 
In other words, in this passage there is no adherence to 
nominalism such as is found in Hobbes in the passage already 
quoted. 1 
In (4) imagism comes out clearly. Images, in (4), 
are said to function as exemplars, "standards to rank real 
existences into sorts."2 To recognize an object, one would 
1 Cf. Aaron, Locke, p. 199. Here Aaron asserts that 
Locke is never a nominalist. Aaron defines nominalism as the 
view that "the universal is the name which can be ascribed to 
more than one particular, and that the concept or general idea 
is unnecessary." Aaron cites several passages from the con-
troversy with Stillingfleet where Locke specifically denies 
nominalism so defined. 
2 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 11, sec. 9, p. 207. 
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compare the object with an idea-image which would presumably 
be carried in the mind as 'an occurrent image. The objection 
to this notion is well put by Price. Recognition, in this 
view, would always require an image, but "the image itself 
would have to be recognized."1 This would lead to an "infin-
ite series of pre-recognitions."2 Such an infinite regress 
is not, of course, ever given in experience; the objection to 
it lies in its falsity to the facts of mental life. Things in 
the world are immediately recognized, straight off, without 
such an appeal to a series of images. Further, it is to be 
noted that this position of Locke's may well be described as 
a polemical version of imagism, since, on this view, images 
would be the primary symbols, at least for recognition, and 
all other symbols would be secondary and derivative. The 
last sentence of this passage, (5), is a forthright statement 
of conceptualism. Locke's example is whiteness, and in this 
passage, the name 'whiteness' is given to a "quality whatso-
ever to be imagined or met with ••• and thus universals ••• 
are made." Paraphrasing this in terms of one of the defini-
tiona previously presented of conceptualism, the third ver-
sion, generic concepts are abstracta, viewed by the mind but 
having no metaphysical status. 
A further point of some importance may be made con-
cerning this passage. There is no necessary incompatibility 
1Price, Thinking and Experience, p. 280. 
2 !E.!2.. ' p • 279 • 
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between imagism and conceptualism. Imagism is a doctrine con-
cerning the mental process. In both versions of imagism, the 
polemical and the constructive, images play a crucial role in 
important thought processes. In the polemical version of 
imagism, they are viewed as the primary symbols which are 
manipulated in thinking, and all other symbols are considered 
secondary or derivative. In the constructive version of 
imagism, images are said to function as general symbols. 
Both of these versions of imagism are present implicitly in 
this passage, the polemical version in (4) and the construc-
tive version in (5). Conceptualism is also upheld. Conceptual-
ism is a doctrine concerned with the referential aspect of 
symbols, whatever these symbols may be. These two doctrines, 
imagism and conceptualism, may be combined as they are in this 
1 passage. Further, the validity of conceptualism and imagism 
do not rise and fall together. Imagism might be right and 
conceptualism wrong or vice versa. 
The process of abstraction, mentioned in comment on 
the last passage quoted, may next be more fully considered. 
Locke offers several accounts of abstraction which it is of 
some interest to compare. The first account that may be con-
sidered is contained in the following passage. Locke writes: 
1some versions of imagism and conceptualism are incom-
patible. It is sometimes asserted that all versions are incom-
patible. cr. Isaiah Berlin who, after summarizing realism, con-
ceptualism, nominalism and imagism, asserts that "each of these 
views contradicts the others • " The Age of Enlightenment, ed. 
Isaiah Berlin (New York: Mentor Book, 1956), p. 84. It is this 
stronger thesis that all versions of conceptualism and imagism 
contradict each other that is here being denied. The matter 
may be left for fuller explication after Berkeley's views on 
abstract general ideas have been considered in the next chapter. 
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The next thing to be considered is how general words 
come to be made. For since all things that exist are 
only particulars, how come we by general terms •••• 
Words become general by being made the signs of general 
ideas: and ideas become general by separating from 
them the circumstances of time and place, and any other 
ideas that may determine them to this or that particular 
existence. By this way of abstraction they are made 
capable of representing more individuals than one; each 
of which, having in it conformity to that abstract idea, 
is (as we call it) of that sort. 1 
Locke is not nominalistic by traditional standards in this 
passage, i.e. the idea is distinguished from the name (word) 
and the universal is an idea not a name. His position, in 
other words, is conceptualistic. Further, in this passage, 
the process of abstraction is described as starting from one 
particular thing. From this one thing, all relations such as 
time and place are abstracted. The end process of abstraction 
would then be a particular quality, say the redness of rose. 
The essential point to be noted about this account of 
abstraction is that the generic concept might be obtained from 
but one particular. 
In the next section, however, a different account of 
abstraction is offered. There Locke writes: 
The ideas of the nurse and mother are well framed in 
their minds; and, like pictures of them there represent 
only those individuals; and the names of nurse and mamma 
the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. 
Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made 
them observe that there are a great many other things in 
the world, that, in some common agreement of shape and 
several other qualities, resemble their father and 
mother ••• they frame an idea which they find those many 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 3, sec. 6, pp. 16-17. 
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particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with 
others, the name man, for example. And thus they come 
to have a general-nime, and a general idea. Wherein 
they make nothing new, but only leave out of the com-
plex idea ••• that which is peculiar to each, and retain 
only what is common to them all. 1 
The first sentence of this passage shows the clarity of Locke's 
own memory images. Galton was afterwards to show that not 
everyone could so imagine a thing not present to sense; this 
is a point not without interest since Locke evidently could, 
and this fact doubtless explains something of his readiness to 
accept imagism. Were one a poor visualizer, for example, the 
first sentence of the quoted passage would make very little 
sense. The later sentences of this passage give the tradi-
tional account of abstraction. The passage may be summarized 
in the phrase that minds "retain only what is common to them 
all." On the view here presented, it takes experience with 
2 
more than one particular for the abstract idea to be formed. 
Locke presents still a third view of the process of 
abstraction in the following passage: 
I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, 
that nature, in the production of things, makes several 
of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially 
in the races of animals and all things propagated by seed. 
1 
Locke, Essay, III, chap. 3, sec. 7, pp. 17-18. 
2 The term 'abstract idea' is at this pointo be con-
sidered a technical term in Locke that has not yet been 
defined. It is only the process of abstraction that has thus 
far been considered. It seems desirable to consider the 
principal passages that throw light on Locke's view before 
attempting summary of Locke's views on abstract ideas. 
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But yet, I think, we may say, the sorting of them under 
names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking 
occasion from the similitude it observest amongst them, 
to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in thel 
mind with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms. 
It would not be proper to say that in this passage Locke has 
forsaken his conceptualism and adopted a thoroughgoing realism, 
but clearly the view here presented is a thoroughgoing modifi-
cation of the views presented in the previous quotations. 
Here reference is made to fundamental divisions in reality 
which the mind discovers or uncovers but does not make. This 
is perhaps odd in one sense, because the phrase "the workman-
ship of the understanding" is frequently quoted as Locke's 
view. The phrase is here used, but it is not this view that 
is usually considered as Locke's official view. As a matter 
of fact the view here presented is not consistent with the 
earlier views, since in the earlier views the mind performed 
an abstractive process of things whereas in this passage the 
mind simply discovers universals pervading things. The view 
here presented is more nearly like the second version of con-
ceptualism, that the generic concept is a universal pervading 
the particulars but having no reality apart from them. 
One further distinction of Locke's needs to be con-
sidered, viz. Locke's distinction between real and nominal 
essence. Some commentators on Locke consider this doctrine 
2 
of fundamental importance in Locke, and no doubt for certain 
1 Locke, Essay, III, chap. 3, sec. 13, p. 23. 
2Aaron, for example, remarks that "there is no more 
important distinction in the Essay than that between real and 
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purposes it is. This investigation, however, need not do more 
than give the distinction a passing word for the sake of 
completeness of exposition of abstract ideas. The doctrine 
is of no interest for Locke's imagism, did not influence 
Berkeley or Hume, and is a dead issue today. The real essence 
is the "real internal ••• constitution of things, whereon 
their discoverable qualities depend."1 Such real essences 
cause different ideas in the mind; the red object causing 
red ideas in the mind, and the green objects causing green 
ideas in the mind, for example. Today one would think in 
terms perhaps of the atomic structure of things as their real 
essences.2 Concerning the real essence, Locke admits that we 
have little knowledge. This could, of course, be in part a 
wise recognition of the undeveloped state of physics. On 
Locke's subjectivist basis, however, he should not even know 
that objects had a real essence. The nominal essence, on the 
other hand, can be thought of as the connotation of a term; it 
is the "abstract idea which the general ••• name stands for."3 
nominal essences." Aaron, Locke, p. 194. This view seems 
hard to justify, since, for one thing, this distinction is 
inconsistent with Locke's subjectivism. If anything is funda-
mental it is Locke's subjectivism in the Essay. 
lLocke, Essay, III, chap. 3, sec. 15, p. 26. 
2In connection with this remark concerning molecular 
or atomic structure Pringle-Pattison makes reference to an 
interesting passage. (Locke, Ehlay, ed. Pringle-Pattison, 
footnote 1, pp. 233-234.) In t s passage Locke refers to 
"microscopical eyes" (Locke, Essay, II, chap. 23, sec. 12) 
which are probably possessed by angels and certainly possessed 
by God. 
3Locke, Essay, II, chap. 3, sec. 15, p. 27. 
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The nominal essence is thus identified with the abstract idea, 
and explication or Locke's view of abstract ideas will suffi-
ciently tell the story of Locke's nominal essences. 
Consideration may next be given to the passage 
Berkeley chooses as the object of his attack in the "Introduc-
tion" to the Principles of Human Knowledge. Locke, in this 
passage, asserts again his view that general ideas come after 
particular ideas. Further, he remarks that such general ideas 
are not formed easily; they are "fictions and contrivances of 
the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so 
easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine."1 As an 
illustration of such an idea, Locke writes: 
For example, does it not require some pains and skill to 
form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none 
of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for 
it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equi-
lateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of 
these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect 
that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several 
different and inconsistent ideas are put together. 2 
The purpose of comment upon this passage is to suggest that 
Berkeley does not offer wrutwouldappear to be one acceptable 
1Locke, Essay, IV, chap. 7, sec. 9, p. 274. The para-
graphs devoted to discussion of this passage are indebted to 
Aaron, Locke, pp. 195-197. Aaron, however, does not sufficiently 
stress what would appear crucial in understanding this passage, 
viz. that Locke here clearly has a concrete imagery in mind when 
referring to the difficulty of framing such an abstract idea. 
2Ibid. The passage appears in the first three editions 
unchanged:--!n the fourth edition the phrase 'general idea' is 
italicized in the fourth edition. Cf. Aaron, Locke, p. 195, 
footnote 1. 
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interpretation of this passage, namely an interpretation which 
would tend to take the sting from Berkeley's classic remarks 
about this passage. This is not to suggest that Locke's 
account of abstraction is not without difficulties. It is not 
the purpose to consider Berkeley's constructive views on uni-
versals, but only to consider his negative thesis, so far as 
this passage purports to have a tendency to establish this 
negative thesis. Berkeley's interpretation of this passage 
depends for its effect upon interpreting Locke as maintaining 
that the general idea of a triangle is a complex idea composed 
of contradictory simple ideas. Berkeley maintains that this 
is both absurd and impossible, and as a result rejects Locke's 
theory of general ideas in its totality. It may be readily 
granted that Locke's language is inexact here and elsewhere, 
but this is not to the point. Confining attention to this 
passage, Locke may be interpreted to mean that we do not put 
"inconsistent ideas" together but only that "some parts of 
several different and inconsistent ideas are put together." 
As Aaron points out, the parts that are put together to form 
the general idea may themselves be consistent. Berkeley, in 
quoting this passage from Locke, puts the words 'all the none' 
1 
and 'inconsistent' in italics, although in none of the four 
editions of Locke's Essay written and edited in his life are 
1Berkeley, Works, II, "Introduction" to Principles, 
sec • 13 , p. 32 • 
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these words so italicized.1 The words, however, in Locke's 
passage which need to be italicized, if any, if Locke is to 
be given a fair run for his money, are the words •some parts 
of. 1 
It may be assumed that hereafter the young Berkeley, 
a polemicist, did not do justice to Locke in commenting upon 
this passage. The necessity remains of summarizing Locke's 
views. This will be of help in considering Berkeley's pole-
mic in detail in the next chapter. 
Locke's first view of abstraction is that the abstract 
general idea is simply the idea of one particular member of 
class, and the abstract idea is used as the general represen-
tative of the whole class. Locke writes, "Ideas taken from 
particular beings become general representatives of all of 
the same kind."2 There is a difficulty with this theory, at 
least as it stands in Locke, viz. that the account "presupposes 
that we already know the •sort• of which the particular ideas 
are instances."3 This, however, is just what a theory of 
1Actually there is nothing particularly novel in in-
terpreting Berkeley's polemic in this way. The novelty lies 
in Aaron's textual reference, viz. that Berkeley tinkers with 
Locke's text in quoting this passage. Fraser in his footnote 
to the passage in Locke, Hicks (Berkeley, p. 90) and others , 
have pointed out that Berkeley uses the passage for piemical 





II, chap. 11, sec. 9, p. 207. 
3Aaron, Locke, p. 198. 
(Italics 
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universals or generic concepts should inform about--how it is 
determined what particulars are represented by the one parti-
cular that stands as the generic concept. This, roughly 
speaking, is Berkeley's theory. 
Secondly, Locke holds that the generic concept is a 
concrete image recalled in memory, i.e. a memory image. This 
theory is imagism on its polemical side. According to this 
theory, universals or generic concepts are, in Locke's words, 
"the precise naked appearances in the mind ••• the understand-
ing lays up ••• as the standards to rank real existences into 
sorts."1 As will be pointed out in the appropriate place, 
Berkeley also holds a theory of this sort, but it can hardly 
be held to be his official view. This view, is of course, of 
prime importance in classifying classical British empiricists 
as imagists, or at least in demonstrating that imagism is an 
2 important strand in their thinking. Locke, however, by the 
logic of his position is not required to hold this view, 
since he defines 'idea' broadly to include "whatsoever is 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 11, sec. 9, p. 207. 
2Aaron identifies three views in Locke, He does not 
consider the view here called an imagist view to be a separate 
and distinct view. This would, however, appear seriously to 
underplay the importance of imagery in Locke's thinking. It 
is to be noted that although this doctrine is stressed in Locke, 
it is not here held that this is »coke's official or strongest 
view. That there is, however, an underlying drive towards 
imagism in Locke's position is maintained. This latent imagism 
becomes explicit in this passage. The account of Locke's 
imagism in the next section will clarify this matter. The 
point to be noted here is that this passage should not be 
interpreted as a chance passage culled from the text to sup-
port the contention that it is worthwhile to consider Locke 
an imagist; the passage is a logical consequence of Locke's 
view as may be seen when the far-reaching extent that images 
play in his conception of the mind is demonstrated. 
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1 
the object of the understanding when a man thinks." There 
is thus nothing in Locke's view which requires him to identi-
fy 1 idea• and •concrete image• or what has here been called 
1 idea-image. 1 
Locke's third view is that the abstract general idea 
is formed by leaving out of the general abstract idea all of 
the ideas of characteristics of the members of the class in 
which they differ, This third view follows from Locke's 
account of the process of abstraction. Locke says: "Ideas 
become general by separating them from the circumstances of 
time and place, and any other ideas that may determine them 
to this or that particular existence."2 By such a process of 
abstraction, the generic concept is formed and this generic 
concept is "capable of representing more individuals than one; 
each of which, having in it a conformity to that abstract 
idea, is ... of that sort.'.3 This Berkeley attacks on the 
ground that no idea could be formed in this way. 
In the fourth place, Locke offers a view of the 
abstract general idea based upon the notion that but one 
particular is required to form an abstract general idea. Such 
an abstract general idea is "formed by conflating ideas of all 
1Locke, Essay, intro., sec. 8, p. 32. 
2 Ibid., II, chap. 3, sec. 6, pp. 16-17. 
3 ~.,III, chap. 3, sec. 6, p. 17. 
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the properties possessed by any member of the class."1 This 
conflation is expressed by Locke in the following way: 
When time and a larger acquaintance has made them 
observe that there are a great many other things in 
the world that do resemble their father and mother ••• 
they frame an idea which they find those many parti-
culars do partake in. 2 
This view would seem to transform the particular by a mental 
process into a universal. This view may be likened to White-
head's view of eternal objects, i.e. universals or qualitative 
characteristics which limit and determine reality. The par-
ticular, on this view, would seem to be a universal essence 
which serves to produce the abstract general idea in a single 
presentation. This view would seem to be aberrant in Locke 
so far as it is inconsistent with his subjectivism. Locke's 
official view would seem to be that more than one particular 
is required for abstraction to occur. Both this view and the 
previous view are commonly thought to suffer from a limita-
tion of the empirical method in general. On the view of 
abstraction that is here offered, many particulars are said 
to possess qualities. Complete induction, however, is always 
impossible. The next particular examined may not possess the 
quality in question, and as a result there always remains 
uncertainty that the particular examined is true to type. 
This argument, however, is not as strong as would appear--at 
1 Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, p. 84. 
2 
Locke, Essay, III, chap. 3, sec. 7, p. 17. 
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least as an objection to Locke. One has but to forego the 
quest for certainty; Locke's scepticism, a matter already 
commented upon, does not require him to seek nor does he 
maintain that empirical knowledge of existents is possible. 
Locke would surely say, in at least one of his moments, that 
our certainty is sufficient to our station. As a matter of 
fact, this would appear to be where the strength of the con-
ceptualist lies, viz. in the suggestion that the generic con-
cept, however. it is construed, is in some sense mind-made. 
Lastly, there is a fifth possible view of abstraction 
suggested in the Essay, a view which asserts that the generic 
concept is a meaning. It is neither a particular idea nor 
any part of a particular idea. As Aaron puts it, "it is a 
character or a group of characters shared by particulars of 
the same sort. This character {or these characters) frames 
1 (or frame) the •essence' of the sort." This theory, thus, 
is based upon Locke's doctrine of real and nominal essences. 
This account of abstraction is based upon "similitude observst 
amongst things."2 The generic concept, thus, on this view, 
is "•essence' of a sort of species, and in its light we 
recognize to what species any particular belongs."3 This 
1Aaron, Locke, p. 201. 
2Locke, Essay, III, chap. 3, sec. 13, p. 23. 
3Aaron, Locke, p. 201. Aaron finds this the most 
significant version of universals or generic concepts to be 
found in the Essay. It is not so considered here. Aaron's 
interpretation requires a good deal of construction to be 
made. No clear text seems to be forthcoming that asserts 
this theory, although there would appear to be clear adumbra-
tions of this theory. 
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last theory, although interesting, for reasons already sug-
gested in commenting upon the doctrine of real and nominal 
essences, is of no particular importance for this investiga-
tion. 
The final point that needs to be discussed in this 
section is the definition of the abstract idea. The abstract 
idea is the end-product of the process of abstraction, It is 
arrived at by the subtraction of qualities that characterize 
only some of the particulars in a class. Locke's abstract 
idea may be termed a concept, correctly enough, if the pro-
viso is added that the abstract idea is thus to be contrasted 
with the concrete image. It is required of an idea, for it 
to be called an abstract idea, that other existents or parti-
culars, when found, agree in possessing those attributes of 
the particular that are in common with the particulars of the 
class already examined. In Locke's terminology the abstract 
idea is best called an abstract general idea. In the voca-
bulary of contemporary psychology, these phenomena are best 
called generalized images. Neither Locke's account nor 
Berkeley's account is without ambiguity. The primary reason 
for this ambiguity may be traced to their method of definition. 
Such abstract ideas in classical British empiricism had to be 
framed. The very word 'framed' prejudges the issue in favor 
of imagery. Now Locke asserted that such abstract ideas 
could be framed, and Berkeley and Hume' denied it, although 
not for the same reasons. The traditional query as to whether 
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such ideas could be framed, expected an answer in terms of 
sensory and imaginal descriptions. This, of course, is to 
misconceive the problem. It is easy to see this after the 
work of the Wurzburg school. Granting that such generalized 
images do occur, and the evidence that they do will later be 
presented, how, it may be asked at this point, are they to 
be defined? Properly speaking, phenomena are to be defined 
in terms of "empirical evidence of functional similarities."1 
They are, in other words, to be described in terms of func-
tional relations with the rest of experience, i.e. by what 
they do and not by what they are in terms of qualitative 
characteristics. This standpoint gives one a vantage point 
to view the controversy in Locke, Berkeley and Hume over the 
status or possibility of such abstract ideas. It further 
permits the introduction in appropriate places of experimental 
evidence which will help in the assessment of the problem. 
Classical British empiricism made some instructive mistakes 
and the family quarrel over abstract general ideas was one of 
them. 
1 
For an excellent account of the change in the defin-
ition of psychological terms from qualitative states of con-
sciousness to definition in terms of functional relation, see 
Robert Leeper, "Cognitive Processes," Handbook of Exlerimental 
Pslchology, ed. Stevens, pp. 730-736. "useful defin tiorB," 
wr tes Leeper on page 730, "are those which enable us to 
classify phenomena on the basis of empirical evidence of func-
tional similarities." 
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5. Locke's Implicit Imagism 
Earlier sections of this chapter were devoted, in 
part, to assessing the role of imagery in Locke's explicitly 
held philosophy. It was there suggested that certain argu-
ments for empiricis~held in this investigation to be Locke's 
most important and characteristic doctrine, were dependent 
upon certain implicitly held views as to the importance of 
images in mental life. There is in Locke a latent imagism 
which became explicit in one passage commented upon, viz. a 
passage dealing with abstraction in which images were said to 
function as exemplars, i.e. "as the standards to rank real 
existences into sorts."1 The passages thus far commented 
upon, connected either with Locke's arguments for empiricism, 
or his views on abstract ideas, do not exhaust the interesting 
and important ways in which images play a role in Locke's 
philosophy. To consideration of some other ways in which 
imagery plays a part in Locke's thought, attention may next 
be given. 
The passages to be commented upon next do not illus-
trate the polemical version of imagism, but rather the con-
structive version, viz. that images play an important and 
frequently neglected role in thinking. Locke is not, of 
course, to be construed as defending this theory, but rather 
is to be viewed as an illustration of the theory: images do 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 11, sec. 9, p. 207. 
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play an important and frequently neglected role in his thought. 
Both he and his commentators have frequently failed to realize 
just how important was the part of imagery in his thinking. 
1 The role of imagery is so basic, particularly visual imagery, 
that Locke himself never realizes its importance in 




1 The fact that Locke has been called a visualizer was 
alluded to earlier. The point may receive attention at this 
point. The term 'visualizer' is defined today as "an indivi-
dual whose imagery is predominantly visual." (Drever, Diction-
ary of Ps{chologf, p. 307.) In this sense of the term it can 
be~emona rated hat Locke uses visual imagery to a marked 
degree; so marked, in fact, is his use of visual imagery that 
it would appear desirable to so classify him so far as it is 
safe to apply the term on the basis on analysis of the text of 
the Essay. Were Locke alive, testa could be given which would 
put the matter beyond doubt. The difficulty in analyzing the 
text of the Esaaimis that it is not always clear whether Locke 
is using verbal agery or visual imagery. It would appear in 
moat cases, and only cases in which it is apparent that visual 
imagery is involved will be cited here, that Locke intends a 
visual image. The contemporary term 'visualizer' is intended, 
however, to differentiate an individual who uses visual imagery 
from one who uses verbal imagery predominantly. In the absence 
of testa such a classification may be somewhat doubtful. (The 
same methodological difficulty pervades discussions of the 
intelligence of great men of the past.) The evidence for call-
ing Locke a visualizer is baaed upon his writings, whereas the 
evidence used to classify an individual as a visualizer today 
is based upon teats. The type of evidence is different, but 
the same term is applied. It is beat, as a result, to guard 
the usage of the term by applying the proviso that he is a 
visualizer in the sense that visual imagery predominates and 
is crucial in the Essay. 
2 The notion of treating Locke in this fashion was sug-
gested by Alexander Fraser's article "Visualization as a chief 
source of the psychology of Hobbes, Locke( Berkeley, and Hume," 
American Journal of Patchology, IV, (1891}, pp. 230-247. Moat 
of the passages here c ted are quoted by Fraser, although not 
with the same emphasis. Fraser treats Locke as a visualizer in 
a sense that implies acceptance of the theory of imaginal 
types. The difference between his account and the remarks 
here result from the denial made here of the suppositions of 
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Detailed comment on these passages does not seem called for; 
it is sufficient to indicate imagistic tendencies by italiciz-
ing those words and phrases which show it.1 
Consider the analogy of the dark room used by Locke 
to explain the manner in which sensation and reflection func-
tion as passages to let in light to the understanding. Locke 
writes: 
These alone ••• are the windows by which light is let in-
to this dark room. For methinks, the understanding is not 
much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only 
some little openings left, to let in external visible re-
semblances, or ideas of things without; would the tlctures 
coming Into such a dark room but stay there, and 1 e so 
orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much 
resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all 
objects of sight, and the ideas of them. 2 
Here, as elsewhere, Locke does not state the importance of 
visual imagery, but nonetheless it is apparent in this passage. 
Locke, in discussing the various degrees of attention 
possible within the field of consciousness, writes: 
this theory. Fraser, for example, writes: 
"Different types of individuals think in different thought-
languages and each ••• thought-language is made up from 
various different sources, but has one dominant characteris-
tic foundation. In one type the characteristic thought-
stuff mar, be visual, in another auditory, in another motor." 
Fraser, 'Visualization," Journ. Psych., p. 230. 
That this is the case is at best conjectural. Typologies of 
any sort, whether mental or physical typologies, suffer from 
the serious systematic methodological defect that most indi-
viduals do not fit any one type, i.e., they are not pure types. 
1 Words italicized and capitalized in the original will 
be so indicated in footnote citations. 
2 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 11, sec. 21, pp. 211-212. 
"Dark-room" italicized in original. 
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Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness 
on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their 
ideas on all sides; marks their relations and circumstan-
ces; and views every part so nicelt and with such inten-
tion, that it shuts out all other houghts, and takes no 
notice of the ordinary impressions made then on the 
senses, which at another season would produce very sensi-
ble perceptions: at other times it barely observes the 
train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without 
directing and pursuing any of them: and at other times 
it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint 
shadows that make no impression. 1 
It is to be noted that each degree of attention differentiated 
in this passage is clearly an image. Further the imagery here 
is visual imagery throughout. 
In discussing memory Locke again and again reverts to 
visual imagery to explain his point. Ideas are "dormant pic-
tures."2 In time they come to be "laid out of sight,"3 but 
the mind can "paint them anew on itself."4 In one of Locke's 
rarer moments of imaginative sensibility, he writes: 
Thus the ideas, as well as children, of our youth, often 
die before us: and our minds represent to us those tombs 
to which we are approaching; where, though, the brass and 
marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, 
and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our 
minds are laid in fading colours; and if not sometimes 
refreshed, vanish and disappear. 5 
1Locke, Essay, II, chap. 19, sec. 3, pp. 299-300. 
2 ~·· chap. 10, sec. 7, p. 197. 
3Ibid., sec. 2, p. 194. 
4Ibid. 
5 Ibid. , sec • 5, p. 196. 
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Locke's conception of memory may well be criticized for avoid-
ing most of the traditional problems connected with memory, 
1 
e.g. how in memory does the mind retain what is retained? 
One thing it does make clear, however: the vital role that 
images play in memory and thought. Memory is the manipula-
tion of images, and without memory thought would be difficult 
if not impossible. This position, taken for granted by Locke, 
makes imagery of crucial importance in Locke's view of think-
ing. In an interesting passage comparing the imagery of man 
with angels Locke writes "the several degrees of angels may 
probably have larger views; and some of them be endowed with 
capacities able to retain together and set before them, as in 
one picture, all their past knowledge at once." 2 Memory and 
imagination are contrasted in the foDowing passage: 
Memory is always the picture of somethinf, the idea 
whereof has existed before In our though s, as near 
the life as we can draw it; but imagination is a 
picture drawn in our minds without reference to a 
pattern. 3 
1Locke likens the memory to a storehouse. This is 
the traditional view. Almost all the commentators remark that 
his treatment is slight. For one such statement, see Aaron, 
Locke, pp. 136ff. 
2Locke, ~ss~*' II, chap. 10, sec. 10, p. 200. (Italics 
not in original. is view is not original with Locke. 
Throughout the tradition it was held that contemplative know-
ledge was of this sort. God 1 s specious present was magnified 
infinitely so that time past, present, and future were seen in 
one act of apprehension. This contrast of contempEtive and 
discursive reasoning, however, with Locke takes an imagist 
turn. 
3Locke 1s Journal quoted in Aaron, Locke, pp. 138-139. 
No italics in original. 
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Locke continues, according to Aaron, to distinguish between 
imagining and remembering by the fact that imaginations are 
hallucinatory and the madman does not know it. This notion 
of the close relation between imagination and madness is at 
least as old as Plato, and is still a theme in contemporary 
psychiatry where the maniac is often described as going in-
to his mind and not out of it. 
Another imagist distinction in Locke, already sug-
gested but not fully developed, is that between the clear 
and obscure ideas. At the outset it is desirable to make 
the point that clarity and distinctness in Locke do not 
mean the same as in Descartes. For Descartes clearness and 
distinctness in ideas is the ultimate test for truth. 1 In 
Locke, however, the doctrine of clear and obscure ideas is 
a question considered in abstraction from a consideration of 
questions of truth and knowledge.2 Locke discusses clear 
1Descartes' doctrine of clear and distinct ideas is 
treated in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the 
Discourse on Method. A clear and distinct idea Is called by 
Descartes Intuition and is defined in the Rules as "the con-
ception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives so readily 
and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt." Rene 
Descartes, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind," Philosophi-
cal Works of Descartes, tr. E. s. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (2 vola.; Dover Publications, Inc., 1955), I, p. 7. In the 
Discourse the famous criterion, the first and fundamental 
principle of Descartes' philosophy, is given as follows: 
"to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly 
recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid 
precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and to accept 
in them nothing more than was presented to my mind so 
clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion to 
doubt it." Philosophical Works, I, p. 92. 
Both these passages show this criterion as a criterion for the 
test of truth. 
2 Locke owes more in immediate debt to Gassendi than 
and obscure ideas in the following passage: 
The perceptions of the mind being most aptly explained 
by words relating to sight, we shall best understand 
what is meant by clear and obscure in our ideas, by re-
flecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects 
of sight. • •• Our simple ideas are clear, when they are 
such as the objects themselves from whence they were 
taken did or might, in a well-ordered sensation or per-
ception, present them. Whilst the memory retains them 
thus, and can produce them to the mind whenever it has 
occasion to consider them, they are clear ideas. So far 
as they either want anything of their original exactness, 
or have lost any of their first freshness, and are, as 
it were, faded or tarnished by time, so far they are 
obscure. 1 
The first sentence of this quoted passage makes the point 
that mental perceptions are most "aptly explained by words 
relating to sight." This, of course, is true only if one 
tends toward visual imagery. It would certainly not be true 
of an audile.2 Further, whenever Locke speaks of memory, as 
Descartes; in the quarrel between the Gassendists and the 
Cartesians, Locke takes the side of the Gassendists. Cf. 
Aaron, Locke, pp. 3lff. In a broad sense, Locke is a follower 
of Descartes, as have been almost all classic-al-modern philo-
sophers. All classical modern philosophy has been philosophy 
based upon the logic of the incorrigible premise, i.e. the 
starting poing for philosophy must be something, according to 
this doctrine, that is sure, immediate, and indubitable. 
Both Descartes and Locke find this certitude in the facts of 
consciousness. 
l Locke, Essay, II, chap. 29, sec. 2, P~· 486-487. ('Clear' and 'obscure' italicized in original.} The only 
other passage of any importance in which Locke discusses the 
'clear' and 'obscure ideas' is in his introduction to the 
Essay, p. 22. There Locke specifically discusses his dislike 
of the terms 'clear and distinct' although he does not make 
reference to Descartes. The phrase is common in the period, 
but it is of capital importance in Descartes and Locke knew 
this. Cf. Gibson, Locke's Theory, pp. 205-232 for the rela-
tion of Locke to Descartes. 
2The terms •audile' and 'visile' are used occasion-
ally. Cf. Drever, Dictionary of Psychology, where both terms 
are defined. 
he does in the last two sentences of this passage, the possi-
bility is usually great that Locke is referring to an idea-
image. There is little doubt that this is the case in this 
passage. Notice the phrases 'original exactness,' 'first 
freshness,' and 'faded and tarnished'; all are phrases 
appropriately used only of idea-images. 
Consider next Locke's account of the passivity of the 
mind in its reception of simple ideas. Locke writes: 
No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he 
thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, 
the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter 
when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new 
ones itself, than a m~rror can refuse, alter, obli~erate 
the images or ideas which the objects set before it do 
therein produce. 1 
Again the reference to vision is made. There would appear to 
be a slip in this passage, for Locke here identifies a reflec-
tion in a mirror with an idea. Even in Locke's extended sense 
of the term 'idea' the reflection is only an idea so far as it 
is an object of the mind. Be this as it may, the idea and 
the image are assimilated in this passage, and again the 
importance of imagery comes to the fore. 
There is no need to multiply further passages of this 
sort. In each case the fundamental point is the same. Locke 
2 tends, in the first place, to think in terms of visual imagery. 
1 Locke, Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 25, pp. 14~-143. 
2There would appear to be one interesting and important 
exception to this statement. Locke makes frequent reference to 
the pineapple; he invokes, in other words, gustatory imagery. 
The pineapple was a delicacy in Locke's day, and it was Locke's 
favorite fruit. One pineapple passage is the following: 
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Secondly, such imagery is not of secondary and derivative 
importance, but is primary to his point of view. In sum, the 
passages just cited illustrate the constructive thesis of 
imagism, that images play a fundamental and frequently neg-
lected role in thinking. It is n~to the point to assert 
that imaginal thinking is unnecessary or that it may be dis-
pensed with. Even if this is granted, as it may be if the 
significance of its dispensability is correctly understood, 
it remains true that Locke constantly tended to think in terms 
of visual imagery. Further, such instances are not isolated 
nor unimportant, but refer to fundamental and critical argu-
ments. This is the case both for the passages earlier dis-
cussed in which Locke is engaged in a defense of his empiri-
cism, and in the passages just cited dealing with the under-
standing, with attention, with consciousness, and finally 
with memory • 
"but yet I think it will be granted easily, that if a 
child were kept in a place where he never saw any other 
but black and white till he were a man, he would have no 
more ideas of scarlet and green, than he that from his 
childhood never tasted an oyster or a pineapple has of 
those particular relishes." Essay, II, chap. 1, sec. 6, 
p. 126. 
In this passage, and others like it, visual imagery is consid-
ered less certain than gustatory imagery. This is unusual since 
for most individuals if there is a question of the greater cer-
titude of the deliverances of two senses, it is touch that is ~ 
considered most certain. Presumably this is because both sight 
and hearing are distance receptors whereas touch is not; one is 
in immediate contact with the cognoscendum. Further, there is 
reason to believe that touch is older in evolutionary develop-
ment than the other senses. Other senses probably developed 
from touch, which would appear to give touch a primacy. Locke 
in this passage, however, takes taste to be more certain. Here, 
of course, the major problem is not one of the heterogeneity of 
the deliverances of the senses, as the previous discussion would 
indicate, but rather the question of the educibility of a corre-
late that has never been experienced. This latter problem is 
made famous by Hume's missing shade of blue, and discussion of 




BERKELEY 1 S IMAGISM 
Introduction 
Berkeley's central and characteristic doctrine is 
immaterialism, i.e. the doctrine that nothing in the uni-
verse exists except minds and ideas. This doctrine Berkeley 
maintains from his earliest philosophical writings to his 
last.1 This doctrine will form the guiding principle for 
1There are differences of interpretation of Berkeley 
that are of some consequence to this investigation. Tradi-
tional interpretations have tended to find two Berkeleys: an 
early Berkeley of the Princi~les, and a later Berkeley, the 
Bishop, who rejected in the Iris and other late works the 
doctrines of his youth. The early Berkeley, according to 
this interpretation, was an inconsistent solipsist, i.e. 
Berkeley's system is logically solipsistic, but God is intro-
duced as an unsubstantiated postulate, a deus ex machina, to 
evade this solipsism. The later Berkeley:-the~ishop, accord-
ing to this interpretation retracted the early doctrines 
which led to solipsism and became a Platonist. This interpre-
tation seems to have been discredited as a result of the 
researches of Luce and others. Cf. A. A. Luce, Berkeley and 
Malebranche (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), passim, 
especially chaps. 7 and 8. According to the interpretation 
of Berkeley followed here, there is but one Berkeley and his 
central doctrine is immaterialism. The matter of interpreta-
tion becomes crucial for this investigation at one point. It 
will be asserted here that imagism in Berkeley is to be under-
stood through consideration of his polemic against abstract 
ideas. According to the traditional doctrine, Berkeley 
retracted his doctrine of abstract ideas. With such are-
traction there would follow a diminution of the importance of 
imagist doctrines. Thus there would be an early imagist 
Berkeley and a later platonistic Berkeley who was not an 
imagist. The fact is, however, that Berkeley never retracted 
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the organization of this chapter. The doctrine will not, 
however, be expounded for its own sake, but will be examined 
for the degree to which imagism enters into the arguments in 
defense of this doctrine. The main text for Berkeley's 
immaterialism is the Principles, and it is this work which 
is of greatest importance for this investigation, although 
nearly all of Berkeley's other works will be considered in 
the course of the chapter. 
The term 'idea' is critical in Berkeley, as it was 
in Locke, and requires preliminary exposition at the outset. 
Berkeley both uses the term in a narrower sense and means 
something different by it than Locke did. Berkeley's offi-
cial definition of the term occurs in the first sentence of 
the Principles proper.1 Berkeley writes: 
his immaterialism, nor did he retract his polemic against 
abstract ideas. It would not, however, advance the argument 
of this chapter appreciably to analyze fully this question. 
The evidence for the modern interpretation and critical com-
ment concerning the traditional interpretation is well 
summarized in John o. Wisdom, The Unconscious Ori~in of 
Berkeley's Philf:mi~ (London: Hogarth Press, 19 3), pp. 41-55. 4faking erialism as Berkeley's central tenet, 
Wisdom resolves the questions of retraction, change, or 
development in one sentence. He writes: 
"In the days of Siris Berkeley retained intellectual 
acceptance of his early Immaterialism without the emo-
tions that brought it to birth; Immaterialism, which had 
been a living faith to him and entered the very 'fabric 
of his mind, 1 was now but a dogma." ~., p. 54. 
1 Footnote 
Geor e Berkele 
essop 
19 ). In this edition several of Berkeley's works, in most 
cases, are bound within a single volume. In order to indicate 
It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the 
objects of knowledge, that they are either ideas 
actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are 
perceived by attending to the passions of the mind, or 
lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, 
either compounding, dividing, or barely representing 
those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. 1 
Berkeley recognizes in this passage two classes of ideas: 
ideas of sense and ideas of imagination; to this degree 
Berkeley's usage is narrower than Locke's. According to 
traditional interpretations, Berkeley recognized a third 
class of ideas, in which the word 'ideas' was supplied after 
the word 1such 1 in this passage, corresponding to Locke's 
ideas of reflection, viz. a class of ideas perceived by 
"attending to the passions of the mind." Although Berkeley 
2 is probably intentionally vague at this point, the most 
cogent argument for accepting only two classes of ideas is 
that there is no place in Berkeley's system for ideas of the 
the particular work of Berkeley's which is cited, the work 
will be indicated in the body of the text. (The reference 
in the body of the text will also include, where it forms 
a part of the text, reference to paragraph numbers. In 
most cases such reference to paaagraph numbers will serve 
as a concordance to other editions of Berkeley's writings.) 
In the case of the Principles, it is necessary to indicate 
further whether or not a quotation is from the "Introduction" 
to the Principles or to the Principles proper, since these 
are separately numbered by paragraph. 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 41. 
2The usual reason given for Berkeley's intentional 
vagueness is that he did not want at the outset to give his 
full quota of reasons for not accepting the Lockean doctrine 
of ideas of reflection. Cf. Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, 
(London: Thos. Nelson Sons Ltd., 1945), pp. 39-40. A full 
account of this interpretation, basing it upon grammatical as 
well as philosophical grounds, may be found in Johnston, 
Development of Berkeley's Philosophy, pp. 143-145. 
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operations of the mind, i.e. one does not have ideas con-
1 
cerning mind and its operations; one has only notions. To 
interpret Berkeley as recognizing three classes of ideas at 
the outset would be to accuse him of a major blunder in the 
first sentence of his ~rinciples. Such an interpretation is 
not necessary. 
In the remainder of section one of the Principles, 
Berkeley considers the various sense modalities and, one by 
one, directly or indirectly, describes the objects of these 
senses as ideas. It is in this regard that Berkeley's term 
'idea• means something quite different from Locke's. Locke 
held to subjectivism, the doctrine that the mind knows only 
its own ideas. Subjectivism is a representative theory of 
perception; the ideas represent to the mind sensible things. 
For Berkeley, however, the perceived objects are ideas. His 
doctrine of perception is presentative and not representa-
tive. The deliverances of the senses are observed to 
"accompany each other" and, therefore, "come to the sense 
marked by one name. 112 Thus, writes Berkeley: 
••• a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consis-
tence having been observed to go together, are accounted 
1so far as it is necessary to deal with Berkeley's 
doctrine of notions in this investigation, it will be com-
mented upon below. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, p. ~1. This passage should per-
haps be read with its parallel passage in the Three Dialofues: 
"A cherry ••• is nothing but a congeries of sensible mpres-
sions, or ideas perceived by the various senses; which 
ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given 
them) by the mind; because they are observed to attend 
each other." Berkeley, Works, II, p. 249. 
one distinct thing, signified by the name afple. Other 
collections of ideas constitute a stone, aree, a book 
and the like sensible things; which as they are pleas-
ing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 1 
The important phrase in this passage is 11 collection of ideas. 11 
No doubt the phrase seems strange to contemporary ears, but no 
objection can be raised unless Berkeley draws his conclusions 
from the phrase itself. Some of its strangeness may be removed 
by the following considerations. The term •collection of ideas' 
is approximately the equivalent of the term •set of sense-
data'; the things designated by both expressions are collec-
tions of sensory qualities. It is desirable, however, to 
preserve as nearly as possible Berkeley's usage. Towards 
that end the following terminology may be introduced. As can 
be seen from the foregoing quotations, the redness of cherry 
is an idea and so is the cherry itself. It is desirable to 
mark this distinction between two types of ideas.2 To desig-
nate a single sensory quality the term 'sensory-idea• will be 
used; a collection of sensory qualities, i.e. Berkeley's 
'collection of ideas,' will be called a 'thing-idea.• 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 41. 
2This terminology follows Wisdom, Berkele{'s Philoso-
~. p. 7. The terms •sense datum• and •sense-da a 1 could be 
used, but there is considerable difference over the usage of 
these terms (or even if they are meaningful at all). There is 
no need to import contemporary quarrels into Berkeley, since 
it can be avoided by this terminology. 
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Consider next Berkeley's doctrine of the mind, the 
second unexplicated term of the doctrine of immaterialism. 
In section two of the Principles, Berkeley writes: 
But besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects 
of understanding, there is likewise something which knows 
or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as 
willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiv-
ing, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or 
y self. By which words I do not denote any oneof my 
Laeas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein 
they exist. 1 
The self or mind is, in Berkeley's phrase, 11 entirely distinct 11 
from ideas. This passage may profitably be compared with 
Berkeley's remarks in section twenty-seven of the Principles 
where he writes: 
••• So far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, 
do not stand for different ideas, or-In trufn, for any 
ideas at all, but for something which is very different 
from ideas, and which being an agent cannot be like 
unto, or be represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though 
it must be owned at the same time, that we have some 
notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, 
such as willing, loving, hating, in as much as we know 
or understand the meaning of these words. 2 
The reference to notions in this passage needs to be compared 
with other passages in the Principles for a fuller grasp of 
an essential point in Berkeley's philosophy. According to 
Berkeley in this passage and elsewhere, self-knowledge, know-
ledge of other finite minds and knowledge of God, i.e. 
1Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 41-42. It should be noted 
that in this passage and elsewhere the terms mind, spirit, 
self, soul are synonymous. 
2Ibid., pp. 52-53. The last two passages quoted pro-
vide the conclusive evidence philosophically, as compared with 
grammatical exegesis, that Berkeley does not recognize a class 
of ideas concerned with the operations of the mind. 
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knowledge of spirits, is different from knowledge by ideas; 
to mark this difference 
describing knowledge of 
Berkeley uses the term •notion' in 
1 
spirits. Berkeley develops the 
difference between the notion and the idea in section 142. 
He writes: 
••• It is I suppose plain, that our souls are not to 
be known in the same manner as senseless inactive ob-jects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things 
so wholly different, that when we say they exist, the* 
are known, or the like, these words must not be thoug t 
to signify anything common to both natures. 2 
How, then, granting that knowledge of spirits occurs, and 
granting further that such knowledge is not by way of ideas, 
does knowledge of spirits occur? Such knowledge for Berkeley 
is by way of inference and analogy. In section 145 of the 
Principles, Berkeley gives a prime text for the interpreta-
tion of the doctrine. There he writes: 
••• We cannot know the existence of other spirits, 
otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by 
them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, 
and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are cer-
tain particular agents like myself, which accompany them, 
and concur in their production. 3 
1Traditional commentators on Berkeley have tended to 
construe the notion in Berkeley as a tertium quid; on this 
view there are ideas of sense, ideas of imagination, and 
notional knowledge. cr. Johnston, Berkeley's Philoso~ry, J 
passim, especially pp. 161-169 for an exposition Of' t s view. 
This interpretation will not be followed here, however; the 
modern view, based upon Luce 1s researches, will instead be 
followed. Cf. Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche, pp. 103-106 
for the full line of reasoning leading to this view. 
2 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 106. 
3 ~., p. 107. 
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1 No doubt the doctrine is obscure, but the reason Berkeley 
asserted the doctrine is clear enough: it is to avoid the 
possible charge of scepticism about God and the soul. 
Reverting again to the Berkeleian doctrine of ideas, 
consideration may next be given to Berkeley's ideas of imag-
ination, a topic important because of its relevance to imag-
ism. So far as it is desirable to give a full exposition of 
Berkeley's doctrine of the imagination at this point, his 
contentions on this score may be summarized under three 
headings. In the first place, the imagination in Berkeley is 
2 the first evidence of the activity of the mind. Berkeley 
writes in section twenty-eight of the Principles: 
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and 
vary or shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is 
no more than willing, and straightway this or that 
idea arises in fancy; and by the same power is obliter-
ated, and makes way for another. This making and 
1The reason obscurity is felt in connection with the 
doctrine is that Berkeley is sceptical concerning the material 
world. He is not sceptical concerning knowledge of spirit, 
God, and the soul. His critique of corporeal substance fin-
ally comes down to the fact that the doctrine of corporeal 
substance is unempirical. But, by parity of reasoning, why 
should Berkeley not be sceptical about the self, God, know-
ledge of other minds? It was, of course, left for Hume to 
take this step. It is not necessary here to take a stand on 
the validity of the arguments of Berkeley or Hume in this 
regard. The whole question may be bypassed in Berkeley since 
the doctrine of the notion is not concerned with imagism. 
Whatever else may be said about notions, it is clear that they 
are not idea-images. 
2This discussion is indebted to Luce. (Berkeley, 
Philosophical Commentaries, ed. A. A. Luce,editor's notes, 
p. 417) • 
unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the 
mind active. 1 
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Secondly, the activity of ideas of imagination is to be con-
trasted with the passivity of ideas of sense. This contrast 
is brought out clearly by Berkeley in section twenty-nine of 
the Principles. He writes: 
But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I 
find the ideas actually perceived by sense have not a 
like dependence on my will. When in broad day-light 
I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose 
whether I shall see or no, or to determine what parti-
cular objects shall present themselves to my view. 2 
Lastly, although both ideas of sense and ideas of imagina-
tion "equally exist in the mind, 113 ideas of imagination are 
copies of ideas of sense. This matter is brought out clearly 
in section thirty-three of the Principles. Berkeley writes: 
The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of 
Nature are called real things: and those excited in 
the imagination ••• are more properly termed ideas or 
images of things, which they copy and represent. 4 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 53. (Berkeley's doctrine of 
imaginative faculty Is the differentiation of man from brute. 
This doctrine will be considered in contrast with Locke in 
discussion of the controversy over abstract ideas in Locke 
and Berkeley.) 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 55. (Since both ideas of sense and imagina-
tion "equa!IY exist in the mind," Berkeley is sometimes charged 
with not having a criterion of reality. This charge will be 
considered in connection with an important passage which will 
be examined for imagism in the third section.) 
4Ibid., p. 54. Cf. also the passage from the Commen-
taries where Berkeley is equally explicit. "Ideas of Sense 
are the Real things or Archetypes. Ideas of Imagination, 
Dreams etc. are copies, .images of these." Berkeley, Commen-
taries, ed. Luce, p. 293. In his editor's note to entry 528, 
Luce has collected the references to the imaginative faculty 
(p. 417). Careful study of these entries is indispensable 
for a full understanding of Berkeley's views on the imagina-
tion. No important point has, however, been eliminated from 
this exposition of the doctrine, except for points about which 
discussion is best deferred. 
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With some preliminary discussion of Berkeley's doc-
trine of ideas accomplished, attention may next be given to 
Berkeley's empiricism. In Berkeley there is a recurrent and 
characteristic appeal to experience which is decisive in his 
1 philosophy. The nature of Berkeley's empiricism may be 
brought out by comparison and contrast with Locke's empiricism. 
Both have in common an empiricism of id,eas; for Berkeley, as 
for Locke, all ideas are derived from experience. The 
differences between their versions of empiricism spring 
largely from different significations they attach to the term 
'idea.• There are three principal differences.2 The first 
difference, already commented upon, is that Berkeley's view 
this 
1 Cf. Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche, p. 151 to which 
remark is indebted. 
2Actually there are four differences in the fact 
that Berkeley does not directly employ Locke's doctrine of 
simple and complex ideas in the Principles. There are a 
number of references to the doctrine in the early portion of 
the Commentaries, but the terminology gradually drops from 
sight. The reason, apparently, that Berkeley decided not to 
consider the doctrine as such was that he found many of Locke's 
simple ideas not to be simple at all, but "abstractions from 
reality." (Luce's phrase in Commentaries, editor's comments 
on entry 53, pp. 331-332.) Berkeley, however, analyzes nearly 
all of Locke's simple ideas in the course of the Principles. 
The upshot of his doctrine is the position ·like the one 
suggested in the third chapter as the strong position of 
British empiricism in this connection--there are simpler and 
more complex ideas. Berkeley recognizes this in the first 
sentence of the Principles (and elsewhere) in speaking of 
the capacity of the mind for "compounding, dividing, or 
barely representing those [ideas] originally perceived." 
Berkeley, Works, II, p. 41. (This footnote is largely a pre-
cis of the editor's note cited above.) 
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is presentative whereas Locke 1s view is representative. 
Secondly, in a number of cases in which Locke asserted that 
the mind has ideas, Berkeley denies this.1 Such cases con-
cern most generally ideas about the material world. For 
Berkeley, alleged ideas of inanimate matter or the like, 
which are in no sense perceived, are for him abstract ideas, 
and against such alleged ideas he wages an unceasing polemic. 
This is to say that as far as our ideas, and thus derivatively 
our knowledge, of the material wor1d is concerned, Berkeley 
is a thoroughgoing sensationalist. Thirdly, for Berkeley 
there is the class of objects of knowledge, notions, concern-
ing which we have knowledge, but such knowledge is not 
derived from ideas. It needs to be emphasized at this point 
that the thesis of empiricism is not applicable to knowledge 
concerning the operations of the mind. 
1 The most striking case is Berkeley's polemic against 
material substance. In the course of the Principles, however, 
Berkeley attacks extension, time, motion, unity,lhappiness, 
power, will, and identity q*a abstractions. (Cf. Luce, 
Berkeletmand Malebranche, cap. 7, for an excellent statement 
of theportance of the doctrine to Berkeley 1 s philosophy.) 
In the third section of this chapter, Berkeley's views on 
the nature of scientific conceptions of his day will be 
analyzed, a topic closely connected with his doctrine of 
abstract ideas. Berkeley's "all-inclusive answer to objec-
tions," says Luce, is in terms of the critique of abstract 
ideas. (Luce, Berkele{ and Malebranche, p. 127). cr. sec-
tion 13 of the Prine~ es with its "to say no more, it is 
an abstract idea." rkeley, Works, II, p. 46. 
276 
1. Abstract Ideas and Imagism 
1 Berkeley's attack on Locke's abstract general ideas 
is a famous chapter in the history of the controversy over 
universals. The purpose of this section is not, however, to 
1It is not only Locke that Berkeley is attacking but 
the scholastic tradition. Berkeley writes, for example, in 
the "Introduction" concerning abstract ideas that "it is 
agreed on all hands." Further, in sections 17 and 21, he 
mentions Aristotle and the "ablest patrons of abstract ideas" 
and refers to "the schoolmen those great masters of Abstrac-
tion." There is no need in this investigation to consider 
this wider throw of Berkeley's net; it will be sufficient to 
consider Locke. For discussion of writers other than Locke 
to whom Locke might have had reference in his attack cf. 
Johnston, Berkele,'s Philosoph~, pp. 118-119 and Luce, 
Berkeley and Male ranche, p. 1 g. 
Another matter of interpretation may be discussed at 
this point. As was suggested in the last chapter, Aaron has 
made an effort to screen Locke from Berkeley's criticism. In 
general his efforts to rehabilitate Locke in this matter take 
two lines. In the first plaee, he suggests that Berkeley is 
unfair to Locke in the matter of the employment of the tri-
angle passage. Secondly, he has attempted to show a line of 
development, discussed in the last chapter, which would at 
least suggest that in Locke there is a more plausible theory 
than the one attacked by Berkeley. Enough on this second 
score has been said in the last chapter. The triangle passage 
needs to be referred to again at this point, since the tri-
angle passage is Berkeley's "killing blow," i.e., the coupb 
de grace is to be given to the doctrine of abstract ideas y 
aTscussion of Locke's triangle. (The passage concerning the 
killing blow is from the Commentaries, p. 243.) On Aaron's 
interpretation Locke means consistent parts of inconsistent 
ideas, whereas Johnston and Luce take Berkeley's position 
that Locke intends 'inconsistent parts of inconsistent ideas.• 
If Berkeley, however, has not fatrly represented Locke, he has 
managed to give a fairly consistent interpretation of what is 
a muddled doctrine in Locke. Furthermore, although the kill-
ing blow on Locke's absurd triangle (in Berkeley's view) ia 
consistently maintained by Berkeley throughout his career, it 
is not th~ only shot in Berkeley's locker. In other words, 
even if this argument of Berkeley's is not taken to be cogent, 
Berkeley has other strong arguments to fall back upon. The 
minimum thesis discussed in the last chapter, that Berkeley 
is unfair to Locke in the matter of quotation of the triangle 
passage, is a weak thesis. A stronger thesis will be suggested 
in the forthcoming analysis. 
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present a straightforward historical account of this contro-
versy, but rather to attempt to discover the degree to which, 
if any, imagism enters Berkeley's analysis. This doctrine 
forms a convenient starting place for a discussion of imag-
ism, since this doctrine can be expounded prior to consider-
ing Berkeley's central doctrine, immaterialism. 
The argument of the section is perforce somewhat 
involved and in order to keep the main lines of discussion 
clear the following outline of the section will be helpful. 
First, an exposition of several of Berkeley's views on abstrac-
tion will be presented. Secondly, there will be a discussion 
of Berkeley's doctrine of abstract general ideas. Berkeley's 
doctrine falls into two main parts which will be considered 
in turn: a negative side in which Berkeley criticizes Locke, 
and a positive or constructive side of the doctrine in which 
Berkeley presents his own contentions. Thirdly, critical 
comment on Berkeley's positive doctrine will be attempted so 
far as it is germane to imagism. This critical comment is 
concerned with two separate but related lines of criticism. 
The first line is concerned with Berkeley's contentions that 
generality is achieved from particularity. In order to 
expound Berkeley's view on their strongest side, a modern 
version of the doctrine, Russell's view in the Analysis of 
~~ will be considered. In this connection experimental 
1 
studies of the generalized image will be considered. 
1The term •generalized image• is today usually substi-
tuted for Locke and Berkeley's term •abstract general idea.• 
This terminological change has the advantage of describing more 
precisely some of the important problems in connection with the 
doctrine. 
A second line of criticism is concerned with a possible 
failure on Berkeley's part to explicate sufficiently in 
his theory the central term •representation.• 
In the "Introduction" to the Principles Berkeley 
gives three views on the nature of abstraction which he 
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1 insufficiently distinguishes. In the first place, Berkeley 
gives an account of abstraction which may be called the pre-
scinding view. He writes: 
It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes 
of things ••• are ••• blended together, several in the 
same object. But, we are told, that the mind, being 
able to consider each quality singly, or abstracted 
from ••• other qualities ••• does by that means frame 
to itself abstract ideas. For example ••• the abstract 
ideas of extension, colour, and motion. 2 
Berkeley accepts this prescinding view of abstraction, 
although this acceptance is not made fully clear until the 
text of the Principles.3 
Secondly, Berkeley discusses a process resulting from 
abstraction which usually goes by the name of 1generalization.•4 
1 
The discussion in this chapter of Locke's view of 
abstraction is indebted to Mary Whiton Calkins. (Berkeley: 
Essay, Principles, Dialogues, ed •. Mary Whiton Calkins, !:New 
York: Charles Scribners, 1929], xxx-xxxiii.) 
2Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 27-28. 
3Full analysis of this view of abstraction is best 
left for the second section. The passage may then be analyzed 
as it relates to immaterialism and imagism. 
4 The definition of the term 'generalization' quoted in 
the second chapter of this investigation may be profitably 
repeated here. 
"When abstraction is from a group of variable situations, 
and organic modification towards particular situations is 
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Berkeley writes in the "Introduction" to the Principles as 
follows: 
••• the mind having observed that in the particular 
extensions ••• there is something common and alike in 
all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that 
figure or magnitude ••• singles out by itself that 
which is common; making thereof a most abstract idea 
of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, 
nor has any figure or magnitude. 1 
Here the issue is joined between Locke and Berkeley. Berkeley 
is opposed to abstraction in this sense so far as it involves 
the assertion of the existence of a general image. In sec-
tion thirteen of the'Tntroductio~ to the Principles, Berkeley 
quotes from the Essay, changing this triangle passage to 
suit his purpose. The grounds for Berkeley's opposition are 
best postponed until the third sense of 'abstraction' to be 
found in the "Introduction" to the Principles is briefly out-
lined. 
Thirdly, Berkeley intends by the term 'abstraction' 
a view which he rejects, viz. that matter may exist inde-
pendently of being perceived. This may be called the 'meta-
physical view' of abstraction.2 This last process of 
determined by a common-feature of the group as such, the 
process is called generalization. Generalization may then 
be said to be the process by which an organism comes to 
effect a constant modification towards an invariable 
feature (or set of features) which occurs under varying 
conditions." Humphrey, Thinking, p. 265. 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 28. 
2 The two other views on abstraction may properly be 
called psychological. No more should be read into the term 
'metaphysical' here than that it goes beyond the p~~&ly psy-
chological. 
abstraction, "abstracting existence from perception"1 is 
described by Berkeley in the following passage from the 
Principles: 
Can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to 
distinguish the existence of sensible objects from 
their being perceived, so as to conceive them exis-
ting unperceived. 2 
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Here, of course, is touched one of the most characteristic 
Berkeleian doctrines, immaterialism. Analysis of this cen-
tral tenet may be postponed until the second section of this 
chapter. 
The relation of these three views to the present dis-
cussion may be summarized as follows. The prescinding view 
of abstraction is accepted by both Berkeley and Locke, although 
it receives most explicit statement in Berkeley. Generaliza-
tion, so far as it involves the assertion of the existence of 
a generalized image,3 is denied by Berkeley. Locke asserts, 
in the triangle passage and elsewhere, the existence of the 
generalized image. The metaphysical view of abstraction, 
denied by Berkeley, will be commented upon in the next sec-
tion. 
Attention may next be given to Berkeley's view on 
abstract general ideas. This doctrine will be considered 
1calkins' phrase in Berkeley: Essay, etc., editor's 
introduction, xxxii. 
2 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 42. 
3The generalized image has been described in the 
second chapter of this investigation. 
first on its negative side, i.e. as a criticism of Locke. 
Berkeley offers two general lines of criticism of Locke 
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1 
which may be considered in turn. Berkeley's first criti-
cism is of Locke's assertion that "brutes abstract not. 112 
Locke had asserted that in animals "we observe no footsteps 
in them of making use of general signs .for universal ideas."3 
Locke had taken abstraction as the chief psychological differ-
entia of man from the animal. This contention Berkeley 
denied on the ground that neither man nor animal could form 
an abstract general idea in Locke's sense. Concerning Locke's 
assertion, Berkeley writes in section eleven of the "Intro-
duction": "If this be made the distinguishing property of 
that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that pass 
for men must be reckoned in their number. 114 It is not the 
capacity for forming abstract ideas for Berkeley that dis-
tinguishes man from animal, but rather the faculty of 
imagination.5 It would appear, however, that contemporary 
1This presentation of Berkeley's criticism of Locke 
with respect to abstract general ideas is indebted to Johns-
ton, Berkeley's Philosophy, p. 122f, although the treatment 
in this investigation is somewhat different from his presen-
tation. 
phrase 
2Locke, Essay, II, chap. 
is Locke's summary of the 
3Ibid., p. 208. 
11, sec. 10, p. 207. 
section. 
4Berkeley, Works, II, p. 31. 
This 
5Actually Berkeley touches only lightly upon the faculty 
of imagination as the differentia of man from the animals in 
section 11 of the "Introduction." In the Commentaries, he 
writes: "Qu: Whether Composition of Ideas be not that faculty 
experimental evidence would suggest that both Locke and 
Berkeley are in error at this point; the general tenor of 
opinion among students of comparative psychology is that the 
mediation of symbolic processes is required to explain in-
1 
sightful animal learning. such insightful learning would 
which chiefly serves to discriminate us from Brutes. I ques-
tion whether a Brute ••• does or can imagine a Blue Horse or 
Chimera." (p. 267). cr. Luce•s editorial comment on this 
entry on p. 450. The •composition of ideas' referred to in 
the above quotation is, of course, the faculty of imagination. 
1Among infrahuman animals there are two general types 
of behavior which have seemed to require the ~ostulation of 
symbolic processes for their explanation: (1} certain condi-
tionings and delayed reaction learnings; and (2) the prompt 
solution of problems which would appear to involve what is 
usually called insight, i.e. the immediate awareness of the 
elements necessary for the solution of a problem. Only the 
second of these need be commented upon here, since this class 
of cases is more relevant both to abstraction and imagination. 
A standard or criterion for the justified invocation of sym-
bolism is the following: 
"Only when the response of an organism must be determined 
by conditions not present at the time of adjustment can it 
be supposed that a symbolic process is operating •••• A 
symbolic process is indicated when the signal or cue for 
adjustment made is not present at the time of response." 
C. T. Morgan quoted in Henry W. Nissen, "Phylogenetic Compari-
son," Handbook of Exper. Psych., ed. Stevens, p. 377. (This 
criterion Is, of course, comparable to the traditional defini-
tion of symbolic thinking, or non-perceptual thinking, as 
thinking in which the objects of thought are not present to 
the senses.) The following multiple-stick test may be used 
as an illustration. 
There is a short stick and food on one platform in 
one room (and the food cannot be reached with the short stick). 
There is a second platform with a long stick on it with which 
the food can be reached in another room. The platform may 
then be put in such a position that one platform cannot be 
seen from the other. The subject, the ape, seesthe long stick 
in its room (at a previous time). When put in the room with 
the short stick and the food, the ape is able to go to the 
other room, taking with him the short stick, retrieve the 
long stick by means of the short stick, return with both, and 
with the long stick retrieve the food. 
include both abstraction and memory images. Locke denied 
the first process in animals and Berkeley the second; it 
would appear that both occur in animals in a rudimentary 
fashion. 
Berkeley's second criticism of Locke is a psycholo-
gical criticism. The issue between Locke and Berkeley may 
be put in the following manner. The question at issue is: 
What goes on in the human mind when someone uses a general 
term? For Locke, at least in the moment which Berkeley here 
criticizes, the process going on in the mind is one in which 
(1) particulars are given in experience, (2) the mind forms 
abstract general ideas from these particulars, and (3) the 
abstract general idea thus formed is given a name. Berkeley 
denies the second of these contentions. With the denial of 
the second contention, the third contention--naming--
receives in Berkeley's constructive version a somewhat 
Two explanations are possible. The first is in terms 
of simpler mechanisms, such as conditioning. In cases of the 
kind cited above, this would appear to involve conditionings 
of a fantastic complexity. Secondly, the explanation can be 
in terms of the postulation of elementary symbolic processes 
which in this case would obviously involve both abstraction 
and memory images. In terms of the standard described above 
for the invocation of symbolism in the explanation of animal 
behavior, it is called for in this experiment if it is ever 
called for. (This description is a summary of a paradigm 
described by Nissen to illustrate the problem of explanation. 
It is neither more nor less complicated than those conducted 
by Kohler and others.) 
Traditionally those commenting upon animal behavior 
have always tried to draw a sharp line between man and animal. 
Since Darwin, however, psychologists have tried to show con-
tinuities between human and animal behavior. This stress on 
continuity rather than upon discontinuity is probably the 
chief distinguishing mark of modern work on the subject. In 
modern thought one tends to look for an accentuation rather 
than an essence. 
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different explanation. To support this criticism of Locke, 
Berkeley's fundamental appeal is to introspective evidence. 
After quoting the triangle passage--and altering it for his 
own polemical purposes--Berkeley writes in the "Introduction: 
If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such 
an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is vain 
to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go 
about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully 
and certainly inform himself whether he has such an 
idea or no. 1 
Berkeley thus challenges anyone to form such an abstract 
general idea in the manner prescribed by Locke. It is, 
according to Berkeley, an impossibility. This is Berkeley's 
fundamental argument against Locke.2 
There are two questions here which, if not disentangled, 
cause confusion over the issues. There is first the question 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 33. (The phrase 'framing an 
idea• is a sign of imagism in Berkeley. This will be discussed 
in detail in the next section.) 
2In Berkeley's own day the charge that he misrepre-
sented Locke had been made. Berkeley was aware of the charge 
and tried to answer it. In a very interesting passage in a 
"Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics," he discusses the 
charge specifically. He does not consider his misleading quo-
tation from Locke, but defends himself vigorously from the 
charge of misrepresenting Locke. The most important point to 
be made in this passage, however, is that Berkeley as always 
rests his case upon introspective evidence, viz. the impossi-
bility of forming such an image. He writes;---
"If the reader will but take a little care to distinguish 
between the definition and the idea, between words or ex-
pressions and the conceptions of the mind, he will judge 
of the truth of what I now advance, and clearly perceive 
how far you are mistaken in attempting to illustrate Mr. 
Locke's doctrine, and where your mistake lies. Or if the 
reader is minded to make short work, he need only at 
once to try whether, laying aside the words he can frame 
in his mind the idea of an im~ossible trian~le; upon which 
trial the issue of this distu e may be fair f tut." 
Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 135. ( talics not in or g nal.) 
whether an abstract general idea, i.e. a generalized image, 
can be formed in the manner Locke suggests, and secondly, 
there is the question as to whether a generalized image can 
be formed at all. The position taken here toward the first 
question is that Berkeley is right in his criticism of Locke; 
it is doubtful if a generalized image can be formed in the 
manner Locke suggests. The second question may be deferred 
for treatment till later in this section. 
Berkeley offers a further criticism of Locke which 
may most properly be viewed as a contention in support of the 
argument from instrospection just considered. Berkeley 
asserts that in fact children use general terms without form-
ing abstract general ideas after the manner of Locke. He 
writes in the "Introduction": 
Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of 
children cannot prate !l;ogether of their sugar plumbs 
and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets ••• 
till they have first tacked together numberless incon-
sistencies, and framed in their mind abstract general 
ideas, and annexed them to every common name they make 
use of. 1 
In this passage Berkeley once more asserts of Locke's theory 
that it requires that "numberless inconsistencies" be tacked 
together. Even if it is granted that Berkeley misstates 
Locke's position on this point, Berkeley's strong contention 
that Locke has misdescribed the process of abstraction re-
mains. 
The argument may be summarized thus far. For Berkeley 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 33. 
286 
an abstract general idea is impossible. An idea for Berkeley 
is always concrete; it is either a concrete thing or a con-
crete image. A man cannot be perceived abstractly, nor can 
he be imagined abstractly. Therefore, an abstract general 
idea cannot be formed. 
Berkeley does, however, recognize that some account 
must be given of universality in thought. He writes, for 
example, in the "Introduction": "It is I know a point much 
insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstrations are about 
universal notions, to which I fully agree."1 The views 
Berkeley substitutes for the allegedly fallacious doctrine 
of abstract ideas may next be considered. Hereafter in this 
section Berkeley's constructive views to replace abstract 
general ideas may be referred to as Berkeley's doctrine of 
universality.2 
The importance of Berkeley's quarrel with Locke on 
the matter of abstract general ideas should not be minimized, 
since nothing less than empiricism of ideas is at stake. 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 33. 
2The discussion of universals (or generic concepts) 
of the third chapter will be assumed in what follows. This 
discussion of Berkeley's constructive views is indebted to 
Johnston, Berkele{'s Philosolhy, pp. 124-142. The discussion 
in this investiga ion, with ts prime purpose discussion of 
imagism, emphasizes some details rather than others. It gives, 
therefore, a somewhat different cast to the treatment than is 
found in Johnston. Furthermore, no effort is made here to 
give a genetic account of Berkeley's views since this is not 
a matter of primary concern for examining imagism. 
Locke, one of the pioneers of empiricism, had on more than 
one occasion not been faithful to his own doctrine. He 
admitted entities for which he had no ideas from experience. 
Further, the words which named these alleged entities were 
incapable of clear definition. There is one class of such 
ideas which Berkeley is eager to combat, viz. matter. 
Berkeley's philosophical program of immaterialism has as one 
half of its burden combatting contemporary views of matter. 
The general thesis to be developed in the second section is 
that in his arguments against the received views of matter, 
Berkeley's arguments against abstract ideas play an important 
role. It is entirely probable that Berkeley's use of the 
argument against abstract general ideas is not his strongest 
suit. For this investigation this is not to the point. What 
will be shown is that Berkeley takes his critique of abstract 
general ideas as important, and that his critique is imagis-
tic. Fundamentally Berkeley is contending that it is unempir-
ical of Locke to talk of abstract general ideas. The abstract 
general ideas that Berkeley is most anxious to hu~to their 
lair and destroy are those that purport to be named by the 
words 1matter 1 and 'existence.• It is Locke's "something I 
know not what" that is in the back of Berkeley's mind in his 
attack on Locke.1 Luce summarizes the reason for Berkeley's 
attack on Locke 1s doctrine as follows: 
1953) 
lcf. G. J. Warnock, Berkeley (London: Pelican Books, 
for an excellent statement of this line of argument. 
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Berkeley of course had to attack abstract ideas. It is 
no good telling folx-that matter does not exist, unless 
at the same time you make it clear to them why they are 
inveterately disposed to think matter does exist. 1 
In the "Introduction" to the Principles, Berkeley con-
2 
siders:,no less than four sign-vehicles that may discharge 
the function of universality. These four sign-vehicles may 
be listed as a preliminary guide to fuller discussion. "The 
function of universality in knowledge may be discharged by":3 
!ll particular things 2 particular images 3 names 4 meanings 
From the above list it would appear that imagism would be 
most apt to be involved in (2); this is the case, but in 
order to give a rounded account of Berkeley's doctrine it is 
desirable to consider all these four possibilities. 
1Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche, p. 126. 
2The view that "a sign refers to something for some-
one" will be accepted in what follows. On this basis the 
sign-vehicle is, then, "that which acts as a sign." For full-
er discussion cf. Charles W. Morris, "Foundations of the 
Theory of Signs," International Enc clo edia of Unified Sci-
ence, ed. Otto Neura , Ru o arnap, C ares Morr s vola.; 
rrniCago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), I, part 1, p. 
81 and passim. 
3Johnston, Berkeley's Philosoph~ p. 124. Johnston 
discusses six views of universality In rkeley. Only the 
four considered at this point, however, are found in the 
"Introduction," the work of Berkeley's here under analysis. 
Consideration of the two other views Johnston discusses would 
involve a full scale study of Berkeley's doctrine of the 
notion. This task will not be attempted since it would not 
aid in the exposition of imagism. 
These four versions of universality, which together 
comprise Berkeley's views on universality in the "Introduc-
tion," may be considered as separate variants of one doctrine. 
This doctrine may be called the representation view; it 
receives its clearest formulation in the "Introduction" in 
section twelve. There Berkeley writes: 
Now if we will annex a meani~ to our words, and speak 
only of what we can conceive, I believe that we shall 
acknowledge that an idea, which considered in itself 
is particular, becomes general, by being made to repre-
sent or stand for all other particulars of the same 
sort. 2 
View (1) of the above list asserts that a particular concrete 
thing discharges the function of universality. According to 
this first view, a particular thing stands for or represents 
all other particulars of the same class.3 The example 
Berkeley uses to illustrate this first view is drawn from 
1The term •conceive' is critical for Berkeley's imag-
ism. Full analysis of the term is best postponed until the 
second section of this chapter; at that point more examples 
of Berkeley's usage will be available for discussion. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 31-32. 
3one might say particulars of the same sort or kind. 
Johnston uses the term 1type-case 1 for the term 'class' that 
is employed here. (In defining the term •type-case' Johnston 
writes that a type-case "is an instance of a class ••• " 
Johnston, Berkeley's Philosoph~, p. 128). It should be noted 
that on Berkeley's view here t ere is no commitment to classes; 
it is convenient, however, in expounding his view to have a 
term for the aggregate of all the particulars. (The question 
of nominalism will be dealt with more fully below). Whatever 
the terminology used it should be noted that the aggregate of 
things is considered in extension. It is not necessary to 
offer a formal definition of a class, but the following 
characterization will prove useful. A class may be thought of 
as determined by a condition, i.e. "exactly those objects are 
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mathematics. He writes, following directly upon the passage 
just quoted, as follows: 
To make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician 
is demonstrating the method of cutting ac.line in two 
equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black line of an 
inch in length, this which in itself is a particular 
line is nevertheless with regard to its signification 
general, since as it is there used, it represents all 
particular lines whatsoever; for that what is demons-
trated of it is demonstrated of all lines or, in other 
words, of a line in general. 1 
It is to be noted that the idea referred to in this version of 
the representation view is an idea of sense, what today would 
be called a sense-datum.2 The particular line, in the above 
example, stands for or represents any line. 
The objection arises, however, that one cannot be 
sure that the particular line or triangle drawn is "true of 
all particular triangles,"3 i.e. the problem of generality. 
Berkeley formulates in the "Introduction" the objection that 
may be raised against this first view when he writes: 
members of the class which satisfy the condition." J. B. 
Rosser, Lo,ic for Mathematicians (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), 
p. 198. ( his characterization of a class is reserved in 
Rosser for infinite classes, but there seems to be no reason 
for not applying it to finite classes.) 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 32. 
2This has been urged as a proof that Berkeley is not 
properly called an imagist. This view is expounded by E. J. 
Furlong, "Abstract Ideas and Images," Berkele* and Modern 
Problems (London: Harrison & Sons, Ltd. !'or t e Aristotelian 
Society, 1953), Supplementary Volume XXVII, pp. 131-136. 
Furlong's argument will be dealt with below. 
3 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 34. 
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Because a property may be demonstrated to agree to 
some particular trian~le, it will not thence follow 
that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which 
in all respects is not the same with it. For example, 
having demonstrated that the three angles of an iso-
celes triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot 
therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other 
triangles, which have neither a right angle,nor two 
equal sides. 1 
Berkeley rejects outright two possible answers to 
this objection--first, that we make "a particular demonstra-
2 tion for every particular triangle." This answer would, of 
course, be to deny the possibility of generality altogether, 
a course B8rkeley never considers adopting. Secondly, he 
rejects a solution based upon a demonstration of "the abstract 
idea of a triangle, in which all the particulars do indiffer-
ently partake."3 The reasons for Berkeley's rejection of this 
solution is, of course, that it requires the existence of 
abstract general ideas. Berkeley's solution to the problem 
of generality is contained in the following passage from sec-
tion sixteen of the "Introduction": 
Though the idea I have in view whilst I make this 
demonstration be, for instance, that of an isoceles 
rectangular triangle, whose sides are of determinate 
length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to 
all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort of big-
ness soever. And that because neither the right angle, 
nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides, 




are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true, 
the diagram I have in view includes all these particu-
lars, but then there is not the least mention made of 
them in the proof of the proposition •••• And here it 
must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure 
merely as triangular, without attending to the particu-
lar qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. 
So far he may abstract ••• l 
This answer to the problem of how generality is achieved is 
an imagistic solution. The image in the mind discharges the 
function of universality. That Berkeley has an idea-image 
in mind in this passage is made clear from comparing the 
first and second of the underlined phrases. He speaks here 
of "the idea I have in view," i.e. the idea-image, and "the 
diagram I have in view," i.e. drawn on paper or on the board. 
The term 'idea' for Berkeley comprehends both an idea of 
sense, i.e. a sense-datum, and also an idea of imagination 
(an idea-image). For this reason, the formula quoted earlier 
that "an idea becomes general by being made to represent to 
stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort"2 suf-
fices to encompass both particulars and images as sign-
vehicles. 
The third version of universality in Berkeley, that 
the function of universality in knowledge is discharged by 
names, is a doctrine which seems to be clearly asserted in 
but one passage in the "Introduction" to the Principles. 
1 
Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 34-35. (Italics not in 
original.) 
2 !E..!£·, p. 32. 
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And as ••• particular line becomes general, by being 
made a sign, so the name line which taken absolutely 
is particular, by being a-sign is made general. And 
as the former owes its generality, not to its being 
the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all 
particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the 
latter must be thought to derive its generality from 
the same cause, namely, the various particular lines 
which it indifferently denotes. 1 
In this version it is no longer either the particular tri-
angle drawn, nor the image of a triangle before the mind 
which discharges the function of universality, but the name. 
In stating general propositions about triangles, according 
to this version, there is nothing before the mind but the 
name. 
Berkeley considered it necessary to take seriously 
the doctrine that the function of universality could be dis-
charged by the name because names have a precise and settled 
signification.2 In the "Introduction" to the Principles 
Berkeley concludes, however, that the advantages of this 
theory were illusory. In section eighteen of the "Intro-
duction" Berkeley writes: "In truth, there is no such thing 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 32. (The passage follows 
directly upon the passage already quoted which formulates 
Berkeley's official representation view.) Johnston, Birkeley 1 s 
Philosophy, pp. 129-130 calls this view an extreme nom nalism. 
He argues that Berkeley accepts this view in the Philosophical 
Commentaries (called by him by its older name, Common~lace 
Book), but, realizing its limitations, comes to rejec the doc-
mile in the "Introduction" to the Principles. Examination 
of the Commentaries, however, does not seem to yield any clear-
cut assertion of this view. It would thus seem desirable to 
ignore the possibility of this view in the Commentaries and 
consider the precise nature of the doctrine only in the "In-
troduction." 
2cf. Johnston, Berkele~ 1 s Philosophy, pp. 129-130 
for a possible account of theevelopment and final rejection 
of this view. 
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as one precise and definite signification annexed to any 
general name, they all signifying indifferently a great num-
ber of particular ideas."1 
The fourth theory of universality considered by 
Berkeley in the "Introduction" is that the function of uni-
versality in knowledge is discharged by a meaning. Such a 
view follows logically upon Berkeley's rejection of the 
third theory. The reason Berkeley dropped the thard theory 
was that names do not supply universally true meanings. 
Johnston puts the rationale of this fourth Berkeleian theory 
in the following way. The third theory was held because of 
"the belief that names supply us with universally true mean-
ings. This theory having been shown to be false, why not 
simply say (omitting all reference to names) that the mean-
ing itself is the universal."2 This view Berkeley expresses 
in the following passage from section fifteen of the "Intro-
duction": 
Universality, so far as I can comprehend not consisting 
in the absolute, positive nature of conception of any-
thing, but in the relations it bears to the particulars 
signified or represented by it: by virtue whereof it 
is that things, names, or notions, being in their own 
nature particular, are rendered universal. 3 
1 
p. 36. Berkeley, Works, II, 
2 Johnston, Berkeley's Philosophy, p. 130. 
3Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 33-34. 
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It can be readily seen that this fourth view summarizes all 
the views thus far considered. In the first two views par-
ticulars--things and images--stand for or represent the 
class. The third view asserts that names discharge the 
function of universality. In the fourth view, however, 
meaning itself is the universal. The four theories have as 
1 
a common bond a representative theory of knowledge. The 
fourth theory involves representation, the essential point 
in all of Berkeley's theory so far considered, but admits of 
several possible sign-vehicles--particulars, images, and 
names. If this fourth theory be taken as Berkeley's most 
completely developed theory--as it would appear to be--
imagism is an important strand, but only a strand, in 
2 Berkeley's theory of universality in the "Introduction." 
Sufficient evidence would now appear to be available 
3 to consider Berkeley's alleged nominalism. That Berkeley 
1cf. Johnston, Berkele*'s Philosophy, p. 131. There 
may seem to be some confusionere. Berkeley's doctrine of 
perception is presentative, what is given in sensory experi-
ence is given directly and without mediation. His doctrine 
of universality, however, is representative; what is given 
immediately comes to stand for or represent the particular. 
2The degree of Berkeley's imagism in the "Introduc-
tion" may profitably be deferred until Berkeley's well-known 
comments on Locke's triangle have been considered, since this 
passage is the most important passage in the "Introduction" 
for the question of Berkeley's imagism. 
3Berkeley is frequently called a nominalist, so far 
at least as the passages thus considered are concerned. It 
would be idle to collect passages from commentators in sup-
port of this contention. Seth puts the usual view of 
Berkeley as a nominalist in the following passage: 
is properly called a nominalist, at least by the traditional 
interpretations of nominalism, seems beyond doubt. The task 
at this point is to relate this traditional interpretation 
of nominalism in Berkeley to the standard of ontological 
commitment that is used in this investigation as a yardstick 
for nominalism. The whole problem is complicated by the 
fact that Berkeley makes very few explicit references to 
nominalism; it is necessary to attribute the doctrine to him, 
where he himself seldom if ever refers to it in his published 
writings.1 There are many passages in the "Introduction" to 
the Principles which might be used as texts for discussing 
the degree of Berkeley's ontological commitment; all of these, 
however, come down to much the same thing. The passage used 
as a text for the representation view may be taken as typi-
cal. On the view there presented "an idea, which considered 
in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to 
"Berkeley's protest was directed against 'abstract ideas'; 
and his nominalistic interpretation of the significance of 
general terms, as reducible to the particular ideas which 
they actually represent, is closely connected with his 
reduction of the esse of the material world to its per-
cipi." Seth, EngiTiill Philosophers and Schools, p. o:-
1Luce quotes a passage from the first draft intro-
duction to the Princ~les in which Berkeley disavows a 
strict nominalism. rkeley writes: 
"Everyone's experience may convince him that this is all 
that's meant by general names, and that they do not stand 
either for universal natures distinct from our concep-
tions as was held by the Peripatetics and generality of 
the Schoolmen, nor yet for universal notions or ideas as 
is the opinion of that sort of Schoolmen called Nominals 
and of the author of the Essay." 
Berkeley quoted in Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche, p. 159. 
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1 
represent or stand for all other particulars." This view 
is prima facie nominalistic by the standard of ontological 
commitment presented in the last chapter, since on this 
view only concrete entities, particulars, need stand as 
values of variables. This is the case whether the particu-
lars in question be particular things, particular images, or 
names. Berkeley thus, although abstaining from use of the 
term, is a nominalist by traditional standards and by the 
semantical formulation considered in this investigation. It 
might be suggested that 'all other particulars' implies 
classes. Classes, however, are abstract, and it might be 
argued that this view implies commitment to a platonistic 
language. Such a view, however, does not seem justified, 
since Berkeley's point would seem to be that it is not nec-
essary to consider the whole class of particulars qua class; 
the particular on this view represents the class. 
Some critical comment on Berkeley's theory of repre-
sentation seems called for since the theory is not without 
difficulties. The essence of the theory of representation 
is that when a general term such as 'man' is used, there is 
an image of a particular man, tall or short, black or white, 
fat or thin, etc., and that this image represents all other 
men. 2 The critical question concerning this theory may be 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 32. 
2Berkeley 1s theory of representation may be consid-
ered here primarily from the point of view of images, since 
images are of most interest in this investigation. In point 
of fact, for reasons which will be developed more fully 
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formulated as follows: 
(1) How is the factor of representing itself to be under-
stood? 
Neither in the "Introduction" nor elsewhere in his writings 
does Berkeley undertake an analysis of this crucial concept. 
It should first be noted that for Berkeley the term 'repre-
sentation' should refer to some empirically observable rela-
tion unless the fundamental empiricist principle that the mind 
has only ideas of things given in experience is to be over-
thrown. The relation of representation is obviously in some 
sense a functional relation, i.e. the image in the mind per-
forms the function that the image of any man in the mind would 
perform. Further this relation of representation by images 
would seem to involve resemblance between the image and the 
thing represented. 
Although Berkeley does not appear to consider the 
possibility, one suggestion might be made which might appear 
to save Berkeley's theory and be a logical extension of it. 
It might be suggested that representation is itself another 
image. Such a solution, however, would appear to lead to 
an infinite regress. There would have to be images mirror-
ing the higher order representations so that there would be 
images of representations of representations. Such a state 
of affairs would not appear to be given in experience. It 
below, images as representatives would appear to be Berkeley's 
official view. At any rate, the discussion may be conducted 
in terms of images and the discussion applied, mutatis mutan-
dis, to the other referenda-names, particulars, and meanings. 
would thus violate his empiricism of ideas and would be no 
1 
solution at all. 
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Attention may next be given to the fact that the 
status of the various referenda (particulars, images, names, 
and meanings) to the referents, particulars, have logical 
differences of some importance. These logical differences 
may be brought out by discussion of certainar the properties 
of dyadic or two-termed relations. Dyadic relations may be 
characterized as symmetrical, asymmetrical, and non-symmetri-
cal. A symmetrical relation may be defined as a relation 
such that if one thing has that relation to another thing, 
then the second thing has that relation to the first. 2 
Common examples of symmetrical relations are designated by 
the phrases 'is next to' and 'is married to.• An asymmetri-
cal relation is one such that if one thing has that relation 
to a second thing, then the second thing cannot have that 
relation to the first. Common examples of asymmetrical rela-
tions are designated by the phrases 1is north of' and 1is a 
parent of.' Non-symmetrical relations may be defined as 
1Hume offers a suggestion which is an attempt in 
part to answer this objection. Consideration of Hume 1s sug-
gestion is, however, best deferred till'-the next chapter. 
2This definition is based upon Irving M. Copi, ~­
bolic Logic (New York: Macmillan Co., 1954}, p. 141. The 
following definition from Church may also be offered. "A 
dyadic relation R is s~etric, if, for all x andy in the 
field of R, xRy~ yRx; is asymmetric if, for all x andy 
in the field of R, xRy~ --yRx; non-symmetric if there are x 
andy in the field of R such that (xRy) & (-yRx)." Alonzo 
Church, "Symmetry," Diet. of Phil., ed. Runes, p. 308. 
(Church's definition is symbolized somewhat differently here 
than in the original for reasons of typographical convenience.7 
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those which are neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical. If 
the referenda are to be considered as having the same logi-
cal status, then they should have the same status as symme-
trical, asymmetrical, or non-symmetrical. This, however, 
would not appear to be the case. 
Consider next the term 'representation.• For the 
term 'representation' to be properly applied it would appear 
that the relations between the referendum and the referent 
would have to be asymmetrical. In oth~words, it should not 
be possible to say that the referent may represent or stand 
for the referendum.1 On this basis it is clear that the term 
'representation' is properly applied only in cases where the 
referendum is an image (or a name, or meaning), and is not 
properly applied where the referendum is a particular thing. 
This is the case since if the referendum is a particular the 
relation between the referendum and the referent is symmetri-
cal. 
1There are some cases in which the relation between 
the referendum and the referent may be symmetrical. For exam-
ple, the partners in a business firm may mutually represent 
one another, i.e. the relation between them is symmetrical. 
Cases of this sort, however, occur only because they are not 
isolated particulars to begin with. There is in suchcases a 
prior relatedness between the referendum and the referent. 
Berkeley's theory, however, to be made to work, must not com-
mence with such prior relatedness between the referendum and 
the referent. His theory purports to account for all cases; 
not such cases as the kind just considered in which the rela-
tion is symmetrical as a result of a prior bond between the 
referendum and the referent. This discussion is indebted to, 
but does not follow in all details, the argument of Johnston, 
Berkeley's Philosophy, pp. 133-135. 
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It would thus appear that of the various referenda 
Berkeley considers--particulars, images, names, and meanings--
particulars do not properly belong to the theory. Given the 
three remaining referenda--images, names, and meanings--
questions remain as to which of these is most important in 
Berkeley's thinking and further as to whether these latter 
three are on all fours. These questions, however, are best 
deferred until consideration has been given to the degree of 
imagism in the "Introduction" in this section, and to imagism 
in the Principles proper and elsewhere in Berkeley's writings 
in the next section. 
The difficulty of the nature of 'representing' is not, 
however, the only difficulty on Berkeley's account. A second 
difficulty is better known; it may be put as follows: 
(2) How is generality achieved from particulars? 
According to Berkeley's theory the mind has knowledge or 
belief that a particular image does in fact represent all 
other men. Images, however, are particular and they would 
not seem to be made general by merely multiplying their num-
ber. As Stace puts it, "a million images are no more general 
than one image."1 
Berkeley himself does not in the "Introduction" seem 
1 Walter Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism," Phil. of 
Russell, ed. Schilpp, p. 381. 
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aware of this first objection. Russell, however, in the 
1 Analysis of Mind, accepts Berkeley's theory as correct in 
its main lines, but attempts by two emendations to meet 
this objection.2 His emendations may first he presented, 
and then critical comment suggested, Russell's first emenda-
tion consists in asserting the occurrence of a generalized 
image. Berkeley, it will be remembered, denied the possi-
bility of a generalized image. Concerning Berkeley's theory 
on this score Russell writes that "the way in which Berkeley's 
view is inadequate is chiefly in the fact that images are as 
a rule not of one definite prototype, but of a number of 
related similar prototypes."3 Russell then goes on to quote 
approvingly Semon's statement of the nature of the general-
ized image. It is not useful to follow Russell's·terminology 
at this point, since Russell uses an extensive and rather 
barbarous terminology to expound this doctrine which he 
adopts from Semon. Rather than developing and using the 
1Russell 1s general thesis in the Analysis of Mind is 
that all mental content is either sensation or image. This 
thesis is part of the neutral monism that Russell advocated 
in 1921, the date of publication afthe Analysis of Mind. 
Neutral monism, the theory that reduces the mental and the 
physical to relations among neutral entities, need not, how-
ever, be considered in this investigation. 
2Russell quotes sections 10, 11, 12 of the "Introduc-
tion" practically in toto in the Analysis of Mind, pp, 214-218. 
The greater part or-tne-Femainder or chapter 11 of the Anal*sis 
is an attempt to straighten out Berkeley's theory to meet t e 
first objection commented upon above. 
3Russell, Analysis of Mind, p. 219. 
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Russell-Semon terminology, a simpler and quite as adequate 
description of the generalized image may be obtained by 
quoting from experimental protocols obtained by Koffka. In 
Koffka 1s experiment the E called out a stimulus-word which 
the 0 awaited passively. The.images produced by this tech-
nique were usually illustrative of the stimulus-word. In 
Woodworth's summary of the crucial point, he says, "In the 
large collection thus obtained, some images represented ob-
jects without a full complement of qualities."1 It is per-
haps profitable to quote from one of Koffka•s protocols: 
Image of a coin, but of no special denomination. 
of an animal, what kind of animaLLI do not know, 
that it was an animal from which fur can be got. 






These results are, of course, in flat contradiction to 
Berkeley. Berkeley wrote, "Whatever hand or eye I imagine, 
it must have some particular shape and colour."3 A visual 
image for Berkeley is a particular image and can only be such. 
Russell's first emendation of Berkeley thus consists in the 
assertion that images may be vague in outline rather than 
specific as Berkeley asserted. With the psychological vali-
dity of this emendation, there can be no quarrel. 
1woodworth, Experimental Psfch., p. 44. Additional 
studies from other investigators wh ch corroborate Koffka 1s 
thesis are discussed in Humphrey, Thinking, pp. 279-280. 
44. 
2Koffka quoted in Woodworth, Experimental Psych. p. 
3Berkeley, Works, II, p. 29. 
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Vagueness, however, as Russell points out forcefully, 
is not generality. A second emendation is thus required to 
demonstrate how generality is achieved from the vague image. 
As well as the vague image, according to Russell, there are 
required 
particular images of the several appearances •••• You 
will then not feel the generalized picture to be ade-
quate to any one particular appearance, and you will 
be able to make it function as a general idea rather 
than a vague idea. If this view is correct, no new 
general content needs to be added to the generalized 
image. What needs to be added is particular images 
compared and contrasted with the generalized image.1 
2 As Stace has pointed out, this solution would not appear to 
have solved the problem. The crux of the matter lies in 
Russell's assertion in the above quotation that one will then 
"not feel the generalized image to be adequate to ~ one 
particular appearance." (Italics not in original.) By com-
paring the vague image with other less vague images, one can 
learn that this vague image is inadequate to these vague 
images. This, however, is not what Russell is required to 
show if he is to answer the objection. How can one learn 
that the vague image is inadequate to any particular image? 
Berkeley's problem thus still remains. 
Russell's first defense depends upon distinguishing 
between the vague and the general by content. He offers 
1 Russell, Analysis of Mind, p. 221. 
2 Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism," Phil. of Russell, 
ed. Schilpp, p. 383. 
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another line of defense which may next be considered. This 
consists in distinguishing between vagueness and generality, 
not in terms of content but in terms of "the reaction they 
1 produce." The difference between the vague image and the 
general image on this theory consists 
merely in the knowledge that no one individual is 
represented, so that what distinguishes a general 
idea from a vague idea is merely the presence of a 
certain accompanying belef •••• A general idea is 
distinguished from a vague one by the presence of 
a judgment. 2 
This, however, would not appear to be a solution, since the 
next question to be asked is how is the judgment or belief 
warranted? No answer in terms of a theory like Berkeley's 
or Russell's seems to be forthcoming. To assert that such a 
judgment is present is to assert that the image is no longer 
in fact the vehicle of reference. The judgment is the vehi-
cle of reference. Furthermore, this last assumption so 
damages the torso of Berkeley's theory that it is no longer 
recognizable as the original Berkeleian theory with which 
the discussion commenced. Stace has put the upshot of 
Russell's efforts to emend Berkeley's theory as follows: 
Russell's theory is incapable of explaining the gener-
ality of thought, and ••• no torturing and twisting of 
particular images and sensations, whether vague or 
1aussell, Analysis of Mind, p. 221. 
2 Ibid., p. 222. 
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clear, can ever produce anything except particular 
images and sensations. 1 
Consideration may next be given to Berkeley's imag-
ism in the "Introduction." The most important passage in 
the "Introduction" to analyze for its imagistic implications 
is in section ten in which Berkeley comments upon Locke's 
triangle. He writes: 
(1) For myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imag-
ining, or representing to myself the ideas of those 
particular things I have perceived and of variously 
compounding and dividing them. (2) I can imagine a 
man with two headsj or the upper parts of a man joined 
to the body of a horse. (3) I can consider the hand, 
the eye, the nose, each by it self abstracted or 
separated from the rest of the body. (4) But then 
whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some par-
ticular shape and colour. (5) Likewise the idea of 
man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, 
or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a 
tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. (6) I cannot 
by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea 
above described. (7) And it is equally impossible for 
me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from 
the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, 
curvilinear nor rectilinear: and the like may be said 
of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. 2 
In this passage Berkeley makes two assumptions which, although 
consonant with his philosophy elsewhere, are not here made 
explicit. First is his general empirical assumption that all 
our knowledge is "derived from original sense-perception of 
particulars."3 Secondly, that our knowledge cannot, as a 
1 Stace, "Russell's Neutral Monism," Phil. of Russell, 
ed.S4hilpp, p. 383. (Stace does not comment upon what is 
here called Russell's second line of defense.) 
2 Berkeley, Works, II, ~· 29. (Numerals here inserted 
for reference not in original.) 
3Johnston, Berkeley's Philosophy, p. 121. 
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result of the first contention, extend beyond ideas of 
immediate sense perception, i.e. ideas of sense and ideas 
of imagination. This is the ultimate ground of Berkeley 1s 
objection to Locke. Grant these assumptions to Berkeley, 
and the contention of this passage is in effect that abstract 
ideas construed after the fashion of Locke are psychologi-
cally and logically impossible. In this passage Berkeley 1 s 
real contention is that thought proceeds by images, i.e. he 
asserts a variant of the constructive view of imagism. This 
assertion, however, requires proof and elaboration. 
The key phrase in this passage is Berkeley 1s asser-
tion that he "cannot ••• conceive" Locke 1 s abstract idea. 
Explication of the main employments in language-in-use of 
the term 1inconceivable 1 --or what cannot be conceived--seems 
required. Four possible senses of the term •inconceivability• 
may be listed, with accompanying examples. 
(1) An assertion may be inconceivable because one':l:s 
not informed or he lacks the necessary mental capacity 
to understand. Einstein 1s theory, for examp~ may be 
inconceivable to someone because he is too stupid to 
understand it, or he doesn•t know enough mathematics, 
or he isn 1 t interested, etc. 
(2) An assertion may be inconceivable because it in-
volves a logical contradiction, i.e. it is meaningless. 
A round square, for example, is inconceivable in this 
sense. 
(3) An assertion may be said to be inconceivable because 
it is unimaginable. It cannot be imaged or pictured in 
the mind 1s eye. Non-Euclidean space, or color to a 
blind man, for example, may be unimaginable in this sense. 
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(4) A belief may be said to be inconceivable in the 
sense that it is incredible or unbelievable. That God 
should wantonly inflict suffering, for example, might 
be considered inconceivable. 
It would appear to be the case that more than one of these 
senses of inconceivable may occur at the same time in cases 
in which a state-description was said to be inconceivable. 
Furthermore, only the second and third senses of the term 
'inconceivable' are of interest in this investigation. Com-
mentators on Berkeley seem usually to interpret his usage of 
the term 'inconceivable' in this passage and elsewhere in 
only the second sense, viz. that by the term 'inconceivable' 
Berkeley meant to describe cases in which logical contradic-
1 tions were involved. That this is the case on some 
1 It has been recognized, however, that •conceivability• 
and 'imaginability' are sometimes synonymous in Berkeley. Cf. 
Calkins, Berkeley, xxxiii and Johnston, Berkeley's Philosolhy, 
p. 125. This assertion has not, however, received Its ful 
measure of attention. 
The matter of 'inconceivability• and 1unimaginability 1 
is much more crucial, since many of Berkeley's important argu-
ments rest upon this point. Detailed evidence for this asser-
tion will be presented in the remainder of this chapter. 
The fact is that Berkeley is surprisingly lax in his 
terminolo~y for one who is so aware of the "mischief wrought 
by words. (Johnston, Berkeley's Philosothy, p. 125.) Luce 
offers an important suggestion in regardo Berkeley's termin-
olog~. He writes: 
It would be a great mistake to try to pin down conceive 
to higher forms and perceive to lower forms of thought; 
for it is clear that they both at times applied to sense, 
imagination, and pure thought." 
Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, p. 90. Luce tries to justify 
such looseness In terminology on Berkeley's part on the 
grounds that Berkeley was no pedant. (Luce, Berkeley's Im-
materialism, tassim, esp. p. 117.) This is no doubt true; 
Berkeley Is r ghtly thought to have a nearly perfect style to 
carry his thought. The fact remains that close study of any 
of the classical British empiricists reveals many difficulties 
resulting from a terminological laxness. 
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occasions cannot be doubted. One thesis of this chapter is, 
however, that in some important cases--that is, cases in 
which crucial arguments are involved--Berkeley's real con-
tention is that something is inconceivable because it is 
unimaginable. 
The structure of the argument in the passage under 
analysis falls into two parts: the first part deals with 
those things Berkeley can imagine; the second part deals 
with those things he cannot imagine. The first part includes 
sentences (1) through (5), and the second includes sentences 
(6) and (7). Berkeley uses the word 'imagine' three times; 
in each case it appears in what is here called the first part 
of the argument. (It may be conjectured that Berkeley does 
not employ the term 'imagine' in the second part of the argu-
ment to avoid repetition.) Demonstration that Berkeley 
intends by the term 'conceive' the term 'imagine• in this 
passage is suggested by the following consideration. 
Berkeley recognizes two classes of ideas: ideas of 
sense and ideas of imagination {idea-images). The differen-
tia between these two classes of ideas i~ found in the 
passivity with which the mind receives the ideas of sense, 
and the activity of the mind in the case of ideas of imagina-
tion. In sentence {7) he refers to "forming the abstract 
idea of motion"; this is a clear indication that an activity 
of mind is involved, i.e. he is considering idea-images. 
Sentences {6) and {7) are to be treated conjunctively as is 
shown by the phrase "an it is equally impossible ••• "in 
sentence (7). On the internal evidence of this passage, 
then, it is proper to construe the term 'conceive' as re-
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1 ferring to the capacity to imagine. In sum, what Berkeley 
"cannot • • • conceive" is in this passage for him unimagin-
able. What Berkeley finds unimaginable are abstract general 
ideas. 
Thus far two lines of evidence have converged to sug-
gest imagism in Berkeley's critique of abstraction; imagism 
in his destructive criticism of Locke's triangle, and imag-
ism in his constructive view of the role of images in dis-
charging the function of universality in thought, It is to 
be noted that Berkeley has not thus far asserted the polemical 
version of imagism. An important part of the polemical ver-
sion of imagism may be stated in the form of two propositions: 
(3) Images are the primary symbols in thinking. 
(4) All other symbols are secondary and derivative.2 
1Actually there are other passages that will be cited 
in appropriate places in which this synonymy of 'inconceivable' 
and 'unimaginable' comes out more openly than it does in this 
passage. Since further analysis of the possible senses of 
the term 'inconceivable' do not occur in this chapter because 
they would be redundant, it is undesirable to use external 
evidence from other writings in support of the alleged 
synonymy for fear of the appearance of circularity. 
2 There are two other important contentions of the 
polemical version of imagism: that imagism deprecates verbal 
thinking, and that a generalized image may discharge the func-
tion of universality. (For this second contention of the 
polemical version of imagism see Price, Thinking and Experience, 
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A case might be made for the assertion that Berkeley holds 
the first of these propositions, but he clearly does not 
assert the second since he allows symbols other than images 
to discharge the function of universality without requiring 
that such other symbols be derivative from images. The most 
that can be asserted is that Berkeley considered images the 
most important symbols in thinking. This latter weaker asser-
tion is, of course, the constructive version of imagism. 
Berkeley's comments on the triangle passage put this matter 
beyond doubt.l 
pp. 284-297. This was not treated in the first chapter 
because it would have required a treatment of the psychology 
of the image process, a task not attempted until the second 
chapter.) Berkeley would have disagreed with both of these 
tenets of the polemical version of imagism. Berkeley is very 
much concerned with verbal thinking and in the "Introduction" 
to the Principles makes some incisive remarks with a modern 
ring. These suggestions are not analyzed here, however, since 
they would add nothing to the argument. On the second score, 
the generalized or generic image, Berkeley was clearly wrong 
on a factual issue concerning the psychological processes of 
many normal human adults, who do in fact image in a fashion 
Berkeley considered impossible. 
lit was noted above that Furlong has denied Berkeley's 
imagism on the ground that Berkeley maintains that the parti-
cular discharges the function of universality. Furlong in 
"Abstract Ideas and Images" Berkeley and Modern Problems, p. 
132. Furlong, however, considers only the polemical version 
of imagism. He defines the imagist doctrine in the following 
manner. "An imagist holds that the primary, or basic symbols, 
which we employ in our thinking, are mental images, mainly 
visual ones: other symbols, including words, must be cashable 
in terms of these." (Ibid., p. 131). Furlong comments only 
on some of those passages-which have been considered in this 
investigation. With his denial that Berkeley is an imagist, 
defined in terms of the polemical theory of imagism, consider-
ing only those passages which have thus far been considered, 
this investigation is in agreement. That Berkeley is an 
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2. Immaterialism and Imagism 
Immaterialism, the doctrine that nothing in the uni-
verse exists except minds and ideas, is Berkeley's central 
doctrine. It is not the purpose of this section to analyze 
this doctrine of immaterialism for its own sake, but to test 
the degree to which imagism plays a part in the formation of 
the argument for immaterialism. The general thesis of this 
section is that at certain points, most usually by way of his 
critique of abstract ideas, Berkeley uses imagist arguments. 
It will be useful at the outset to present a summary 
of the various structural divisions of the Principles for 
purposes of reference. Aside from the "Introduction" to the 
Principles, which has already been discussed, the text of.the 
Principles falls into three main divisions. In the first 
division, comprising sections one through thirty-three, the 
doctrine of immaterialism is explained. For the purposes of 
this section, this first division is ofgreatest importance. 
The second division, from sections thirty-four to eighty-four, 
discusses and answers sixteen possible objections to the 
doctrine of immaterialism. Finally, in the third section, 
from eighty-five to the end, the implications of the doctrine 
imagist, so far as the constructive version of imagism is con-
cerned, is not considered by Furlong. He does refer to the 
passage in section 10 of the "Introduction" to the Principles 
which was here used as prime evidence thus far for Berkeley's 
constructive version of imagism, but does so only in a foot-
note and does not quote the passage. Ibid., p. 132, footnote 
11. This would appear to be a lacuna Inlnis treatment. 
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are examined. This third division shows the application of 
Berkeley's argument to mathematics, science, theology, and 
1 philosophy. 
Berkeley's argument for immaterialism proper, as 
distinguished from the matters of terminology considered in 
the introduction to this chapter, falls.logically into two 
parts: a negative argument designed to show that the physi-
cal world is immaterial, i.e. that material substance does 
2 
not exist, and a positive argument designed to show that the 
universe is spiritual. This latter argument includes Berkeley's 
argument for the existence of God. It is the negative argu-
ment that is of primary concern in this section, since it is 
in this argument that imagism plays its principal role.3 
lThis summary of the structure of the Principles is 
indebted to the editor 1s introduction by Luce. Berkeley, 
Works, II, pp. 13-17. 
2The terms •matter,• •corporeal substance,• and 
•material substance• are synonymous for Berkeley. In the quo-
tations to follow all of these terms appear. Cf. Berkeley's 
remark in section 35 that "the only thing whose existence we 
deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal sub-
stance" for evidence that two of these terms are synonymous. 
(Berkeley, Works, II, p. 55.) The term •material substance• 
will most often be used here when discussing Berkeley's doc-
trine since it brings out most clearly the difference between 
Berkeley and Hume at this point. 
3From this it should not be inferred that Berkeley's 
argument for God is here considered unimportant. Berkeley 
considered this argument the crown of his system. Traditional 
interpretations of Berkeley have tended to maintain that 
Berkeley is a solipsist, and that the argument for God is an 
unsubstantiated postulate in his system, a deus ex machina, 
introduced to evade this solipsism. One reSUit O:f modern 
researches into Berkeley has been to dispel this interpretation. 
What is more important for this investigation is that Berkeley 
never retreated from his attack on abstract ideas; this is 
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Exposition of Berkeley's polemic against material sub-
stance may most profitably commence by some account of what 
Berkeley means by the term 'exist.• Thing-ideas, since they 
are collections of sensory ideas, exist like sensory ideas 
in the mind.1 The following passage from section three of 
the PPinciples is central in this connection. Berkeley 
writes: 
The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see 
and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should 
say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my 
study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit 
actually does perceive it. 2 
This passage, and one or two others like it, may be inter-
preted as upholding phenomenalism, the doctrine that all 
statements about material objects can be reduced or trans-
lated without remainder into hypothetical statements about 
appearances (or sense-data). Phenomenalism, however, would 
important because where abstract ideas are under discussion, 
imagism is involved. (The evidence that Berkeley's polemic 
against abstract ideas was in full force to the end of 
Berkeley's days may be found in Luce, Berkeley and Malebranche, 
chaps. 7 and 8.) It would not, however, advance the argument 
of this section to any appreciable extent to discuss these 
two interpretations at length. 
1It is often asserted that the phrase "in the mind" 
and others like it are confusing, suggesting as they do the 
notion that the mind is like a box which is opened. This cri-
ticism seems weak, however. It is probably less misleading 
and equally accurate to say that the secondary qualities are 
effects upon an organism; this does not.seem to do violence to 
Berkeley's position and would seem to take the sting from this 
criticism. 
2 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 42. 
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appear to be at fundamental variance with Berkeley's con-
sidered philosophy. Berkeley's real position is that a 
material object exists if it is perceived; not that it 
exists if it is perceivable. It seems best to interpret 
this passage, and others like it, as slips on Berkeley's 
part.1 In this passage Berkeley mentions the fact that a 
material object exists if "some other spirit actually does 
perceive it." This latter clause clearly is not phenomenalis-
tic. 
The argument of section three is summarized in the 
following passage--the famous statement of Berkeley's "~ 
is percipi." Berkeley writes: 
There was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was 
a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a colour or fig-
ure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is 
all that I can understand by these and the like expres-
sions. For as to what is said of the absolute existence 
of unthinking things without any relation of their being 
1 Wisdom, Berkeley's Phil., pp. 9-11 holds that for 
sensory-ideas Berkeley's position is "esse is percipi," but 
that for thing-ideas·his real position is "esse is percif? 
posse," i.e. phenomenalism. His argument inessence isfiat 
Berkeley's phrasing is associationist, sensory-ideas are 
"observed to go together." He interprets this to mean that 
the apple does not consist merely in sensory-ideas, 11 but has 
to do with associated sensory-ideas, those the observer could 
have had if he used his other senses." (Ibid., p. 10) The 
apple, on this interpretation, is a visuar-5ensory-idea plus 
the tactual sensory-idea that could be obtained if one moved 
his hand appropriately. This argument, however, fails to take 
Berkeley seriously. The necessary and sufficient condition for 
Berkeley for existence is the existent's actually being per-
ceived, by the individual percipient, or "some other spirit," 
i.e. God. It is this latter proviso, at this point barely 
insinuated into Berkeley's argument, which makes the phenomenal-
ist interpretation of Berkeley supererogatory. 
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perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their 
~ is tercipi, nor is it possible they should have 
any exis ence, out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them. 1 
Sections four and five of the Principles, which may 
be treated together, are not to be taken as part of Berkeley's 
direct arguments against material substance, but as indirect 
arguments. The purpose is to show how it is that anyone may 
be inclined to believe in existence apart from perception. 
Here the doctrine of abstract ideas of the "Introduction" is 
worked directly into the Principles. Section four describes 
the position that Berkeley is attacking, ~· that "sensible 
objects have an existence, real or natural, distinct from 
2 
their being perceived by the understanding." This position 
is for Berkeley a "manifest contradiction."3 Berkeley's first 
argument against this position is contained in section four. 
He writes: 
For, what are theaforementioned objects [i.e. sensible 
objects like houses, mountains and rivers) but the 
things we perceive by sens~and what do we perceive 
besides our own ideas or sensations; and is it not 
plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combina-
tion,of them, should exist unperceived. 4 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 42. Another statement of 
"esse is percipi," which, r.roperly guarded, states Berkeley's 
pOBrtion is that Berkeley 'asserts that mind is immediate 
reality." Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., p. 181. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, p. 42. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. It is perhaps worth noting that Berkeley's 
identific~n of sensation and idea in this passage and else-
where has been criticized. According to this line of criti-
cism the word 'sensation' is properly used for bodily sensa-
tions like ticklings, headaches, vertigo, etc. According to 
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The appeal here is to "~is percipi" (or to avoid con-
stant repetition of the learned phrase--"perception is the 
this line of analysis, colors may be seen without feeling a 
sensation, properly so-called, at all. The upshot of this 
argument, stemming from G. E. Moore, is that Berkeley's 
arguments are made persuasive by the unwarranted assimilation 
of two things--idea and sensation--which should be kept dis-
tinct. Malcolm has probably given this argument as clear a 
formulation as anyone; part of his argument may be quoted. 
He writes: 
"I conclude that an expression like 'the experience (or 
the sensation) of seeing a table' is able to play an 
important part in making Berkeley's sceptical arguments 
persuasive because there is a temptation to understand 
it in two ways at once. On the one hand, it is fat~ly 
natural to regard the expression 'I have an experience of· 
seeing a table' as meaning I see a table. This inclines 
us to accept the proposition 'when I see a table I have 
the experience of seeing a table.' On the other hand, it 
is easy to suppose that the expression 1 the experience of 
seeing a table' refers to an experience in the sense in 
which the phrase 'the throbbing headache that I experi-
ence whenever I ride the subway.' When understood in 
this second way, the fact that one had 'the experience of 
seeing a table' would not entail the fact that the table 
existed. The total result of the ambiguous interpreta-
tion of the expression is that, on the one hand, one 
~eels compelled to allow that when one sees a table one 
has the experience of seeing a table; while, on the other 
hand, one is forced to admit that from the fact that one 
has the experience, it doesn't follow that there is a 
table; and then one wonders how there can be any justifi-
cation for an inference from the experience to the table." 
Norman Malcolm, "Discussion of Russell's Human Knowledge," 
Philosophical Review, (1950), p. 97. The argument ere, 
however, does not seem conclusive. It achieves its result, 
and the result is interesting and important, by attacking 
Berkeley's language. This, however, is not to the point. The 
classical British empiricists were all anxious to express 
philosophically what scientists were saying, viz. that second-
ary qualities were not in the objects independently of percep-
tion, but were effects of the objects on percipient organisms. 
To express this they chose a misleading terminology of 'inner' 
and •outer' with its resultant (false) problems of locus of 
the inner and outer. To attack this language is not enough~ 
one is still required to answer Berkeley's arguments center-
ing around the notion that perception is the criterion of 
reality. These arguments do not depend upon a misleading use 
of the idea terminology; they are expressed that way, but 
could be expressed independently of this terminology. 
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1 
criterion of reality.") This section is of intrinsic inter-
est for immaterialism, but contains nothing of an imagist 
turn and so further consideration of the passage need not be 
attempted. 
In section five, in which the polemic against abstract 
ideas makes an appearance, the argument takes an imagist turn. 
It is worthwhile to work through this passage sentence by 
sentence. Berkeley contrasts, in the first two sentences, 
the metaphysical view of abstraction with the prescinding 
view. The metaphysical view, which ~rkeley denies, he 
states as follows: 
For can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to 
distinguish fhe existence of sensible objects from their 
being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unper-
ceived. Light and colours, heat and cold, extension 
and figures, in a word the things we see and feel, what 
are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas or imprer 
sions on the sense; and is it possible to separate, even in 
thought, any of these from perception? For my part I 
might as easily divide a thing from itself. 2 
Actually, however, naming this doctrine •abstraction' at all 
is extremely confusing. Berkeley here asserts that it is 
impossible to separate colour from the perception of color, or 
hotness from the perception of hot objects. On Berkeley's own 
theory, however,~ and percipi are the same thing. For 
1 John Herman Randall, "David Hume," Freedom and Experi-
ence, ed. Hook and Konvitz, p. 298. Randall calls Berkeley's 
"esse is ~ercipi" as applying to material objects 1observation-
aiiSii.• his terminology will not, however, be employed in 
this investigation. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 4~-43. 
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abstraction to occur there must be two terms, one of which 
is subtracted from 
percipi," there is 
the otherj on the 
1 
only one term. 
showing of "~ is 
Immediately following the sentence last quoted, 
Berkeley considers another of his three views of abstraction, 
the prescinding view. He writes: 
I maymdeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from 
each other those things which, perhaps, I never perceived 
by sense so divided. Thus I imagine the trunk of a human 
body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose 
without thinking on it self. So far I will not deny I 
can abstract, if that may properly be called abstraction, 
which extends only to the conceiving separately such 
objects as it is possible may really exist or be per-
ceived asunder. 2 
?rescinding, or in Berkeley 1s phrase what may be "perceived 
asunder," is the usual psychological sense of abstraction.3 
Berkeley, however, incorrectly limits the process in this pas-
sage with his assertion that abstraction "extends only to the 
conceiving separately such objects, as it is possible may 
1 This consideration the writer owes to Stace. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, p. 43. 
3The definition of abstraction quoted in the second 
chapter of this investigation may be repeated since it states 
the general psychological view which is Berkeley's view--with 
one ~ualification to be pointed out below. Abstraction is 
the psychological result of which behaviour or experience 
is determined, not by the total psychological situation 
immediately confronting an organism but by some particular 
feature or features with the exclusion by the organism of 
other features." 
Humphrey, Thinking, p. 265. 
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really exist asunder." 1 As Calkins points out,. color may be 
abstracted from extension, and pitch from loudness, but 
neither of these exists asunder. This prescinding view of 
2 
abstraction is acceptable to Locke and Berkeley and is not a 
point of disagreement between them. This process is one in 
which attention is paid to a given part of a complex experi-
ence, e.g. the visual, auditory, or affective part of the 
complex experience. 
In the next sentence Berkeley says, "But my conceiving 
or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of 
real existence or perception."3 This sentence is of first-
rate importance for the argument of this chapter. Conceiv-
ability and !~ability are here identified by Berkeley. He 
does not speak in this passage of two powers, a power of 
imagining and a power of conceiving, but of one power with two 
names. It is not intended here to put more weight on this 
passage than it will carry. The passage only tends to con-
firm a clue discussed above that 11maginab111ty 1 and 1conceiv-
ability• may be used synonymously by Berkeley. The task 
remains of specifying such an identification of imaginability 
and conceivability in crucial arguments for immaterialism. By 
1Berkeley, Essay, etc., ed. Mary Whiton Calkins, xxxi. 
2 Although it is difficult to find a passage unequivo-
cally supporting it in Locke. 
3 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 43. 
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performing this latter task, one would show that Berkeley is 
an imagist and that such imagism is more than an aberrant or 
peripheral doctrine. 
In the last sentence of this section, Berkeley sum-
marizes: 
Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything 
without an actual sensation of that thing, so it is 
impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible 
thing or object distinct from the sensation~ perception 
of it. 1 
This passage does not further the argument and need not be 
further considered here. 
The upshot of this analysis of sections four and five 
may be said to consist in the establishment of the following 
three points. First, Berkeley considers his polemic against 
ideas as an indirect part of his argument against material 
substance. Secondly, it may be doubted if Berkeley has fully 
made his case at this point since the argument against 
abstract ideas is badly confused in section five. The princi-
pal difficulty is Berkeley's inclusion as one of his three 
views of abstraction a notion which is properly not concerned 
with abstraction at all, but is rather a reformulation of 
"esse is percipi." Lastly, it may be suggested that sections 
four and five tend to confirm the argument thus far that the 
doctrine of abstract ideas in Berkeley gives a valuable clue 
for possible imagism. 
1 
Berkeley, Works, II, p.43. 
322 
Enough has been presented to permit discussion and 
comment on Berkeley's polemic against material substance, the 
negative side of his immaterialism. The arguments to be con-
1 
sidered here are found in sections nine through twenty-one. 
The first argument that needs to be examined for imagism is 
Berkeley's argument concerning the Lockean doctrine of primary 
and secondary qualities. 
As a prelude to considering the argument in detail, a 
summary of the structure of the argument may be presented. 
Berkeley finds it agreed by everyone that secondary qualities 
are in the mind. If, however, this is the case, then primary 
qualities must be in the mind since primary qualities are in-
conceivable without secondary qualities, and primary qualities 
as well as secondary qualities appear various under different 
conditions of perception. Therefore, primary qualities are in 
the mind. Now primary and secondary qualities describe 
material objects without remainder, s~nce there is no material 
substance. The final result is thus that material objects 
are in the mind. 
1
rf both sides of Berkeley's immaterialism were up for 
discussion, its negative critique of material substance and its 
pOsitive argument for the spiritual interpretation of the uni-
verse, then consideration would have to be given to sections 6, 
7, and 8 which contain important material for the positive side 
of the doctrine of immaterialism. These sections, however, 
although important for Berkeley's philosophy considered in en-
tirety, contain nothing of interest from the vantage point of 
imagism. The argument of these three sections may be briefly 
summarized in this footnote. Sections 6 and 7 contain the 
first adumbrations of Berkeley's doctrine of God and his rela-
tion to human perception. Section 8 contains a discussion of 
the Lockean doctrine that ideas are likenesses of powers or 
qualities in the object. The principal reason for not discus-
sing this argument in detail here is that the main points con-
tained in this section are sufficiently brought out in what 
follows. The material of this section is only peripheraay 
related to imagism. 
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The argument concerningwimary and secondary quali-
ties begins in section nine. In this section Berkeley states 
the received doctrine of primary and secondary qualities as 
it is found, for example, in Locke. Berkeley writes: 
Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary 
and secondart qualities; by the former, they mean 
extension, 6 gure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetra-
bility and number: by the latter they denote all other 
sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes and so 
forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not 
to be the resemblances of any thing existing witbout.-s 
the mind or unperceived; but they will have our ideas of 
the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things 
which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance 
which they call matter. 1 
It is to be noted that in this argument Berkeley argues that 
upholders of the distinction "acknowledge" that secondary 
qualities are in the mind. It might appear that Berkeley here 
assumes what has to be proved, viz. that secondary qualities 
are in the mind. This criticism of Berkeley, however, would 
not be to the point, since Berkeley later offers arguments 
purporting to show that secondary qualities are in the mind. 
The possibility of this criticism arises because of the order 
in which Berkeley states his case. He commences with the 
received opinion rather than with the logical order of his 
own contentions. 
In section ten Berkeley offers an imagistic argument 
to show that primary and secondary qualities are in the mind. 
Since this is one of his two major arguments concerning the 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 44. 
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status of primary qualities, the demonstration that the a~gu­
ment is imagistic will support the contention of this chapter 
that imagism plays an important role in Berkeley's argument 
for immaterialism. The important passage that requires analy-
sis here runs as follows: 
(1) Now if it be certain, that those original qualities 
are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, 
and not, even in thought capable of being abstracted from 
them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. 
(2) But I desire anyone to reflect and try, whether he 
can by any abstraction of thought conceive the extension 
and motion of a body, without all other sensible qualities. 
(3) For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my 
power to frame an idea of a body extended and moved, but I 
must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality 
which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. (4) In 
short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all 
other qualities are inconceivable. (5) Where therefore 
the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also, 
to wit, in the mind and no where else. 1 
Berkeley's argument here is in brief that primary qualities 
are inconceivable apart from secondary qualities. 2 Color and 
1Berkeley, Works, II, p. 45 (Numbers of sentences not 
in original.) 
2 This passage is a fundamental text in the issue over 
the bifurcation of nature (Whitehead's phrase). Science since 
the seventeenth century has bifurcated nature and still does 
today. The philosophical problem raised is the justification 
of this bifurcation. If one accepts Berkeley's line of analy-
sis, although not necessarily committing oneself to this parti-
cular argument, one then must consider accepted scientific 
practice as dubious. On the other hand, to accept the occur-
rence of bifurcation without explanation is a philosophical 
scandal. The issue is in part one concerning the criteria for 
primary qualities. There seem to be two criteria possible. 
On the one hand, primary qualities may be construed as those 
~ualities for which a mathematical treatment is possible. 
tReference may be made to the third chapter of this investiga-
tion where Galilee was quoted. In this passage, which may be 
taken as typical, this was the criterion.) Secondly, primary 
qualities may be construed as those qualities which are 
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extension, a secondary quality and a primary quality respec-
tively, are "inseparably united." The key word in this pas-
sage, as in others where imagistic arguments are involved, is 
'inconceivable.• Here it occurs in sentence (4). In sen-
tence (3) Berkeley says it is not in his "power to frame an 
idea" without giving it "some colour or other sensible quality." 
That the term •conceivability• here has reference to what is 
capable of being imagined can be shown by the following con-
siderations. In Locke, as was discussed in the third chapter, 
'framing an idea• almost invariably has reference to imagery. 
Furthermore in a passage in the Analyst Berkeley specifically 
associates the phrase with the process of imagination. There 
he writes: "The imagination, which faculty derives from sense, is 
very much strained and puzzled to frame clear ideas of the 
1 least particles of time." The suggestion thus seems plaus-
ible that Berkeley in this passage means to say that he cannot 
imagine a colorless body; this would appear to be a fact so 
necessary for the determination of a natural object. This is 
Berkeley's line, as it is many other thinkers•. All that is 
necessary for this investigation is the examination of this 
particular argument in Berkeley so far as it seems to take an 
imagist turn; it is not necessary to attempt to settle such a 
far-reaching issue as the bifurcation of nature. 
1 Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 67. This passage is funda-
mental in considering Berkeley's attitude toward the new 
science of his day. Berkeley's views on this matter will be 
considered in the next section. 
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l long as one holds that such an image must be a concrete image. 
The same conclusion concerning this passage may be 
reached by another route. Let it be granted initially that 
of the four senses of the term 'inconceivable' discussed 
above only two would be possible to apply to this passage: 
(l) meaninglessness and (2) unimaginability. Consider the 
consequences of assuming that Berkeley intends (l) in this 
passage, i.e. it is meaningless or false to assert that body 
2 
can be extended and colored at the same time. An assertion 
that a body can never be both extended and colored by the 
same time is surely not cognitively meaningless, since one 
can readily understand test conditions which would either con-
firm or disconfirm such a proposition.3 On this variant 
Berkeley would be asserting that a proposition about a state-
description was meaningless when in fact such a proposition 
lit will be remembered that Berkeley requires of 
images that they are concrete; this is his reason for criticiz-
ing the generalized image. It is difficult to know what one 
individual can imagine as compared with another, particularly 
when dealing with images which lack concreteness and specifi-
city. This fact, however, is not at issue, since Berkeley 
recognizes only concrete images. 
2The distinction between falsity and meaninglessness 
was not clearly drawn in classical British empiricism, although 
it is suggested inHume. It is thus necessary to discuss both 
falsity and meaninglessness as possibilities that explicate 
Berkeley's intentions on this interpretation. 
3It is not here being implied that some version of 
the verifiJLbility criterion is necessary for the determina-
tion of meaningfulness. There is instead the much weaker 
appeal to the fact that even on a narrow interpretation of 
this criterion the proposition under discussion appears to be 
meaningful. 
327 
is not meaningless. But, a proposition about a body being 
both colorless and extended at the same time is clearly not 
false, since counter instances are possible, e.g. a window-
pane so transparent and perfect as to be totally invisible. 
A proposition about such a window-pane can be described and 
someone may have on occasion bumped into such a window-pane. 
This interpretation thus requires the assumption that 
Berkeley slipped rather badly in the passage under discus-
sion; prima facie one boggles at this suggestion, since 
Berkeley is notoriously acute in matters of the sort under 
consideration. That Berkeley intends by the term 'inconceiv-
ability 1 1n this passage to refer to what is unimaginable may 
thus be reached by the elimination of the possibility that 
he means to refer to meaninglessness. 1 
Berkeley's second major argument to show that pri-
mary and secondary qualities are in the mind is an argument 
designed to show that the status of primary and secondary 
1 Warnock may be taken as typical of the commentators 
who have in general seemed to assume that Berkeley means by 
cHnoonceivable 1 to refer to something logically impossible 
or absurd. In an interesting and useful analysis of this 
passage, Warnock implies that for Berkeley an assertion of 
extension apart from colour would be meaningless. He is 
then forced to suggest that Berkele~ is guilty of some sort 
of factual error. He remarks that 'Tales about invisible 
men do not strike us as meaningless ••• " Berkeley would 
not have thought such tafres meaningless either, despite 
Warnock's implication to the contrary. G. J. Warnock, 
Berkeley (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 101. 
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1 qualities is identical. The argument is contained in sec-
tion fourteen and commented upon in section fifteen. It 
will be useful to present first Berkeley's conclusion con-
cerning the argument. He writes: 
In short, let anyone consider those arguments, which 
are thought manifestly to prove that colours and 
tastes exist only in the mind and he shall find they 
may with equal force, be brought to prove the same 
thing of extension, figure, and motion. 2 
To show that primary and secondary qualities are on all fours, 
Berkeley employs an argument from the relativity of sense 
perception; both primary and secondary qualities "appear 
various," says Berkeley. He writes: 
After the same manner as modern philosophers prove cer-
tain sensible qualities to have no existence in matter, 
or without the Mind, the same thing may be likewise 
proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus 
••• it is said that heat and cold are affections only of 
the mind ••• for the same body which appears cold to one 
hand seems warm to another. Now why may we not as well 
argue that figure and extension are not pavterns or 
resemblances of qualities existing in Matter; because to 
the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a differ-
ent texture at the same station, they appear various, 
and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled 
and determinate. a 
1 Were a full-dress presentation of this argument nec-
essary it would be desirable to discuss the first of the 
Three Dialo~ues, since there Berkeley includes some ar~uments 
not include in the Princifles, and spells out somewhat more 
fully the argument of sect ons 14 and 15. There would be 
nothing gained, however, by this procedure since this class 
of arguments, all having to do with the relativity of sense-
perception, ts not imagistic. 
2 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 47. 
3Ibid. (Italics not in original.) 
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This argument is a powerful and puzzling one; it would appear 
to have a 
secondary 
tendency to show that the 
1 qualities ,i::a the same. 
status of the primary and 
Enough of this argument 
has been presented to warrant suggesting that in this criti-
cal argument Berkeley does not rely at all upon imagistic 
contentions. 2 
1This may be denied by objective relativists among 
others. According to objective relativists the primary quali-
ties "appear various" because they are seen from different 
p,erspectives. Consider shape as an example. Shape might 
'appear various" from different points of view--elliptical 
from one perspective and round from another. The primary 
qualities on a view such as this might still be objective as 
opposed to subjective. Such a view might maintain that secon-
dary qualities are subjective; primary qualities are objective. 
(This view would require a further argument to the effect that 
the structure or state of the sense organs was different in the 
primary qualities from what it was in the secondary qualities. 
This latter proviso would answer the objection that by parity 
of reasoning if primary qualities are objective, so must 
secondary be objective. This latter proviso would assert that 
secondary qualities "appear various" as a result of a condi-
tion of the sense organ whereas primary qualities "appear vari-
ous" because of perspectives.) Such a view is attractive since 
it offers an explanation of what scientists do in practice, 
i.e. make a distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 
Such a view is far more complicated than anything appearing in 
British empiricism; it does, however, suggest the close rela-
tion between their discussions and problems in contemporary 
philosophy. For a discussion of objective relativism (or as 
it is sometimes called, perspective realism) cr. William 
Savery, "Significance of Dewey's Philosophy," Philosophy of 
John Dewey, ed. P. A. Schilpp (2d ed.; New York: TUdor Pub-
lishing Co., 1951), pp. 487-489. For a discriminating account 
of the nature of the theory and objections to it, see Lovejoy, 
Revolt Against Dualism, pp. 79-155· 
2 It should be noted that no arguments of Berkeley's 
have yet been discussed which have a tendency to show that 
orimary and secondary qualities must be relegated to a status 1
' in the mind • " 
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In sections sixteen and seventeen, Berkeley presents 
arguments against material substance. These arguments, un-
like the arguments concerning primary and secondary qualities, 
are not designed to advance Berkeley 1s positive views, but 
are rather designed to c~iticize traditional views. The argu-
ment of these sections falls into two parts: an argument 
designed to show that the traditional view of substance--
that any given material object is a substance plus its per-
ceived qualities--is invalid; and an argument designed to 
advance the view that a material object is a collection of 
1 perceived qualities only. The argument against the tradition-
al view of substance is contained in sections sixteen and 
seventeen of the Principles. The two arguments there presented 
1In Locke substance was seen "as the something I know 
not what." For Berkeley there are two substances to consider: 
material substance and spiritual substance. The two do not 
have equal status for Berkeley; he denies material substance 
and asserts spiritual substance. Hume later gives the general 
empirical argument against substance, viz. that we have no 
idea unless it is derived from a previous impression, and that 
there is no impression of substance. Therefore there is no 
substance, in the sense in which it was traditionally asserted. 
If one is assessing the general validity of Berkeley 1s meta-
physics, one must come to a decision concerning his argument. 
If one accepts this, 'metaphysics, as for example Luce does ( cf. 
Luce, Berkeley 1s Immaterialism, esp. p. 97ff.), one must accept 
that his argument against material substance is cogent, and 
that his argument for spiritual substance is cogent. The other 
tack is to assert ~t Hume was in the right; what one says 
about material substance, viz. that it is unempirical to say 
one has an idea of it, equarfy applies to spiritual substance. 
It forms no part of the design of this investigation to choose 
between Berkeley and Hume at this point, since the question of 
imagism in the arguments of Berkeley and Hume is entirely 
separate from this question. This investigation is not con-
cerned with whether Berkeley•s arguments are right or Hume•s 
are, but rather with whether or not they are arguments depend-
ing upon imagism. 
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may be considered in turn. In section sixteen the argument 
turns upon the meaning of the term •supporting' in expres-
sions such as occur in the traditional doctrine in which 
substance is alleged to support the perceived qualities. 
Writes Berkeley: 
But let us examine a little the received doctrine. It 
is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter, and 
that Matter is the substratum that supports it •••• I 
desire that you would explain to me what is meant by 
Matter's supporting extension: ••• if you have any mean-
ing at all, you must at least have a relative idea of 
Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be 
supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents 
and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident 
support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal 
sense, as when we say that pillars su~porf a building: 
In what sense therefore must it be ta en? 
Berkeley here charges that those who use the term 'material 
substance' are guilty of using a mere metaphor. Berkeley 
would no doubt allow, as it would that anyone must, that meta-
' 
phorical language has its usages. Concerning the metaphorical 
language of material substance, however, Berkeley asserts 
that "for my part I am not able to discover any sense at all 
that can be applicable to it."2 
Berkeley's second argument against the traditional 
view of substance, the argument of section seventeen of the 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 47. 
2 
This sentence was omitted in the second edition. It 
is given, however, in the footnote to the text as it appeared 
in the first edition. (Berkeley, Works, II, p. 47.) 
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Principles, is that no meaning is attached to the notion of 
material substance except that of Being in general. Being 
in general, however, is an abstract idea and thus worthless. 
Writes Berkeley: 
If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers 
declare themselves to me.an by material substance, we 
shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning 
annexed to those sounds butthe idea of Being in general, 
together with the relative notion of its supporting 
accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me 
the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other. 1 
The general idea of Being is here described as a "most abstr-
act and incomprehensible" idea. The reason presumably that 
Berkeley finds this to be so is because Being in general 
involves something from which all particular determinations 
have been removed.2 Taken by itself the argument is not imag-
istic. Since, however, the critical argument against abstract 
ideas is an imagistic argument,namely that a concrete image of 
an abstract idea cannot be formed and thus it is meaningless 
to consider such ideas, the argument here has imagism at its 
root. The first argument considered bears no such direct 
relation to imagism. The argument of the first section is 
clearly not incompatible with imagism, however, since the 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, pp. 47-48. The supporting 
accidents, i.e. the perceived qualities, will be discussed 
below. 
2 
It is not here contended that this argument is a 
strong one. Berkeley's strong suit is the argument of sec-
tion 16. The argument of section 16 comes down to the fact 
that material substance, as conceived traditionally, is un-
emprical. This is Berkeley's real case. 
argument 
abstract 
is an appeal to concrete thinking as opposed to 
1 thinking. 
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Thus far only one-half of Berkeley's argument con-
cerning material substance has been considered--his argument 
against the tradtional view. The remaining half of the argu-
ment purports to show that the perceived qualities of material 
objects are sensations, and that sensations can exist only in 
minds. The conclusion of this general line of argument is, of 
course, that perceived qualities--which describe material sub-
stances without remainder--exist only in minds. The conten-
tion that perceived qualities are sensations--or in Berkeley's 
terms 'ideas'--is put by him in section three as follows: 
That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed 
by the imagination, exist without the mind, is what every 
body will allow. AnQ it seems no less evident that the 
various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense, how-
ever blended or combined together (that is whatever obj-jects they compo~e) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind 
perceiving them. 
In this passage sensations and ideas are asserted to be equi-
valent. Furthermore, the assertion is made that sensations 
can exist only in minds.3 The reason for this assertion stems 
1 Cf. Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, pp. 30-37 for a 
discussion of Berkeley's constant appeal to the concrete as 
opposed to the abstract. 
2Berkeley, Works, II, p. 42. (Italics not in original.) 
3Ibid., p. 51. This interpretation of Berkekey 1s argu-
ment follows Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, pp. 85-90. The 
only difference between the Interpretation he~and Luce•s 
interpretation is that Luce is unwilling toallow that Berke-
ley's terminology is misleading. It is here contended that 
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from seventeenth century science, with its doctrine of pri-
mary and secondary qualities. Secondary qualities like hot-
ness and coldness are in the mind. 
Although the argument Just considered is probably 
Berkeley's strong argument, another argument is offered in 
sections twenty-two, twenty-three and twenty-four. This 
again is an inconceivability argument, but with a difference 
from those so far considered. This argument is probably the 
most famous argument in the Principles. It is important to 
get this argument straight as it has been a bone of conten-
tion. In section twenty-two Berkeley deals with sensible 
existence, in section twenty-three with imaginary existence, 
and in twenty-four draws the conclusion from twenty-two and 
twenty-three that the "absolute existence of unthinking things 
are words without meaning, or which include a contradiction."1 
Consider the argument of twenty-three. Berkeley 
offers to rest his case upon an issue concerning the nature 
... 
of sensible existence. He offers first a demonstration "in a 
2 line or two;" the demonstration consists in "looking into 
Berkeley has used the terms •conceive• and 'perceive' synony-
mously in these sections and that this gives a misleading im-
P.ression of his argument. Berkeley's real position is that 
·~ is perci¥i" and in those cases where he substitutes the 
term •conceive for 'perceive' his position would seem to be 
"esse is conciti." This is a serious lapse, since it has 
resulted in cr tics foisting upon Berkeley views which, whether 
true or not, were certainly not held by Berkeley. (Luce himself 
is, of course, well aware of this charge of laxness of termino-
logy on Berkeley's part and attempts to meet the charge. Ibid, 
pp. 89-90. Here Luce overreaches in an effort to save BerKe!ey 
from being misinterpreted.) 
lBerkeley, Works, II, p. 51. 
2Ibid. , p. 50. 
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your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it 
possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or color to 
1 
exist without the mind or unperceived." As Luce puts the 
substance of this contention, Berkeley is here arguing that 
2 
"existence adds nothing to perception." It is to be noted 
that Berkeley has chosen his examples here to include two 
examples of primary qualities--figure and motion--and two 
examples of secondary qualities--colour and sou~d. The 
passage is a reiteration of "~is percipi;" perception is 
the criterion of reality. Berkeley then offers to rest his 
case upon one issue. He writes: 
Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this 
issue:--if you can but conceive it possible for one 
extended moveable substance, or in general for any one 
idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than 
in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the 
cauae. 3 
The first point to be noted here is that Berkeley uses the 
term 'conceive' in this passage when his real case demands 
the term 'perceive' since "~is percipi" is his philosophy. 
Consider this suggested emendation and a restatement of 
Berkeley's thesis: can anyone perceive anything existing 
unperceived? This is the real sting of Berkeley's contention; 
the Berkeleian answer to this question is no. 
1 Berkeley, Works, II, p. 50. 
2 Luce, Berkeley's Immaterialism, p. 88. 
3Berkeley, Works, II, p. 50. 
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Passing from the sense perception of section twenty-
three to imagination in section twenty-four, the famous trees 
1 in the park come up for discussion. Writes Berkeley: 
(1) But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than 
for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or 
books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive 
them. (2) I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty 
in it. (3) But what is all this, I beseech you, more 
than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call 
books and trees, and at 'the same time omittin~ to frame 
the idea of any one that may perceive them? t4) But do 
not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? 
(5) This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only 
shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in 
your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it 
possible, the objects of your thought may exist without 
the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you 
conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of; 
which is a manifest repugnancy. 2 
1 Made famous, no doubt, by Ronald Knox 1s limerick 
which deserves still another quotation. 
2 
There was a young man who said, "God 
Must think it exceedingly odd 
If he finds that this tree 
continues to be 
When there 1s no one about in the Quad. 11 
Dear Sir: 
Your astonishment's odd: 
I am always about in the Quad. 
- And that 1s why the tree 
Will continue to be, 
Since observed by 
Yours faithfully, 
God. 
Berkeley, Works, II, p. 50. (The reference to 11 fram-
ing ••• ideas 11 in this passage serves to confirm the lead 
hitherto followed, that certain terminology appropriate only 
to the faculty of imagination{ and thus possibly imagistic, 
can be specified in Berkeley.) 
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Berkeley here discusses what can be imagined and what is un-
imaginable. What is unimaginable is that "objects of • •• 
thought exist without the mind;" it is a "manifest repugnancy" 
to think that what is thought of is not thought of.1 
Berkeley has accounted for both ideas of sense and ideas of 
imagination; on neither score is there an appropriate exis-
tence to such ideas beyond the mind. One who considers, so 
Berkeley's argument runs, that he can imagine matter as 
existing outside the mind is self-deceived. The argument is 
imagistic, relying as it does on what is imaginable and what 
> 
is not imaginable. It is a constructive version of imagism, 
however, and not a polemical. Images play an important part 
in thought; to neglect their role in thought is to misunder-
stand thought. Such is the imagistic burden of Berkeley's 
analysis. Matter cannot be apprehended by either the senses 
or by the imagination. One-half of his argument against 
matter in sections twenty-two to twenty-four is dependent 
upon an imagistic turn of the screw. 
3. Imagism in Berkeley's View of Science 
Berkeley the philosopher made three original contri-
butions to science: a contribution to the psychology of 
1Interpreting the term 'conceive' in the fifth sentence 
as referring to imagining. Elsewhere in this passage Berkeley 
again uses •conceive 1 where he should use 'perceive .• This 
would not, however, appear to occasion misunderstanding so 
readily as laxness in terminology in the previous pass@ge in 
which ideas of sense were involved. 
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visual perception in the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision;1 
a contribution to the interpretation of the laws of motion in 
the De Motu; and a contribution to the foundations of mathema-
tics in The Analyst.2 These three contributions will be 
analyzed in this section not for their own sake, but for the 
·degree to which imagism enters as a formative element in 
Berkeley's attitude toward science. It will be necessary to 
consider the main lines of Berkeley's theory in each of these 
works, but the proportions and details of treatment are guided 
by considerations concerning imagism and not by an effort to 
present a fully rounded account. These contributions will be 
treated in the order in which they are stated above. At the 
conclusion of the section, a summary of Berkeley's imagism 
will be attempted, based upon the evidence of the three sec-
tions which make up this chapter. 
Berkeley published his Essay in 1709, a year before 
1 Hereinafter referred to in this section as the Essay. 
2 Berkeley also made contributions to economics in the 
Querist, but it would add nothing to the present chapter to 
discuss this. His contribution to economics is briefly sur-
veyed in Wisdom, Berkeley's Philosokh~, pp. 88-94. It should 
also be noted that the works of Ber e ey here mentioned as 
containing his views on visual perception, the laws of 
motion, and mathematics should be supplemented by other 
writings--usually second thoughts--on theee,.·;matters. The 
works mentioned abov.e are, however, his classics in these 
fields; they contain the passages which it will be useful to 
analyze in this sectiqn. 
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~he publication of the Principles.1 The philosophical pur-
pose of the Essay is to support the doctrine of 11~ is per-
cipi" at least as far as vision is concerned. As a contribu-
tion to the psychology of visual perception, Berkeley's 
purpose is to show that the visual perception of distance, 
magnitude, and orientation (or what Berkeley calls 'situation•) 
is based upon tactual perception. Secondly, he is interested 
2 in discussing the relation between sight and touch. Further-
more, Berkeley works in his polemic against abstract ideas, 
with its attendant imagism. 
The main thesis of the Essay is as follows: 
1Berkeley worked on the Principles and the Theory of 
Vision concurrently. cr. Luce, Berkeley ahd Malebranche, pp. 
25-26. The point is of some importance, since the Theory of 
Vision and the Principles are not in complete agreement. The 
Theory of Vision works out immaterialism for vision, but 
assumes, although not explicitly, a different status for 
touch, viz. the objects of touch exist in matter. One state-
ment, for-example, that clearly implies a different status 
for the objects of sight and touch is the following from 
section 55: "But though tangible and visible magnitude in 
truth belong to two distinct objects: I shall nevertheless ••• 
sometimes speak of them belonging to one and the same thing." 
(Berkeley, Works, I, p. 191.) 
There seems little doubt, however, that immaterialism 
was fully worked out by Berkeley before the Theort of Vision 
was published. Berkeley's reason for not present ng fils full 
doctrine of immaterialism in the Theory of Vision is put as 
follows by Luce: 
"Berkeley was a tactician; he had a revolutionary creed 
to announce; he was afraid of being laughed out of court 
before the case was heard; and he had hopes that by a 
wise economy of truth the notion of immaterialism •might 
steal unawares on the reader.•" 
Berkeley, Works, I, (Luce 1s introduction to Theory of Vision), 
p. 150. 
2These remarks on the purpose (or in Berkeley's term 
the 1design 1 ) of the Theory of Vision are a precis of section 
1 of that work. Berkeley, Works, I, p. 171. 
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The extension, figures, and motions perceived by sight 
are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch 
called by the same name, nor is there any such thing as 
one idea or kind of idea common to both senses. 1 
Berkeley demonstrates this thesis by consideration of distance, 
magnitude, and orientation. A few paragraphs devoted to sketch-
ing the main points of Berkeley's theory of distance and magni-
tude will be sufficient. Consideration may then be given to 
the relation of sight and touch. 
Distance, according to Berkeley, is not immediately 
seen by an observer in the way in which an object is immediately 
seen. The famous and simple argument for this position is put 
by Berkeley in the following way: 
For distance being a line directed end-wise to the eye, 
it projects only one point in the fund of the eye, 
which point remains invariably the same, whether the 
distance be longer or shorter. 2 
The estimates made of remote objects is instead based upon 
"an act of judgment grounded on experience."3 In other words, 
Berkeley discusses here what are now called •secondary criteria,• 
i.e. secondary judgmental criteria which the individual leanas 
d ,4 by experience to employ for the estimation of istance. 
1Berkeley, Works, I, pp. 222-223. 
2Ibid., p. 171. This argument is not original with 
Berkeley;-rr-was used by a number of other writers prior to 
Berkeley. Cf. Wisdom, Berkele~ 1 s Philosohhy, p. 82, footnote 
1 for citations of the works o other sue writers on vision. 
3 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 171. 
4For discussion of the primary and secondary criteria 
cf. Boring, Sensation and Perception, pp. 263-311 passim. 
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Such acts of judgment are based upon immediate perceptual 
data, according to Berkeley, such as the presence of inter-
1 
vening objects (interposition) and relative size. 
Binocular perception of distance was exp~ained in 
Berkeley's time by writers on optics, usually mathematicians, 
by means of the optic axes, i.e. the converging straii,ght 
lines from the eyes to the objects. According to this view, 
the nearer the object the larger the angle of intersection of 
the optic axes; the judgment of distance was supposedly made 
by an estimation of the size of this angle. Monocular per-
ception was explained on the basis of the angle of convergence, 
i.e. the angle subtended at the eye by the objects; the angle 
of convergence decreased as the object was further away. 
Berkeley rejects this account; his grounds, in effect, are 
that perception is the criterion of reality. Berkeley puts 
the matter in section twelve as follows: 
But those lines and angles, by means whereof some men 
pretend to explain the perception of distance, are them-
selves not at all perceived, nor are they in truth ever 
thought of by those unskilled in optics. I appeal to 
any one's experience whether upon sight of an object he 
computes its distance by the bigness of the angle made by 
the meeting of two optic axes. 2 
1 
Berkeley discusses these secondary criteria in sec-
tion 3 of the Essa{. Boring, Hist. of Exter. Psych., pp. 182-
183 points out tRa relative movement is he only criterion 
mentioned today which does not have its equivalent in Berkeley. 
2 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 173. 
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In section fourteen Berkeley remarks that "those lines and 
angles have no real existence in nature."1 
Berkeley's explanation of binocular judgment involves 
three criteria,2 two of which are usually granted today, and 
the third of which is still controversial but probably not 
valid. There is, first, a difference in the kinesthetic 
sensation, which, unlike optic axes, does exist in nature. 
This phenomenon, now called 'convergence,' Berkeley describes 
in section sixteen as follows: 
It is certain by experience that when we look at a near 
object with both eyes, according as it approaches or re-
cedes from us, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by 
lessening or widening the interval between the pupils. 
This disposition or turn of theeyes is attended with a 
sensation ••• 3 · 
Secondly, Berkeley mentions what is now called "blurring." 
He writes in section twenty that "an object placed at a 
certain distance from the eye, to which the breadth of the 
pupil bears a considerable proportion, being made to approach 
is seen more confusedly."4 This criterion, however, after 
two centuries of controversy, is not today considered valid, 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 173. (Cf. also section 19.) 
2These criteria are today called 'primary criteria' 
since they lack the inferential and mediate character of the 
secondary criteria. 
3Berkeley, Works, I, p. 174. (Cf. also sees. 17-20.) 
4 ~-· p. 175. 
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since blurring occurs beyond the focus as well nearer the 
focus of the eye.1 Finally, Berkeley mentions the "strain-
ing of the eye" or what is now called •accommodation.• 
When objects at a distance are brought too near the eye, "we 
may nevertheless prevent, at least for some time, the appear-
ances growing more confused."2 
Having distinguished the criteria by which distance 
may be judged from visual appearances, Berkeley offers an 
account of the nature of visual distance. Essentially 
Berkeley's position is that the perception of distance, 
although mediate, is a matter of ideas; distance itself is 
not perceived directly. Visual appearances, according to 
Berkeley, vary in faintness according to distance. The judg-
ment that a tree seen faintly is a mile away does not mean 
that what is seen is a mile away, for if this were the case 
it would appear the same as it was ap'proached. As the tree 
is approached, however, the appearances alter.3 Berkeley 
writes: 
Having of a long time experienced certain ideas, per-
ceivable by touch, as distance, tangible figure, and 
solidity, to have been connected with certain ideas of 
sight, I do upon perceiving these ideas of sight forth-
with conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted 
1Boring, Hist. Exper. Psych., p. 183. 
2Berkeley, Works, I, pp. 176-177. (Cf. also sees. 
21-29.) 
3These statements are a paraphrase of Wisdom, 
Berkeley's Philosophy, pp. 82-83. 
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ordinary course of Nature, like to follow. Looking at 
an object, I perceive a certain visible figure and colour, 
with some degree of fattness and other circumstances, 
which from what I have formerly observed, determine me to 
think that if I advance forward so many paces or miles, I 
shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch: So 
that in truth and strictness of speech, I nei;her see dis-
tance itself, nor anything that I take to be distance ••• 
what [an observer] sees only suggests to his understanding 
that, after having passed a certain distance, to be 
measured by the motion of his body, which is perceivable 
by touch, he shall come to perceive such and such tangible 
ideas, which have usually been connected with such and such 
visible ideas. 1 
Visual distance, thus, is denied altogether by Berkeley; he 
asserts instead that visual data which do not include distance 
are used to estimate tactual distance. 
Having offered an introspectionist account of distance, 
Berkeley considers magnitude, i.e. objective size. Berkeley's 
view of magnitude is similar to his view of distance; he re-
jects accounts based upon geometrical optics. In section 
fifty-five, Berkeley states his doctrine of magnitude. He 
writes: 
The magnitude of the object which exists without the 
mind, and is at a distance, continues always invariably 
the same: but the visible object still changing as you 
approach to, or recede from the tangible objects, it 
hath no fixed and determinate greatness. Whenever, there-
fore, we speak of the magnitude of any thing, for instanc~ 
a tree or a house, we must mean the tangible magnitude ••• 
Berkeley's doctrine of situation or orientation is similar to 
his doctrines of distance and magnitude and need not be con-
sidered here. 
1 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 188. 
2 Ibid., p. 191. 
1 Berkeley, in contradistinction to Locke, held that 
the sense of sight and touch are heterogeneous; there is 
nothing in common between visual and tactual appearances. 
Berkeley supports this contention by three arguments·, two of 
which do not involve imagism and one of which does. Berkeley's 
first argument for the heterogeneity of sight and touch is 
based upon the Molyneux problem.2 The Molyneux problem sup-
poses a man born blind and able by touch to distinguish a 
sphere from a cube. It then supposes the man's sight restored. 
The problem is, then, whether by sight alone, before touching 
the objects, the man could tell which is the globe and which 
the dube.3 The philosophical implications of the problem 
1Locke held that observers see and touch the same 
thing. "We can receive ••• the ideas of our extension, fig-
ure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling." 
Locke quoted in Berkeley, Commentaries, ed. Luce, p. 326 
(notes}. 
2so-called because of a "jocose problem" propounded 
by Molyneux to Locke which Locke inserted in the second edi-
tion of the Essay. Locke, Essay, II, chap. 9, sec. 8. 
Berkeley, Commentaries, ed. Luce, p. 325 is the source of the 
data. 
3The wider ramifications of the Molyneux problem 
should be noted. It is the central problem of epistemology 
and psychology in the eighteenth century. Cassirer discusses 
these wider ramifications in The Philosorh~of the Enlighten-
ment. (Ernst Cassirer, The Philoso¥h~ o he Enlightenment 
TnOSton: Beacon Press, 19551, pp. 0 -133.) He writes: 
"The decisive systematic significance of Molyneux's 
problem is ••• clearly indicated; the individual example 
which this problem presents called attention to the 
general question as to whether sense as such can produce 
the physical world which we find in consciousness, or 
whether to this end it requires the cooperation of other 
powers of the mind, and as to how these powers are to be 
determined." ~., p. 109. 
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are concerned with whether anything can be known concerning 
1 the external world except by perception. Locke and Moly-
neux had answered the query in the negative, and Leibniz 
took a middle of the road position, asserting that if the 
man was informed that the two objects which he sees are a 
cube and a globe respectively, he will know which is which, 
but if he is not so informed, he will not at first connect 
either object with the cube and globe he has touched. 2 
Berkeley's opinion, an extreme one, is that sight and touch 
have absolutely nothing in common whatever. He writes: 
But it has been, if I mistake not, clearly made out 
that a man born blind would not at first reception of 
his sight think the things he saw were of the same 
nature with the objects of touch, or had anything in 
common with them; but that they were a new s~t of ideas, 
perceived in a new manner, and entirely different from 
all he had ever perceived before. 3 
1Price takes an extreme view toward the problem. 
After remar~ing that the problem is famous and that strange 
views have been held about it, Price remarks that: 
"When I lay my hand on a penny I sense a cold circular 
expanse; and when I look at a penny from directly above 
I sense a brown circular expanse. It is just obvious 
that these two shapes are exactly alike." 
Price, Percehtion, p. 244. (Itaaias not in original.) To 
·the writer tis does not seem obvious at all. 
2cf. Berkeley, Commentaries, ed. Luce, p. 326. There 
have been, of course, a large number of attempts to settle 
the problem by experiment on individuals whose sight has been 
restored. Such experimental evidence has by and large been 
inconclusive because individuals whose sight has been restored 
are confused. Their reports thus lend themselves to the gamut 
of opinions that have been held on the problem. 
3Berkeley returns to the Molyneux problem again and 
again; the quotation here given summarizes his opinion. For 
a list of such other references in Berkeley, see Berkeley, 
Commentaries, ed. Luce, pp. 325-326. 
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The Molyneux problem, although important for Berkeley, parti-
cularly because of its relation to the thesis of the hetero-
geneity of sight and touch, does not contain imagistic impli-
cations. It is, however, for Berkeley probably his chief 
argument for heterogeneity, and in assessing the importance of 
imagism in Berkeley's argument at this point this fact is 
important. 
Berkeley offers a second argument for heterogeneity 
based upon an alleged qualitative difference between ideas of 
sight and ideas of touch. This difference in kind between 
visual appearances and tactual appearances Berkeley describes 
in section 129. He writes: 
Lights and colours are allowed by all to constitute a 
sort or species intirely different from the ideas of 
touch: Nor will any man, I presume, say they can make 
themselves perceived by that sense: But there is no 
other immediate object of sight besides light and colours. 
It is therefore a direct consequence that there is no idea 
common to both senses. 1 
Berkeley's third argument, an imagistic argument, 
commences by citing in section 131 a maxim that Berkeley takes 
for granted, viz. that "quantities of the same kind may be 
added together and make one entire sum."2 According to this 
argument lines may be added to lines and solids added to solids, 
but lines cannot be added to solids because the two are dis-
parate in nature. The same considerations apply to the proper 
objects of sight and touch; they cannot be mentally added 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 223. 
2 Ibid., p. 224. 
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together because they are different in kind. Berkeley writes 
in section 131 as follows: 
Now let anyone try in his thoughts to add a visible line 
or surface to a tangible line or surface, so as to con-
ceive them making one continued sum or whole. He that 
can do this may think them homogeneous; but he that can-
not, must by the foregoing axiom think them heterogeneous; 
a blue and a red line I can conceive added together into 
one sum and making one continued line: but to make in my 
thoughts one continued line of a visible and tangible 
line added together, is I find, a task far more difficult, 
and even insurmountable. 1 
Again the term 'conceive' is used. As usual in these Berkele-
ian arguments, it is necessary to decide which sense of incon-
ceivability is at issue: inconceivability construed as a logi-
cal impossibility, or inconceivability constnued as unimagin-
ability. If the latter sense of the term is intended, then 
the argument is properly called imagistic. That this latter 
sense is intended by Berkeley is made clear by his reference to 
an inability "to make in my thoughts" the required visible 
and tangible line. Such a reference to an activity of mind 
involves for Berkeley the making of an idea-image, i.e. an 
idea of imagination. This last argument occurs embedded in a 
series of sections in which Berkeley is discussing abstract 
ideas.2 
In the discussion of abstract ideas in the Essay, 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 224. 
2 Sections 120 to 160 of the Essay are dominated by 
discussion of abstract ideas. 
Berkeley gives his formal disproof of the doctrine in sections 
122 and 123 in brief form although no essential point is left 
out. It should be noted, however, that throughout the discus-
sion of abstract ideas in the Essay it is the abstract idea of 
extension which Berkeley is particularly concerned to analyze. 
Berkeley commences by defining the idea of extension. In 123 
he writes: 
We are ••• to understand by extension in abstract an idea 
of extension, for instance, a line of surface intirely 
stript of all other sensible qualities and circumstances 
that might determine it to any particular existence; it is 
neither black, nor red ••• nor any tangible quality ••• it 
is of no finite magnitude. 1 
Such an idea would have no sensible qualities. An image of an 
abstract idea of extension cannot, of course, on Berkeley 1s 
Y.iew be formed. He writes: "Now I do not find that I can 
perceive, imagine, or any wise frame in my mind such an 
abstract idea as is here spoken of."2 Further comment on the 
polemic against abstract ideas is not called for, since no 
points of importance are brought up in the Essay which have 
not already been commented upon in discussion of the "Intro-
duction" to the Principles. 
In the second chapter of this investigation it was 
suggested that it would be helpful to consider the possibility 
that the classical British empiricists were visualizers, i.e. 
1 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 220. 
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that their imagery tends to be predominantly visual. This 
matter was discussed in the third chapter for Locke, and may 
be considered in connection with Berkeley at this point, 
since it is the Essay that is the prime document for the 
assessment of visual imagery in Berkeley. The case for con-
sidering Berkeley a visualizer is best approached by consid-
ering Berkeley's theory of the divine visual language. This 
doctrine may be considered the main metaphysical result of 
the Essay as contrasted with the purely psychological con-
siderations which have thus far been considered. Berkeley 
maintains that the visible world is a world of signs, not 
made by man but by God, which enable man to direct his acti-
vities toward the true, the beautiful, and the good.1 As 
such the divine visual language implies an argument for the 
existence of God, but it is not from that point of view 
that the doctrine will here be considered. The doctrine 
here will be used to exemplify the mode or character of 
Berkeley's visualization. Consider section 147 as Berkeley 
wrote it for the first and second editions of the Essay. 
He writes: 
We may fairly conclude that the proper objects of 
vision constitute the universal language of nature, 
whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions 
1 These remarks concerning the metaphysical signifi-
cance of the doctrine of the divine visual language are 
indebted to the editor's introduction by Luce. (Berkeley, 
Works, I, pp. 152-153.) 
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in order to attain those things that are necessary to 
the preservation and well being of our bodies, as also 
to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of 
them. l: 
This stress on visualization may be read in connection with 
the imagistic passage which follows in the next section.· 
Berkeley writes: 
Suppose one who had always continued blind be told by 
his guide that after he had advanced so many steps he 
shall come to the brink of a precipice, or be stopt 
by a wall; must not this to him seems very admirable 
and surprizing? He cannot conceive [i.e. imagine) how 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 231. Berkeley made some signi-
ficant changes in his wording in the passage here quoted. Luce's 
footnote to section 147 summarizes the net result of these 
changes. There are two changes. In the third and fourth edi-
tions, which Berkeley re-edited late in his life and which thus 
show the unity of his philosophy, the theistic implications of 
his view are made explicit by the phrase the "Author of nature,' 
rather than simply •nature,' and secondly his change of wording 
from 'the universal language' to 1an universal language' indi-
cates that not only visible signs but all sensible signs are 
to be taken as symbols for the divine visual language. These 
changes show that once Berkeley's full immaterialist position 
is stated, there is no need to consider sight and touch separ-
ate metaphysically, although the heterogeneity psychologically 
is still adhered to. These considerations, however, have no 
tendency to show that Berkeley was no longer a visualizer in 
his later years, but only that "the divine visual language of 
the Essay merges into the divine sensible language of the Prin-
ciples." Berkeley, Works, I, p. 231 (Luce's footnote 1). --
This point is of some interest since Alexander Fraser 
offers a much stronger thesis than the one maintained in this 
investigation. This thesis comes out in the following quota-
tion from his article. He writes: 
"In Berkeley and Hume we have the philosophy of youth. At 
the age of twenty-five both these men had completed their 
chief philosophical works. And here again we have an illus-
tration of Galton's results [that the power of visualiza-
tion decreases with age). Their powers of visualization 
were much higher than in the case of [Hobbes and Locke)--
so high, in fact, that they could visualize enough to make 
them believe that anything they couldn't visualize did not 
exist." 
Fraser, "Visualization," Amer. Jour. Psych., p. 241. The thesis 
maintained here, suggested by Titchener, EXper. Psych. of Thought 
Processes, p. 211 is that Locke, Berkeley, and Hume differed in 
mode or character of their visualization but not necessarily in 
the degree of their visualization. 
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it is possible for mortals toframe such predictions as 
these, which to him would seem as strange and unaccount-
able as prophesy doth to others. Even they who are 
blessed with the visive faculty may (though familiarity 
make it less observed) find therein sufficient cause of 
admiration. The wonderful art and contrivance wherewith 
it is adjusted to those ends and purposes for which it 
was apparently designed, the vast extent, number, and 
variety of objects that are at once with so much ease 
and quickness and pleasure suggested by it: All these 
afford subject for much and pleasing speculation, and 
may, if any thing, give us some glimmering, analogous 
praenotion of things which are placed beyond the certain 
discovery and comprehension of our present state. 1 
Vision is here construed as almost a spring board by which man 
may take a leap to ultimate reality. Such a contention could 
only be made by someone who had the power of visualization to 
a high degree, i.e. someone whose imagery was probably pre-
dominantly visual. This is brought out by Berkeley's explicit 
admiration for the faculty of vision in this passage, and the 
aesthetic pleasure he derives from the use of the faculty for 
its own sake. 
Before concluding discussion of Berkeley's Essay, it 
is desirable to include fuller discussion of a topic intro-
duced in the second chapter in connection with Titchener. It 
will be recalled that for Titchener the perception of meaning 
always is carried in sensory and imagina.l terms, at least as 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 231. Berkeley's views on 
the divine visual language here quoted should be compared 
with similar remarks in the Principles, sec. 44, 65-66, 108. 
(These passages are referred to in Berkeley, Works, I, p. 
231 [Luce's footnote 1}). 
353 
far as new meanings were concerned.1 It was suggested earl-
ier that this theort was anticipated in Berkeley. It is 
relevant at this point to cite and comment upon passages in 
Berkeley which bear on this matter. Berkeley's attempted 
solution of the problem of the perception of meaning for 
objects in the material world must for him remain within the 
bounds of sensory and imaginal presentations. Were this not 
so, an abstract idea of meaning of the sort Berkeley rails 
constantly against would be admitted, viz. an abstract idea 
which could not be imaged. His problem is thus one of con-
struing meanings only from ideas given in experience. Like 
Titchener after him, and others who hold to some variant of 
a context theory of perception, Berkeley holds that it takes 
two ideas--or sensations as one would say today--to make a 
meaning. Berkeley's solution of the problem of the percep-
tion of meaning is to find meaning in the connection of 
ideas.2 In section nine Berkeley writes: 
It is evident that when the mind perceives any idea, 
not immediately and of it self, it must be by the means 
of some other idea. Thus ••• the passions which are in 
the mind of another are of themselves to me invisible. 
I may nevertheless perceive them by sight, though not 
immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in 
the countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks 
of a man, by perceiving the changes in his countenance to 
red or pale. 3 
1 For Titchener, it will be remembered, meanings to 
which the individual was habituated could be carried unconsci-
ously. 
source 
2 Boring, Hist. Exper. Ps~ch., pp. 184-186 is the 
of the explication of Ber eley at this point. 
3Berkeley, Works, I, p. 172. 
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Another passage relevant in this discussion is from section 
forty-five where Berkeley deals with the proper objects of 
sight, He writes: 
Sitting in my study I hear a coach drive along the street; 
I look through the casement and see it; I walk out and 
enter it; thus, common speech would incline one to think 
I heard, saw, and touched the same thing, to wit, the 
coach, It is nevertheless certain, the ideas intromitted 
by each sense are widely different and distinct from each 
other; but having obse~ved to go constantly together, 
they are spoken of as one and the same thing. 1 
As the last sentence of this quoted passage shows, ~rkeley 
appeals to an associationist principle to explain how the 
ideas of sight and touch come to be associated; the ideas of 
sight and touch are heterogeneous but they are "observed con-
stantly to go together." In commenting in section sixteen on 
the perception ofdistance Berkeley appeals to "an habitual or 
customary connexion" between ideas, 2 an even more explicit 
evocation of the principle of association. 
In section forty-nine Berkeley draws the inevitable 
conclusion from his argument, ~. "that we never see and feel 
one and the same object." This heterogeneity of the objects 
of sight and touch is in fact the central conclusion of the 
Essay. Berkeley recognizes, however, that this negative doc-
trine does not carry him all the way. The same words are used 
for the objects of sight and vision. Po~ively Berkeley needs 
to show, as he believes he can, "how visible extension and 
1 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 188. 
2 !.!?.!£..' p. 174. 
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figures come to be called by the same name with tangible ex-
tensions and figures if they are not of the same kind with 
them, 111 Berkeley's answer to this question in sections fifty 
and fifty-one provide a summary of his doctrine of meaning, 
He writes: 
We must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objects 
apprehended by the eye, one primarily and immediately, 
the other secondarily and by intervention of the former. 
Those of the first sort neither are, nor appear to be, 
without the mind, or at any distance off; they may indeed 
grow greater and smaller, more confused, or more clear, 
or more faint, but they do not, cannot approach or recede 
from us. 2 
In the perception of material objects, however, the associated 
idea (Berkeley's secondary idea) are ideas we have 
whenever we say an object is at a distance, whenever we 
say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always 
mean it of the latter sort, which properly belong to the 
touch, and are not so truly perceived as suggested by the 
eye in like mnnner as thoughts by the ear. 3 
This secondary idea is in Boring 1 s words "often taken note of 
to the exclusion of the primary idea which gives rise to it,"4 
The same considerations apply to wo~s; in section fifty-one 
Berkeley describes the process for this latter case. He writes: 
No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language 
pronounced in our ears, but the ideas corresponding 
thereto present themselves to our minds: in the very 
same instant the sound and the meaning enter the under-
standing: So closely are they united that it is not in 
our power to keep out the one, except we exclude the 
other also, We even act in all respects as if we heard 
the very objects themselves. 5 
1Berkeley, Works, I, p. 227. 
2Ibid., p. 189. 
3Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
4Boring, Hist. of Exper. Psych., p. 184. 
5 Berkeley, Works, I, p. 190. 
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The theory of meaning thus implied in the Essay is not 
directly imagistic but closely connected with imagism. The 
whole matter may be summarized as follows. The supposed idea 
common to both senses is an abstraction of the vicious sort 
against which Berkeley wages constant warfare. To demonstrate 
the contention that abstract ideas of extension are impossible 
Berkeley uses among other arguments his usual imagistic argu-
ment, that it is impossible to frame such an idea. His 
positive doctrine, his theory of material objects, is a 
theory which must undertake an account of meaning in sensory 
and imaginal terms. This empirical requirement Berkeley ful-
fills by a context theory of perception; meaning accrues with 
two or more ideas. such connection between ideas is not 
necessary but merely habitual. 
The De Motu, although not prized as one of Berkeley's 
best literary productions and thus probably read less than 
some of his other works, is Berkeley's clearest formulation 
of his attitude toward science. One way of looking at the De 
Motu is to consider that it shows for Newton's laws of motion 
what the useful senses of the terms used in describing motion 
are, and what are the senses of terms based on false abstrac-
tion. The structural divisions of the work are indicated by 
the subtitle: there are three major divisions in the work 
corresponding to "the Principle and nature of motion and the 
cause of the communication of motion."1 It will not be 
1The De Motu appeared in Latin. All citations are 
from the English translation prepared by A. A. Luce for the 
Works. This subtitle appears in Works, IV, p. 31. 
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necessary here, however, to treat these three parts separ-
ately and in detail. Instead consideration may be given to 
the criticism of absolute space and motion in the De Motu, 
since these critiques contain the essential imagistic con-
siderations. Berkeley's criticism of the doctrine of abso-
lute space and absolute motion are found within the second 
division of the De Motu dealing with the nature of motion, 
i.e. throughout sections forty-three and sixty-six. It will 
prove advantageous to begin with the criticism of absolute 
space; the doctrine of absolute space as described by Newton 
and others is described by Berkeley in sec~n fifty-two as 
follows: 
Tney [the Newtonians] distinguishdietween absolute or 
true space and relative or apparent space. That is they 
postulate space on all sides measureless, immoveable, 
insensible, permeating and containing all bodies, which 
they call absolute space. 1 
This absolute space, however, is characterized by the fact 
that all 11 its attributes are privative or negative 112 except 
extension "which is a positive quality."3 Such an extension, 
however, as described by the Newtonians, Berkeley finds is 
unimaginable. He writes: 
But what sort of extension, 
be divided nor measured, no 
ceived by sense or pictured 
I ask, is that which 
part of which can be 
by the imagination? 





nothing enters the imagination which from the nature 
of the thing cannot be perceived by sense, since 
indeed the imagination is nothing else than the 
faculty which represents sensible things either actu-
ally existing or at least possible. Pure intellect, 
too, knows nothing of absolute space. That faculty is 
concerned only with spiritual and inextended things, 
such as our minds, their states, passions, virtues, and 
such like. From absolute space then let us take away 
now the words of the name, and nothing will remain in 
sense, imagination, or intellect. Nothing else is 
denoted by those words than pure privation or negation, 
i.e. mere nothing. 1 
Here are mentioned all the ways of knowledge for Berkeley; 
sense, imagination, and pure intellect.2 The relation of sense 
perception and imagination is stated by Berkeley in its official 
form. The imagistic contention comes out more fully in the next 
section, section fifty-four. Here Berkeley writes: 
Let us diligently inquire whether it is possible to 
form any idea of that pure, real, and absolute space 
continuing to exist after the annihilation of all bodies. 
Such an idea ••• when I watch it some.what more intently, 
I find to be the purest idea of nothing, if indeed it can 
be called an idea. This I myself have found on giving 
the matter my closest attention; this, I think, others 
will find on doing likewise. 3 
As usual Berkeley's imagistic contention is an appeal to intro-
spective evidence; examination of the contents of conscious-
ness reveals that the required view of absolute space is not 
forthcoming as an idea that can be imaged. 
1Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 45. 
2 What Berkeley here calls the 'pure intellect,' con-
cerning as it does the nature of spirit, has not been analyzed 
in this investigation since Berkeley's imagistic contentions 
do not here apply. 
3Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 46. 
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Berkeley's vie~on the nature of motion are summarized 
by him in three rules. He writes: 
(1) to distinguish motion from the 
(2) to beware of abstractions; (3) 
as something sensible, or at least 
be content with relative measures. 
natures of things; 
to consider motion 
imaginable; and to 
1 
The consequences of the first rule are spelled out in the 
text in an interesting statement of what Wisdom calls the 
descriptive theory of scientific concepts and laws, i.e. 
"that they have a summarizing or descriptive function useful 
for computation and that they have no other role or meaning."2 
Concerning abstraction, ·the second rule of the above list, 
Berkeley has little to say, although what he does say does 
not in any way withdraw his usual contentions. This leaves 
the third rule to be considered for its imagistic implica-
tions. Rule three of the above list falls into two parts: 
that motion must be considered as something sensible or 
imaginable, and that one must be content with relative meas-
ures of motion. The latter point may be considered first. 
The doctrine of relative motion is stated by Berkeley in sec-
tion fifty-eight as follows: 
1Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 49. 
2wisdom, Berkelefs Philoso~y, p. 85. (This is most 
explicitly stated in Sec ion 66}.rkeley makes common com-
pany here with Mach and some early logical positivists like 
Schlick. (Cf. Moritz Schlick, "Description and Explanation," 
Readin~s in Philosophy of Science, ed. Philip P. Wiener [New 
York: fiarles Scribners Sons, 1953], pp. 470-473.) That 
Berkeley deflates what he considers pretentious analyses by 
metaphysicians in a way that reminds one of the early days of 
logical positivism is a fact that has probably not been suffi-
ciently noted. 
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No motion can be understood without some determination 
or direction, which in turn cannot be understood unless 
besides the body in motion our own body also, or some 
other body, be understood to exist at the same time. 
For ~' down, left, and tfght and all places and regions 
are ?Ounaea-in some rela on, and necessarily connote 
and suppose a body different from the body moved. 1 
In support of this relativistic view of motion as here opposed 
by Berkeley to a view of absolute motion Berkeley offers in 
the next two sentences following on the passage just quoted 
an imagistic proof. He writes: 
So that if we suppose the other bodies were annihilated 
and, for example, a globe were to exist alone, no 
motion could be conceived [i.e. imagined in it] so nec-
essary is it that another body should be given by whose 
situation the motion should be understood to be deter-
mined. The truth of this opinion will be very clearly 
seen if we shall have carried out thoroughly the supposed 
annihilation of all bodies, our own and that of others, 
except that solitary globe. 2 
In the next section, se11tion fifty-nine, another little 
imaginal experiment is offered which brings out neatly a cen-
tral aspect of Berkeley's imagism. The imagistic implications 
of the passage will be brought out by interspersing Berkeley's 
text with the term 1 imagine 1 and its variants for Berkeley's 
term •conceive• and by underlining. Berkeley writes: 
Then let two globes be conceived [i.e. imagined] to 
exist and nothing corporeal besides them. Let forces be 
conceived to be applied in some way; whatever we may 
understand by the application of forces, a circular 
motion of two globes round a common center cannot be 
1 Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 47. 
2Ibid. The word 1seen 1 is not italicized in the ori-
ginal; it-rs-here underlined to bring out the force of the 
visual imagery in Berkeley's little imaginal experiment. 
conceived b{ the im~ination. Then let us suppose that 
the sky of he fixe stars Is created; suddenly from the 
conception of the approach of the globes to different 
parts of that sky the motion will be conceived [i.e. 
imaginable]. This is to say that since motion is-, a rela-
tive in its own nature, it could not be conceived [i.e. 
imagined] before the correlated bodies were ~iven. 
Simiarly no other relation can be conceived [i.e. imagined) 
without correlates. 1 
Consider the last sentence of the quoted passage that "no 
other relation can be conceived without correlates." Here 
lies the key to much of Berkeley 1s im~gism. Material objects 
to be capable of being thought about must possess two charac-
teristics, qualities and relations, or so most thinkers would 
say.2 Sensible qualities (or simple qualities) are recognized 
by Berkeley, since they are given in sensory experience. 
Berkeley, however, is very doubtful about relations. He 
recognizes their importance, but on the few occasions he 
mentions relations it is always with hesitation and doubt,3 
The reason is not far to seek; relations apart from their 
relata are unimaginable, Here is the nub of many of the 
Berkeleian arguments thus far considered. Consider the follow-
ing remarks by Berkeley concerning relations. In the Commen-
taries, entry 733, he writes: "The obscure ambiguous term 
1Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 47. 
2 Cf. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, p. 166 to 
which these remarks are Indebted. 
3These remarks on Berkeley 1s view of relations are in-
debted to Luce•s masterful comments on entry 540. (Berkeley, 
Commentaries, p, 419.) Luce, however, does not draw the con-
clusions here drawn concerning imaginability and relations 
apart from their relata. 
Relation which is said to be the largest field of knowledge 
[i.e. by Locke] confounds us, deceives us. nl In entry 540 
in the Commentaries, Berkeley gives his fullest account of 
relations, an account which can hardly be called adequate. 
There he writes: 
The Vast, Widespread, Universal Cause of our Mistakes. 
Is that we do not consider our own notions, I mean con-
sider them in themselves, fix, settle & determine them. 
We regarding them with relation to each other only. In 
short we are much out in study the~ations of things 
before we study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus 
we study to find out the Relations of figures to one 
another, the Relations also of Number--. without endeav-
ouring rightly to understand the Nature of Extension & 
Number in themselves. This we think is of no concern of 
no difficulty b~t if I mistake not tis of the last 
Importance. 2 
In the Principles in section eighty-nine Berkeley improves 
his account somewhat, but still without offering relations 
their due as objects of human knowledge. He writes: 
We know and have a notion of Felations between things 
and ideas, which relations are distinct from the ideas 
or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be per-
ceived by us without our perceiving the f'ormer. 3 
Here again perception is the criterion of reality; 
the mind has notional knowledge of relations, but not ideas 
1Luce cites a number of other entries in the Commen-
taries in which Berkeley discusses relations (Berkeley, 'Com-
mentaries, p. 419), but the passages quoted are the only ones 
essential to the present argument. 
2 
Berkeley, Commentaries, p. 189. 
3Berkeley, Works, I, p. 80. Relations are considered 
also in AlciEhron VII, but the passages there add little to 
the account ere presented. 
about relations. Returning again to the text of the De Motu, 
consider Berkeley's remark in section sixty-three that 
"determination or direction is essential to motion; but that 
consists in relation. Therefore it is impossible that abso-
1 lute motion should be conceived." Relations apart from 
their relata are abstract and unimaginable; sensibles are 
concrete and given in perception. This is the root reason 
for Berkeley's imagism in both his attitude toward science 
and his attitude toward the material world in general. It is 
not here being contended that Berkeley's attitude toward 
science is without value; quite the contrary is intended. 
Berkeley's contributions to science are for this investiga-
tion one of Berkeley's most interesting aspects, and an 
aspect of his thought that is much neglected. His three 
contributions to science considered in this chapter all have 
an honored place in the histories of the subject. 
Berkeley's The Analyst is one of the great polemical 
works in the history of philosophy. Here Berkeley attacked 
2 the notion of the fixed infinitesimal, a quantity supposedly 
1 Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 49. 
, J p. 
Analyst controversy. 
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greater than zero but yet so small that no multiple of it 
ever reached a measureable size. Furthermore, the infin-
itesimal vanished on the method of fluxions (the then current 
name of what is now called the 'differential calculus•), but 
yet retained its effects for further use. Such effects 
1 Berkeley called "ghosts of departed quantities." They were 
"neither finite quantities, nor quantities infinitely small, 
2 
nor yet nothing." Berkeley's attack is based upon logical 
grounds. This comes out clearly in section twenty of The 
Analyst. Berkeley writes: 
I have no controversy about your conclusions, but about 
your logic and method. How you demonstrate? What ob-jects you are conversant with, and whether you conceive 
them clearly? What principles you proceed upon; how 
sound they may be, and how you apply them. It must be 
remembered that I am not concerned about the truth of 
your theorems, but only about the way of coming at them; 
whether it be legitimate or illegitimate, clear or 
obscure, scientific or tentative. To prevent all possi-
bility of your mistaking me, I beg leave to repeat and 
insist, that I consider the geometrical analyst as a 
logician •••• 3 
It would not advance the course of the present discussion to 
consider the mathematical issues involved in detail; it may, 
however, be noted that The Analyst has been described as 
marking "a turning point in the history of mathematical thought 
in Great Britain."4 Berkeley's purpose in The Analyst was 
1 Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 89. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., p. 76. 
4
cajori, A Hist. of Limits and Fluxions, p. 89. 
not to improve the foundations of mathematics but rather to 
attack mathematicians whom he considered materialists and 
1 infidels. In section seven this point is clearly brought 
out. Berkeley writes: 
All these points, I say, are supposed and believed by 
rigorous exactors of evidence in religion, men who pre-
tend to believe no further than they can see. That men 
who have been conversant only about clear points should 
with difficulty admit obscure onee seems altogether 
accountable. But he who can digest a second or third 
fluxion, a second or third differenc~, need not, me-
thinks, be squeamish about any point in theology. 2 
It will not be necessary to quote a large number of passages 
showing Berkeley's imagistic argument against the mathemati-
cal conceptions which he criticized. He makes the point 
clearly enough in section four. Berkeley writes: 
Now, as our sense is strained and puzzled with the 
perception of objects extremely minute, even so the 
imagination, which faculty derives from sense, is 
very much strained and puzzled to frame clear ideas 
of the least particles of time. 3 
In summary Berkeley's imagism may be put as follows. 
Berkeley's central and characteristic doctrine is immaterial-
ism, the doctrine that nothing in the universe exists save 
minds and ideas. Imagism is concerned with one-half of im-
materialism, viz. ideas. Berkeley recognizes two classes of 
1 The subtitle of The Analyst is "A discourse addressed 
to an infidel Mathematician." It is generally agreed that 
Berkeley was attacking Halley, the Astonomer Royal who may not, 
have been a Christian. For discussion of the question as to 
whom Berkeley's polemic was addressed, see Berkeley, Works, IV, 
pp. 56-57 (editor's introduction by Luce). 
2Berkeley, Works, IV, p. 68. 
3Ibid. , p. 67. 
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ideas by which the mind has knowledge of the material world: 
ideas of sense and ideas of imagination. These have their 
differentia in the fact that ideas of sense are passively 
received, whereas ideas of imagination show the activity of 
the mind. Because of this activity of the mind in imagination, 
it would not be correct to call Berkeley a strict sensational-
ist. He is, however, an empiricist as far as knowledge of 
the material world is concerned; his empiricism is an empiri-
cism of ideas. In criticizing doctrines which he feels lead 
to materialism and atheism, i.e. in establishing his immaterial-
ism, Berkeley uses an imagistic mode of argumentation which 
may be called his inconceivability argument. This argument 
consists in the demonstration that it is impossible to form 
an idea-image of a certain concept, and that as a result the 
concept should not be admitted into discussion without redef-
inition in sensory and imaginal terms. The inconceivability 
argument thus rests upon Berkeley 1s empiricism of ideas. 
Recognition of such arguments requires careful attention to 
Berkeley 1s terminology since frequently commentators have 
been led astray in the interpretation of Berkeley 1s argument 
on the supposition that by the term 1inconceivable 1 and its 
variants Berkeley has reference to logical impossibility or 
meaninglessness. In many cases, and often these are crucial 
cases for his empiricism and immaterialism, Berkeley means 
by 1 inconceivable 1 not logical impossibility, but unimagin-
ability. Further, many of the ideas which Berkeley finds 
unimaginable are relational concepts, which are, of course, 
unimaginable unless their relata are given in experience. 
These considerations apply most clearly perhaps to Berkeley's 
attitude toward science. Examination of his three principal 
contributions to science--his study of visual perception, his 
discussion of Newton's laws of motion, and his criticism of 
the foundations of the differential calculus as it was 
interpreted in his day--all reveal this mode of argument. It 
would not appear that Berkeley 1 s imagism is a polemical version 
of imagism, viz. that images are the primary symbols in think-
ing and all other symbols are secondary. Berkeley recognizes 
other classes of symbols--or in his terminology 1signs 1 --and 
such other symbols are not to be construed as derivative. 
Berkeley's version of imagism is instead a constructive ver-
sion of imagism; images do play a fundamental part in thought. 
Unlike Locke, Berkeley was fully conscious of this as is shown 
by the fact that he has a more fully worked out theory of the 
imagination than Locke, whose imagism is implicit. Berkeley 




Hume is usually considered to have made three famous 
analyses: of substance, of cause and effect, and of personal 
identity. Furthermore, Hume made an analysis of space and 
time for which he is, justly enough probably, not as famous. 
The three famous analyses are contained in parts one, three, 
and four respectively of Book One of the Treatise, and the 
analysis of space and time in part two. These analyses are 
all based upon Hume's version of an empiricism of ideas. This 
chapter will have as its main task analysis of the imagism 
involved inHume's account of substance, of space and time, 
and of cause and effect. The central imagist contention of 
his account of personal identity will be treated in the sum-
mary at the end of the chapter since it would add nothing new 
in principle to consider this analysis in detail in a separ-
ate section of this chapter. 
The leading and characteris~ic Humean principle that 
will serve to guide and organize the material of this chapter 
is pbenomenalism,1 a doctrine that has not been thus far 
1Hume 1s philosophy has been variously described as 
scepticism, naturalism, phenomenalism, positivism, association-
ism, realism, and empiricism. All of these definitions of the 
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employed in this investigation, except to suggest its inappli-
cability to Berkeley. Phenomenalism and empiricism will thus 
be taken here as the essential and characteristic Humean doc-
trines. A useful definition of phenomenalism as it may be 
applied to Hume is that given by Laird. Laird writes: 
Phenomenalism is the doctrine that all our knowledge, 
all our belief, and all our conjectures begin and end 
with appearances; that we cannot go behind or beyond 
these; and that we should not try to do so. Sensory 
phenomenalism is the doctrine that such appearances a~ 
in the last analysis, either sensations or images which 
echo and mimic sensations. If the term •experience' is 
taken to mean •sense-experience,' a philosophy which 
professes to be nothing but a prolonged appeal to 
•experience' is a pure sensory phenomenalism. 1 
essential tendency of Hume's philosophy, if defined carefully, 
can be defended. (Cf. J. A. Passmore, Hume•s Intentions 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952], Bassim for 
discussion of several of these themes in Hume).ere an account 
of Hume 1s philosophy in its entirety intended in this investi-
gation, it would be necessary to discuss these several inter-
pretations of Hume; since no such task is intended, it will be 
sufficient in this note to remark that other interpretations 
are both useful and possible. 
1John Laird, Hume 1s Philosophy of Human Nature (N.Y.: 
E. P. Dutton and Co., n.d.) p. 25. «talrd goes on to remark on 
this page, as specified in detail in later chapters, that Hume 
goes on to mitigate this pure sensory phenomenalism, but con-
tends that this moment in Hume 1s philosophy is central from 
first to last. 
This definition of phenomenalism may be compared with 
the usual formulation given in recent writings on the subject. 
Chisholm's formulation may be taken as useful since it does not 
involve reference to disputed sense-data. Chisholm defines 
phenomenalism as "the view that statements about material 
things may be translated into statements about appearances." 
Chisho.lm then goes on to give the standard critic ism of pheno-
menalism (on any of its usual definitions} that phenomenalism 
is untenable since no phenomenalist "has ever been able to 
make the re~uired translations. And therefore we have no map 
to examine.' Roderick M. Chisholm, "Symposium: The Concept 
of Empirical Evidence)." Journal of Philosohhy, LIII, (November 
1956), 729, footnote~. Chisholm offers tIs definition in a 
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The primary text for imagism in Hume is Book I of 
the Treatise. When Hume came to write the Enquiry, he omitted 
the distinction between simple and complex ideas, between 
ideas of memory and ideas of imagination, and did not dis-
cuss abstract ideas at length--all doctrines which are essen-
tial to his imagism.1 There is imagism in the Enquiry chiefly 
because the distinction between impressions and ideas is still 
drawn, but this latter distinction is more fully developed in 
the Treatise. The occasional quotation of the Enquiry, as a 
result, will be only for the purpose of supplementing the 
Treatise, particularly in the discussion of cause and effect, 
where the argument of the Enquiry is on occasion more clearly 
put. 
Although Hume started with a phenomenalism which 
implied that any and every perception of the mind was either 
an impression or an image, he was unable to sustain this posi-
tion. Concerning the implication that every perception of the 
mind is either an impression or an image, Maund writes: 
footnote commenting upon Hume, Such a definition as this, how-
ever, will not be used in this investigation only because it 
is more useful for the purposes of discussing imagism to use 
the language of introspective psychology, not because of any 
doctrinal difference between the older formulations of pheno-
menalism and those current in recent literature, i.e. litera-
ture on phenomenalism arising out of contemporary debates over 
logical positivism. 
1David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding 
and concerning Principles of Morals, ed~. A. Selby-Blgge 
(2d. ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), xii, For a full 
discussion see the remainder of the editor's introduction. 
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The view that the implication is due to Hume's preoccu-
pation with impressions and ideas, and his desire to 
establish his starting-point, and that he had not con-
sidered it sufficiently either to accept or reject it, 
is borne out by the fact that even when he appears to 
be asserting that all accusatives [Maund's name for 
what are here called 'presentations'] are impressions 
or images he is also discussing relations and abstract 
ideas. Thus the two elements are present side by side 
from the very beginning, but the dominating one gives 
place to the other as the argument proceeds. In the 
Enquiry, when the argument is recast, the claims for 
impressions and ideas are very much modified. Hume 
certainly begins with them again, but his discussion of 
them is brief, and he asserts only that 'all the materi-
als of thinking are derived from our outward or inward 
sentiment,• quickly passes to other accusatives which he 
then regards as more important. 1 
It will not, however, be necessary in this investigation to 
treat critically the nature of this shift in doctrine, except 
insofar as it shows the limitations of imagism when consistently 
carried out to its logical conclusion. The attempt:to tell 
the story of the human mind entirely in sensory and imaginal 
terms has never been carried further in epistemology than by 
Hume. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss the view 
issuing from this imagistic starting point, and not to offer 
strictures against it. 
In comment upon certain topics there will be noted a 
disparity of length between the treatment of some topics in 
this chapter and the treatment accorded to the same topics in 
previous chapters on Locke and Berkeley. This should not, 
however, be taken to indicate that such topics are considered 
less important or less deserving of treatment in Hume than 
they were in Locke or Berkeley. Had the historical order 
1constance Maund, Hume 1s Theory of Knowledge, (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1937), pp. 168-169. 
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been reversed so that Hume was treated first, the lengths 
would more or less have been reversed. It should also be 
specifically noted that it will not be possible, within the 
lengths prescribed for such a chapter as the present one, to 
discuss all or even most of Hume's arguments. Because of 
space limitations a number of philosophically interesting 
topics will not be discussed at all. There have been two 
principles guiding the selection of topics to be treated in 
this chapter. First, those topics essential to Hume's philo-
sophy as a whole,--at least so far as it is here conceived 
with phenomenalism as its leading characteristic--have been 
included in order to set imagism within the framework of the 
whole. Secondly, those topics in whose treatment Hume 
employs imagistic arguments have been treated more fully. 
As it turns out, those topics in which Hume employs imagist 
arguments are1not, in general, peripheral, but are central to 
his philosophy. For this reason there does not seem to be 
any injustice done to the main torso of his work, although, 
of course, the proportion of treatment would be different 
were another problem under examination. 
1. 1 Imagism in the Elements of Hume 1s Philosophy 
It is the purpose of this section to provide an ac-
count of the elements or Hume's philosophy. The topics to be 
considered are Hume's account of the contents of the mind, an 
1The phrase "the~elements of this philosophy" is used 
by Hume to describe the topics treated in Book I, part 1. 
(Hume, Treatise. p. 13. Unless otherwise indicated all refer-
ences are to the page numbers of the Selby-Bigge edition of 
the Treatise) • 
373 
account of the doctrine of imaginative association, and fin-
ally Hume's account of abstract ideas.1 
In the open~ng sentence of the Treatise Hume lays it 
down that "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve 
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call 
2 impression and ideas." Impressions and ideas are distin-
guished by the superior degree of "force and liveliness" with 
3 
which the former "strike the mind." Impressions, which enter 
the mind "with most force and violence," include "sensations, 
passions, and emotions."4 Ideas are "the faint images of 
these in thinking and reasoning."5 Perception, thus, for 
Hume is the genus of which impression and idea are exhaustive 
6 
species. In the terminology of contemporary psychology, 
Hume 1s impressions include what today would be called 'sensa-
tion' and 'perception. 1 Hume 1 s ideas would today be called 
'images.' 7 
1In Book I, part 1 Hume also introduces the doctrine 
of relations, but discussion of this topic is best deferred 
until a later point, except to show the connection between re-
lations and the imagination. 




6The term 'idea• in Hume should be contrasted with 
Locke's usage of the term. Hume remarks that he wished "to 
restore the word, idea, to its original usage, from which Mr. 
Locke had perverted it." (Hume, Treatise, p. 2, footnote 1). 
In Locke ideas were the genus; Hume halves Locke's ideas into 
impressions and ideas. 
7cf. Boring, Hist. of Exp. Psy., p. 188. 
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Hume did not particularly like the term 'impression' 
since it seemed to include in its signification the "manner 
in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul" 
whereas Hume was not interested in defining perceptions 
physiologically or by reference to objects absent or present. 
But he knew of no other suitable name "either in English or 
any other language."1 There are two kinds of impressions: 
impressions of sensation, and impressions of reflection. The 
former "arises in the soul originally from unknown causes" 
and the latter are "derived in a great measure from our ideas."2 
An original sensation of pain or pleasure may be copied by 
the mind as an idea of pain or pleasure and this idea of pain 
or pleasure, recurring, may cause an impression of reflection. 
It is important to recognize in this temporal process that 
ideas must be based upon antecedent impressions of sensation, 
although impressions of reflection may be derived from ideas. 
These in turn, however, are derived from impressions of 
sensation. This temporal priority of the impression is 
crucial inHume's psychology. 
Within the field of ideas, Hume recognizes two classes: 
ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. Ideas of memory 
and imagination are classified as that faculty "by which we 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 2, footnote 1. 
2 
~-· p. 7. 
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1 
repeat our impressions," Memories are repeated impressions 
which differ in two respects both from their prototypical 
impressions and from ideas or imagination: in force and 
vivacity a memory is "somewhat intermediate betwixt an impres-
2 
sion and an idea," and 
a manner ty 1d down"3 to 
in their recurrence memories are "in 
4 
the order or the original impressions. 
The upshot is thus that in the matter of force and vivacity 
impressions are the most forceful, memory-images are next 
most forceful, and idea-images are most "faint and languid."5 
There is a further division of the "two species of 
perception"6 into simple and complex impressions and ideas. 
Simple ideas and impressions are "such as admit of no distinc-
tion or separation."7 Complex impressions and ideas, on the 
other hand, "may be distinguished into parts."8 Although 
this distinction is of importance for Hume 1s theory, his dis-
cussion or the notion is meager. Acceptance by Hume or this 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 8. 
2Ibid. 
3 Ibid., p. 9. 
4 Hume, in section 3, "of the ideas of memory and ima-
gination", in distinguishing between memory and imagination 
leaves out what perhaps should be taken as the essential 
characteristic of memory as differentiated from imagination, 
viz. the reference to the past occurring in memory-images. 
5Hume, Treatise, p.:g. (It should be noted that Hume's 
ideas of memory are here called 'memory-images' and his ideas 
of imagination are called 'idea-images.•) 
6Hume, Treatise, p. 4. 
7 Ibid., p. 2. 
8 
~·· p. 2. 
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distinction between simple and complex ideas involves Hume 
in a compositionalism similar to Locke's. Such a composi-
tionalism, however, is to be distinguished, as it was in 
Locke, from empiricism. This compositionalism Laird des-
cribes as follows: 
[the distinction between simple and complex] indicated 
in fact, Hume•s acceptance of the age-long ideal of 
explanation according to which the business of thinking 
was to discover what was (analytically or visibly?) 
simple, and thereafter to •explain' anything, either by 
exhibiting its ultimate simplicity, or its composition 
out of simple elements. 1 
Simple ideas copy impressions, and complex ideas are derived 
from impressions, although the derivation of the latter is 
not described as that of copying. Hume's rule for the rela-
tion between simple ideas and impressions, holding "without 
exception," is that "every simple idea has a simple impres-
sion which resembles it; and every simple impression a 
correspondent idea."2 The proof of this doctrine is that 
"constant experience" teaches that.the "simple impressions 
always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas."3 
One must see scarlet before one can imagine scarlet. Con-
firmation is given to the doctrine by the fact that in cases 
of psychological deficit such as blindness, the idea could 
not be imagined at all. 
lLaird, Hume's Philosophy, p. 28. 
2 Hume, Treatise, p. 3. 
3 Ibid., p. 5. 
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The foregoing analysis of the contents of the mind 
is Hume's statement of the thesis of empiricism of ideas. 
It may be summarized as follows. Hume divides the contents 
of the mind into impressions and ideas. The distinction 
between impressions and ideas is found in an intrinsic 
quality of impressions, viz. their force and vivacity.1 
Every simple idea is a copy of a simple impression, and com-
plex ideas are built up from simple ideas which are them-
selves copies of impressions. Lastly, Hume proves that 
impressions are temporally prior to ideas by the considera-
tions of simple observation, and by the fact that we never 
have a simple idea without having had a previous impression. 
Hume's doctrine of an empiricism of ideas is Locke's doctrine 
made consistent. This consistency is achieved by the distinc-
tion of impression and idea, which allows a clear statement 
of the temporal and logical order necessary to explain the 
contents of the mind by a genetic account. Further, con-
sistency is achieved by avoiding the trap into which Locke 
fell of finding the source of ideas in bodies without us, 
2 
which, by definition, the mind can never know. 
1This distinction between impressions and ideas as 
found in the characteristic qualities of the experience should 
be contrasted with Locke, who, it will be remembered, distin-
guished ideas of sensation from ideas of reflection by their 
sources in experience. Ideas of sense come "from bodies with-
out us";ideas of reflection are known by examination of "the 
operations of ••• mind." Locke's subjectivism, however, that 
the mind knows only its own ideas, gives him the problem of 
explaining how the mind knows this unknown external reality. 
2This statement of the empiricist thesis in Hume is 
indebted to Berlin, Age of Enlightenment, pp. 165-166. 
378 
It should be noted that the Humean doctrine of 
empiricism is not reducible to sensationalism, since Hume 
allows impressions of reflection. Hume, and earlier Locke, 
were concerned to consider the origin of ideas; their argu-
ment does not assert that all knowledge is derived from 
sensation. The mind operates on the data given to it by the 
senses. Once more the analogy of the meat and the meat 
grinder is applicable; it is necessary to have the meat but 
it is also necessary to have the meat grinder; it is neces-
sary to have sensation but it is also necessary to have the 
mind operate on data received from the senses. 
Hume, however, recognizes one "contradictory phaeno-
menon" which might tend to prove "that 'tis not absolutely 
impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impres-
sions, "1 ~· the missing shade of blue. This case presents 
the leading features of many imaginal experiments in the 
Treatise. The psychological validity of Hume 1s account and 
the significance of the topic for Hume 1 s theory need comment. 
Suppose a series of shades of blue from very light to very 
2 dark are set out before the individual, save one missing shade. 
1 Hume, Treatise, 5. 
2Whitehead points out that the exception "cannot be 
restricted to colour, and must be extended to sound, and smell, 
and to all graduations of sensations." Whitehead, Process and 
Realitf, p. 201. As Church points out, Hume compares sounds 
and co ors in the paragraph containing the discussion of the 
missing shade of blue. {Ralph w. Church, Hume•s Theory of the 
Understanding [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 19351, 
p. 25r.) Hume thus would probably accept Whitehead's exten-
sion with equanimity. 
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The question is, then, could such a shade be imaginatively 
supplied, assuming the individual had never before experienced 
the shade? Hume writes: 
Let all different shades of that colour, except a single 
one [the missing shade], be placed before him, descend-
ing gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis 
plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade 
is wanting, and will be sensible that, there is a greater 
distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, 
than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for 
him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, 
and raise up to himself the idea or that particular shade, 
tho it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I 
believe there are few but will be or opinion that he can; 
and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are 
not always derived from their correspondent impressions. 1 
Hume remarks that "the instance is so particular and singular, 
that tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that 
2 for it alone we should alter our general maxim." Hume main-
tains that the gap in the color series will be observed. There 
is no reason to doubt that this is the case. Hume, furthermore, 
asserts that anyone could imaginatively supply the missing 
shade "tho it had never been conveyed to him by the senses." 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 6. 
2 Hume, Treatise, p. 6. Laird holds that the missing 
shade of blue is an afterthought Hume learned in France from 
some Cartesian. He cites evidence in the form or a similar 
problem in the Regulae. This is an interesting hypothesis. 
Hume, when stating fils maxim concerning no idea without a 
previous impression, says that this admits of no exceptions. 
He then offers the exception or the missing shade of blue. 
This is a natural lapse if it were added as an afterthought 
and the original text not emended accordingly. (Laird, Hume's 
Philosophy, p. 36). 
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The problem has a deceptive simplicity which has apparently 
led at least one psychologist astray; Spearman asserted 
that he was able to verify Hume's conjecture.1 It would 
appear, however, that he has missed the point, since Hume's 
conjecture requires that the individual never have seen the 
color before. This latter proviso makes the conjecture 
impracticable to establish as a fact. How does anyone know 
what color sensations he has had in the past? All efforts to 
test such conjectures experimentally in cases of the congenit-
ally blind with restored sight are inconclusive, since such 
individuals are confused by the problem. This favorite cru-
cial experiment of classical British empiricism is in fact 
inconclusive. What is of interest, however, is the candid 
manner in which Hume admits the exception, saying it is 
"particular and singular." This, however, will not do, since 
the priority of impression to idea both logically and tempor-
ally is a cardinal maxim of Hume's philosophy. The full 
1The crucial assertion of Spearman is contained in the 
following quotation. After quoting Hume on the missing shade, 
Spearman writes: 
11 A few trials of this kind have been made experimentally by 
the present writer, but with a convenient simplification; 
in place of Hume's gradationof colour depth interrupted 
only by the absence of a single shade, there were exhibited 
two shades--one markedly deeper than the other. On looking 
at this, it was actually found possible to get a notion, or 
even an image, of the shade intermediate; and this notion 
did not come into consciousness in a manner at all resembl-
ing any production of previous experience; it appeared, 
rather, to be directly drawn out of, or educed from, the 
characters of the two shades seen." Charles E. Spearman, 
Nature of Intelli ence and the Princi lea of Co nition (London: 
em an an o., , pp. • pearman, us, uses 
Hume's example to illustrate his doctrine of the eduction of cor-
relates, i.e. a form of relational thinking in which the percep-
tion of the eduction of relations is the essential process by 
which the mind builds up a perception of total form. 
significance of this dubiety in first principles will be 
brought out in the course of discussion. 
The difference between impression and idea is not 
dwelt upon by Hume on the ground that "every one of himself 
will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and 
thinking."1 There is, however, a well-known difficulty in 
the distinction. Hume 1s official criterion for distinguish-
ing between impression and idea is the "force and violence"2 
of the former. But, so runs the difficulty, could it not be 
possible that the faintest impression was weaker than the 
strongest idea, i.e. idea-image? As Boring puts it, "Is the 
idea of thunder never more vigorous than the impression of 
the barely perceptible tick of a watch?"3 This difficulty 
did not escape the perspicacious Hume. Concerning the dis-
tinction between ideas and impressions, he writes: 
The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; 
tho it is not impossible but in particular instances 
they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in 
sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent 
emotions of soul, our ideas approach to our impres-
sions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that 
our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot 
distinguish them from our ideas. 4 
1Hume, Treatise, pp. 1-2. 
2' 
Ibid., p. 2. 
3Boring, Hist. of Exp. Psy., p. 189. 
4 Hume, Treatise, p. 2. 
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Since Hume's time, there have been several experiments des-
igned to test the difference in conscious experience, if any, 
between images and sensory perceptions. such experiments do 
not tend to bear out Hume's purely psychological criterion. 
The best known of these experiments is by Perky, a pupil of 
1 Titchener. In this experiment an 0 (a subject) was led to 
mistake an actual sensation (Hume's impression) for an image 
(Hume 1s idea). The 0 1s were instructed to project conscious 
visual images in front of themselves onto a ground glass 
screen. At some points, without so informing her o•s, Perky 
had an assistant throw a faint image of a banana on a screen 
at the same time that the O's were asked to project an image 
of a banana. The faint picture of the banana was then gradu-
ally increased in intensity until the 0 reported he had a 
good image of a banana. As the subjects were intent on con-
juring up a good image of the banana, they mistook the pic-
ture for their own projected image. The result was obtained 
without exception from twenty-seven college men and women.2 
1c. w. Perky, "An experimental Study of imagination," 
American Journal of Psychology, (110), XXI, 422-452. See 
Leeper, Handbook of EXper. Psy. for a write-up that contains 
the essential points. 
2cr. Woodworth, Exp. Psf•• p. 45. It should be noted 
that this experiment has been d sputed. Titchener, however, 
a believer in sensory and imaginal data to the last ditch, 
accepted Perky's results. cr. Boring, Hist. of Exp. Psy., 
p. 202. There are other experiments along this iine.mentioned 
by Woodworth, ibid., p. 45, but this experiment is tfie most 
striking. ----
The results of this experiment should not be inter-
preted to mean that there is no useful distinction between 
what Hume called 'impressions' and 'ideas' or what are called 
today •sensations' and 'images.• It suggests, rather, that 
Hume was right in a suspicion that between the two there is a 
"near resemblance in a few instances."1 The distinction 
between the two inHume's philosophy is capital. Once again 
there is the possibility of dubiety on the score of first 
principle. Hume constantly tests theories by asking whether 
the expression under discussion refers to an impression or an 
idea. If the expression refers to an idea, then from what 
impression is it copied? Without such a warrant for an idea, 
Hume rejects it, at least as such ideas were conceived by his 
predecessors. It is, therefore, imperative for many of Hume's 
arguments that the distinction between the two be clean-cut. 
The distinction in fact, however, is not without considerable 
ambiguity, at least if taken from the standpoint of conscious 
2 
experience • 
The importance of Hume•s doctrine of the associative 
imagination cannot be overemphasized. Some of the important 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 2. 
2Today, following results established by Kulpe, the 
distinction would not be sought in conscious experience, but 
in functional relations--the two processes have different 
origins. The one is based on peripheral excitation; the 
other on central excitation. cr. Boring, Hist. of Exp. Psy., 
p. 189. 
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principles involved may be brought out at this point. Hume 
needs to show, in the first place, that the principles of 
the imagination are not wholly unpredictable. 
Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone 
wou 1d join them; and 'tis impossible the same simple 
ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they 
commonly do) without some bond of union among them, 
some associating qqality, by which one idea naturally 
introduces another. 1 
Such an associating quality cannot be considered as an 
"inseparable connexion, for that has been already excluded 
from the imagination."2 The associations by which the mind 
is carried from impression to idea and from idea to idea is 
to be regarded as a "gentle force."3 The qualities, i.e. 
principles, from which association 
resemblance, contiguity, and cause 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 10. 
2Ibid. 
arises are three, viz. 
4 
and effect. Although 
3Ibid. ;Hume also speaks of the principles of asso-
ciation a~"kind of attraction which in the mental world will 
be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural:." 
Hume, Treatise, pp. 12-13. This analogy to gravitation in 
Newtonian mechanics is interesting because it illustrates Hume 1s 
purpose in writing the whole Treatise, viz. to write"a science 
of man." ( Hume, Treatise, "introductioi1;"'" passim, esp. xxi.) 
Hume's larger interests will receive little attention in this 
investigation, devoted as it is to a fairly narrow problem in 
epistemology, but this larger bearing of Hume's philosophy 
must be recognized as the reason for his epistemological 
inquiries. 
4Today, following Bradley, most philosophers and psy-
chologists would agree that the law of redintegration, or some 
similar formulation with another name, expressess all of asso-
ciation. Bradley's formulation runs as follows: "Any part of 
a single state of mind tends, if reproduced, to reinstate any 
remainder; or any element tends to reproduce those elements 
with which it has formed one state of mind. Bradley quoted in 
Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Mac-
millan & Co., 1949), p. 250, footnote 1. 
the effects of association are all pervasive, the causes of 
association, physiological or otherwise, are "mostly unknown 
and must be resolved into the original qualities of human 
nature."1 Hume asserts that: "Nothing is more requisite 
for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate 
desire of searching into causes."2 The manner in which the 
associative imagination operates is described by Hume in the 
following passage. He writes: 
•Tis plain, that in the course or our thinking, and in 
the constant revolution or our ideas, our imagination 
runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles 
it, and this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient 
bond and association. 1Tis likewise evident, that as 
the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated 
to change them regularly, and take them as they lie con-
tiguous to each other, the imagination must by long cus-
tom·:' acquire the same method or thinking, and run along 
the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. 3 
This doctrine or the forwardness of the imagination will be 
frequently noted in what follows. The last sentence of this 
passage should be noted, since here a terminology important in 
1 
-Hume, Treatise, p, 13. 
2Ibid, In part II or Book 1, however, Hume violates 
this maxim with a lo~ discussion of physiological causes. 
Hume, Treatise, pp, 60-61. This is pointed out by Kemp Smith, 
Smith, The Philosophy of Hume, p, 241. 
3Hume, Treatise, p. 11. cr. Hume 1s remark that 
"the imagination, when it sets into any train or thinking, 
is apt to continue, even when the object fails it, and 
like a galley put into motion by the oars, carries on its 
course without any new impulse." 
Hume, Treatise, p, 198, 
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Berkeley may be noted inHume,~· the use of the term •con-
ceive' as applied to the imagination. This raises the possi-
bility that in Hume conceivability-and inconceivability-argu-
ments may turn out to be arguments concerning imaginability 
and unimaginability. This usage is, of course, only a clue 
and not a demonstration. 
It would be difficult to improve on Hendel's statement 
of Hume 1s doctrine of the imagination. His summary may be 
quoted. Hendel writes that for Hume: 
All acts of the mind with its own ideas, that are not 
logical operations of reason, must be activities of 
imagination. What such inferences from cause to effect 
or effect to cause reveal is that our imagination, 
though seeming to be free to combine, take apart, and 
produce ideas in any order at all, is actually deter-
mined to operate in certain regular ways. Man has a 
"natural" imagination. He has it because he needs it in 
hisP1ysical activities among things in the world. There 
is, then, a rationale of some sort in our imagination. 
This is Hume's constructive idea. 1 
The faculty of imagination for Hume in fact takes the place of 
much that today would be construed as ordinary thinking. Says 
Hume in reference to the relations of resemblance, contiguity, 
and cause and effect: "there are, therefore, the principles 
of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the 
imagination supply the place or that inseparable connexion, 
1charles William Hendel Jr., Studies in the Philoso hy 
of David Hume, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 192;), 
p. 73. Chapter three of Hendel's book, as well as being an 
excellent statement of Hume's doctrine of the imagination, 
traces the sources of the doctrine in writers prior to Hume 
extending back to Cicero. Hobbes, Locke, Malebranche, and 
Berkeley to a lesser extent, are all important. 
by which they are united in memory."1 And in the "conclusion 
of this book" he writes, "the memory, senses and understand-
ing are, therefore, founded on the imagination."2 
Hume•s doctrine of the associative imagination is 
properly called imagistic, since it is a doctrine asserting 
specifically that thought proceeds by images in many impor-
tant and previously unrecognized ways. This doctrine is one 
form of the constructive version of imagism, and, in fact, 
forms one of the two main pillars of the imagism in the 
Treatise. 
Among the effects of association of ideas, Hume finds 
"none more remarkable, than those complex ideas, which are 
the common subjects of our thoughts and reasonings."3 Follow-
ing Locke, Hume treats of complex ideas as divided into rela-
4 tions, modes, and substances. The word •relation• Hume finds 
is used in two different senses: there are relations of 
association and relations of comparison, both of which go by 
the name •relation.• Relations of association, called by 
Hume •natural relations,• concern "that quality, [i.e. prin-
ciple} by which two ideas are connected together in the 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 12. 
2 Ibid., p. 265. 
3~ •• p. 13. 
4Relations are an important class of complex ideas, 
but their full importance does not come out until Hume 1s dis-
cussion of cause and effect. The account here, thus, may be 
very brief. 
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imagination ••• after the manner above explained," and rela-
tions of comparison, called by Hume 'philosophical relations,' 
refer to "that particular circumstance, in which, even upon 
the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy we may think 
1 proper to compare them." Hume is most usually concerned 
with philosophical relations. There are seven general cate-
gories of philosophical relations, i.e. ways in which percep-
tions may be compared. Hume enumerates these as follows: 
resemblance, identity, space and time, quantity and number, 
2 degrees of quality, contrariety, and cause and effect. 
Hume uses his empirical principle that every idea is 
a copy of a prior impression for the first time in the 
Treatise in dealing with substance. The argument against sub-
stance, the central point of which is but one paragraph long, 
may be taken as one of Hume's three most influential analyses.3 
Hume states the argument as follows: 
I wou'd fain ask those philosophers, who found so much 
of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and 
accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, 
whether the idea of substance be derived from the impres-
sions of sensation or reflection. If it be conveyed to 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 13. 
2An important distinction is later made in this list 
of philosophical relations between those which yield certainty 
and those which yield only probability. Discussion of this 
point, however, is best deferred. 
3The other two analyses are those of cause and effect 
and personal identity. 
us by our senses, I ask by which of them, and after 
what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must 
be a colour; if by the ears a sound; if by the palate, 
a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe 
none will assert that substance is either a colour, or 
a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must, there-
fore, be an impression of reflection, iftt really exist. 
But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves 
into our passions and emotions; none of which can 
possibly represent a substance. We have, therefore, 
no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection 
of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning 
when we either talk or reason concerning it. 1 
Apart from questions of the cogency of this argument, it would 
be difficult to improve on its clarity. The following remarks 
are intended not as summary, but as remarks to show the imag-
ism involved in this argument. According to the argument, 
traditional philosophers imagined that they had a clear idea 
of substance, apart from perceived qualities, when in fact 
they had no clear idea at all. According to Hume, for every 
idea there must be an antecedent impression, and for substance 
there is no such impression. There cannot, thus, be an idea 
of substance. There are two types of impressions: impressions 
of sensation and of reflection. Hume examines both classes of 
impressions and finds as a result there is "no idea of sub-
stance, distinct from that of a collection of particular 
qualities," i.e. no idea at all as substance was traditionally 
understood.2 The argument of Hume against substance may be 
1 Hume, Treatise, pp. 15-16. Hume refers later to sub-
stance as viewed In traditional scholastic theory as an "unin-
telligible chimera." (Hume, Treatise, p. 222). 
2It is to be noted that Hume does not assert in the 
case of substance--or of any other controversial notion--that 
there is no idea of substance, but only how the controversial 
notion of substance is to be understood as constituted. cr. 
Smith, Philosophy of Hume, p. 254 and Maund, Hume's Theory of 
Knowledge, pp. 165-166. 
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called imagistic in the sense that the argument depends upon 
the fact that no idea-image can be formed of the concept of 
substance, i.e. the idea is unimaginable. It is customary 
to say that for Hume his grounds of criticism of the tradi-
tional idea of substance is that the concept is meaningless. 
This is to the point as long as it is recognized that the 
concept of substance falls into meaninglessness for Hume 
primarily because of its unimaginability, i.e. no "clear 
idea" of the traditional notion can be formed. The argument 
is imagism in its constructive version; the concept of sub-
stance construed as something apart from a collection of 
perceived qualities is inadmissible. The inadmissibility 
of the concept rests on its unimaginability. Images here 
and elsehwere play an important role in Hume 1s philosophy. 
His criticism of previous philosophers at this point is 
that they have failed to find a warrant in sensory and 
imaginal experience for notions they have introduced into 
ph1losophy.1 
1 Hume's argument against substance should be com-
pared and contrasted with Berkeley's argument. For 
Berkeley the idea of substance is identical with the idea 
of being, but the idea of being is the most abstract idea. 
But there are no abstract ideas, and, therefore, there is 
no substance. Berkeley and Hume 1s argument are both 
imagistic, since for both the argument turns on the fact 
that no idea-image can be formed of substance; the concept 
is unimaginable. 
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Granting that Hume denies only the traditional view 
of substance, one may ask how the idea is constituted on his 
view. The answer is plain enough; the idea of substance is 
obtained through the forwardness of the imagination. Writes 
Hume: 
The idea of a substance ••• is nothing but a collection 
of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and 
have a particular name assigned to them, by which we 
are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that 
collection. 1 
Elsewhere Hume writes: 
But the mind rests not here [in perceived qualities 
alone] ••• it finds that all these qualities are differ-
ent, and distinguishable, and separable from each other; 
which view of things being destructive of its primary 
and more natural notions, obliges the imagination to 
feign an unknown something, or original substance, as a 
principle of union or cohesion among these qualities. 2 
The idea of substance, then, is derived from the feigning of 
the imagination; whatever value the notion of substance has 
it derives from the faculty of associative imagination. 
As was the case with Berkeley, it is in dealing with 
abstract ideas that imagism comes to the fore inHume. In 
general Hume sides with Berkeley against Locke in the issue 
over abstract ideas, but he adds some fresh arguments which 
give his imagism a new turn. Hume states the problem of 
a,bstract ideas in the following way. He writes, "A very 
material question has been started concerning abstract or 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 16. 
2Ibid. , p. 221. 
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general ideas, whether they be general or particular in the 
1 
mind's conception of them." After studying the whole sec-
tion,2 however, one can only conclude that Hume does not 
really answer this question, nor does he intend to. His 
whole intention can rather be summed up as answering two 
other questions, viz. the role played by images in abstract 
thinking, and the manner in which they function "as if (they} 
were universal."3 These are imagistic questions. 
This section is the one place in the Treatise in 
which Hume specifically 4 acknowledges indebtedness to Berkeley. 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 17. 
2 I.e. Book I, part 1, section 7. 
3cf. Smith, Philosoth* of Hume, p. 257. The treatment 
here is indebted to Kemp Sm t . Kemp Smith's treatment is 
highly critical of Hume in this section, since he feels Hume 
evades the main problem. So be it. For an investigation of 
imagism, however, the section is of prime importance, since it 
brings out clearly the importance of imagery inHume's account 
of thinking. 
4 In Selby-Bigge 1s useful and exhaustive index to his 
edition of the Treatise, the only reference to Berkeley is the 
one quoted in fu11 below. As a matter of fact, study of the 
Treatise reveals that Hume was not particularly interested in 
Berkeley's philosophy except negatively. It is Locke that 
Hume uses for method, procedure and positive argument, even 
though his disagreement with the latter is frequently profound. 
As Hendel puts it, "the books of Berkeley led to the sceptical 
question." (Hendel, Studies inHume, p. 100). In other words, 
one may say that Berkeley's influence on Hume is, except for 
this section, almost entirely one of motivating Hume to try to 
deflate what he considers Berkeley's pretentious proofs for 
theism. 
In the Enquir{, I, p. 12, (155n) Hume gives his reasons 
for not taking accoun of Berkeley: 
" ••• most of the writings of that very ingenious author 
form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found 
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He writes: 
a great philosopher [identified in a footnote as Berkeley] 
has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and 
has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but parti-
cular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a 
more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon 
occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. 
As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most 
valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in 
the republic of letters I shall endeavour to confirm it by 
some arguments, which I hope will put it beyond all doubt 
and controversy. 1 
The quotation contains two sentences which will be considered 
here in reverse order from the order in Hume•s text. There is 
in the second sentence the well-known appreciation of Berkeley 
which may have led to the general opinion--if it is a general 
opinion--that Hume is greatly indebted to Berkeley, What, how-
ever, is of more importance to this investigation is that Hume 
is explicit in the second sentence about the fact that he will 
offer "some arguments" which will put the matter beyond doubt. 
eithar ,~ong the ·.ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle 
not excepted •••• That all his arguments, though other-
wise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears 
from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no 
conviction. Their only effect Is to cause that momentary 
amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the 
result of scepticism." 
These latter remarks should also be taken as Hume 1s 
clearest text on what he means by the term •scepticism.• In 
this sense of the term, Hume is himself a sceptic. In other 
senses of the term, however, Hume is not as sceptical as many 
of his critics have made out. Many of his famous denials--
the self, cause and effect, the material world--are denials 
~of the traditional views. In general Hume reinterprets 
arr-of these doctrines in the light of his doctrine of the 
associative imagination. Some of these reinterpretations will 
be the subject of comment in later portions of this investiga-
tion. 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 17, 
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Hume, in other words, is under no illusion that he leaves 
Berkeley's doctrine unchanged. In the first sentence Hume 
states what he takes to be Berkeley's position on the matter 
of abstract ideas, namely "that all general ideas are nothing 
but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives 
them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall 
upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them." 
It has been noted that this summary by Hume of Berkeley is 
more nominalistic than Berkeley himself.1 This opinion will 
be examined, since it will throw some light on Hume's posi-
tion. Berkeley's position, it will be recalled, was defined 
as nominalistic by the standard of ontological commitment 
insofar as Berkeley does not in his representative view commit 
himself to admitting abstract entities as values of variables 
but admits only concrete entities, particularly images, as 
values of variables. It was further suggested that although 
he does admit relations as values for variables, and speaking 
strictly this is a commitment to a platonistic language, few 
would try or be able to avoid this degree of commitment to 
such a language. Considering the matter from the standpoint 
of traditional terminology, the terminology employed by those 
1 Laird comments on this interpretation and quotes 
Meinong and Husserl as upholding the position that Hume is 
more nominalistic than Berkeley. Laird, himself, however, 
allows that this may have been of Hume 1s part "simply inadver-
tent, since so much in Berkeley's theory, as well as in 
Locke's, referred to the office of general names." (Laird, 
Hume•s Philosophy, p. 60.) 
395 
who uphold the position that Hume is here more nominalistic 
than Berkeley, it can be suggested in what sense this is the 
case. Hume takes over from Berkeley the doctrine that all 
ideas are determinate, i.e. that they are concrete images. 
Hume, however, does not commit himself to the further posi-
tion that particular images represent or stand for the class 
of particulars in the sense that particular images have a 
meaning apart from a purely associative meaning. In general 
it may be suggested that Hume's position is more nearly like 
the authentic nominalism of Hobbes, for whom "this word uni-
versal is never the name of anything existent in nature, nor 
of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the 
1 
name of some word or name • " 
Like Berkeley's argument before him, Hume's argument 
concerning abstract ideas falls into two main parts: a nega-
tive argument against the received Lockean view, and secondly 
a constructive view in which Hume attempts to explain what is 
before the mind when abstract ideas (i.e. generic concepts--
or 'abstract adjectives) are used. It has been pointed out 
earlier that many problems of abstract ideas are left unex-
amined.2 For this investigation, however, this is not of 
1Hobbes quoted in Laird, Hume 1 s Philosophy, p. 60. 
This quotation is nominalism by any standard. It may be com-
pared with another statement of Hobbes's nominalism which has 
been quoted before. "There being nothing in the world univer-
sal but names, for the things named are every one of them 
individual and singular." Hobbes quoted in Aaron, Theory of 
Universals, p. 20. 
2Lamprecht puts the matter of the inadequacy of Hume's 
position as follows: 
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serious moment, since Hume does try to solve the problem of 
abstract ideas in sensory and imaginal terms, i.e. his argu-
ment is imagistic. 
Hume states the issue to be discussed in the form of 
l 
a "plain dilemma." He writes: 
The abstract idea of a man represents men of all sizes 
and all qualities; which •tis concluded it cannot do, 
but either by representing at once all sizes and all 
possible qualities, or by representing no particular 
one at all. 2 
For the sake of ease of discussion the alternative views here 
expressed may be numbered, displayed and slightly rephrased. 
(l) that abstract ideas "represent all possible parti-
cular degrees of quality and quantity'' 
(2) that abstract ideas "represent no particular degree 
of quantity and quality." 3 
It having been "esteemed absurd" to defend (l) as "implying 
an infinite capacity in the mind,"4 the inference has been 
made that (2) is the correct alternative. Hume's argument 
purports to show that "this inference is erroneous,"5 and 
"Nowhere is Hume more inadequate than in his analysis of 
abstract ideas. What he says is true enough as far as it 
goes, but it does not point out the important things. His 
treatment results in interpreting ideas as just so much 
imaginal stuff, and the reference of thought is overlooked. 
The only extenuation which could be pleaded is that the 
whole British tradition has erred in this matter, usually 
more flagrantly than Hume." 
Lamprecht, Studies in Hist. of Ideas, II, p. 231, footnote 44. 
l Hume, Treatise, p. 17. 
2Ibid • , p. 18. 
3church, Hume's Theory of the Understanding, pp. 40-41. 
4Hume, Treatise, p. 18. 
5Ibid. 
397 
this by two arguments--here called Hume 1s 'negative' and 
'positive' arguments respectively. Hume puts his negative 
argument as follows. He hopes to prove that "•tis utterly 
impossible to conceive any quantity or quality, without form-
1 ing a precise notion of its degree," i.e. the denial of (2). 
The positive argument purports to show that: 
tho the capacity of the mind be not infinite, yet we 
can at once form a notion of all possible degrees of 
quantity and quality, in such manner at least as how-
ever imperfect, may serve all the purposes of reflex-
ion and conversation. 2 
In other words, his positive contention is the assertion of 
(1), properly guarded from the absurdity that finite minds 
have an infinite capacity. 
Hume sets his greatest store by his negative argument, 
saying that "I place my chief confidence in what I have already 
prov'd concerning the impossibility of general ideas--accord-
ing to the common method of explaining them. 113 Hume 1 s nega-
tive argument, the denial of (2), Hume restates as follows: 
"that the mind cannot form anyrotion of quality or quantity 
4 
without forming a precise notion of the degree of each." 
Before considering the arguments Hume offers in detail to 
establish this position, it is important to recognize that in 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 18. 
3 I bid • , p • 24 • 
4 Ibid., p. 18. 
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general Hume is asking for introspection on the nature of 
imagery. The very statement of the problem is imagistic, 
since it assumes at the outset that to think is to think by 
means of images.1 
Hume seeks to establish this position by three argu-
ments which may be considered in turn. It is the first of 
these arguments that is of greatest consequence to this in-
vestigation, since it involves a principle here called 
'psychological atomism'--which is ubiquitous inHume's 
philosophy. Hume 1 s statement of the doctrine in question is 
as follows: 
Whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and 
that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable 
by the thought and the imagination. And we may here add, 
that these propositions are equally true in the inverse, 
and that whatever objects are separable are also dis-
tinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguish-
able are also different. 2 
1 It has been argued that Hume•s arguments here beg the 
question, since they all rest upon "a definition of experience 
as consisting of impressions and ideas and therefore excludes 
abstract ideas by definition." Church, Hume's Theory of the 
Understandi~, p. 42. This is another way of saying the same 
thing that s contended here, viz. that Hume begins with the 
imagistic assumption that to tnrnk is to think with images. 
2Hume, Treatise, p. 18. Isaiah Berlin points out 
that the principle here called Hume's 'psychological atomism' 
often "acts as a psychological substitute for the notion of 
logical entailment or rather non-entailment." Berlin continues: 
"Thus where we should say that what he really wants to 
prqve is, e.g., that the occurrence of an event A does 
not logically entail the occurrence of an event B, he 
will in fact assert that the idea of A is different from 
that of B, and hence, by this principle, the two ideas 
are distinguishable and therefore separable." Berlin, 
Age of Enlightenment, p. 177. 
There Is perhaps not complete agreement among contemporary 
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The "objects" referred to here are objects of the mind or 
what have been in this investigation 'presentations,' i.e. 
the term 'presentation' is here used comprehensively as a 
generic term for any content of consciousness. In a very 
1 helpful analysis of this passage, Laird points out that 
philosophers on the meaning of the term •entailment,' but the 
following remarks will indicate the way in which Berlin's re-
marks will be here interpreted~ Entailment is contrasted with 
material implication. Entailment is a necessary implication 
and material implication is not. This difference may be put 
as follows. To say that 'P entails q' is to say that it could 
not be the case, i.e. is logically impossible, that 'P is true 
and q Is false.• To say, on the other hand, that 'P materially 
implies q 1 is to say that it is not as a matter of fact the 
case that 'Pis true and q is false.• To say, in other words, 
'that" 'P entails q 1 is to say that 1q can be deduced from pt. 
Where Hume applies his principle of psychological atomism, he 
is interested in expressing the fact that there is a material 
implication between the terms related by implication. His 
argument consists in showing that his opponents have asserted, 
tacitly or explicitly, that the relation is a necessary impli-
cation. When Hume employs his principle he is denying this. 
It is in this sense that Hume 1s principle of psychological 
atomism may be taken as a psychological substitute for non-en-
tailment. 
There is a more controversial matter that may be sug-
gested here. Many would argue-Russell for example--that all 
cases of entailment are subvarieties of material implication. 
In other words, on this view the introduction of the notion of 
entailment ultimately serves no useful function. With this 
matter of logical theory this investigation need not be con-
cerned, since at the non-formal level at which this investi-
gation is conducted there does seem to be a difference 
between 'could not be the case' and 'is not as a matter of 
fact the case.• This difference is the crux of Humean argu-
ments involving the principle of psychological atomism. 
Cf. Stebbing, Modern Introduction to Logic, pp. 225-226 
and Eaton, General Logic, pp. 231-234 to which this footnote 
is indebted. 
1Laird, Hume 1 s Philosophy, pp. 82-83. 
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what Hume here calls the 'inverse' is what logicians today 
usually call the •converse.• If this is the case, then 
Hume must have considered the four assertions contained in 
this quotation as independently evident, since conversion of 
a universal affirmative proposition is illicit. Hume was 
concerned, thus, to maintain that the following four proposi-
tions were evidently true. 
(1) All different presentations are distinguishable. 
(2) All distinguishable presentations are different. 
(3) All distinguishable presentations are separable. 
1 (4) All separable presentations are distinguishable. 
Consideration, however, or these four assertions separately 
reveals that they have very different degrees of plausibility. 
It may be assumed that by 'distinguishable' here Hume means 
•correctly distinguishable.' This seems a safe enough 
assumption, since it would appear that the contrary assumption 
would .·make complete nonsense of the doctrine. Furthermore, 
it would appear that by •separable' here Hume means that what 
is separable is that which can be imaged separately. Were 
this not the case the whole quotation would reduce to a 
tautology: to state tautology does not, however, seem to be 
Hume•s intention at all in regard to this principle. On this 
1The present analysis thus far adds nothing to Laird's 
comments: what has been done is to restate Laird's conten-
tions in the terminology adopted for this investigation. 
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basis, it would appear that (4) is true, since what can be 
imaged separately is distinguishable in one very ordinary 
sense of 'distinguishable.• Furthermore, it would appear 
that (2) is true in the sense that there is a difference of 
~ kind "wherever a distinction may be correctly drawn. "1 
On the other hand, (1) is implausible to some degree since 
it seems to require the belief that finite and human knowers 
are able to discern all possible distinctions. There are, 
however, presumably many distinctions which the mind will 
never know. Even if Hume 1s assertion in (1) were true, it 
would require some argument at least having a tendency to 
show it were true. Finally, (3) would seem to be false on 
Hume's principles, since it would seem to entail the conse-
quences that either 
there are no discernible distinctions in things unless 
either ( 1) X is discernib]$ GD.fnit:•t from Y because it 
can be pictured i.e. imaged in isolation, or (2) be-
cause it can be pictured in conjunction, not with X, 
but with something different, say z. 2 
Concerning such entailments of (3), however, Laird comments 
that 
there is no absurdity in believing in the existence of 
inseparable companions which are intellectually, not 
impressionistically or pictorially, separable; and Hume 
begged the question by asserting, in effect, that 
imaginative or sensorial separation was the only kind 
of distinction men could draw even in their thoughts. 3 




It is not difficult to find examples of Laird's "inseparable 
companions," i.e. items of consciousness which are intellectu-
ally separable- but not separable in the sensory and imaginal 
realm to which Hume limited the processes of thought. Con-
aider, for example, pitch and loudness. These may be dis-
tinguished, but are not separable in sensory and imaginal 
terms since one does not occur without the other either · · 
in impression or idea. Consider, again, for example, the 
concavity and convexity of a curved line. This is distinguish-
able, but neither concavity nor convexity is separably imagin-
able. The same image which shows a curve to be concave shows 
it to be convex. Further, the mind cannot form the image of 
a half, without it being the half of something.1 Surely, how-
ever, one knows that the whole is greater than the part. The 
grounds for doubting Hume's principle that what is distinguish-
able is separable should be carefully noted here. The argu-
ment here offered against Hume is cogent only so far as Hume 
consistently maintains the doctrine that the contents of 
consciousness, i.e. Hume's perceptions, are exhaustively 
described in terms of impressions and ideas. In fact, however, 
Hume does go beyond this framework. He even suggests ways 
in which some of the counter instances here suggested might 
be met. It is not the purpose of this investigation to 
1This example is quoted by Laird, Hume 1s Philosophy, 
p. 57. It is a case given by Kenelm Digby, an opponent of 
Berkeley and Hume who might have provided for them a less 
easy triumph over the issue of abstract ideas. 
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decide among several possible views offered by Hume. This 
study of Hume's imagism is best confined to the study of 
those cases in which his official view concerning impressions 
and ideas dominates in his thinking. In other words, Hume is 
considered in this investigation only so far as he stays 
within the phenomenalistic framework with which he begins. 
Hume's first use of the principles of psychological 
atomism occur in the first of his three arguments. Hume 
writes: 
It is evident at first sight, that the precise length of 
a line is not different from the line itself; nor the 
precise degree of any quality from the quantity. These 
ideas, therefore, admit no more of separation than they 
do of distinction and difference. 1 
In this case, however, Hume does not appeal to the dogma which 
is here rejected that what is distinguishable is separable. 
Of course, so far as this argument rests upon Hume's defini-
tion of psychical experience as constituted by impressions 
and ideas he has excluded abstract ideas by definition at the 
outset. 
Hume's second argument falls into two parts. The 
first part of the argument asserts that "no impression can 
become present to the mind, without being determined in its 
degrees bothnof quantity and quality."2 The second part of 
the argument begins by reiterating that ideas are copies of 
impressions and that "whatever is true of the one must be 




acknowledged concerning the other." The only difference 
between ideas and impression is force and vivacity, and the 
conclusion he reaches is "not founded on any particular de-
gree of vivacity."2 Thus, as an "impression must necessarily 
have a determinate quality, the case must be the same with its 
copy or representative,"3 i.e. with an idea-image. Once again 
the argument is imagistic. It rests ultimately upon Hume's 
contention that the impressions and ideas exhaustively des-
cribe the objects of the mind, and that thinking is the mani-
pulation of images. 
Hume•s third argument opens with a statement of prin-
ciple which Hume calls "generally receiv 1d in philosophy" 
4 that "everything in nature is individual." To start with 
this assumption is, of course, to beg the question of abstract 
ideas at the outset. The principle is interesting as an illus-
tration of the fact that objective universals in Plato's sense 
are consistently denied by the classical British empiricists--
the same denial having been previously been in Locke and 
Berkeley which now appears inHume. Hume employs the prin-
ciple that everything in nature is an existent as follows: 
•tis utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, 
which has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If 
this therefore be absurd in fact and reality, it must also 
be absurd in idea, since nothing of which we can form a 






clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible.1 
In the last sentence of this passage Hume employs his impor-
tant imagistic principle that what can be imagined cannot be 
impossible. This notion that what the mind can form a clear 
and distinct image of is not impossible in nature will appear 
in other contexts in Hume to be discussed more fully in later 
sections of this chapter. 
Hume puts the transition from his negative argument 
to his positive argument concerning abstract ideas as follows: 
Abstract ideas are therefore in themselves individual, how-
ever, they become general in their representation. The 
image in the mind is only that of a particular object, tho' 
the application of itccin our reasoning be the same, as if 
it were universal. 2 
How individual ideas become general in their representation is 
thus the positive or constructive side of Hume's doctrine of 
abstract ideas. To this view attention may next be given. 
In essence Hume's constructive theory is that the mind 
has repeated experiences of resembling perceptions and associa-
tes the name with "the compass of that collection."3 Through 
this association, or as Hume calls it the •custome,' the hear-
ing of the name revives the image of a particular member of the 
collection. Other members of the collection are not actually 
present in fact, but are present "in power" i.e. the mind does 
not "draw them all out distinctly in the imagination" but is 
in a state of "readiness to survey any of them, as ••• 
prompted by a present design or necessity."~ 
1Hume, Treatise, pp. 19-20. 
2Ibid., p. 20. 
3Ibid., p. 22. 
4Ibid. , p • 20. 
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This dispositional theory of Hume, that images need 
not be present in fact but only "in power," marks a clear 
advance over Berkeley, since it solves a difficulty which 
Berkeley's theory fails to solve. On Berkeley's theory it 
would seem to be required that the mind have images of all 
the men in the world when the class name •man• is used. 
This would seem to assume an infinite capacity in a finite 
mind. Hume 1s advance consists in his recognition that such 
images are not present in fact but in power. This theory 
bears close resemblance to the notion of set as used by psy-
chologists. In reaction-time experiments typically the •o• 
is warned in advance that a certain word or signal is about 
to occur. His state of readiness is thus described as one of 
set, a state of affairs similar to Hume 1 s "keeping ourselves 
in readiness."1 There is, however, one important difference 
in that the term •set• as used in psychology is in its primary 
usage created artifically in the laboratory whereas for Hume it 
is an empirically produced custom or habit of the 1magination.2 
Hume describes the working of this habit of the 
imagination as follows: 
~his is one of the most extraordinary circumstances in the 
present affair, that after the mind has produced an indi-
vidual idea, upon which we reason, the attendant custom, 
revived by the general or abstract term, readily suggests 
any other individual, if by chance we form any reasoning 
that agrees not with it. Thus, should we mention the word 
triangle, and form the idea of a particular equilateral one 
to correspond to it, and should we afterwards assert, that 
the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other, the 
other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles, which we 
overlooked at first, immediately crowd in upon us, and make 
us perceive the falsehood of this proposition. 3 
lHume, Treatise, p. 20. 
2cf. Aaron, Theory of Universals, pp. 81-82. 
3Hume, Treatise, p. 21. 
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This habit of the imagination thus prevents erroi'. A possible 
limitation of this theoi'y may be noted. Hume has hei'e 
accounted foi' negative cases, i.e. those cases in which the 
mind may fall into ei'I'Or by its reasoning on its habits of 
the imagination. He does not, howevei', offei' an explanation 
of the mind's I'easoning on ti'ue pi'opositions. The pi'oviso, 
howevei', foi' such cases would I'equii'e only that attendant 
imagei'y foi' ti'Ue pi'opositions as well as false "ci'owd in upon 
us. 11 
InHume's consti'Uctive ai'gument concei'ning absti'act 
ideas thei'e is a fui'thei' matter closely affiliated with imagism 
which I'equii'es discussion, viz. Hume•s analysis of I'esemblance. 
It will be I'emembei'ed that in the fii'st chaptei' of this inves-
tigation two theories pui'poi'ting to explain change wei'e 
summai'ized--the Philosophy of Univei'sals and the Philosophy 
of Resemblances. It was thei'e pointed out that classical 
British empii'icists denied this Philosophy of Univei'sals and 
accepted a vai'iant of the Philosophy of Resemblances. Thus 
fai' this investigation has attempted to spell out in detail 
the sense in which it may be said that classical BI'itish 
empii'icists deny the Philosophy of Univei'sals, but attention 
has not been given to explicating the sense in which they 
accepted what has hei'e been called the Philosophy of Resem-
blances. The I'eason foi' not so dealing with the Philosophy 
of Resemblances pi'ioi' to this point is that Locke and 
Bei'keley take the Philosophy of Resemblances moi'e or less 
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for granted, or perhaps better, deny the Philosophy of Uni-
versals and end up with the Philosophy of Resemblances by 
default. There is, however, the celebrated difficulty in 
the Philosophy of Resemblances that resemblance itself is a 
universal. This the acute Hume perceives and he attempts to 
meet the difficulty. His answer provides an account not 
only of Hume himself on this matter, but of all the classical 
British empiricists vis-a-vis this problem since both L~cke 
and Berkeley would require some such proviso as Hume provides. 
According to the Philosophy of Resemblances the fact 
of resemblance is taken as a basic character of experience. 
On this theory, in cases where qualities and relations re-
occur in experience the resemblance between certain of these 
qualities and relations is taken as basic. Expressions such 
as 'This object has the quality red' means that the object in 
question resembles other red objects. 
In classical British empiricism there are two theories 
as to the nature of resemblance. There is first of all the 
traditional theory, accepted by all the classical British 
em~ists, that two things resemble one another when they 
have one or more than one element in common. This view is 
expressed by Hume in the following way. 
When we reason upon general subjects, one may just affirm, 
that our speculations can scarcely ever be too fine, pro-
vided that they be just •••• General reasonings seem 
intricate, merely because they are general; nor is it 
easy for the bulk of mankind to distinguish, in a great 
number of particulars, that common circumstance in which 
they all agree, or to extract it, pure and unmixed, 
from the other superfluous circumstances. • •• They 
cannot enlarge their view to those universal proposi-
tions which comprehend under them an infinite number 
of individuals, and include a whole science in a 
single theorem. But ••• it is the chief business of 
philosophers to regard the general course of things.1 
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Hume here asserts that it is difficult to distinguish in a 
great number of particulars, i.e. in experienced qualities 
and relations, "that common circumstance in which they all 
agree." It is, however, the common assumption of Locke and 
Berkeley, as well as Hume throughout most of his utterances 
on the subject that this is just what the mind does. The 
mind must find this common resemblance and "extract it, pure 
and unmixed." 
If pressed, however, concerning the nature of these 
common elements the probable answer of the classical British 
empiricists would be that the common elements are identical 
qualities. Hume 1s advance in the footnote to be commented 
upon lies in the suggestion that when resemblances are noted, 
such an act of apprehension does not require that identical 
qualities be given in experience. 
As Hume wrote the Treatise originally, there occurs 
the following sentence: "When we have found a resemblance 
among several objects, that often occurs to us, we apply the 
same name to all of them."2 Hume, however, on becoming aware 
1 Hume quoted in Laird, Hume 1s Philosophy, p. 60. 
2 Hume, Treatise, p. 20. 
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of certain problems after completing the Treatise, wrote an 
important footnote in the "Appendix" in which he attempted 
to analyze more fully the nature of resemblance. He writes: 
It is evident that even different simple ideas may 
have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor 
is it necessary that the point or circumstance of 
resemblance should be distinct or separable from 
that in which they differ. Blue and green are differ-
ent simple ideas, but more resembling than blue or 
scarlet: tho their perfect simplicity excludes all 
possibility of separation or distinction. It is the 
same with particular sounds and smells. These admit 
of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance 
and comparison without having any common circumstance 
the same. 1 
Hume here states the problem in the language of the composi-
tionalism that he and Locke hold in common. Resemblance, on 
the view expressed in this passage, does not require identi-
cal elements, but only resembling elements. In regard to the 
celebrated difficulty of the Philosophy of Resemblances--that 
resemblance itself is a universal, and thus the theory must 
admit at least one universal--Hume here seems to have hinted 
at an answer. This is the case, since on his view of 
resemblance there is no identical quality-~universal--which 
2 is reinstated. 
After thus considering Hume 1s analysis of resemblance, 
attention may next be given to the manner in which Hume spells 
out the details of his dispositional theory that images need 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 637. 
2This account of Hume's theory of resemblance is 
indebted to Aaron, Theory of Universals, pp. 71-75. 
411 
not be present in fact but may be present only "in power."1 
Hume illustrates this doctrine by several "analogies." 
Three of these may be treated in turn. Hume writes: 
First, then, I observe, that when we mention any great 
number, such as a thousand, the mind has generally no 
adequate idea of it, but only a power of producing 
such an idea, by its adequate idea of the decimals, 
under which the number is comprehended, This imper-
fection, however in our ideas, is never felt in our 
reasonings; which seems to be an instance parallel to 
~he present one of universal ideas. 2 
1There is disagreement among Hume's commentators at 
this point. Maund and Kemp Smith hold that Hume's analogies 
express the relation between an abstract idea and an ima~e in 
the mind. As such, Maund asserts that Hume's analogies are 
not strictly speaking •analogies' at allr, but merely illustra-
tions of the point he is tr~ing to make.' (Maund, Hume's 
Theory of Knowledge, p. 173). Kemp Smith holds that "they are 
not really analogous in any helpful manner." (Kemp Smith, 
Philosoph~ of Hume, p. 262.) Aaron, on the other hand, holds 
tfiat Hume s analogies are really illustrations of his disposi-
tional theory. According to Aaron, the analogies do not refer 
to the relation between an image and an abstract idea, but to 
the relation between a concrete image and its power to ~ro­
duce other acts of mind which bring about generality. tAaron, 
Theory of Universals, pp. 75-78). It is this latter interpre-
tation which wi11 be adopted in this investigation. 
There is evidence for both these interpretations in 
the text since Hume•s language is vague. He writes: 
"The only difficulty ••• must be with regard to that 
custom, which so readily recalls every particular idea, 
for which we may have occasion, and is excited by any 
word or sound, to which we may commonly annex it. The 
most proper method ••• of giving a satisfactory explica-
tion of this act of mind, is br producing other instances 
which are analogous to it, and other principles, which 
facilitate its operation. (Hume, Treatise, p. 22.) 
Actually, which of these interpretationsis correct, or 
indeed if either is correct, is not of great import for this 
investigation, since the analogies will here be cited as illus-
trations cf the role images play in Hume 's thought--a question 
which may be discussed independently of the relation of the 
analogies to Hume•s system as a whole. 
2 Hume, Treatise, pp. 22-23. 
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Hume here indicates that an "adequate idea" of a large num-
ber such as thousand cannot be formed. It would appear that 
here Hume•s difficulty stems from the failure to make the 
distinction which is a commonplace in contemporary thought 
between what can be imagined and.what can be conceived, 
where conceived is taken to refer to what is capable of con-
ceptual meaning. Hume recognizes that men handle large 
numbers successfully. On the premises. of his psychology, 
however, this does not seem to be possible. Rather than 
revising his psychology to fit such facts, Hume considers 
such an idea an "imperfection." Hume's candor as he is 
driven beyond the premises of his psychology is in a way 
startling. 
Consider the second analogy. Hume writes: 
We have several instances of habits, which may be reviv'd 
by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any 
periods of a discourse, or any number of verses, will be 
put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at a loss 
to recollect, by that single word or expression, with 
which they began. 1 
The phenomenon to which Hume here refers is familiar enough. 
According to Aaron this passage illustrates "the way in which 
a person, once conditioned in a certain way, can be stimulated 
to the appropriate reaction by hearing or seeing a certain 
word. 112 This interpretation seems fair enough. Adopting, 
however, the line of analysis which was given in comment on 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 23. 
2Aaron, Theory of Universals, p. 77. 
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the first analogy, once again a case seems to arise in which 
Hume is doubtful about this "act of mind." He prefaces the 
account of all these analogies by his oft repeated remark 
that "to explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is 
1 impossible." For Hume, "tis sufficient, if we can give any 
2 
satisfactory account of them from experience and analogy." 
Now why should Hume feel such dubiety on this score? It 
seems reasonable to suggest that probably the principal 
reason was that he only recognized impressions and ideas as 
contents of consciousness--at least at this point in the 
Treatise. The mind, however, has a capacity to produce effects 
which cannot be explained in terms of such contents. This is 
sufficient to give him the pause which is recognizable in 
his treatment of this topic. There can be little doubt that 
Hume takes very seriously the role of imagery in thinking; he 
takes it so seriously that when he cannot find a series of 
discrete images in the processes of thought he is at a loss 
as to what explanation to give. True to his empiricism, 
however, he does not burke such facts. 
That Hume recognized that his view was ultimately 
inadequate comes out perhaps even more clearly in his state-
ment of his third analogy. He writes: 
I believe every one, who examines the situation of his 
mind in reasoning, will agree with me, that we do not 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 22. 
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annex distinct and compleat ideas [i.e. idea-images] to _ 
every term we make use of, and that in talking of govern-
ment, church, negotiation, conquest, we seldom spread 
our-in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these 
complex ideas are compos'd. 'Tis however, observable, 
that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid 
talking nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any 
repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a full 
comprehension of them. 1 
Here Hume is dealing with a case of conceptual thinking in 
which imagery may be attendant but is supplemental to the 
concept. Hume may, however, "avoid talking nonsense" despite 
the "imperfection" of such concepts. It is obvious that the 
"full comprehension" which is referred to in this passage 
would consist in a procession of idea-images occurring as a 
content of consciousness when such terms as 'government' or 
'church' were used. On Hume'a view the 'custom,' or habit 
of the imagination, is a sort of shorthand by which the mind 
can operate successfully in the absence of the full and 
detailed imagery which occurs in thought in ita full compre-
hension. 
Lastly, Hume 1s distinction of reason should be noted. 
The distinction of reason is approximately equivalent to 
2 Berkeley's preacinding view of abstraction. For Berkeley, 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 23. 
2 Berkeley, it will be remembered, asserted that "to 
be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when 
I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from 
others." Berkeley quoted in Hendel, Studies inHume, p. 131. 
Hendel defines the distinction of reason as consider-
ing "certain qualities or modes of existence in abstraction 
apart from other features of the concrete object." (Hendel, 
Studies inHume, p. 131). This doctrine is somewhat obscure 
inHume, and Hendel's account makes sense of it. Lard, Hume's 
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prescinding was not the perceiving of an abstract idea, but 
nonetheless it was thinking abstractly. In prescinding, the 
mind does distinguish between certain parts or qualities of 
experience by means of ideas, excluding other parts or quali-
ties. Hume's distinction is an effort to specify the nature 
of this kind of abstract thinking. In effect his solution is 
to explain the mind's prescinding on the basis of "distinct 
1 habits" of the mind. One of Hume•s examples of this process 
is as follows: 
When a globe of white marble is presented, we receive 
only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a 
certain form, nor are we able to separate and distin-
guish the colour from the form. But observing after-
wards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and 
comparing them with our former object, we find two 
separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and 
really is, perfectly inseparable. After a little more 
practice of this kind, we begin to distinguish the 
figure from the colour by a distinction of reason; that 
is, we consider the figure and colour together, since 
they are in effect the same and undistinguishable; but 
still view them in different aspects, according to the 
resemblances, of which they are susceptible. 2 
Hume 1s imagism comes out clearly as he continues: 
When we wou'd consider only the figure of the globe of 
white marble, we form in reality an idea of both of the 
Philosophb, p. 63 briefly discusses the doctrine as it is 
found In escartes and the Port Royal Logic. For a critical 
account of the doctrine as inconsistent with the rest of the 
teaching in the section on abstract ideas cf. Kemp Smith, 
Philosophy of Hume, pp. 264-266. 
1 Hendel, Studies in Hume, p. 132. 
2 Hume, Treatise, p. 25. 
figure and coloure, but tacitly carry our eye to ita 
resemblance with the globe of black marble: And in 
the same manner, when we wou'd consider ita colour 
only, we turn our view to ita resemblance with the 
cube of marble. By this means we accompany our ideas 
with a kind of reflexion, of which custom renders us, 
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in a great measure, insensible. A person, who desires 
us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble 
without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility; 
but his meaning is, that we shou 1d consider the colour 
and figure together, but still keep in our eye the 
resemblance to the globe or marble •••• 1 
It is impossible to perceive only the figure of the white 
marble, i.e. an idea-image of colored body without shape can-
not be formed. The shape and the color are, however, treated 
separately by considering only the shape or white sphere of 
marble at which time we "tacitly carry our eye to its resem-
blance with the globe of black marble." A aeries of diverse 
relations between objects allows the mind to distinguish 
color and figure. One, thus, can "accompany ••• ideas with 
a kind of reflection" of which custom "renders us insensible." 
Hume•s point is that the distinction of reason is not an "act 
2 
of reason" but an act of the associative imagination. Here 
again Hume relies on his basic imagistic assumption that the 
imagination is the primary activity of mind. The argument 
turns on what is capable of being imagined. It is only 
because Hume sets out with imagistic assumptions that the 
problem arises. Had Hume allowed conception, construed as a 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 25. 
2 Hendel, Studies inHume, p. 133. This discussion of 
Hume•s distinction of reason leans heavily on Hendel's account 
or the doctrine • 
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deliberate act of thought, as a primary activity or mind, 
then the problem of construing such a basic feature of 
psychical experience as abstraction in imaginal terms would 
not arise. Hume's argument has, no doubt, a make-shift 
character, but this is not to the point for this investiga-
tion, since it is the degree to which Hume is involved in 
imagistic assumptions that is in question--of this latter 
point there seems little doubt. 
2. Imagism in the System of Space and Time 
Although Hume 1s analysis of space and time in Part II of 
Book I is not usually considered the most original or influ-
1 
ential portion of the Treatise, it does contain arguments of 
1 Leroy states the general opinion as well as Hume 1s 
own opinion of the doctrine on space and time as follows: 
"L'etude des idees d'espace et de temps est la partie 
la plus critiquee, et meme la plus decriee de sa philo-
sophie. Hume en a lui-meme, semble-t-il, accepte la 
condamnation, portee par Lord Philip Stanhope, l'un des 
meilleurs mathematicians de son temps, en retirant et 
supprimant la Dissertation sur lea Principes thilosophiques 
de la aeometrie, qu1 111 pensait publier vera 755 avec 
trois autres dissertations." 
Andre-Louis Leroy, David Hume (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1953), p. 111. 
This opinion is not, however, fully shared by Hendel 
who considers Hume•s account of space and time very important. 
He cites at the conclusion of his chapter on the topic a 
"significant body of thought" which has developed Hume 1s 
suggestions concerning space as an imaginative or intellectual 
construction. These two opinions are not necessarily con-
trary, however, since Hendel does not try to show that 
Alexander, Broad, Russell and other realists--the writers he 
cites--are indebted directly to Hume. His point would appear 
to be that the contemporary realists whom he has cited develop 
a position consonant with Hume 1s. Hendel, Studies in Philoso-
phy of Hume, pp. 166-167. 
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considerable interest for imagism. It will be the purpose 
of this section to analyze these arguments. 
Hume comments that his "system concerning space and 
time consists of two parts which are intimately connected 
1 
together." He then proceeds to summarize his argument. 
This summary may first be quoted in full, and then the two 
parts of his argument considered in turn for their imagistic 
implications. Hume writes: 
The capacity of the mind is not infinite; consequently 
no idea of extension or duration consists of an infin-
ite number of parts or inferior ideas, but of a finite 
number, and these simple and indivisible: 'Tis there-
fore possible for space and time to exist conformable 
to this idea: And if it be possible, 'tis certain they 
actually do exist conformable to it; since their infin-
ite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory. 
The other part of our system is a consequence of this. 
The parts, into which the ideas of space and time resolve 
themselves, become at last indiviaible; and these indivis-
ible parts, being nothing in themselves, are inconceivable 
when not fill'd with something real and existent. The 
ideas of space and time are therefore no separate and 
distinct ideas, but merely those of the manner or order, 
in which objects exist. Or, in other words, tis impos-
sible to conceive either a vacuum and extension without 
matter of a time, when there was no succession or change 
in any real existence. 2 
The two parts of the argument correspond, thus, to the separ-
ate paragraphs. It is the first of these arguments that 
requires some analysis for its imagistic implications. It 
will, therefore, be useful to summarize briefly the argument 
for the second main part of the argument and give detailed 
analysis only to the first part of the argument. The second 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 39. 
2 ~-· pp. 39-40. 
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part of the argument assumes that Hume has shown that the 
ideas of space and time are not infinitely divisible. Fur-
ther the ideas of space and time are "no separate and dis-
tinct ideas" but "merely those of the manner or order" in 
which objects, i.e. ideas, exist. As a thoroughgoing empiri-
cist Hume is required to show how such an idea of space and 
of time as we have is obtained. The idea of space is 
1 
acquired, says Hume, "by considering the distance between" 
visible bodies, since the only other sensory source, internal 
impression, is obviously inappropriate as a point of origin. 
He concludes by the assertion that "the idea of extensions is 
nothing but a copy of ••• coloured points, and of the manner 
of their appearance." Similar considerations apply to time. 
The first part of Hume's argument may be set out 
as a four-lined chain of reasoning as follows: 2 
(1) The capacity of the mind is not infinite. 
(2) Consequently, the ideas of space and time consist of 
a finite number of parts or ideas that are simple 
and indivisible. 
(3) Accordingly, it is possible for space and time to 
"exist conformable" to these ideas. 
(4) But, if this is possible, it is certain that space 
and time are not infinitely divisible, since "their 
infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and con-
tradictory." 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 33· 
2 This statement of the first part of Hume•s argument 
is indebted to Kemp Smith, Philosophy of Hume, pp. 289-290. 
420 
The imagism involved in Hume 1s argument centers around what 
is possible and impossible, since possibility and impossi-
bility are construed by Hume in imagistic terms. In other 
words, it is points three and four above that are central to 
the imagism in the first part of Hume's argument concerning 
space and time. 
Hume states the first step of the foregoing argument 
as follows: 
'Tis universally allowed, that the capacity of the mind 
is limited, and can never attain a full and adequate 
conception of infinity: and tho' it were not allow 1d, 
•twould be sufficiently evident from the plainest 
observation and experience. 1 
Hume reaches this conclusion in part by examination of mental 
imagery and in part by examination of perceptual experience. 
The argument from mental imagery in brief is that anything 
which is infinitely divisible must have an infinite number of 
parts, i.e. ideas. An introspective imaginal experiment 
reveals, however, that a minimum image is reached, i.e. a 
finite number of ideas only are possible. Hume writes: 
1 This argument is usually taken to be unsatisfactory 
since it confuses an idea of infinity with an infinite idea. 
Hume's argument is that because the capacities of the mind are 
finite we cannot frame an infinite idea. The argument thus 
rests upon the imagistic framework·that the only presentations 
of the mind are impressions and their copies, idea-images. 
Given such a premise Hume's argument is cogent. Hume's cri-
tics, of course, are unwilling to give Hume such a premise. 
With this latter point this investigation has no quarrel; 
Hume's imagism is displayed, however, by followng out the 
consequences of this premise. Laird succinctly discusses the 
argument and relates it to the literature of the period. 
Laird, Hume's Philosophy, pp. 67-68. 
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It is therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a 
minimum, and may raise up to itself an idea, of which it 
cannot conceive any subdivision, and which cannot be 
diminished without a total annihilation. When you tell 
me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain 
of sand, I have a distinct idea of these numbers and of 
their different proportions; but the images which I form 
in my mind to represent the things themselves, are nothing 
different from each other, nor inferior to that image, by 
which I represent the grain of sand itself. 1 
Here Hume asserts that he can represent what he cannot imagine. 
In itself this is not an imagistic argument; it also does not 
enable Hume to reach his desired conclusion. Such introspec-
tive imaginal evidence is confirmed by perceptual experience. 
Hume writes: 
It is the same with the impressions of the senses, as 
with the ideas of the imagination. Put a spot of ink 
upon paper, fix youreye upon that spot, and retire to 
such a distance that at last you lose sight of it; it is 
plain, that the moment before it vanished, the image, or 
impression, was perfectly indivisible. 2 
These two arguments should be treated conjunctively. Hume 
asserts that in both cases there are minimum presentations, 
i.e. a lower limit beyond which a presentation is perfectly 
indivisible. If the argument is valid, it would be easy to 
show by similar considerations that there are no infinitely 
large images • 
After rejecting the infinite divisibility of the ideas 
of space and time, Hume turns to the question of the infinite 
divisibility of space and time itself. He opens his account 
as follows: 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 27. 
2Ibid. 
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Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, 
the relations contradictions, and agreements of the 
ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we 
may, in general, observe to be the foundation of all 
human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representa-
tions of the most minute parts of extension; and, 
through whatever divisions and subdivisions we may sup-
pose these parts to be arrived at, they can never become 
inferior to some ideas which we form, The plain conse-
quence is, that whatever appears impossible and contra-
dictory upon the comparison of these ideas, must be 
really impossible and contradictory, without any further 
excuse or evasion. 1 
In the last sentence of this quotation, the crucial sentence 
for the immediate purposes at hand here, Hume 1s ground has 
changed from the earlier contention that he could conceive 
what he could not imagine. Here Hume asserts that "whatever 
appears impossible and contradictory upon the comparison of 
these ideas," i.e. idea-images, "mustbe really impossible 
and contradictory," i.e. that what can 1 t be imagined can 1 t 
exist ~rerum natura. 
It should be noted first that the argument of this 
passage is not a slip or an aberrant doctrine on Hume•s part. 
It is in fact an argument that is necessary to establish the 
desired conclusion of the first part of his doctrine, i.e. 
the fourth and final point in his four-linked chain of reason-
ing. In this argument, as Hume•s text runs, space and time 
can "exist conformable" to our ideas "since their infinite 
indivisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory." 
Hume 1s reason for this conclusion is that "whatever appears 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 29. 
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impossible and contradictory ••• must be really impossible 
and contradictory." Now this argument is clearly imagistic 
and would also appear to be deficient. Hume has here failed 
to distinguish sufficiently two senses of impossibility: 
psychological impossibility and logical impossibility. What-
ever plausibility Hume 1s argument has stems from the assimila-
tion of the two. Hume 1s conclusions based upon his imaginal 
and perceptual experiments refer to an alleged psychological 
impossibility, ~· the impossibility of imaging something 
like the thousandth part of a speck where the speck itself is 
imaginable. (The consideration that it is difficult to know 
what one person can imagine as opposed to another may be 
passed). For Hume 1s argument to be sustained, however, it 
would appear that he would have to show that it is logically 
impossible for a state of affairs to prevail in the world if 
this state of affairs cannot be imagined. Wherein lies the 
difference between the psychological possibility and logical 
impossibility of conception? Most people would probably 
assert that it is logically impossible to conceive a square 
circle or to conceive two parallel lines meeting in Euclidean 
space. The differentia between what is logically impossible 
and psychologically impossible to conceive would appear to 
rest in the fact that what is psychologically impossible to 
conceive, i.e. to imagine, varies from person to person 
whereas what is logically impossible to conceive is not so 
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1 
variable. Actually what is psychologically impossible to 
conceive varies from culture to culture, and the history of 
science is in part the gradual growthaf men's capacity to 
imagine conceptually a state of affairs as prevailing which 
their forefathers considered psychologically impossible to 
conceive. Neither thought nor the possibilities of nature 
are limited by man's imagination. As James remarks "How do 
we know which things we cannot imagine unless by first con-
ceiving them, meaning them and not other things?"2 
In the course of his argument in Part II Hume con-
siders a number of arguments and difficulties--particularly 
in connection with an effort to give a phenomenalistic founda-
tion for mathematics, which, although not necessarily 
incompatible with imagism, are not germane to consideration 
of it. Today most of these quarrels have lost their interest.3 
In a passage prefacing discussion of possible objections to 
his view from mathematicians, Hume writes: "Before I examine 
these arguments and objections in detail, I will here take 
1 This consideration the writer owes to John Hospers, 
An Introduction to Philoso hical Anal sis (N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 
, p. ospers, not be held responsible 
for the argument of this 
(N.Y.: 
2James quoted in J. H. Woodger, Biological Principles 
Harcourt, Brace and Company 1929), p. 164. 
3 One may safely say that Hume did not have the compe-
tence or flair in mathematics which Berkeley displayed. The 
previous quotation from Leroy discusses this matter suffi-
ciently. 
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them in a body, and endeavour, by a short and decisive reason, 
to prove, at once, that it is utterly impossible they can have 
any just foundation." He then proceeds to stake the whole 
upon the following contention: 
It is an established maxim in metaphysics, That whatever 
the mind clearll conceives includes the idea of£iossib1e 
existence, or, n other words, that nothl~ we aglne 
Is utterly impossible. We can form the i~a of a golden 
mountain, and from thence conclude, that such a mountain 
may actually exist. 1 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 32. Laird points out that 
"the 'established' maxim ••• was the very different 
Cartesian proposition that whatever we clearly conceive 
(in the rationalistic sense) must be true; and Hume 1s 
translation of 'clear conception' into 'obvious imagery' 
made nonsense of the doctrine." Laird, Hume 1s Philosophy, 
p. 81. 
Laird's point is loosely put. It may be stated as follows. 
For Descartes, rationalism was a method of philosophy in which 
the criterion of truth was intellectual and deductive rather 
than sensory. The term 'clear conception' thus referred to 
an idea which, prototypically, was mathematical. 
The difference between the classical British empiri-
cists and the continental rationalists may be illustrated by 
the following quotations from Descartes. Descartes, in speak-
ing of his investigations on geometrical demonstrations writes 
in Part IV of the Discourse on Method as follows: 
"that the great certitude which by common consent is 
accorded to these demonstrations, is founded solely upon 
this, that they are clearly conceived in accordance with 
the rules I have already laid down." 
Secondly, he observed that 
"there was nothing at all in these demonstrations which 
could assure me of the existence of their object: thus, 
for example, supposing a triangle to be given, I distinctly 
perceived that its three angles were neceSBarily equal to 
two right angles, but I did not on that account perceive 
anything which could assure me that any triangle existed." 
Lastly, to illustrate the point here under discussion, he 
writes: 
"But the reason which leads many to persuade themselves 
that there is a difficulty in knowing this truth, and 
even also in knowing what their mind really is, is that 
they never raise their thoughts above sensible objects, 
and are so accustomed to consider nothing except by way 
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Hume then goes on to assert that it is certain we have an 
idea of extension, i.e. of space since men talk and reason 
concerning it. Further, this idea, as it is conceived by 
the imagination, does not consist in an infinite number of 
parts because such a possibility is beyond the limited powers 
of comprehension. The idea of extension, therefore, must 
consist of parts, i.e. ideas which are indivisible. He con-
cludes: 
Consequently this idea implies no contradiction: conse-
quently 1tis possible for extension really to exist con-
formable to it; and consequently all arguments employ 1d 
against the possibility of mathematical points [which 
for Hume are minimum sensibilia] are mere scholastic, 
quibbles, and unworthy of our attention. 1 
The proposition that "nothing we imagine is utterly 
impossible" is, of course, a different proposition from the 
proposition that what can't be imagined can't exist, the 
proposition which was just discussed. The assertion that 
"nothing we ~ine is utterly impossible" does not seem un-
exceptionable. Against this doctrine of Hume's the following 
points may be made.2 There are, in the first place, the ruasmcal 
of imagination, which is a·mode of thinking limited to 
material objects, that all that is not imaginable seems 
to them not intelligible." 
Descartes quoted in Woodger, Biological Princitles, pp. 164-165. 
The issue between conceivability and imaglnabl lty in classical 
British empiricism and continental rationalism could not be 
more clearly drawn than by comparison of Hume 1s "established 
maxim" and Descartes' remarks here quoted. 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 32. 
2 Laird, Hume's Philosoph{m p. 81 suggests the classical 
difficulties of Illusions and ch eras. 
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difficulties of perceptual illusions such as the bent stick, 
and the dove's neck with many colors seen from different angles. 
Clearly impressions can be obtained of such illusions and 
such illusions are perfectly capable of being imagined; one 
would be somewhat reluctant to assert, however, that such 
images are possible existences i.e. in rerum natura. Secondly, 
it seems dubious reasoning to assert that centaurs and chimeras 
may exist in nature because they can be imagined. Simply 
their imaginability, apart from other facts, should have no 
tendency to increase our belief in their probability. 1 
Further, one does not have to go to the figments of imagina-
tion to be doubtful of the value of Hume 1s "established maxim." 
Our interest in the world is more in what is than what is 
possible, where possibility refers to logical possibility. 
In these cases Hume 1 s maxim is idle. Assume that the maxim 
is true and nothing than can be imagined is impossible. Con-
sider the case of a blue-eyed tom-cat. No such tom-cat has 
as yet turned up that is not deaf, at least so that an 
account of such a tom-cat forms a part of the literature of 
animal psychology. It is, thus, a surd fact without logical 
1Hume does distinguish emphatically at points on the 
distinction between •matter of fact• and imaginative concep-
tion. A careful reading of the section on space and time, 
however, does not seem to yield the conclusion that Hume held 
to one .distinction in these sections. If he had, his argu-
ment would have been much clearer. 
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necessity that deafness and blue eyes co-exist in tom-cats. 
It is doubtless a biological impossibility and hence an 
empirical impossibility for a blue-eyed tom-cat who can hear 
to turn up. On Hume 1 s principal :lt:ia not, however, "utterly 
impossible." One can image with perfect clarity a blue-eyed 
tom-cat who can hear. In this case one does not even have to 
strain the imagination; probably most people who consider the 
situation would evince some surprise at the co-existence of 
deafness and blue-eyes in tom-cats. But, on the other hand, 
one can image with perfect clarity a blue-eyed tom-cat who 
cannot hear; this also can be imaged and is not, thus, 
"utterly impossible." The case of the blue-eyed tom-cat's 
deafness is a border line case where both the deafness and 
capacity to hear are equally easily imaginable. In fact the 
whole question of imaginability in connection with this fact 
about the space-time order is not helpful. For most facts 
about the world their imaginability helps us only to picture 
a situation, which has intelligibility on prior grounds to 
its imaginability. To argue about such facts or their con-
tradictories on the basis of the "established maxim" is a 
non-sequitur. 
The upshot of the first part of Hume's argument 
concerning space and time may be put as follows. Hume argues 
that our ideas of space and time are of finite divisibility. 
He asserts, further, that it is logically possible for space 
and time to "exist confirmable" to these ideas. Finally he 
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asserts that the logical possibility of space and time's 
finite divisibility is assured by the psychological impossi-
bility of the contradictory proposition, viz. that space and 
time are infinitely divisible. The argument is imagistic, 
maintaining as it does that thinking and intelligibility 
stem from the manipulation of mental images. The argument 
is clearly a variant of the constructive version of imagism, 
i.e. images play the crucial role in thinking as Hume here 
construes it. Whether or not Hume•s argument at this point 
illustrates the polemical version of imagism, that images 
are the primary symbols used in thinking and all other 
symbols are secondary and derivative, is more difficult. 
Hume 1s official view that the contents of consciousness, i.e. 
Hume 1s perceptions, are exhaustively composed of impressions 
and ideas is imagistic, since on this official view the term 
1 idea 1 and 1 image 1 are synonymous. Hume, however, cannot 
sustain this pure sensory phenomenalism; he is driven beyond 
idea-images to recognize a purely conceptual element in 
thought. This purely conceptual element would today probably 
be called a meaning, in one ordinary sense of the term •mean-
ing.• This contention, however, that Hume is driven beyond 
idea-images to meanings in the course of his analysis does 
not come out as clearly in the argument of Part II as it 
does elsewhere. An attempt to answer this latter question 
is thus better deferred until more of Hume 1s arguments have 
been considered. 
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3. Imagism in Hume 1s Account of Causality 
Hume 1 s argument concerning causality is without ques-
tion his most influential analysis. It is possible to set 
out Hume 1s argument concerning causality quite briefly, and, 
in fact, that is the way it is usually done in the text-books. 
For certain purposes there is no harm done in this short way 
with Hume, but for the purpose of this investigation it will 
be necessary to set forth the argument in some detail. This 
will involve consideration of a long and intricate argument, 
shortened by summary statement where possible. For the pur-
pose of ascertaining the degree to which imagism enters into 
Hume 1s argument concerning causation this seems the best 
course. 
Before embarking on the study of imagism in Hume 1s 
account of causality, it will be desirable to summarize Hume 1s 
imagism so far as it has been given exposition thus far. 
Hume 1s imagism may be said to rest on three main pillars. 
There is, first of all, the general phenomenalistic framework 
within which Hume conducts his analysis, viz. his doctrine 
that all the perceptions of the human mind are exhaustively 
described as either impressions or ideas (idea-images). Such 
a framework may naturally be expected to result in an imagis-
tic mode of analysis. Secondly, there is the doctrine of the 
associative imagination. This imagistic doctrine may be 
expected to enter into Hume 1s account of causality as a 
principle of explanation. Finally, there are the principles 
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of Hume's psychological atomism. It will be instructive to 
note the degree to which Hume's arguments depend upon the 
most dubious thesis of this psychological atomism, viz~ the 
doctrine that what is distinguishable is separable in the 
thought and imagination. 
Hume opens section I of Part III by assuming the dis-
tinction between knowledge and probability--a distinction 
taken over from Locke. Knowledge for Hume, as it is for 
Locke, is one-hundred per cent certain.1 Actually, however, 
all the remainder of Part III, after section 1, is given 
over to causation, concerning which we have only probable 
knowledge, i.e. not knowledge at all properly so-called. 
In the first paragraph of section I, Part III of Book 
I Hume repeats his classification of the seven kinds of 
philosophical relations. This classification is supposedly 
1 Actually, like Locke, Hume uses knowledge in two 
senses: a strict sense in which knowledge is certain or 
demonstrative, and a broader sense in which knowledge is 
merely probable. These two senses are brought out clearly in 
the following passages from Book I, Part IV. Hume writes: 
"But knowledge and probability are of' such contrary and 
disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly 
into each other, and that because they will not divide, 
but must be either entirely present, or entirely absent." 
In the next paragraph, however, Hume writes: 
"All knowledge resolves itself into probability, and 
becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, 
which we employ in common life." 
Hume, Treatise, p. 181. Actually this wavering use of the 
tei'Ill •lci'lowledge' occasions no real confusion inHume, since 
the context usually supplies which of his two senses of 
'knowledge' is under discussion. 
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exhaustive. The seven kinds divide themselves into two 
classes: in the first group are those "such as depend 
entirely on the ideas, which we compare together, and such 
1 
as may be chang'd without any change in the ideas," i.e. 
the relations depend upon the relata and unless such relata 
change the relations do not change. Within this first group 
there are four relations: resemblance, contrariety, degree 
in quality, and proportions in quantity or number. Knowledge 
of the first three of these is intuitive and knowledge of the 
fourth is by demonstration. Taken collectively, these ex-
haustively account for the content of intuitive and demonstra-
tive knowledge, i.e. knowledge in Hume•s strict sense. 
The second group of relations comprises identity, 
situations in time and place, and causation. All reasoning, 
according to Hume, is "nothing but a comparison, and a dis-
covery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, 
which two or more objects bear to each other."2 Such 
1one might expect that geometry would be treated under 
proportion of quantity and so partake of the characteristic of 
the first class of relations. This, however, is not the case. 
Geometry, according to Hume, "tho' it much excels, both in uni-
versality and exactness, the loose judgments of the senses and 
imagination; yet never attains a perfect precision and exact-
ness." Hume, Treatise, pp. 70-71. Geometrical knowledge is 
thus only probable. One may perhaps see in Hume here an anti-
cipation of the contemporary view of geometry in which if one 
set of axioms is assumed one gets Euclidean geometry and if 
another set of axioms is assumed one gets Riemannian geometry. 
For Hume, as for most philosophers of mathematics today, a set 
of axioms holds in nature. There are differences of some 
importance, however, between contemporary views of the nature 
of mathematics and Hume•s views. Hume 1s view in only an anti-
cipation; it is by no means a full-fledged statement of the 
contemporary view. 
2Hume, Treatise, p. 73. 
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comparison may be made "when both the objects are present to 
the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when only 
one, 111 Reasoning, however, strictly speaking, does not occur 
unless the "mind can go beyond what is inunediately present to 
the senses." 2 It is only causation 
which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance 
from the existence or action of one object, that •twas 
follow'd or preceded by any other existence or action; 
nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in 
reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are 
affected by it, 3 
Hume concludes his comments upon this second class of rela-
tiona by suggesting the importance of causation. For Hume 
causation is "or those three relations, which depend not upon 
the mere ideas, the only one that can be traced beyond our 
senses, and inform us of existences and objects, which we do 
not see or fee 1 , ,4 
Hume, in order to "begin regularly," considers "the 
idea of causation, ••• [to] see from what origin it is derived,"5 
The necessity for this procedure Hume describes as follows: 
'Tis impossible to reason justly, without understanding 
perfectly the idea concerning which we reason; and 'tis 
impossible perfectly to understand any idea, without 
tracing it up to its origin, and examining that primary 
impression, from which it arises. 6 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 73. 
2 ~-, pp. 73-74. 
3~ •• p. 74. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
6 ~., pp. 74-75. 
This is, of course, Hume's standard procedure. It is impor-
tant, however, since at the beginning or the argument we find 
the search is to be for the idea, i.e. an idea-image, about 
which we reason when we reason by means of cause and effect. 
The idea of cause and effect is an idea of "prodigious 
consequence"1 for Hume. There are two possibilities for its 
source in impression. It might be an impression of quality, 
or of a relation. It cannot, however, be an impression of a 
quality since, as Hume remarks, "which-ever of these quali-
ties I pitch on, I find some object that is not possessed of 
2 it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause and effect." 
In other words, any quality might be absent and one would 
still observe cause and effect. As Hume writes: 
Indeed there is nothing existent, either externally or 
internally, which is not to be consider 1d either as a 
cause or an effect; tho 1 tis plain there is no one 
quality, which universally belongs to all beings, and 
gives a title to that denomination. 3 
This being the case, "the idea, then, or causation must be 
deriv'd from some relation among objects."4 Without great 
difficulty Hume finds two such relations. In the first place, 
causes and effects are contiguous. Hume then remarks that 
Tho 1distant objects may sametimes seem productive of 
each other, they are commonly found upon examination 
to be link'd by a chain of causes, which are contiguous 




among themselves, and to the distant objects: and 
when in any particular instance we cannot discover 
this connexion, we still presume it to exist. 1 
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Secondly, Hume discovers a relation of "priority of time in 
the cause before the effect."2 To deny such a priority in 
time of the cause to the effect and assert the simultaneity 
of cause and effect would "annihilate time." Writes Hume: 
Now if any cause may be perfectly co-temporary with 
its effect, •tis certain ••• that they must all of them 
be so •••• The consequence of this would be no less than 
the destruction of that succession of causes, which we 
observe in the world; and indeed, the utter annihilation 
of time. 3 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 75. Hume here assumes that there 
is no action at a distance. He does not, however, attempt to 
offerlliCb.'a<11apJoof at action at a distance; such as disproof 
would presumably be grounded in logical necessity. Hume does 
not so far in Part III deal with logical necessities at all. 
2 Ibid., p. 76. This, of course, has been hotly 
challengea:--Kant pointed out cases where cause and effect 
were simultaneous. Some hold today that all cause and effect 
is simultaneous. 
Aside from this question, it has been pointed out 
by Broad that Hume 1s argument is formally vicious. The 
essence of Broad's argument is brought out in the following 
quotation, in which Broad reduces Hume 1s argument to two 
premises and an invalid conclusion drawn by Hume from these 
premises. Broad writes: 
"It is perfectly obvious that the two·premises 
'Some causes produce their effects at the same moment 
as themselves• and 1No cause produces its effect at a 
moment later than the next• cannot possibly lead to 
any conclusion about all causes. Yet Hume makes them 
lead to the conclusion that all causes produce their 
effects at the same moment as the!j!!selves." 
Broad, Perception, Physics, and Reality, pp. 121-122. 
~ 
3 Hume, Treatise, p. 76. 
After discovering these two parts to causation Hume 
1 finds himself "stopt short" Innumerable instances may be 
cited in which "an object may be contiguous and prior to 
2 
another, without being consider'd as its cause." One may, 
for example, touch a table and then feel a pain in his leg. 
These two events are contiguous and successive, and yet there 
is no necessary connection between them. Occurrences of this 
kind could be multiplied in limitless fashion. Such a state 
of affairs, however, does not warrant for Hume giving up the 
search for the impression from which the idea of necessary 
connection is derived. Rather than say that "I am here 
possest of an idea, which is not preceded by a similar impres-
sion"3 Hume decides "to beat about all the neighboring fields"' 
in an effort to find "the nature of the necessary connexion, 
which enters into our idea of cause and effect."4 
The first question which Hume discusses as an allied 
question to that of the idea of necessary connection is the 
question "why a cause is always necessary."5 Hume contends 
that although it is a "general maxim in philosophy" that 
6 
every event must have a cause, this is not a matter of 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 76. 
2 Ibid.,p.77. 
3Ibid. 
4 !E.!£., p. 78. 
5Ibid., p. 78. 
6 Actually Hume states the general maxim to be "what-
ever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence." Hume 
takes this to be entailed by the proposition that •every event 
must have a cause,' or, at least it is this latter proposition 
that Hume is really interested in discussing in this section. 
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demonstration, i.e. of knowledge in the strict sense of the 
term. Philosophers in the Middle Ages, as well as Descartes, 
had assumed that the proposition that 'every event must have 
a cause' was a matter of demonstrable knowledge, and, in 
fact, had used this contention in various proofs for the 
existence of God. Hume offers two arguments designed to show 
that "every demonstration, which has been produc'd for the 
1 
necessity of a cause, is fallacious and sophistical." The 
first of these may be stated briefly and passed by. The 
second argument, and Hume 1s real argument by his own say-so, 
is imagistic and will require fuller consideration, 
The cogency of Hume 1s first argument is contingent 
upon the exhaustiveness of his classification of relations. 
He cites the four relations which he takes to be intuitively 
certain and asserts that none are implied by the proposition 
that "Whatever has a beginning has also a cause of existence."2 
Hume then argues that someone who finds intuitive certainty 
in other relations than these is required to produce such 
relations, and "it will then be time enough to examine."3 
Hume's second argument purports to prove "at once" 
that the proposition just quoted is "neither intuitively nor 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 80. 
2 Ibid., p. 79. 
3Ibid. 
1 demonstrably certain." In other words, Hume wants to show 
that the proposition "whatever has a beginning has also a 
cause of existence" is an empirical proposition, i.e. it is 
not logically true (analytic), or in his own words it is not 
a proposition established by reason. Hume•s technique in 
the argument is typical; it is the argument that a proposi-
tion is an empirical proposition since its contradictory can 
be conceived, i.e. imagined,· For Hume•s psychological cri-
terion, there would .~ro b.adJ . .'l-.7' be substituted today a 
logical criterion, ~· that if the contradictory of a pro-
position is not itself a contradiction, then the proposition 
2 is empirical. Hume•s argument runs as follows: 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 79. Berkeley and Hume frequently 
preface imagistic arguments by such phrases as •at once• or 
its equivalents. This seems to indicate that such imagistic 
arguments had an immediate and indubitable quality for Berkeley 
and Hume lacking in other arguments. On the other hand, by 
the very fact that most usually imagistic arguments do not 
occur alone but coupled with other arguments would seem to 
indicate that they felt that perhaps such imagist arguments 
would not produce conviction in everyone. They often asserted 
their willingness to stake all on an imagist argument, but 
nonetheless most usually included arguments of other types. 
All the writers of this period give an embarrassment of riches 
as far as their arguments are coneerned. To prove a position 
only one argument is necessary as long as the argument is 
valid. The classical British empiricists mixed imagist argu-
ments, logical arguments, and arguments based upon empirical 
psychology rather than imagist considerations more or less 
indiscriminately. To the contemporary mind this seems to 
weaken rather than strengthen the case. 
2This manner of stating Hume 1s technique is indebted 
to Berlin, Age of the Enli~htenment, p. 186, esp. footnote 3. 
The definition or an analy ic statement that parallels this 
definition of an empirical statement is that an analytic 
statement is one whose denial is self-contradictory. 
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All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and 
as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 
•twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-
existent this moment, and existent the next, without 
conjoining to the distinct idea of a cause or productive 
principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of a 
In the Enfuirf the relation between this distinction 
and a Humean dist net on is more clearly drawn than in the 
Treatise. In the Enquiry Hume draws the distinction between 
relations of ideas and matters of fact. He writes: 
"All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally 
be divided into two kinds, to wit, Reations of Ideas, and 
Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of 
geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every 
affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstrably 
certain •••• Matters of fact, which are the second 
objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same 
manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, 
of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of 
every matter of fact is still possible; because it can 
never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the 
mind with the same facilitr, and distinctness, as if ever 
so conformable to reality.' Hume, Enquiry, p. 25. 
There would seem to be little doubt that«aume•s distinction, 
then,,between relations of ideas and matters of fact corres-
ponds to the distinction between analytic and empirical (or 
synthetic) statements respectively. The notion, however, of 
analyticity has recently been challenged by Quine and others. 
As Quine puts it: 
"we hear analytic statements defined as statements whose 
denials are self-contradictory. But this definition has 
small explanatory value; for the notion of self-contra-
dictoriness, in the quite broad sense needed for this 
definition of anaQyticity, stands in exactly the same 
need of clarification as does the notion of analyticity 
itself. The two notions are the two sides of a single 
dubious coin." Quine, From a Logical Point of View, p. 20. 
No decision will even be attempted In this Investigation on 
this question of the traditional cleavage between the analy-
tic and the synthetic. The traditional position will be 
assumed. It may be hoped that for the arguments which will 
be considered here the traditional criterion does have some 
explanatory value. Such a hope does not seem entirely 
without foundation. 
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cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly 
possible for the imagination; and consequently the 
actual separation of these objects is so far possible, 
that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity; and is 
therefore incapable of being refuted by any reasoning 
from here ideas; without which 1tis impossible to 
demonstrate the necessity of a cause. 1 
The argument here turns upon Hume 1 s imagistic principle that 
what is imaginable is not logically impossible. From this 
.Hume is able to derive the conclusion that since something 
coming into existence without a prior cause is imaginable, 
the proposition asserting such a state of affairs is an 
empirical proposition. Hume summarizes this conclusion in 
the following words: 
Since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reason-
ing, that we derive the opinion of the necessiwof a 
cause to every new production, that opinion must neces-
sarily arise from observation and experience. 2 
So far Hume has shown only that our knowledge of causation is 
only probable knowledge, i.e. knowledge based upon experience. 
One point may be noted. In his argument Hume makes specific 
appeal to his dogma that what is distinguishable is separable. 
Of his various imagistic principles this seems the most doubt-
ful. Such an appeal, however, is unnecessary on Hume•s part, 
and, in fact, as the import of his argument was summarized 
in the foregoing, the argument was said really to turn on 
the much less dubious principle that what is imaginable is 
not logically impossible. 
1 Hume, Treatise, pp. 79-80. 
2 ~., p. 82. 
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Hume's argument has as its next step the assertion 
that causal inference begins with that which is immediately 
sensed or remembered. We believe certain facts concerning 
Julius Caesar, and, if occasion requires, a chain of causal 
inferences may be traced back to credible testimony. Causal 
inference contains, thus, reasoning from a present percep-
tion of sense or memory to an idea reached by inference. He 
notes that this state of affairs gives three things to be 
explained: 
First, the original impressions. Secondlf• the transi-
tion to the idea of connected cause or ef ect. Thirdly, 
the nature or qualities of that idea. 1 
Since the ultimate cause of impressions is, however, "per-
fectly inexplicable,"2 Hume turns to the question of the 
characteristic which distinguishes the memory from the 
imagination. Hume repeats his usual criterion, viz. that 
memory is distinct from imagination only in the 'force and 
vivacity• of the former. 
It is the second question, the transition to the idea 
of connected cause or effect, that Hume is really concerned 
to discuss. Hume restates the question as that "of the 
inference from the impression to the idea. n3 Hume 1 s results 
on this question are of the first magnitude, since they are 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 84. 
2 Ibid. 
3This is the title of section six of Part III, Book I. 
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1 
at the basis of his celebrated view about induction. The 
first step in Hume 1s argument is to indicate that the infer-
ence from the impression to the idea is not a relation of 
entailment, i.e. it is not a necessary implication. Were it 
such a necessary implication it'would amount to knowledge, 
and would imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility 
of conceiving anything different."2 This is, in fact, not 
1This last statement requires some explication. Hume 
purports throughout his discussion to be discussing causal 
inference. In fact, however, some of the time at least, he 
is discussing inductive arguments which are non-causal. On 
this terminology, there are two types of inductive arguments: 
non-causal inductive arguments and causal inductive arguments. 
Non-causal inductive arguments are based upon the relation of 
co-existence. They may be exemplified by the proposition, 
earlier used as an example, that 'All blue-eyed tom-cats are 
dear.• (A non-causal inductive argument may eventually be 
reduced to a causal inductive argument, and science is in 
part an effort to bring this state of affairs about). Causal 
arguments, on the other hand, are inductive arguments based 
upon a causal relation. Hume's analysis applies to both 
types of arguments, but his failure to distinguish clearly 
between the two makes this tendency of his argument less evi-
dent than otherwise it might be. Hume writes, for example: 
"The only connection or relation among objects i.e. 
objects of the mind or presentations, which can lead 
us beyond the immediate impression of our memory and 
senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 
it is the only one, on which we can found a just infer-
ence from one object to another." Hume, Treatise, p. 89. 
Here relations of co-existence are not considered. It may be 
suggested that if relations of co-existence are superadded to 
the causal relations Hume purportedly considers, then his 
argument against inductive arguments being necessary--his 
real point--may be considered on its merits more precisely. 
This whole discussion is indebted tow. T. Stace who pointed 
this matter out in lectures attended by the present writer. 
2Hume, Treatise, p. 87. 
the case. Hume writes about this alternative as follows: 
••• as all distinct ideas are separable, 'tis evident 
that there can be no impossibility of that kind. When 
we pass from a present impression to the idea of any 
object, we might possibly have separated the idea from 
the impression, and have substituted any other idea in 
its room. 1 
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Hume's argument thus far is that the causal relation is not 
a necessary implication--a relation of entailment. This argu-
ment is based upon the imagistic consideration that what is 
imaginable is never self-contradictory. In making the transi-
tion from a present impression to the idea of any object·· the 
contradictory might be imagined as a possible occurrence. 
The nub of this portion of Hume 1s argument is that a proposi-
tion about a cause does not entail a proposition about any 
particular effect. This being the case, causal inference is 
not demonstrable knowledge. 
Since causal inference is not demonstrative reasoning, 2 
it is a matter of experience. Hume•s general description of 
the nature of this experience is as follows: 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 87. 
~he term 1apagogic' is sometimes used to refer to 
what is here called 'demonstrative' reasoning. Cf. Church, 
Hume's Theory of the Understanding, p. 74 and passim. Hume's 
own terminology is the one here followed, viz. that arguments 
dealing with necessary implications are 'demonstrative reason-
ings.• This terminology is useful to preserve, as long as 
it is remembered that 'demonstrative' refers to necessary 
implication for Hume. 
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The nature of experience is this, We remember to have 
had frequent instances of the existence of one species 
of objects; and also remember, that the individuals of 
another species of objects have always attended them, 
and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and 
succession with regard to them •••• We likewise call to 
mind their constant conjunction in all past instances. 
Without any further ceremony, we call the one cause and 
the other effect, and infer the existence of the one 
from that of the other. 1 
There is a new relation between cause and effect thus noted, 
viz. constant conjunction, which always accompanies cause and 
effect. The discovery of this new relation, however, "seems 
to advance us but very little on our way."2 It does not help 
in the discovery of new ideas and "can only multiply, but not 
enlarge, the objects of our mind."3 
Hume's next question is his usual question: 
whether experience produces the idea by means of the 
understanding or of the imagination; whether we are 
determined by reason to make the transition, or by a 
certain association and relation of perceptions, 4 
Furthermore, his answer to this question can be foreseen; 
Hume will find the basis for predictions about cause and 
effect not in reason but in the principles of the associative 
imagination. 
His argument against reason as the source of the 
causal inference is his by now familiar imagistic argument, 
1 
Hume, Treatise, p, 87. 
2 ~-· p. 88. 
3Ibid. 
4 ~-· pp. 88-89. 
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Hume states the problem as follows: 
If reason determined us to make the inference it wou 1d 
proceed upon that principle, that instances, of which 
we have had no experience, must resemble those, of which 
we have had experience, and that the course of nature 
continues always uniformly the same. 1 
In other words, if causal inference were based upon reason--
using •reason• here as synonymous with deductive reason--the 
argument would be cast in syllogistic form with the uniform-
ity of nature as the major premise. The uniformity of nature 
itself, however, would have to be demonstrated, and this can-
not be done. Hume writes: 
Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince 
us, that there can be no demonstrative arguments to 
prove, that those instances, or which we have had no 
experience, resemble those, ol' which we have had experi-
ence. We can at least conceive a change in the course 
Oflnature; which sufficiently proves, that such a change 
is not absolutely impossible. To form a clear idea of 
any thing i.e. [an idea-image], is an undeniable argu-
ment for its possibility, and is alone a refutatbn of 
any pretended demonstration against it. 2 
It is to be noted that this argument of Hume 1s depends neither 
upon his copy theory of ideas, nor upon the dogma of his atom-
ism that what is distinguishable is separable in thought or 
imagination. The argument is perfectly general; it merely 
asserts that what :Is imaginable is possible. His more doubt-
ful arguments, not here applied, consist in asserting the 
converse of this proposition, namely that what is possible is 
imaginable. 
1 Hume, Treatise. p. 89. 
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It might be assumed, however, that after experience 
of constant conjunction recourse could be had to probability 
to justify induction. This evasion, however, Hume argues, is 
not possible. As inferences to a probability must be grounded 
in cause and effect, it is impossible that such inferences can 
be independent of that relation. All arguments to the con-
trary involve for Hume a vicious circularity. He puts this 
last matter as follows: 
According to this account of things, which is, I think, 
in every point unquestionable, probability is founded 
on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those ob-jects, of which we have had experience, and those, of 
which we have had none; and therefore •tis impossible 
this presumption can arise from probability. The same 
proposition cannot be both the cause and effect of 
another; and this is, perhaps, the only proposition con-
cerning that relation, which is either intuitively or 
demonstratively certain. 1 
The final step in Hume 1s argument is that, since a 
causal inference is not based upon reason, it must be based 
upon the principles of the associative imagination. Hume puts 
the essential point of this conclusion as follows: 
Reason can never show us the connexion of one object 
with another, 1tho aided by experience, and the obser-
vation of their constant conjunction in all past 
instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from the 
idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief 
of another, it is not determined by reason, but by cer-
tain principles, which associate together the ideas of 
these objects and unite them in imagination. Had ideas 
no more union in the fancy thancobjects seen to have to 
the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference 
from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter 
of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on 
the union of ideas. 2 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 90. 
2Ibid., p. 92. 
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Hume, then, proceeds to recapitulate the principles of the 
association, mentioning again resemblance, contiguity, and 
succession. As Hume restates his doctrine, however, he 
seems to imply that cause and effect is the ultimate prin-
ciple of the associative relation and that the three other 
principles are dependent upon the causal relation. 
Hume's argument concerning induction falls into four 
stages. These may be recapitulated in order to show the 
stages of the argument in which imagism or its affiliated 
doctrines are involved. First, Hume asserts that any parti-
cular causal relation is not a deduction in the sense that an 
effect is deduced from the cause. Hume appeals to an imagis-
tic argument in this first step, viz. that the relation of 
cause and effect is not an entailing (i.e. a necessary rela-
tion), since some other effect could be imagined as conse-
quent upon the particular cause under discussion. Secondly, 
Hume asserts that the causal relation involves the notionof 
constant conjunction, a relation observed in experience. 
Thirdly, Hume again returns to the question of causal infer-
ence and asserts that if this were based upon reason, it 
would require the assumption of the uniformity of nature--a 
principle fully as much in need of warrant as the principle 
of deduction of effect from cause is to sustain. Finally, 
Hume asserts that since causal inference is not based upon 
reason it must be based upon the principles of the associative 
1 imagination, another imagist doctrine. 
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1 The problem of the justification of induction, as it 
is usually called, has been in practice the search to find 
that Hume was wrong in his sceptical conclusions. One of the 
best known discussions of the problem in recent philosophical 
literature is the article by Max Black, "The Justification of 
Induction" in Black, La~uage and Philosoph~, pp. 59-88. 
Black's main points wou appear to be the ollowing. 
The scepticism of Hume, and those who have followed 
him, arises from the impossibility of a demonstration, i.e. a 
deductive proof of an assertion concerning a matter of fact. 
(A typical example of such a sceptical assertion, quoted from 
Black, would be the assertion that "We are not justified in 
believing that the sun will rise tomorrow." (Black, Languag~ 
and Philosoph~, p. 62). 
All a tempts to justify inductive inference, in the 
sense of offering a standard appropriate to deduction, are, 
according to Black, foredoomed to failure since it is of the 
nature of inductive arguments that "their premises are compat-
ible with the logical nature of their conclusion." Black, 
Language and Philosoph~, p. 61. (This applies to efforts to 
found probable conc1us ons as well as certain conclusions on 
a deductive standard). In other words, it is true by defini-
tion that induction is not deduction. There are, in point of 
fact, two kinds of inference: deductive inference and induc-
tive inference·. Deductive inference is characterized by the 
fact that it is a logic of entailment, i.e. the conclusions 
follow necessarily from the premises. Inductive inference, on 
the other hand, is characterized by the fact that the premises 
are compatible with the logical negation of the conclusion. 
This state of affairs should not, however, occasion 
alarm. Why should induction be like deduction? Sceptical 
arguments in part achieve their persuasiveness by gradually 
sliding from using the term 'justification• in some "everyday" 
or "practical" sense to the use of the term in a deductive or 
strict sense. (The same analysis can be provided for other 
epistemic terms such as 'proof', 'possibility', 'knowledge' 
and •evidence.•) When terms are used in this latter strict or 
deductive sense, one can assert that we do not know any matter 
of fact, and the sceptical conclusion is reached. 
It has been suggested that critics of induction are 
really making linguistic recommendations, recommending that 
terms like 'know• should be used in such a sense that to know 
will mean to know certainly or infallibly. Such a line of 
analysis, however, according to Black, will not satisfy the 
critic of induction like Hume. "The critics of induction will 
not be appeased by a mere change in terminology." Black, 
Language and Philosophy, p. 62. 
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Hume•s argument thus far has been fairly straight-
forward. Despite his beating "about all the neighboring 
fields" in general the analysis into causation has been to 
find ultimately the original impression which can give us 
the idea, i.e. idea-image, which the mind must possess if it 
is to reason with probable knowledge of cause and effect. 
The argument so far considered may be considered the~gin­
ning portion of the argument. From this point on, however, 
the argument takes a quite new turn into the psychology of 
belief. This middle portion of the argument is supposed to 
serve as a buttress for the beginning and end of the argument. 
It should be remembered, however, that despite the many 
twists and turns the argument takes in its sinuous course, 
it is still the search for the idea-image of necessary con-
nection which is Hume •s goal. It is easy to lose ,,;sight of 
this fact, and sometimes one wonders if Hume himself has not 
The difficulty lies in another direction. Critics of 
induction like Hume assume that deduction is somehow superior 
to induction because of its certainty. Here is the fundamen-
tal mistake. The answer to Hume is to reject the implicit as-
sumption that deduction is superior to induction in all instan-
ces. Deduction is superior to induction only in relation to 
certain ends, viz. where data is to be organized or classified. 
Induction, on the other hand, has "the great merit of permit-
ting inference to hitherto unobserved phenomena." (Black, 
Languafe and Philosophy, p. 63). The proper justification of 
induct on, Ir serious questions arise, lies in showing that 
inductive methods "work in practice." Black, Langua~e and 
Philosophy, p. 63. Such justification, proper to In uction, 
Involves no circularity since no attempt is made to offer a 
demonstration of the validity of inductive inference, i.e. a 
standard appropriate to deduction is not offered. 
A similar argument to Humean scepticism has been 
offered by Frederic L. Will, "Will the Future Be Like the 
Past?", Mind, LVI, ( 1947), pp. 332-347. 
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lost sight of it. 
Hume•s discussion of the psychology of belief occu-
pies about sixty-one pages in the first book of the Treatise, 
but it will not be necessary to consider this extended dia-
l 
cussion in full detail. The connection between the argu-
ment thus far and Hume 1s considerations on the psychology of 
belief need first to be pointed out. Hume has shown thus 
far, if his argument is considered convincing, that inductive 
causal arguments are based upon the association of ideas. 
When the mind makes the inference from cause to effect it is 
determined not by reason, but by "certain principles which 
associate together the ideas of theae objects, and unite 
2 
them in the imagination." Association of ideas, however, 
considered by itself, might lead the mind to false conclu-
sions as well as true ones. It is necessary, therefore, to 
show that there is a warrant for believing true ideas and 
excluding false ideas, since the mind may be led to both 
classes of ideas by the forwardness of the imagination. This 
warrant is supplied by Hume's doctrine of belief. 
Hume sets the problem for discussion as follows: 
"The idea of an object is an essential part of the belief of 
it, but not the whole. We conceive [i.e, imagine] many 
1In these pages Hume also discusses probability. It 
is not necessary, however, to consider Hume 1s discussion of 
this topic, since all of value for considerations of imagism 
has already been discussed. 
2 Hum~, Treatise, p. 92. 
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1 
things, which we do not believe." Hume's task is thus to 
consider the nature of belief--in other words to distinguish 
between imaginative conception and fact. 
The first step toward the solution of the foregoing 
problem, as Hume construes it, is the assertion that exist-
ence is not a characterizing predicate, i.e. to say that 
something is black or is white and then to add that it also 
2 has existence does not add any new assignable characters. 
Hume writes: 
••• the idea of existence is nothing different from the 
idea of any object, and what when after the simple con-
ception of anything we wou'd conceive it as existent, 
we in reality make no addition or alteration to our 
first idea. 3 
Furthermore, belief adds nothing to an idea. Hume writes: 
I likewise maintain, that the belief of the existence joins no new ideas to those, which compose the idea of 
the object. When I think of God, when I think of him 
as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 94. 
2It has been noted that Hume 1 s doctrine at this point 
is substantially the same as Kant's doctrine. Immanuel Kant's 
Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Mac-
millan and Co., 1953), "Transcendental Dialectic," Book II, 
ch. iii., sec. iv, pp. 504-505. This similarity, however, 
should not be pressed too far, since Hume did not have a doc-
trine of predication, i.e. he did not make clear the status 
of existential propositions. Cf. Hume, Treatise, p. 96, 
footnote in which Hume distinguishes conception, judgment, 
and reasoning. In his discussion of judgment--the point at 
which existential propositions would presumably be discussed--
he reduces judgment to conception. He wri tea, "Whether we 
consider a single object, or several; whether we dwell on 
these objects, or run from them to others; and in whatever 
form or order we survey them, the act of mind exceeds not a 
simple conception ••• " This discussion is indebted to Laird, 
Hume's PhilosofhY, pp. SQ-81. As Laird's remarks are some-
what cryptic, t is not certain that the remarks here are 
consonant with what he intends. 
3Hume, Treatise, p. 94. 
my· idea of him neither encreases nor diminishes •1 
In the sense of existence which Hume here intends, viz. that 
existence is what is common to all existents, his point is 
clear enough. Hume is asserting that there is neither a dis-
tinct impression nor an idea--in the sense of a memory image--
of existence apart from an existent. There is nothing added 
to such a perception or memory image by asserting that it is 
in rerum natura. Hume's earlier assertion of this same doc-
trine may be profitably quoted. Hume writes: 
The idea or existence, then, is the very same with ideas 
of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on any 
thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are 
nothing different from each other. That idea, when con-join'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition to 
it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent. 
Any idea we please to form is the idea of being; and the 
idea of being is any idea we please to form. 2 
The point of Hume's contention here must be carefully noted. 
Hume is not asserting anything as silly as to say that when 
we imagine a character of fiction we conceive of him existing 
in the space-time order. Hume has a doctrine of the distinc-
tion between imaginative conception and matter of fact. His 
point is rather that the mind does not add assignable charac-
ters in conceiving of something as existing. This is the 
point of the commonly made assertion that existence is not a 
(characterizing) predicate. This doctrine is necessary for 
Hume's empiricism of ideas, since if existence were a 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 94. 
2 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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characterizing predicate, then it would be distinguishable 
and separable in thought and imagination. Obviously, how-
ever, this is not the case; one cannot image sheer existence 
apart from an existent thing. Existence apart from existents 
would be an abstract idea of the sort Berkeley and Hume are 
constantly at odds with. 
As there is a difference between imagining something 
existing and believing that it does exist, Hume next turns to 
the nature of such a difference. For Hume since "this 
difference lies not in the parts or composition of the idea, 
which we conceive; it follows, that it must lie in the manner, 
in which we conceive it."1 He formulates his question as 
asking "Wherein consists the difference betwixt believing and 
2 disbelieving any proposition." In the case of propositions 
that proved by intuition or demonstration, i.e. propositions 
in which certainty is obtainable, the answer is easy enough; 
in such cases the individual who considers such a proposition' 
~ot only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, 
but is necessarily determin 1d to conceive them in that parti-
cular manner. 113 The grounds for this assertion are Hume 1s 
usual imagistic grounds. He writes, "Whatever is absurd is 
unintelligible; nor is it possible for the imagination to 
conceive anything contrary to a demonstration."4 This passage 





presents no novel elements, except possibly the specific use 
of the term 'conceive' in connection with the faculty of 
imagination. It has been hitherto assumed, on legitimate 
grounds of context, that the term •conceive' may have refer-
ence to imagination; in this passage, however, the terminology 
is specifically nailed down to such a usage. As in the case 
of Berkeley, the inference should not be drawn that imagin-
ability and conceivability are synonymous terms in every 
context. That they are synonymous in some contexts is all 
that is required as a clue for possible imagism. In this 
case the matter seems beyond doubt. 
It is not, however, with intuition and demonstration, 
but with "reasonings from causation, and concerning matters 
1 
·or fact" that Hume is primarily concerned. Furthermore, it 
should be repeated that belief in an empirical proposition 
as opposed to disbelief is not to be found in any intrinsic 
denomination or character which such a believed proposition 
exhibits. The differentia between the believed as opposed to 
the disbelieved proposition lies in its "manner" of concep-
tion, i.e. in some extrinsic denomination. What then is the 
extrinsic denomination which leads to belief rather than 
incredulity? The answer to the question is found in the 
degree of force and vivacity of an idea and its corresponding 
expression in a proposition. Hume writes: 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 95. 
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When you would any way vary the idea of a particular 
object, you can only encrease or diminish its force 
and vivacity. If you make any other change on it, it 
represents a different object or impression. The case 
is the same as in colours. A particular shade of any 
colour may acquire a new degree of liveliness or 
brightness without any other variation. But when you 
produce any other variation, 1tis no longer the same 
shade or colour •••• An opinion, therefore, or belief, 
may be most accurately defined, a livel{ idea related 
to or associated with a present impress on. 1 
To believe in an idea, then, is to have an increase in the 
force and vivacity with which such an idea strikes the mind. 
In the appendix, however, Hume comments upon this criterion 
of belief. He writes: 
An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious 
idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this 
different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it 
a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, 
or steadiness. 2 
There is in this passage the suggestion of a somewhat differ-
ent criterion for belief, viz. feeling. An idea believed in 
"feels different" from one not so assented to. Hume 
immediately goes on, however, as the quoted passage shows, 
to return to the force and vivacity theory. As Hume contin-
ues in the appendix he remarks that he finds it "impossible 
to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception."3 
Whether in effect Hume is offering another theory of belief 
than his official force and vivacity theory is a question 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 96. 
2 Ibid., p. 629. 
3rbid. 
1 that cannot be fully explored in this investigation. 
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Having shown that a belief consists in a "lively 
idea related to a present impression,"2 Hume goes on to dis-
cuss the source of such vivacity in an idea. He would will-
ingly "establish ••• as a general maxim in the science of 
human nature" the principle that "when any impression becomes 
present to us, it not only transports the mind to such ideas 
as are related to it, but likewise communicates to them a 
share of its force and vivacity."3 This notion is straight-
forward enough; Hume is simply asserting that if an impres-
sion, A, leads the mind to think of an idea, B, then there 
is a flow of vivacity from A to B. 
There is one final point that is needed to connect 
Hume 1s account of belief with his account of necessary 
connection. There are three associating principles of 
1It would not be profitable to explore it since his 
force and vivacity doctrine certainly appears again and again 
and Hume cannot be said to wi~hdraw it. The matter is com-
plicated, however, by a withdrawal Hume does make in the 
appendix. In reference to the passage under discussion Hume 
writes: 
"I say [i.e. in his definition of belief quoted above] 
that two ideas of the same object can only be different 
by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I be-
lieve there are other differences among ideas, which 
cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had 
I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be 
different by their different feeling, I shou'd have been 
nearer the truth." Hume, Treatise, p. 636. 
This does not seem to be a retraction as much as a restatement, 
but, in any case, Hume does not spell out a feeling theory in 
any more detail. Because he does not, it would seem idle to 
speculate upon the degree to which his imagism might thereby 
have been modified. 
2Hume, Treatise, p. 98. 
3Ibid. 
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thought and imagination, viz. resemblance, contiguity, and 
cause and effect. Of these three, however, Hume asserts 
that only cause and effect leads to belief. Resemblance 
and contiguity suggest ideas to the mind; they do not, how-
ever, condition belief. Why is it that only causality leads 
to belief? Hume states the problem as follows: 
••• if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. 
that these three species of relation [i.e. resemblance, 
contiguity and cause and effect] are derived from the 
same principles; that their effects, in inforcing and 
inlivening our ideas, are the same; and that belief is 
nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an 
idea; it shou'd follow, that that action of the mind 
may not only be deriv 1d from the relation of cause and 
effect, but also from those of contiguity and resem-
blance. But as we find by experience, that belief 
arises only from causation, and that we can draw no in-
ference from one object to another, except they be con-
nected by this relation, we may conclude, that there is 
some error in that reasoning which lead us into such 
difficulties. 1 
Hume's answer to the problem is that, although contiguity and 
resemblance have some tendency to enliven ideas, it is only 
by causation that a "general rule," i.e. an inveterate habit, 
is formed. Hume writes: 
But although I cannot altogether exclude the relations 
of resemblance and contiguity from operating on the 
fancy in this manner, 1 tis observable that, when single, 
their influence is very feeble and uncertain •••• And as 
this imperfection is very sensible in every single 
instance, it still increases by experience and observa-
tion, when we compare the several instance we may 
remember, and form a general rule against the reposing 
any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, 
which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance 
and contiguity. 2 
1 Hume, Treatise, p. 107. 
2 Ibid., pp. 109-110. 
The main points of Hume 1s doctrine of belief may be 
summarized. In the first place, belief is not a separate 
impression or idea, but is the name for the "manner" in which 
certain ideas are entertained by the mind. Secondly, since 
the sole difference between impression and ideas is in the 
degree of force and vivacity, an idea needs only to be suf-
ficiently lively to operate on the mind in the same fashion 
as an impression. Finally, it is the case that causal 
inference conditions belief as well as belief conditions 
causal inference. It is this last doctrine which is revolu-
tionary in Hume•s account. It is also that aspect of his 
doctrine of belief which makes it of prime consequence for 
imagism, and this in the following way. Hume holds that 
every idea resultant upon causal inference has a possibility 
of being believed, allowing that it can be raised to a 
sufficient degree of force and vivacity. The mind is led, 
however, from one idea to another by the principles of the 
forwardness of the imagination, i.e. by manipulation of 
mental images. Thus what we are led to believe as true 
about the external world is conditioned by the nature of mental 
imagery. 1 It is this very possibility of the "infective" 
power of belief that leads Hume to the scepticism that is 
probably the best known aspect of his teaching. As Kemp 
Smith puts it, it is only by a moderate scepticism that 
1 Kemp Smith, Philosophy of Hume, p. 378. 
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[the) self can be guarded agahst the malign influences 
which are ever present and ever ready, within the very 
citadel of the self, as in the society around it, to 
deceive and mislead us. 1 
The remainder of Hurne•s discussion of belief adds no new 
points of interest for a discussion of imagism; it consists 
in the introduction of evidence for those principlescof his 
doctrine of belief that have been considered above. 
In section fourteen Hurne returns to his original 
question: what is the impression from which the idea of nec-
essary is derived? Hurne's first paragraph presents one point 
of interest. Hurne writes: 
Having thus explain 1d the manner, in which we reason 
beyond our immediate impressions, and conclude that 
such particular causes must have such particular effects; 
we must now return upon our footsteps to examine that 
question, which first occur 1d to us, and which we dropt 
in our way, viz. What is our idea of necessity, when 
we say that two objects are necessarily connected 
together.? 2 
The point that should be noted here is that Hurne has actually 
asked two quite distinct kinds of questions in the course of 
his analysis, both of which are stated in this quotation. 
The question of the idea of necessary connection is a ques-
tion of meaning, and is related to Hurne's version of the 
thesis of empiricism of ideas, namely, that every idea is a 
copy of a previous impression. The question of causal infer-
ence, however, with its attendant doctrine of belief is a 
question of truth; if image A in the mind leads to image B, 
mary 
Kemp 
1Kemp Smith, Philos~ht of Hurne, p. 379. This sum-
of Hurne's doctrine ofl ef is heavily indebted to 
Smith's account. 
2Hurne, Treatise, p. 155. 
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by what right do we think this process is one leading from 
1 truth to truth. It is not the purpose of this investigation 
to decide upon the cogency of either one of these Humean con-
tentions. Furthermore, these two types of arguments tend to 
overlap. It is interesting to note, however, that Hume's 
imagism can be summarized as falling under two separate sets 
of considerations. In the first place, Hume's imagism is 
shown in those arguments in which Hume argues that what is 
imaginable is possible, and the several variants of this doc-
trine. These questions are part and parcel of Hume's version 
of the thesis of empiricism of ideas with its central conten-
tion that every idea-image is a copy of a prior impression. 
The question of causal inference, however, is connected more 
with Hume•s doctrine of the associative imagination. The 
associative imagination leads from idea to idea. What then 
are the circumstances under which the mind comes to believe 
one idea rather than another, i.e. the question of truth 
arises in the general form of a question as to the correspon-
dence of ideas with the state of affairs in the world. 
In thus returning to his original question concerning 
the idea of necessary connection, Hume repeats in summary 
1In this distinction between Hume's arguments con-
cerning meaning as contrasted with those concerning truth, 
the writer is indebted to Stace. Stace, however, should 
not be held responsible for the way in which his suggestion 
is here used. There is, no doubt, much with which he would 
disagree. 
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form what had been discovered before the question was "dropt," 
~· in any particular instance of a cause and effect rela-
tionlthere is contiguity, and temporal succession and con-
stant conjunction. In this state of affairs, however, the 
idea of necessary connection is not to be found. Hume, 
however, goes on to suggest that light may be case upon the 
problem by an attemt to enlarge his view and "comprehend 
several instances," i.e. by considering a number of instances 
of cause and effect. Such repetition does not at first blush 
seem to help, Hume, however, notes that 
The reflection on several instances only repeats the 
same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a 
new idea. But upon further enquiry I find, that the 
repetition is not in every particular the same, but 
produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, 
which I at present examine. For after a frequent 
repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one 
of the objects, the mind is determin 1d by custom to 
consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in 
a stronger light upon account of its relation to the 
first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or deter-
mination, which affords me the idea of necessity. 1 
Hume's answer is simple enough--at least after one has pro-
ceeded through what has been called "the most remarkable 
2 piece of sustained philosophical argument in any language." 
Cause and effect relations in themselves and taken singly 
display nothing but prior conjunctions. The repetition, 
however, of similar specific conjunctions leads to an impres-
sion of necessity, a "determination" of the mind. It is 
1Hume, Treatise, pp. 155-156. 
2Laird, Hume 1s Philosophy, p. 95. 
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from this impression of reflection that the idea of connec-
1 tion is derived, 
1 The very simplicity of Hume's "prodigious discovery" 
concerning causes, when finally the end of the trail is 
reached, leads him to repeat the jist of his argument several 
times. A couple of such summaries may be quoted, Hume writes: 
"Did we never see any but particular conjunction of ob-jects, entirely different from each other, we shou 1d never 
be able to form any ideas •••• suppose we observe several 
instances, in which the same objects are always conjoin 1d 
together, we immediately conceive ~.e. imagine]a connex-
ion betwixt them, and begin to draw an inference from 
one to another, This multiplicity of resembling instan-
ces, therefore, constitutes the very essence of power or 
connexion, and is the source, from which the idea of it 
arises." (Hume, Treatise, pp. 162-163.) 
And again: 
"After we have observ'd ••• resemblance in a sufficient 
number of instances, we immediately feel a determination 
of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant, 
and conceive it in a stronger light upon account of that 
relation. This determination is the only effect of the 
resemblance; and therefore must be the same with power of 
efficacy, whose idea is deriv'd from the resemblance." 
(Hume, Treatise, p, 165). 
And finally, Hume, recognizing the "inveterate prejudices" 
his doctrine must overcome, writes as follows: 
"I am sensible, that of all the paradoxes, which I have 
had ••• occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, 
the present one is the most violent •••• 'tis merely by 
dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will 
have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of 
mankind. Before we are reconcil'd to this doctrine, how 
often must we repeat to ourselves, that the simple view 
of any two objects or actions, however-related, can never 
give us any idea of power, or of a connection betwixt 
them: that this idea arises from the repetition of their 
union; that the repetition neither discovers nor causes 
anything-In the objects, has an influence only on the 
mind, by that customary transition it produces; that 
this customary transition is, therefore, the same with 
the power and necessity; which are consequently quanities 
of perceptions, not of objects, and are internally felt 
by the soul, and not perceiv 1d externally in bodies?" 
(Hume, Treatise, p. 166). 
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His own view as to the nature of the idea of neces-
sary connection having been presented, Hume next turns to 
the opposing claims of various opponents.1 In examining 
these opposing views, Hume is arguing against a doctrine, 
which appeared in several variants, that the mind had an 
idea of power. This Hume denies on his usual empiricist 
grounds that there is no impression from which such an idea 
could be derived.2 This argument, for the purposes at hand 
here, should not be viewed as adding anything in the way of 
new argument to Hume 1s contention concerning the idea of 
necessary connection. It is interesting, however, as an 
illustration of the unmistakeable way in which imagism enters 
into the formation of Hume 1s argument. The passage, in fact, 
might serve as a text for Hume 1s {and much of Berkeley's) 
version of imagism~ As the passage is somewhat long, the 
various sentences will be numbered for the purposesar the 
reference in the summary and comment which will follow. 
1 Particularly against Locke and the Cartesians. 
2Hume•s assertion that there is no impression of power 
or effort may be challenged. In the presence of awesome forces 
of nature or powerful machines there is an experience {which 
for Hume would be an impression} best described as a feeling 
of power. This feeling is not observed in the sense of being 
entirely sensory, but is in part sensation and in part 
thought-construction •• It may be called a gestalt-quality. 
Hume, no doubt, could not recognize such an experience because 
of his bias towards construing all experience;;in only sensory 
or imaginal terms. 
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(1) It has been establish 1d as a certain principle, that 
general or abstract ideas are no~hing but individual 
ones taken in a certain light, and that, in reflecting on 
any object, •tis as impossible to exclude from our thoughts 
all particular degrees of quantity and quality as from the 
real nature of things. (2) If we be possest, therefore, 
of any idea of power in general, we must be able to con-
ceive some particular species of it; and as power cannot 
subsist alone, but is always regarded as an atrribute of 
some being or existence, we must be able to place this 
power in some particular being, and conceive that being 
as endow 1d with a real force and energy, by which such a 
~articular effect necessarily results from its operation. 
l3) We must distinctly and particularly conceive the con-
nexion betwixt the cause and effect, and be able to pro-
nounce, from a simple point of view, that it must be 
follow 1d or preceded by the other. (4) This is the true 
manner ofoonceiving a particular power in a particular 
body: and a general idea being impossible without an 
individual; where the latter is impossible, •tis certain 
the former can never exist. (5) Now nothing is more evi-
dent, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of 
two objects, as to conceive any connexion betwixt them, or 
comprehend distinctlf that power or efficacy, by which 
they are united. (6) Such a connextion wou•d amount to a 
demonstration, and wou 1d imply the absolute impossibility 
for the one object not to follow, or to be conceiv 1d not 
to follow upon the other: Which kind of connextion has 
already been rejected in all cases. (7) If any one is of 
a contrary opinion, and think he has attain 1d a notion of 
power in any particular object, I desire he may point out 
to me that object. (8) But till I meet with such-a-one, 
which I dispair of, I cannot forbear concluding, that 
since we can never distinctly conceive how any particular 
power can possibly reside in any particular object, we 
deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such 
general idea. 1 
The synonymy of the terms •conceive• and •imagine• in this 
passage may first be established by paying attention to (5). 
In (5) the impossibility of forming a certain concrete idea-
image is insisted upon, ~· an idea-image of necessary 
connection. The notions of 1forming an idea• and •conceiving• 
lHume, Treatise, pp. 161-162. 
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are in this sentence obviously synonymous. Rereading the 
passage and substituting the word 'imagine' for the word 
'conceive' in each of its several occurrences bring out 
forcibly Hume's imagism. The argument may be summarized as 
a four-linked chain of reasoning. The first part of the 
argument, consisting of (1) and (2), asserts in (1) that 
abstract ideas are impossible. Thus, according to (2), if 
there is an idea of power, it must be an attribute of an 
existent causal relation. The second step, comprising (3) 
and (4), consists in the assertion that to fulfill the 
required conditions, specified in (3), such an idea of power 
must be a concrete idea-image chosen from a particular causal 
relation. Only by thus generalizing on a particular, accord-
ing to (4), could the requisite idea-image be formed. The 
third step, comprising (5) and (6), consists in asserting in 
(5) that the required conditions cannot be fulfilled, since, 
according to (6) the contradictory of any matter of fact is 
possible to imagine. Finally, in (7) and (8), the case is 
made to rest on the evidence of introspection. Hume throws 
down the challenge to anyone to form the required idea-image. 
As he has defined the conditions, this is no doubt impossible. 
Now if imagism be defined in its constructive version as the 
doctrine that images play an important and neglected role in 
thinking, there seems little doubt that Hume is an imagist on 
such a definition. In this passage and elsewhere, in sub-
stance, thought is asserted to proceed by images, and opposing 
claims are met by charging that opposing claims do not 
recognize the role images must play in valid thinking. 
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One final passage may be commented upon which shows 
the imagistic nature of Hume 1s study of the causal relation. 
Hume was, of course, well aware that his view reversed the 
usual order in asserting that causal connection was a mental 
operation. According to common sense, "thought may well 
depend on causes for its operation, but not causes on 
thought." 1 He realizes that his view will be taken as one 
which reverses "the order of nature, and makes that second-
ary, which is really primary."2 In sum, Hume considers 
that the following interpretation will be put on his view. 
If we remove the power from one cause, we must ascribe 
it to another: But to remove it from all causes, and 
bestow it on a being, that is no ways related to the 
cause or effect, but by perceiving them, is a gross 
absurdity, and contrary to the most certain principles 
of human reason. 3 
Hume, however, was not moved. There could be no other source 
for a "clear" idea of necessary connection than the mind it-
self. In other words, Hume is true to two principles: 
first, that all ideas are derived from experience--the 
cardinal tenet of classical British empiricism; and secondly, 
true to his imagist principle that only idea-images can be 
given clear conception. He writes: 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 167. 
2Ibid. 
3Ib1d.' p • 168. 
I can only reply to all these arguments [i.e. the 
arguments summarized above], that the case is here 
much the same, as if a blind man shou'd pretend to 
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find a great many absurdities in the supposition, that 
the colour of scarlet is not the same with the sound of 
a trumpet, nor light the same with solidity. If we have 
really no idea of a power or efficacy in any object, or 
of any real connexion betwixt causes and effects, •twill 
be to little purpose to prove, that an efficacy is 
necessary in all operations. We do not understand our 
meaning intalking so, but ignorantly confound ideas, 
which are entirely distinct from each other. I am, 
indeed, ready to allow, that there may be several quali-
ties both in material and immaterial objects, with which 
we are utterly unacquainted; and if we please to call 
these power or efficacy, •twill be or little consequence 
to the world. But when, inslilad of meaning these unknown 
qualities, we make the terms of power and efficacy 
signify something, of which we have a clear idea, and 
which is incompatible with those objects, to which we 
apply it, obscurity and error begin then to take place, 
and we are led astray by a false philosophy. This is 
the case, when we transfer the determination of thought 
to external objects, and suppose any real intelligible 
connexion betwixt them; that being a quality, which can 
only belong to the mind that considers them. 1 
Here again there is reference to the blind man, who, as a 
result of his psychological deficit, would be unable to 
imagine a color. This reference so common in classical Bri-
tish empiricism makes no sense unless meaning is thought of 
as carried only in imaginal terms. The substance of Hume's 
argument is carried in his assertion that "we do not under-
stand our meaning in talking so, but ignorantly confound 
ideas, which are entirely distinct from each other." What, 
then, is here declared to be meaningless? It is the possi-
bility of construing meaningfully the relation of cause and 
effect without construing it in imaginal terms. 
1Hume, Treatise, p. 168. 
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4. Summary of Hume's Imagism 
Hume's imagism is constituted by three doctrines: 
the phenomenalistic framework of his system according to 
which the presentations of the mind are limited to impres-
sions and ideas (idea-images); the doctrine of the associa-
tive imagination; and the doctrine of psychological atomism 
that what is distinguishable is separable and the other 
variants of this doctrine. There is no need to summarize the 
first doctrine at this point, since sufficient comment has 
been made on the doctrine in the course of the chapter. The 
second doctrine, however, may be restated in summary form at 
this point as follows. Hume, following the distinction made 
in the Enquiry, limits the operations of the mind to two 
classes: •relations of ideas' and 'matters of fact.• Know-
ledge of the first class yields certainty. Those activities 
of the mind which do not yield certainty, i.e. which are not 
logical operations of reasons but are concerned with matters 
of fact, are activities of the imagination. In this class of 
cases, in which things are believed which outrun the demonstra-
tive evidence, there are operative and determinate ways in 
which this associative imagination works, viz. resemblance, 
contiguity, and cause and effect. As a result of this for-
wardness of the imagination, the mind is led to entertain 
many ideas, some of which are believed and some of which are 
not. Those that are believed have a greater degree of force 
and vivacity than those which are not believed. 
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Although these three doctrines do not make a complete 
appearance in each of Hume's arguments, in one way or another 
they form an important part of his account of substance, of 
space and time, and of causality. These imagistic doctrines 
taken separately and collectively as they appear are examples 
of the constructive version of imagism, namely that images 
play a vital and frequently neglected role in thinking. 
The logic of Hume's argument is similar throughout. 
Its leading principle consists in finding an impression aris-
ing from one thing, and then applying this impression else-
where. The idea of necessary connection may be used as a 
paradigm for the manner in which this principle operates. The 
idea of necessary connection is obtained by repetition of 
instances which determine the mind by 'custom' to expect the 
usual accompaniment in the form of another idea. Having 
obtained the idea in this way, it can be applied elsewhere. 
In the course of this chapter various difficulties 
were noted in passing in connection with Hume 1s imagistic 
doctrines. Some of these difficulties, and some new ones, 
may be next summarized. There are, in the first place, two 
difficulties concerning Hume's copy theory of ideas, that 
every idea is a copy of a prior impression. These difficul-
ties thus, are connected with Hume 1s general phenomenalistic 
framework. The first difficulty is that, at least in one 
class of cases, the doctrine that every idea is a copy of a 
prior impression does not hold, e.g. in the famous case of 
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the missing shade of blue noted by Hume himself. As this 
difficulty can be extended to all graduationsof sensation 
there are a respectably large number of cases which Hume him-
self would grant as forming such exceptions. It does not do 
to more or less fob these cases off as "particular and singu-
lar." Because of the use to which Hume puts this doctrine 
in ruling out of court a number of alleged ideas as not 
ideas at all because they lack a prior impression, the prin-
ciple in all consistency should seem to have no exceptions. 
All of Hume's proscribed ideas might fall within the class 
of exceptions. Further, it is not at all clear that Hume's 
distinction between impressions and ideas in terms of the 
force and vivacity of the former will hold, since on occasion 
the two may be confused. That Hume himself notes both of 
these exceptions does not in the least tend to remove the 
stirl.g from them. 
Lastly in connection with Hume's phenomalistic frame-
work, it may be reiterated that he finds difficulty in stay-
ing within it. Hume's difficulties along this line first 
come out, as might be expected, in his account of abstract 
ideas. His denial of abstract ideas in the Lockean sense of 
them achieves its plausibility by denying the possibility 
of such ideas at the outset. This becomes clear as the 
three arguments on the negative side, i.e. against the 
received doctrine, are considered in turn. Each of his 
three arguments against the doctrine that "abstract ideas 
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represent no particular degrees of quantity or quality" begs 
the question. 
Furthermore, at least one tenet of Hume's psychologi-
cal atomism is not unexceptionable, ~· the doctrine that 
what is distinguishable is separable in thought and imagina-
tion. This doctrine of Hume•s, with its result of "loosen-
ing all our perceptions," serves to describe a relation which 
today would be called a relation of non-entailment. Hume is 
frequently interested in showing that the occurrence of one 
thing, A, does not entail the occurrence of another thing, B. 
Hume puts such matters within his psychological framework, 
however, and most usually asserts in effect that the idea of 
A is different from that of B, and thus is separable from it. 
Hume is asserting that any discrimination which can be made 
in a presentation is separable in thought and imagination. 
On Hume's definition of thought, however, this comes down to 
the assertion that anything discriminable may be separately 
imaged. This by no means, however, seems to be the case, 
since counter instances are possible such as the concave-con-
vex line which is discriminably concave and convex, i.e. is 
distinguishable in Hume 1s sense, but which is not separable 
in the sense that it can be separately imaged. 
Although there are possible difficulties with Hume's 
account of belief, such difficulties do not seem particularly 
connected with the imagism of this doctrine except in the 
case of the dubiety concerning the force and vivacity cri-
terion. This last matter, however, has been discussed 
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already in this summary in brief, and in full in the second 
section of this chapter. 
There is one further subject that deserves comment in 
this chapter, but because of the brevity with which it may be 
treated and the position of the relevant passages in the 
final part of the Treatise, it has been left for discussion 
in this summary. This subject is Hume's doctrine of the self 
so far as his views therein involve imagism. Consideration 
of this doctrine will also permit some comment upon visuali-
zation in Hume, a subject which has also been treated in 
connection with both Locke and Berkeley. 
Hume commences his famous analysis of the self by 
considering the traditional view that there exists a unitary 
soul~substance in which impressions and ideas were supposed 
to inhere in much the same fashion as material substance was 
supposed to bear to the qualities of bodies. This doctrine, 
in one of several forms, was held by Descartes. It will be 
remembered that B~rkeley excepted mental substance from his 
empirical analysis, and asserted that the mind has no idea of 
a substantive soul but only notion. For Hume, however, there 
is no idea of the self apart from particular perceptions or 
clusters of particular perceptions, i.e. the mind is a 
bundle of images. Hume•s most famous passage on the self, 
in which he criticizes the traditional view, runs as 
follows: 
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For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I 
call myself, I always stumble on some particular per-
ception or other, of heat and cold, light or shade, 
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch 
myself at any time without a perception, and never can 
observe any thing but the perception. When my percep-
tions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so 
long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said 
not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by 
death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, 
nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, 
I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive 
what is farther required to make me a perfect non-
entity. 1 
This passage, however, contains nothing novel. It is Hume 1s 
usual empiricism of ideas applied to the self. As Hume con-
tinues in the next paragraph he presents an interesting 
account of the human mind which is both imagistic and illus-
trative of the fact that Hume's imagery is predominantly of 
a visual sort. Hume writes: 
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several percep-
tions successively make their appearance; pass, re-
pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of 
postures and situations. There is properly no simpli-
city in it at one time, nor identity in different; 
whatever natural propension we have to imagine that 
simplicity and identity. The comparison of the tneatre: 
must not mislead us. They are the successive percep-
tions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the 
moat distant notion of the place, where these scenes 
are represented, or of the materials, of which it is 
compoa 1d. 2 
As Hume depicts the nature of the human mind in this passage 
he seizes upon a visual methaphor to carry his meaning. Con-
sciousness is here depicted as a perpetual flux of discrete 
l Hume, Treatise, p. 252. 
2 Ibid., p. 253. 
perceptions, i.e. impressions and idea-images. Since this 
passage is metaphorical, it perhaps ought not to be pressed 
too far; nonetheless the metaphor is a visual metaphor. 
Introspection is here compared to the spectators at a theater, 
who see only flitting images endlessly pass and repass before 
them. 
In sum: Hume displays uncommon ingenuity in attempt-
ing to save his basic imagistic assumption that thought is 
the manipulation of mental images. All his difficulties 
with this theory stem from a failure to preserve a distinc-
tion which on occasion he comes close to recognizing 
1 
explicitly, the distinction between imaginability and con-
ceivability. Rather than attempting to revise his psycholo-
gical assumptions in the light of the fact that not all the 
presentations of the mind are given in sensory and imaginal 
terms, Hume on most occasions resorts to makeshift to save 
his imagistic assumption. 
1 Perhaps the clearest passage in which Hume approaches 
recognition of the distinction is in his account of the third 
analogy. The passage is quoted and comment made upon it in the 
second section of this chapter. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY 
This investigation has yielded four main conclusions 
which may be stated as follows: 
(1) Locke, Berkeley and Hume held a doctrine, here called 
'imagism,' the central tenet of which is that thought 
proceeded by the manipulation of mental images. This 
theory is not always explicit in their thinking, but 
is sometimes implicit. There are differences of some 
interest among their various views on imagism, but 
such differences are best construed as variations on 
one central theme. 
(2) It has not been noted sufficiently that this imagis-
tic theory of thought played a.crucial role in the 
separate defenses of empiricism offered by the classi-
cal British empiricists. 
(3) At various points, however, each of the three thinkers 
has difficulties in attempting to sustain the theory. 
(4) From (1), (2), and (3), the probable inference can be 
drawn that the difficulties encountered by Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume are insuperable on their respective 
premises and do not arise from any lack of ingenuity 
on their parts in attempting to overcome the diffi-
culties. In general, the difficulties stem from a 
failure to preserve the distinction between imagina-
bility and conceivability. 
The first three conclusions embody the results of philosophic 
inquiry into matters of doctrine and interpretation. The 
fourth conclusion, if true, is of considerable philosophic 
interest, since it would seem to indicate that a dead-end 
street had been reached along one line taken by the classical 
British empiricists. Part of the value of this investigation 
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lies in showing in detail that imagism was basic and vital 
to their separate defenses of empiricism. It is on this 
latter doctrine more than any other that their permanent 
claim to philosophic fame rests; their defense is imagistic. 
These four conclusions will serve to organize the remainder 
of the discussion in this chapter, although such organiza-
tion will perhaps not be apparent at the outset. 
The data brought to bear on this investigation was in 
part psychological as contrasted with epistemological data, 
i.e., some of the data tends to show how the mind in fact 
works and is not an attempt at rational reconstruction. 
Oftentimes such factual data has little bearing on philoso-
phical problems since disagreement usually does not arise 
over the facts but how such facts are to be interpreted. In 
part, however, the thesis of the classical British empiricists 
was a factual thesis, !!!• that the mind does work completely, 
or almost so, by the manipulation of mental images. On this 
point of fact the classical British empiricists were wrong. 
The main result of the wHrzburg studies on imageless thought, 
so far as they are germane to the present inquiry, was that 
as far as the matter or content of thought is concerned, there 
are presentations which cannot be classified in sensory and 
imaginal terms. It is, of course, true that on occasion the 
classical British empiricists come close to recognizing ex-
plicitly the occurrence of such presentations, but their 
separate theories tend to explain such facts away rather 
than make a place for such facts within the framework of 
their presentational psychology. 
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On the epistemological side, this investigation is 
organized around the notion of imagism, a doctrine which is 
here considered as falling into two main varieties. The 
constructive version may be first considered. The essence 
of this constructive version, as it applies to the classical 
British empiricists, is that images play a vital and fre-
quently neglected role in thinking. Within this statement 
of imagism there are embodied two separate but closely affi-
liated assertions which deserve separate statements in order 
to make the reference to their separate accounts clearer. 
The required statement, after separating out these two 
theses, may be put as follows: 
(1) Images play a vital role in thinking. 
(2) Their predecessors, according to Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume, neglected this role of images. 
Before turning to specific statements of this constructive 
version of imagism in each of the three, the following 
general characterization will prove helpful. In Locke this 
theory is implicit or latent; in Berkeley the theory is 
full-blown but limited in its scope; and in Hume the 
theory is rendered fully consistent and becomes at the same 
time incredible. 
In asserting that in Locke the constructive version of 
imagism is implicit, the following is. intended. Locke does 
not attempt to account for all presentations of the mind in 
sensory and imaginal terms. His basic framework has sufficient 
latitude, as a result of the broad signification he gives to 
the term 'idea•, to make room for non-imaginal and non-sensory 
elements, i.e. conceptual meanings, to turn up as elements in 
his philosophical psychology. (It would, of course, be a 
great mistake to expect Locke to have described specifically 
such non-imaginal elements as conceptual meanings, or even to 
have described what are here called 'conceptual meanings' in 
his own idiom. Questions of this kind simply did not occur 
to the classical British empiricists. To formulate such ques-
tions, however, and then apply them to the classical British 
empiricists is a legitimate enterprise, as long as this techni-
que serves as a basis for understanding the tendency of their 
thought and does not serve as a technique of inquisition.) 
Although Locke's initial starting point is broad 
enough so that the phrase 'imagistic starting point' is inap-
plicable, in point of fact Locke does use a standard of 
sensuous imagination, i.e. of concrete imagery, to test 
whether certain ideas are admissible entities. Those ideas 
which pass muster are those ideas which can be imagined; 
those ideas which do not pass muster are those ideas which 
cannot be imaged. Consider Locke's account of substance as 
a test case for this alleged latent imagism. Locke puts the 
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traditional doctrine of substance to the empirical test. If 
there is substance, then the mind must have an idea of sub-
stance. This is the classic thesis of an empiricism of ideas; 
it is a test for the meaning of an idea as contrasted to a 
test for the truth of an idea. Such an idea as substance is 
not, however, capable of being imagined apart from sensory 
qualities. It is not capable of retrospection in imaginal 
terms. It is, thus, in Locke's usual non-revolutionary fash-
ion, construed as a "something I know not what." In other 
cases examined in this investigation--the ideas of space, 
time, and infinity--the same method is applied. Without 
difficulty the same result could be demonstrated for the 
remainder of the entities considered in Book II of Locke's 
Essay. This imagism is best called implicit or latent, 
because it is not wrought into the elements of his system, 
i.e. into Locke's "new way of ideas." 
With Berkeley, however, imagism in its constructive 
version is no longer implicit but explicit. This development 
of imagism from an implicit working assumption to an explicit 
working assumption comes about in the first instance as a 
result of Berkeley's more careful specification of the term 
'idea.• There are for Berkeley only two classes of ideas: 
ideas of sense and ideas of imagination. There are three 
differentia between the two classes of ideas: ideas of 
imagination indicate the primary activity of mind; ideas of 
imagination are active and ideas of sense are passive; and 
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ideas of imagination copy ideas of sense. So far as knowledge 
of the material world is concerned, that aspect of Berkeley's 
doctrine most clearly on the imagist path, this doctrine 
leads to a thoroughgoing sensationalism. For Berkeley "per-
ception is the criterion of reality." That which cannot be 
sensed, and thus copied by image, cannot be real. 
The constructive version of imagism can be illustra-
ted in Berkeley, as it was in Locke, by consideration of the 
argument advanced by Berkeley against material substance. 
Although imagistic arguments are not the only arguments used 
by Berkeley against the traditional doctrine of substance, 
they are considered by him crucial arguments and sufficient to 
prove his case. His inconceivability argument, for example, 
offers a demonstration in "a line or two" that the received 
doctrine is incomprehensible. The burden of his argument is 
that existence adds nothing to perception, i.e. mere existence 
as a characterizing predicate is not capable of being imaged. 
Since it is not capable of being imaged, it cannot be admitted 
as an intelligible entity as it was construed in traditional 
terms. On the view presented in this argument, and elsewhere 
in the Principles, thought proceeds by means of images. 
Thought that does not proceed in imaginal terms is ipso facto 
unintelligible. 
The limitation in scope in Berkeley's version of 
imagism suggested above may next be considered. Berkeley 
recognizes two classes of ideas: ideas of sense and ideas of 
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imagination. His imagistic arguments result from attempting 
to reconstruct the processes of thought from materials given 
by these two classes of ideas. Berkeley, however, recognizes 
a third class of objects which lead to knowledge, viz. 
notions. Notions for Berkeley give knowledge, however, only 
in a relative sense. Such knowledge as they give lacks the 
perceptual assurance of ideas of sense and the intellectual 
assurance of ideas of imagination. The doctrine of notions 
raises difficulty if Berkeley's empiricism is construed as an 
empiricism of ideas. (And any other characterization seems to 
miss the point.) For whatever else notions are, they are not 
ideas. This point is made explicitly by Berkeley in section 
142 of the Principles. In this passage Berkeley also makes it 
clear that notions involve relational knowledge. It was 
suggested in this investigation that Berkeley faced a major 
problem in attempting to give a satisfactory account of rela-
tions, apart from their relata. Perhaps the doctrine of 
notions was an attempt in this direction, and perhaps Berkeley 
did not succeed. 
What now of the relation of the doctrine of the notion 
to imagism? The doctrine of the notion in Berkeley, so far 
as this writer knows, has never been satisfactorily expli-
cated. The task would require a full-scale study of Berkeley 
inappropriate to a study primarily directed toward another 
topic. The following attitude, however, seems a tenable one 
for this investigation to adopt. Imagism as it is understood 
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in this investigation relates primarily to ideas and to 
empiricism. Notional knowledge is not imaginal knowledge. 
Given these two facts, there seems no reason to attempt to 
solve this puzzling problem in Berke:Jdan scholarship.here. 
The reason that Berkeley had to have a doctrine of 
notions is clear enough; what is in doubt is what he under-
stood by them. Berkeley maintained to the last ditch that 
spiritual substance and material substance were not on all 
fours. Were this not so, the same devastating critique he 
applied to the doctrine of material substance could be turned 
against his own doctrine. To say that we do not have ideas 
of spirit, but only notions, if his argument is valid, saves 
him from this difficulty. Care is thus required in specify-
ing the extent of Berkeley's imagism. His imagistic arguments 
are affiliated with empiricism and his doctrine of perception; 
they form no part of his doctrine of the spirit. 
The same considerations that lead to calling Berkeley 
an imagist areapplicable to Hume. Once again the doctrine of 
substance may be used as the paradigm to exemplify the 
constructive version of imagism inHume. For what, after all, 
is Hume•s central argument against the doctrine of substance 
as it was traditionally understood? His argument in essence 
is that if we have an idea of substance it must be based upon 
a previous impression. Examination, however, of the two 
sources of impression--impressions of sensation and reflec-
tion--reveal that there is no such antecedent impression. 
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There is, therefore, no idea of substance except as revealed 
in sensory and imaginal terms as "a collection of particular 
qualities." Those who consider that they have a clear idea 
of substance, i.e. an idea-image, are mistaken since no image 
can be formed of substance apart from particular qualities. 
Hume's constructive version of imagism can be said to 
be rendered consistent and complete, where Berkeley's argument 
is limited in scope. Hume commences with a phenomenalistic 
framework which admits of no elements other than sensory and 
imaginal elements. Hume, in other words, resolutely refused 
to take refuge in any such doctrine as the relative knowledge 
obtainable from the notion. His empiricism is thus thorough-
going. The further question of choosing between Berkeley's 
version of empiricism and Hume's may be flanked in this inves-
tigation, since decision on the issue would not appreciably 
advance discussion of imagism. It may, however, be suggested 
that Hume's attempt to account for all the processes of human 
thought in a thoroughgoing fashion as either impressions and 
ideas is incredible. The fact is that Hume is not able to 
carry out this announced program, as was shown in the chapter 
devoted to him. 
Summary statement of the possibility that Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume hold the polemical version of imagism may 
next be considered. In its polemical version imagism holds 
that images are the primary symbols in thinking and that all 
the other symbols used in thinking--concepts, words, signs, 
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gestures, diagrams--are derivable from and substitutes for 
images. As the doctrine is described by its principal exposi-
tor Price, and as it was viewed in this investigation, the 
doctrine is not necessarily to be found in pure or ideal form 
in any one thinker, but rather acts as an unconscious assump-
tion. The motivation for the implicit acceptance of this 
theory is to account for a seeming paradox in all thinking, 
viz. that thinking of the absent, or free thinking, should 
somehow approximate inspection of the present. The drive 
towards holding the polemical version of imagism is thus 
understandable enough, but there are obvious difficulties. 
Many of the symbols used in thinking are not simply cashable 
in terms of images as this theory would require. The theory 
in fact fails to trust memory sufficiently, since in memory 
there does occur the cum fundamento in ~ required of thought 
properly so-called. 
Consideration of the question as to whether any or all 
of the classical British empiricists hold the polemical version 
of imagism is best considered in conjunction with the ques-
tion of universals in classical British empiricism. The 
problem of universals--at least so far as the classical Bri-
tish empiricists are concerned--is to account for or describe 
the processes in the mind when a general term is used. If 
imagism is to be maintained in its polemical version, then 
one way in which the doctrine would manifest itself would be 
in the assertion that universals were images. If this were 
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not maintained, then the doctrine described could hardly be 
called imagism in its polemical version, since there would 
be recognized a presentation of a most important sort which 
was not an image or which could not be reduced to an image. 
This latter assertion is not consonant with the polemical 
version of imagism, as here defined. The position of classi-
cal British empiricism towards the relation of universals and 
images is easy enough to state in principle: none of the 
classical British empiricists held consistently to the pole-
mical version of imagism. The task of the next few paragraphs 
will be to spell this matter out systematically for each of 
the classical British empiricists in turn. 
Locke's official position vis a vis the problem of 
universals is conceptualism. On one occasion, noted by Price 
and commented on in this investigation, Locke does maintain 
that images function as "standards to rank real existences 
into sorts." Such a passage may well serve as a text for 
the polemical version of imagism, but the doctrine of this 
passage is an aberrant one in Locke. 
Berkeley, on the~her hand, takes an imagist position 
towards universals particularly in the "Introduction," but 
his imagism is not of the polemical version insofar as he 
recognizes that symbols other than images may discharge the 
function of universality in thought. His starting point is 
the doctrine that images are the primary symbols used to 
discharge the function of universality. He cannot, however, 
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sustain this position and is forced to go beyond the position 
to recognize the occurrence of a conceptual element in thought. 
This conceptual element may be described as the recognition of 
a meaning which is not carried in sensory and imaginal terms. 
Fuller details of his treatment may be suggested by recalling 
the main lines both of Berkeley's controversy with Locke and 
his own constructive view on generality. 
For the Locke that Berkeley attacked, an abstract idea, 
in essence, was formed by generalization on the particulars 
given in experience. This process of generalization resulted 
in the formation of an idea which contained all the similari-
ties andnone of the differences of the particulars which made 
up the class. (Locke's view is badly muddled, and if this 
view was not held by Locke such a view is certainly implied 
by much Locke said.} However abstract ideas are to be con-
strued, Berkeley showed that they could not be formed in the 
way just described above as Locke's way. His polemic against 
abstract ideas at its nub consists in showing the faeity of 
such an account to the facts of experience. Berkeley 
challenges anyone to form the idea Locke describes. That no 
one can form such an idea seems beyond a peradventure for 
Berkeley. 
Berkeley's attack on Locke, however, constitutes but 
one half of his story on abstract ideas. There remains the 
' constructive side of his account. According to this account, 
487 
"an idea, which considered in itself is particular, becomes 
general, by being made to represent or stand for all other 
particulars of the same sort." In explicating this represen-
tation view Berkeley considers a number of sign-vehicles 
which might discharge the function of universality in thought. 
Of the various sign-vehicles Berkeley considers--names, 
particulars, images, and meanings--it is finally meanings and 
not images that discharge the function of universality. In 
his most fully developed theory in the "Introduction" univer-
sality does not consist "in the absolute, positive conception 
of anything." By this Berkeley may be taken to mean that an 
idea-image does not ultimately discharge the function of uni-
versality. Universality rather consists in the relations a 
sign-vehicle bears to the class it represents. Such sign-
vehicles "being in their own nature particular, are rendered 
universal." Now of the possible sign-vehicles images are the 
most important. 
These considerations, it might be suggested, prove 
too much. Not only do they show that Berkeley does not hold 
the polemical version of imagism, they also show that he does 
not hold the constructive version either, since elements other 
than images are manipulated in the processes of thought. 
Such an assertion, however, would be a mistake. Berkeley's 
constructive imagism remains intact, since images and sensory 
materials are always present. On the view just considered, 
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however, such imaginal and sensory material is supplemental 
to the meaning. Berkeley, in other words, is driven beyond 
a purely imagistic view to the recognition of conceptual 
elements which are not imaginal. Such considerations as 
these led to the suggestion in the course of this investiga-
tion, and in the summary at the beginning of this chapter, 
that the imagistic position maintained by the classical Bri-
tish empiricists could not ultimately be maintained. 
The possibility that Hume holds the polemical version 
of imagism may be more briefly dealt with. Hume follows 
Berkeley in the doctrine of universals, but makes one signi-
ficant addition to Berkeley's theory. Hume recognizes that 
images need not be present in fact, but may be present only 
"in power," i.e. he recognizes the existence of image-disposi-
tions and is not forced to the awkward contention that all 
images, thousands and thousands of them, are present when the 
mind thinks. This addition, however, has no tendency to 
result in the polemical version of imagism. 
The nature of Hume 1 s view may be brought out by a 
simile. Images for Hume are like the primitive notation in a 
logistic system; general terms are like the definitional 
abbreviations of such a system. Just as theorems involving 
definitional abbreviations may always be translated back into 
primitive notation, so, on Hume'a view, could general terms 
be translated back into images. once the simile is stated, 
the falsity of Hume 'a account to tne facts of experience iB'-' 
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obvious. Actually it would appear that imaginal elements are 
usually present in early thinking about most things, but as 
such thinking becomes familiar and habituated imaginal ele-
ments tend to be pared away. Assume for the moment that 
imaginal elements are always present in every presentation. 
Such imaginal elements often have a supplementary function as 
Berkeley and Hume were driven to recognize, although not 
explicitly. Meanings in presentations are logically prior to 
images. 
In summary: Locke, Berkeley and Hume all held that 
thought is the manipulation of mental images. This is the 
essence of their imagism. In each case, however, there is 
reason for not describing their views as the polemical ver-
sion of imagism. The difficulty that all three have in sus-
taining this theory is similar. There are elements in thought 
which do not seem capable of being given as sensory or imagin-
al presentations. One way of putting this is to say that the 
classical British empiricists overlooked the reference (or 
referential function) of thought. The terminology used in 
this investigation states the matter as follows: there are 
meanings given in thought which are not capable of sensory 
or imaginal representation. When such meanings are described 
by the classical British empiricists there is always an 
uneasy tension in their descriptions. Since they were so 
fundamentally and basically imagists, they never gave up the 
premises which led to this unresolved tension but instead 
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adopted various strategies to explain away such meanings in 
purely imaginal terms. 
It was suggested in the summary of conclusions with 
which this chapter began that the relation of imagism to the 
empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume had not been suffi-
ciently noted. This point needs some expansion. In order 
to relate classical British empiricism to imagism the doctrine 
of empiricism was given a formulation called in this investi-
gation •empiricism of ideas.• Two things not intended by 
this formulation may first be specified. In the first place, 
the formulation was not intended to describe historically all 
or even a large part of what the term •empiricism' has meant. 
Secondly, the formulation was not intended to suggest that 
the formulation as such was used by the classical British 
empiricists. The intention was rather to describe accurately 
enough for the purpose at hand the significance of the method 
of argumentation and way of doing philosophy of the classical 
British empiricists. (As it happens, this way of doing 
philosophy is of considerable contemporary interest, and is 
without doubt a fertile conception of permanent historical 
importance. The relation of empiricism of ideas to contem-
porary discussions was not, however, developed in any detail 
in this investigation.) 
The essence of empiricism of ideas lies in the conten-
tion that for an idea to be meaningful it must be capable of 
clear conception. The peculiar shape and style of classical 
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British empiricism results from the significance these 
writers gave to the term 'clear conception.• To bring this 
style out most clearly their intention may be contrasted with 
the method of continental rationalism. For the continental 
rationalists the notion of clear conception was related to 
mathematics, i.e. an idea was clearly conceived when it was 
capable of mathematical treatment. For the classical British 
empiricists, on the other hand, clear conception meant obvious 
imagery. Here, then, is the point of connection between 
empiricism and imagism in the classical British empiricists. 
The relationship between these two doctrines may be 
clarified by drawing a distinction within the field of ideas 
that is usually drawn in discussions of truth, viz. the dis-
tinction between the tests for truth and theories as to the 
nature of truth. Empiricism of ideas is a test for the mean-
ing of an idea; it is a description of the conditions that 
must be present for cognitive, factual knowledge to occur via 
the medium of ideas. Only those ideas which are meaningful 
can lead to knowledge. Ideas, in this sense, function in 
classical British empiricism as logical concepts~ There is 
more, however, than this to be said about the idea. The 
nature of the idea as a psychological entity must be described. 
The nature of an idea, according to classical British empiri-
cism, is that it is an image. To avoid a seeming duplication 
of entities one may refer to 'idea-imagesj a practice followed 
in this investigation. What has not been sufficiently stressed 
1see Chapter two of this study. 
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in most accounts is that when 'clear conception' and similar 
terms are used by the classical British empiricists such 
terms are synonymous, in an important class of cases dealing 
with the defense of empiricism, with such terms as 'imagine• 
and its variants. For detailed documentation of this matter 
reference to the previous chapters is required. 
The only thoroughgoing treatment~ the central problem 
of this investigation in the literature, so far as the present 
writer knows, has been given by Blanshard in The Nature of 
Thought. His results may be compared with those of the pre-
sent investigation at this point. In general Blanshard comes 
to conclusions similar to those of the present investigation. 
His work, however, differs from the present one in its method 
of approach, since Blanshard 1s account is admittedly polemical. 
Blanshard is a rationalist who approaches various opposing 
views from a dialectical point of view, taking what he can 
from each view after subjecting it to a critique. 
Blanshard's polemic against imagism occurs at the out-
set of a discussion of free ideas, i.e. ideas used "whenever 
we think explicitly of what is not at the moment given us in 
1 
sense." The chapter from which this quotation is taken is 
entitled "The Idea as Image," a title that accurately des-
I 
cribes the central theory with which the chapter is concerned, 
viz. the theory "that makes of the idea an image."2 Blanshard 
1Blanshard, Nature of Thought, I, p. 257. 
2Ibid., I, pp. 258-259. 
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also deals with Titchener in this chapter, but his discussion 
of the latter is not relevant to the present discussion. The 
theory he examines in connection with the classical British 
empiricists is a restricted version of the theory that makes 
the idea an image. This restricted version will be called 
1 
the •copy theory of imagism.• This copy version of imagism, 
according to Blanshard, is the view taken by common sense and 
by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Concerning these writers 
Blanshard comments: 
No one of these writers held consistently to the copy 
theory which they all began with; their variations on 
it wou~d almost fill a volume. I disregard these since 
our main interest is not historical. 2 
Since Blanshard combines dialectical skill, vast historical 
learning, and complete familiarity with contemporary epistemo-
logy and scientific psychology, his remarks on imagism in 
classical British empiricism are of unique interest. 
Blanshard advances five arguments against the theory 
of the idea as image. It is not relevant, however, to con-
sider all of these arguments in this chapter; those that are 
germane to this investigation but which will not be dealt 
with below have been discussed elsewhere in substance in 
this investigation. It is necessary to consider only one of 
his arguments, viz. the argument against the copy theory of 
imagism--the theory that makes the idea of anything "an image 
that copies it .'.3 His argument against this theory may be 
1Blanshard does not use the term 'imagism', but there 
is no injustice done to his views by applying the term to the 
theory he criticizes. 
2Ibid., p. 260, footnote 2. 
3rbid., p. 259. 
stated in summary form as follows: 
No adequate image can be formed of: 
{ 1~ the object of a general idea 2 of what is individual but non-sensible 3 of many kinds of relations 
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These three ways in which the image is inadequate according 
to Blanshard will be treated seriatim. 
The point that no adequate image can be formed of the 
object of a general idea is, according to Blanshard, typically 
Berkeley's problem. Berkeley's answer as to how generality is 
achieved from particulars is summarized and criticized in the 
following passage. Blanshard writes: 
His solution was this: when we think of 1man 1 we do 
form an image, and this image is perfectly particular, 
but we take it as standing for any man and hence for 
all men. But this which seems at first so plausible 
was less a defence than a surrender. For he had to 
admit that besides the image, we are aware of what it 
stands for, and that without this grasp of its wide--
s"ead reference the idea would not be general at all. 
And this is really to admit that the image by itself is 
not an idea •••• Berkeley was in effect reducing the 
image to a convenience, which indeed helps in carrying 
the reference, but may be made as sketchy as one pleases 
so long as it performs this essential function of carry-
ing thought beyond it. 1 
Blanshard here states, in a fashion hard to improve upon, a 
central contention of this investigation, viz. that it is in 
dealing with the referential function of thought that imagism 
has one of its most serious difficulties. As it was put in 
this investigation, it was suggested that the classical Bri-
tish empiricists had difficulty in~ng within theframework 
1 Blanshard, Nature of Thought, I, pp. 264-265. 
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which they had set for themselves. There are, of course, 
possibilities for considerable difference of opinion on this 
wider reference of thought among any who find imagism impos-
sible to sustain. Blanshard's own thesis on the reference of 
thought is expressed in the following passage. He writes: 
Thought is related to reality as the partial to the 
perfect fulfilment of a purpose. The more adequate 
its grasp the more nearly does it approximate, the 
more fully does it realize in itself, the nature and 
relations of its objects •••• Thought thus appears to 
have two ends, one immanent and one transcendent. On 
the one hand it seeks fulfillment in a special kind of 
satisfaction, the satisfaction of systematic vision. 1 On the other hand, it seeks fulfilment in its object. 
The idea as an "image that copies the thing" cannot !:Ear the 
burden of thought placed upon it. It cannot give the wide-
spread reference necessary to be explained in thought. The 
image, which according to the copy theory of imagism would 
have been central, becomes peripheral, "a convenience" accord-
ing to this criticism. Blanshard's point against imagism, of 
course, may be accepted without either acceptance or rejection 
of the larger views expressed in the quotation immediately 
above. 
Blanshard examines the view that no adequate image 
can be formed of what is individual but non-sensible in 
connection with both Locke and Berkeley. The case is the 
doctrine of substance in Locke and Berkeley. Locke's sub-
stance, "that something he knew not what," is both individual 
1Blanshard, Nature of Thought, II, p. 262. 
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and yet non-sensible. Locke is thus in the embarrassing 
position of using a term but not knowing exactly what he is 
talking about. This dilemma arises, according to Blanshard, 
because Locke owned in effect "that it was only of sense-
qualities that we could form images. What sort of idea was 
it, then, that we had of this non-sensible something." 1 
Berkeley, although not believing in material substance, did 
cleave to substances of another kind (himself, God) and when 
dealing with these, his image theory broke down. 
The third criticism of the copy version of imagism, 
that no adequate image can be formed of relations, is, accord-
ing to Blanshard, typically Hume 1s problem. The substance of 
Blanshard's critique of Hume on this point is contained in 
the following passage: 
No less signal was the collapse of the image theory in 
its attempt to deal with relations. This attempt was 
most notable inHume, whose struggle to reconcile the 
view that perception is nothing but sensation, and 
thought nothing but imagery, with the fact that we 
somehow grasp the relations of identity and causality, 
is one of the decisive battles of philosophic history. 
It is evident that when we see something move, we take 
it to be the same body as it was the moment before. 
Apparently, then, we do grasp the relation of sameness 
or~entity. But is there a sensation or image of 
identity? Hume saw that there was not. BUt instead of 
revising his theory of knowledge to suit the fact, he 
denied the fact in order to save his theory of knowledge. 
He denied that there was any such thing as identity, and 
held that our supposed thought of it was an illusion •••• 
Unfortunately for Hume 1s theory, however, a thought that 
is an illusion is as much a thought as any other, and 
on his theory it should be impossible even to make such 
1 Blanshard, Nature of Thought, I, p. 265. 
a mistake. If our ideas are images, and identity 
cannot be imaged, it is inexplicably perverse of 
us to have stumbled on such an idea, even in error 
••• 1 
Blanshard's point is admirably clear and further comment 
seems superfluous. 
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Within the compass of space he has allowed himself 
to deal with the problem, Blanshard 1s account is masterly. 
One point may be made concerning the general line adopted by 
Blanshard. Blanshard offers a streamlined version of classi-
cal British empiricism, as indeed he must considering the 
wide-ranging views he takes account of. The account he 
offers of the classical British empiricists as a result is 
not inaccurate but at points sketchy. There are considerable 
differences in classical British empiricists in the doctrine 
here called 'imagism,' and such differences are worth speci-
fying in detail. Furthermore, Blanshard deals only with what 
may be called the official view of each or the philosophers 
in question, whereas in fact some of the most interesting 
consequences of their views are seen in their various attempts 
to modify and reformulate their official views to meet objec-
tions which they themselves recognize. In particular 
Blanshard's study fails to take account of the considerable 
differences in the usage of the key term 'idea' in Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume; it is this term more than any other 
which sets the style of the versions of imagism of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume. Also, in a full-dress account of the 
1Blanshard, Nature of Thought, I, pp. 266-267. 
problem such as this investigation attempts, it was desir-
able to show the relation of imagism to empiricism, and to 
such matters as an attitude toward the science of the day 
consequent upon imagism. In sum, to appreciate the full 
import of the struggle waged by the classical British 
empiricists in their defense of imagism, one must turn to 
the various twists and turns of their arguments to meet the 
difficulties. 
In conclusion the following analysis of the problem 
of imagism seems justifiable. The root of the difficulty 
faced by the classical British empiricists is everywhere the 
same. Each failed in his own way to distinguish clearly 
enough bltween the imaginable and the conceivable. It would 
seem evident that the proposition 1what is imaginable is con-
ceivable,1holds. (At least no difficulties were uncovered 
in this investigation on this point.) The converse of this 
proposition that 'what is conceivable is imaginable,• how-
ever, does not hold. Although a simple enough point, it is 
not without considerable importance. In the case of the 
classical British empiricists there is the instructive spect-
acle of three keen and ingenious minds, masters of dialectical 
skill, who carried a theory to bankruptcy in an effort to sus-
tain it. The moral is clear enough: there is some progress 
in philosophy, since one informed in the history of this 
problem and others like it may be able to avoid at least some 
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IMAGISM IN LOCKE, BERKELEY, AND HUME 
.by 
John Whitney Davis 
Abstract 
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Locke, Berkeley, and Hwae--referred to as 1the classi-
cal British empiricists~-are examined for the extent to which 
a doctrine, called 1imagism 1 by Price, played a formative 
role in their philosophies. Imagism as defined bas two main 
varieties, the polemical version and the constructive version. 
According to the former, images-are the primary symbols in 
thinking and all other symbols are secondary and derivative. 
According to the latter, thought is the manipulation of mental 
images. It is this latter doctrine which is demonstrated as 
applicable to the classical British empiricists; so far as 
the former doctrine appears at all, it is an aberrant doctrine. 
Some psychological researches into imagery conducted 
since the time of the classical British empiricistswere ger-
mane to this inquiry. The imageless-thought controversy, 
Titchener 1s attempted defense of the context theory of mean-
ing (because of its similarity to Berkeley's view), and 
several experiments designed to test the possibility of the 
formation of generalized images are discussed. In general 
the upshot of such stUdies, so far as they are relevant to 
this inquiry, is that the classical British empiricists were 
factually wrong in certain contentions concerning the role 
of images in mental life. 
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The classical British empiricists• version of imag-
ism is shown to be central to each one 1s defense of empiri-
cism. Demonstration of this point required specification 
of the kind of empiricism held by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
Empiricism had to be distinguished from both compositional-
ism and sensationalism. Imagism is displayed in connection 
with the doctrine of abstract ideas; the main lines of the 
controversy in classical British empiricism over abstract 
ideas are traced. 
In order to evaluate the modern usage of the term 
1 imagism 1 as contrasted with the traditional terms that were 
employed, a comparatively non-polemical semantic formulation 
of nominalism, conceptualism, and realism is given. Accord-
ing to this semantic formulation, the problem of universals 
is a question of the entities which will be allowed to stand 
as values for variables. In a nominalistic language only 
concrete entities can stand as values for variables; in a 
platonistic language both abstract entities and concrete 
entities can stand as values for variables. Conceptualism, 
however, has several sub-varieties, some of which are com-
mitted to platonistic languages and some of which are com-
mitted to nominalistic languages. Examination of the three 
thinkers reveals that no one of them can be said to hold an 
authentic nominalism by the standard of ontological 
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commitment. (Historically it is Hobbes who best exemplifies 
the nominalist position.) Imagism is a useful term in des-
cribing the position of Berkeley and Hume, but by the 
standard of ontological commitment here discussed, conceptual-
ism (in any version applicable to the classical British 
empiricists) is also accurate, since there is no necessary 
conflict between the doctrines. 
The differences in the imagism of the three are quite 
marked. In Locke the doctrine is implicit. In Berkeley, it 
is fully developed, but is only partial because of the non-
imagist doctrine of the notion. In Hume the doctrine is 
rendered fully consistent and its difficulties are correspond-
ingly more obvious. Each of the three thinkers has difficulty 
in sustaining his imagism. It is suggested that their diffi-
culties do not spring from a lack of ingenuity, but are a 
result of inherent difficulties in the doctrine. 
Imagism, as all of them hold the doctrine, requires 
that the contents of consciousness be described entirely in 
sensory and imaginal terms. The task of maintaining this 
position seems insuperable. At root, the difficulty stems 
from a failure to hold to the distinction between imagina-
bility and conceivability. All that can be imagined can be 
conceived; but not all that can be conceived can be imagined. 
Berkeley and Hume, in particular, try unsuccessfully to 
subsume conceivability under imaginability. 
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